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This dissertation examines and evaluates Louisiana's 
debt structure and debt management. The experiences of the 
American states in debt management contribute to the develop­
ment of "principles of debt management" which are the basis 
for this study. Other debt management principles are derived 
from the various factors considered by investment bankers 
and investor services in their analyses of bond issues.
Since these groups prevail in the market, and since debt 
management must often be passive and adaptive, the various 
financial criteria must be recognized and exploited if state 
debt management is to be successful. Distinctions between 
proper and improper purposes of borrowing and safe and unsafe 
borrowing are examined. Other principles deal with bond 
provisions and the management of existing debt.
With the various principles established as standards, 
Louisiana's modern debt experiences are examined in detail. 
Individual issues are analyzed in terms of their purposes, 
their provisions and features, and their effects upon the 
debt structure. General tendencies observable only when 
issues are considered in the aggregate involve the timing of
x
issues, the use of the call feature, the ratings received, 
and the administrative machinery. A major effort is made to 
emphasize both the desirable and the undesirable practices.
The findings in this study fall into two major cate­
gories: those applying generally to all states, and those
findings particularly pertinent to Louisiana. Among the 
findings that may be appropriate generally on the state 
level are the following: (1) The techniques utilized by
investment bankers and rating services in rating municipal 
bonds are not entirely pertinent to state bond issues, but 
they cannot be ignored and must be observed in debt 
management. (2) The traditional market concepts of safety 
and propriety in borrowing do not take into account the fact 
that considerations of what is proper and safe borrowing 
will depend greatly upon expectations of secular and cyclical 
economic conditions and upon what role the state government 
has been assigned under various conditions. (3) The planning 
and execution of debt policy should be keyed to the objec­
tives of simplicity and stability. (î) The timing of bond 
sales and the reporting of debt are more important than is 
generally recognized. The value of debt reporting has been 
dramatically demonstrated in Louisiana, The use of a 
seasonal index to aid in timing bond sales is not a tested 
technique, but it would appear to warrant further study.
xi
Louisiana has frequently violated the principles of 
good debt management; debt management has been character­
istically uncertain and unstable. The State presently has 
no administrative machinery for coordinating, planning, 
authorizing, issuing, reporting, and retiring debts which 
directly or indirectly involve the State. A recent improve­
ment in the management of highway finance has yet to spread 
to other areas of the debt structure.
Proposals for the Improvement of Louisiana’s debt 
structure and management are necessarily general because of 
the underlying philosophy that management requires flexi­
bility. Nonetheless, it is clear that Louisiana’s constitu­
tional debt provisions need rationalization. Extensive 
planning would be necessary in the formulation of a desirable 
legal framework; even if a large-scale constitutional revi­
sion is Impossible, planning would help to minimize the 
present legal impediments. The responsibility for debt 




It Is earnestly desired that this study make some 
useful contribution to a better debt structure and to more 
efficient debt management in Louisiana. The body of this 
study, therefore, consists of a critical analysis of 
Louisiana1s debt structure and management. This critical 
analysis must not be construed to reflect adversely upon any 
State officials or groups of officials who have been respon­
sible for debt management in the past. There Is no question 
but that in recent years officials with this responsibility 
have acted in good faith and with some measure of success.
However, Louisiana debt management, like debt manage­
ment in most states, has not always been as efficient as was 
possible. One reason there has been inefficiency in debt 
management in the American states is that the problems of 
debt management are largely nonrecurrent except over long 
periods of time. Furthermore, there has been little formal 
study of the peculiar problems that confront states in the 
management of their debts. Principles that might promote 
better debt management on the state level have not been 
fully developed. It is little wonder then that the actual
1
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operation of state borrowing has been subject to "false 
starts." It is hoped that this thesis will help bridge this 
gap. The appraisal of debt management experience in 
Louisiana presented in this study should permit future state 
officials to profit from the successes and the mistakes of 
past officials.
I. APPROACH AND METHOD
The analysis of Louisiana* s debt structure and debt 
management practices contained in this study is based 
largely on what might be considered a "traditional” view of 
public finance. This approach implies that the financing of 
government expenditures normally should be by means of taxa­
tion and that only special circumstances justify the 
financing of government spending by means of borrowing.
The method of this study is to develop certain 
principles of good debt management from historical data and 
from the dictates of logic. The basic criterion for the 
formulation of these principles is whether the given prin­
ciple will contribute to the welfare of the state and its 
people. One of the most important and tangible tests of 
this benefit is the money that can be saved by using certain 
techniques in debt management. After the principles are 
formulated, they become the basis for the appraisal of debt 
management which follows in later chapters.
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II. ORGANIZATION OP MATERIAL
This Chapter reviews some of the major developments 
in the debts of the American states. Proposed principles of 
debt management are presented in Chapter II. Only the more 
important general developments are analyzed in the period of 
Louisiana's debt history before 1921, in Chapter III.
Chapters IV and V cover the period 1921-19^9 and deal with 
the debt structure and the management of individual issues 
in some detail. In the final Chapter, the problems of
Louisiana’s current debt structure are examined, and general
proposals to aid in their solution are offered.
III. BACKGROUND OP AMERICAN STATE DEBTS
A resum£ of the development of American state debts 
is useful to this study for two reasons: (1) the experiences
of the states contribute to the development of principles of 
debt management, and (2) the debt experience in Louisiana 
must be viewed in the context of common experiences.
Basic Porces Behind State Borrowing
State borrowing in the United States apparently has 
followed at least two main tendencies: there seems to have
been a direct relationship between the level of business 
activity and the amount of state borrowing; and, there 
apparently has also been a direct relationship between
k
transportation improvement (water, railroad, highway) and 
debt growth.1' These forces probably were interrelated.
States borrowed in prosperous times, and one of the main 
reasons why they did so was to finance transportation 
improvements. The spending and the borrowing may well have 
had an influence on the degree of prosperity. The two 
elements, transportation improvements and the business cycle, 
were involved in the development of American state debts in 
the following stages: (1) 1820-1860, transportation and
bank borrowing; (2) 1860-1900, Civil War and Reconstruction 
borrowing; (3) 1900-1959* highway, bonus, relief, welfare, 
and education borrowing.
Transportation and Bank Borrowing. 1820-1860
The first cycle in American state debts lasted from 
21820 to 181;5. Debt expansion continued from 1820 until the 
Panic of l837> and the contraction which began at that time 
lasted until l81|-5. During this period, the Northern states 
borrowed primarily in order to finance internal improvements
^B. U. Ratchford, American State Debts (Durham,
North Carolina: Duke University Press, T^lJ, pp. 5* 73-122.
2The states wefre relieved of $ 22, i|.92,915.5^ of debt 
when the Federal government assumed their Revolutionary War 
obligations, John Watts Kearny, Sketch of American Finances. 
1789-1835 (New York: G-. P. Putnam*s Sons, The Knickerbocker
Press, 1887)> PP. 20-27.
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such as canals, turnpikes, and railroads. The only major 
purposes of borrowing, other than for financing transporta­
tion facilities, were to provide banking capital and to 
finance state enterprises. In some states, it was actually 
hoped that these investments would provide enough profit to 
eliminate the need for taxation. Most of the bank borrowing 
took place in the Southern states while the enterprise debt 
was largely in the Western states. The purposes of the 
borrowing during this period differ somewhat from the under­
lying causes of the borrowing. For example, the transporta­
tion needs were too great to be satisfied from private
sources, but the Federal government did not finance these
3needs. The result was the first large-scale state borrow­
ing which Henry G. Adams viewed as a part of the weakening 
of centralized power. Another underlying cause of the heavy 
debt expansion during the period before 1837 was simply the 
speculative spirit of the times. As a result of this mood,
some of the state borrowing from 1820 to l8lj.5 probably was
I4.unnecessary and wasteful.
• T̂here was also local borrowing for these same 
purposes.
William J. Shultz and M, R. Caine, Financial Devel­
opment of the United States (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1937), pp. 220-21; Paul Studenski and Herman E. Krooss, 
Financial History of the United States (first edition;
New Yorks McGraw Hill Company, 1952), pp. 128-36; Frederick A.
6
In 1837, the great "business boom came to an end, but 
It did not Immediately curtail borrowing in all of the states. 
Some states attempting to complete developmental projects 
continued to borrow along with those states that were not 
convinced that the economic situation was serious. According 
to Ratchford, still other states continued their borrowing 
and public works in order to relieve unemployment. The 
burden of the debts proved to be too much, however, after 
another round of banking failures in 1 8 3 9 . Some of the 
states could no longer borrow, and their revenues fell with 
the general decline in business activity. The problem was 
intensified where the banks that failed had been established 
with funds raised by state borrowing. When banks could not 
repay the states, the states missed this source of funds in
Cleveland and Fred Wilbur Powell, Railroad Finance (New York:
D. Appleton and Company, 1912), pp. 31-32; Ratchford,
American State Debts. pp. 77-81, 8 7-8 8 ; Horace Secrist, An 
Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Restrictions Upon 
Public Indebtedness in the United States, bulletin of the 
University of Wisconsin, No." "637» Economics and Political 
Science Series, Vol. VIII, No. i (April, I9II4.), pp. 13-20; 
Davis Rich Dewey, Financial History of the United States 
(twelfth edition; New York: Longmans, Green and Company,
1 9 3 6), pp. 2l|3-)|6; Henry C. Adams, Public Debts, An Essay in 
the Science of Finance (New York: D. Appleton and Company,
1 8 8 7), pp. 3 1 7 " ?  and United States Bureau of the Census, 
Tenth Census of the United States: 1880. Report on Valuation,
Taxation, and Public Indebtedness In the United States (here- 
inafter referred to as Tenth CensusT, Vol. VII (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 188̂ .), pp. 5>23-2 7 .
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paying interest on bonds that had been issued to support
5these same banks.
States in financial difficulty around 1839 and l81|0 
were unable to get much relief by means of increased taxation. 
By 181̂ .2, nine states had defaulted and several others were 
nearly as hard pressed.^ Mississippi and Florida had repu­
diated part of their debts on technical points of the law.
Some states averted default by managing to increase their
tax revenues, while others adjusted their debts by selling
7bank stocks and publicly owned railroads and canals. One
of the more lasting reactions to this collapse of state
credit was the establishment of constitutional debt limita­
ry 8tions in nineteen states within fifteen years after I84.O,
^Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 8 6-8 7# 96-100. 
See also Reginald C. McGrane, Foreign Bondholders and 
American State Debts (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1935)# P. 265# Shultz and Caine, o£. cit.. p. 235; Studenski 
and Krooss, op. cit.# pp. 131-32; Tenth Census, VII, 
pp. 5 2 3-2ij.; and Secrist, op. cit., pp. 21-31.
^McGrane gives a detailed description of the diffi­
culties encountered by each of the defaulting and repudiating 
states in this period, McGrane, op. cit.. pp. 62-261?..
7
There was also an attempt in I8J4.2 on the part of 
some states to have state debts assumed by the Federal 
government. Albert S. Bolles, The Financial History of the 
United States from 1789 to i860 (New York: D. Appleton and
Company, 1803)# pp. 5B0-8 2 .
Q
This movement was interpreted as a public reaction 
against state participation in business. It has been 
suggested that the collapse of the states* ventures In pro­
viding internal improvements led to the rise of corporation 
power in the United States. Adams, on. cit., pp. 3if.l-l|.2.
8
The states thus were occupied with debt adjustment until
9about 181±$ when business activity revived.
Business revival marked the beginning of another debt
cycle which lasted from 181̂ 5 to i860. Borrowing again moved
with business activity, but it was somewhat more restrained
than in the first debt cycle. The states that had defaulted
earlier generally did not borrow--their credit standings
were so impaired that their obligations were unpopular in
the European money markets. Also, the previous experiences
of these states made them more conservative in their
policies, and they abandoned the notion that state operation
of enterprises was a sound way to finance government.
Western and Southern states did much of the borrowing in
10
this period in order to finance railroad construction.
Debt contraction ending the pre-Civil War period was 
temporary and mild. It came primarily in cases where the 
railroads were unable, because of the crisis of 1857* to pay 
interest on bonds they had sold to the states. The states,
^Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 98-99* 105-35? 
Tenth Census, VII, pp. 523-5̂ 4-? McGrane, o£. cit., p. 265* 
William L. Raymond, State and Municipal Bonds (second 
edition; Boston: Financial Publishing Company, 1932), p. 56;
and Shultz and Caine, o£. cit., pp. 220-21.
■^Raymond, op. cit., pp. 59-60; Ratchford, American 
State Debts, pp. 122-23; McGrane, op. cit., pp. 268, 289; 
and Shultz and Caine, o£. cit. , pp. 220-21, 263-62j..
in turn, found it difficult to pay the interest on their own
"bonds. The slight reduction in debts that occurred in 18^7
11was soon completely overshadowed by the war.
Civil War and Reconstruction Borrowing. 1860-1900
Civil War debt experiences were somewhat different in 
the two groups of states. States on both sides borrowed 
during the war and then reduced their debts as soon as 
possible afterward, but the methods of accomplishing the 
borrowing and the debt reduction differed considerably. The 
Northern states borrowed between $100,000,000 and $110,000,000 
to support the war effort, but they were fortunate in 
receiving prompt reimbursement from the Federal government 
and as early as 1880 had reduced their debts to about 
$32,000,000. In the South, the lack of experience and 
taxing power on the part of the Confederacy made the problem 
somewhat similar to that which had confronted the Continental 
Congress. The Southern states made up this deficiency by 
borrowing. This borrowing, which was sometimes supplemented 
by Issues of paper money that occasionally bore interest, 
consisted of both voluntary and involuntary bank (short-term) 
loans and bond issues (long-term). The total debts of the 
Southern states were estimated to have increased by between
Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 122-34? 
Shultz and Caine, o£. cit., p. 2 6 3.
10
$81,000,000 and $96,000,000. Default on obligations of the
12Confederate states became common before the war ended.
A financial question that presented itself even
before the conclusion of hostilities was what to do with the
war debts of the Southern states. Loyal constitutional con-
13ventions protected by Union forces in four states, in l86ij. 
and 1865* invalidated all laws that had contributed to the 
war effort of the Confederacy. This action was construed by 
some as a repudiation of war debts. The majority of the 
Southern Reconstruction conventions later specifically 
repudiated their war debts upon the advice of President 
Johnson. This action, incidentally, is sometimes considered 
to have set a precedent for and contributed to later repudi­
ations by Southern states. The Civil War debt cycle had run
Ikits course of expansion and contraction.
Civil War debts had not been completely settled when 
a new cycle of debt expansion was launched in the South.
The Presidential Reconstruction (1865-1868) brought inevitable
12Tenth Census, VII, p. 55^J Ratmond, o]d. clt., 
pp. 60-61; Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 135-61; and 
Shultz and Caine, o£. cit., pp. 2&2, 310.
13Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia.
^Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 159-60; and 
William A. Scott, The Repudiation of State Debts (ed. Richard T. 
Ely, Library of Economics and Politics, No. 2; Boston:
Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1893)> p. 233.
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increases in state borrowing. In addition to the need for 
revenues to help finance the replacement and completion of 
Internal improvements, there was also a pressing need for 
funds to settle unpaid interest and matured principal on 
debts. Moreover, the assets of the South had been greatly 
reduced during the war, and there was a sharp decline in tax 
revenues when the need for such revenues was quite great.
The result was a wave of funding and refunding as well as 
the sale of some new issues for the financing of needed 
improvements. The debts of the Southern states increased by 
between 133,000,000 and $35*000,000 during the Presidential
15Reconstruction period.
Records of state debts during Congressional Recon­
struction, which were kept by the usually untrained and 
often dishonest persons who held office at that time, are 
sketchy and confused. In Alabama, no records were kept of 
the amount of bonds actually issued, and an estimate of its 
debt could be made only after asking all bondholders to 
state their claims. The total of all state debts in the 
South had been about $110,000,000 in 1865 after the repudi­
ation of Oivil War debts. At the end of the Presidential 
Reconstruction, 1868, it was approximately $llj.5> 000,000.
■^Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 162-67•
The Congressional Reconstruction, which continued until 
1877* increased the Southern debts by approximately 
$100,000,000 to over $21^5*000,000. Borrowing during both 
phases of the Reconstruction thus totaled approximately 
$135*000,000.16
The relationship between transportation and state- 
debt was not entirely missing even during the Congressional 
Reconstruction. The stated purpose of many bond issues in 
the South was for the development of railroads. In practi­
cally every Southern state, however, statements as to the 
reasons for borrowing were more nominal than real. The 
underlying purpose of state borrowing In the South during 
the period of Congressional Reconstruction was to enrich the
"rings" of state officials, the members of which succeeded
17in getting most of the borrowed funds.
The Reconstruction debt cycle had its contraction 
phase as soon as the native whites regained control. Most 
of the Southern states repudiated the Reconstruction debts 
and prohibited the issue of previously authorized bonds at 
the first opportunity. The method and extent of debt adjust­
ment differed from state to state— some issues were completely
*^Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 170* 181-83.
Shultz and Caine, op. cit.» pp. 3^3-Wr estimated the total 
as $150,000,000.
■^McGrane, op. cit.. pp. 282-83* Ratchford, American 
State Debts. p. 17^; and Shultz and Caine,, op. cit., pp. 3h3-hh»
repudiated while others were "scaled11 down to some fraction 
of their face value. Estimates are very crude, but the 
amount of debt reduction appears to have been greater than 
the amount that had been added during the Congressional 
Reconstruction. Pre-Reconstruction debt was scaled down 
along with questionable debts in several states. In some 
instances, therefore, repudiations may have been opportun­
istic; in most states, there were good reasons for the 
repudiation of individual bond Issues. Another predictable 
occurrence resulting from the Reconstruction was the revival
of the debt limitation movement. Several of the Southern
18states revised their limitations.
Outside the South in the period from i860 to 1900, 
tax revenues were generally used to reduce debts. State 
debt was again moving in the same direction as the general 
level of business activity. The national economy was in a 
somewhat depressed condition during the last quarter of the 
century. The total debt of all the states declined from 
over $2 9 7,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 in 1880 to about $2 2 9,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 in 1 8 9 0. 
Reduction of this total was accomplished by the application
1 ARatchford, American State Debts, pp. 162-96; 
McGrane, op. cit., pp. 2 8 2-3 8I; and Shultz and Caine, op. 
cit., pp.“501-5. For a detailed discussion bf repudiation 
after the Civil War in twelve states, see Scott, op. cit.. 
pp. 33-196.
li(.
of surplus current revenues to debt retirement and by the
19scaling of debts.
Highway, Bonus, Relief, Welfare, and 
Education Borrowing, 1900-1959
After 1 9 0 0, economic conditions began improving while
state borrowing increased apace. Total state debt outstanding
rose to $23^,908,873 in 1 9 0 2, $[{.22,796,325 in 1913, and
$£8 0,Ij.0 8,0 8l in 1915* The automobile, which was the next
important transportation development after the invention of
the locomotive, represented another attempt to meet the
challenge of space in the United States. The automobile
brought problems of its own— highways were now needed. There
was still an inability on the part of the private sector of
the economy to provide all of the capital necessary for
financing a highway network, and the Federal government was
not yet inclined to assume the responsibility. States (and
local governments) again undertook the financing of the new
20transportation medium.
■^United States Bureau of the Census, Eleventh Census 
of the United States; 1890. Report on Wealth, Debt, and
Taxation (hereinafter referred to as Eleventh Census), Part 
1, Public Debt (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1 8 9 2),^pp. 73, 77? Ratchford, American State Debts, pp.
253-59? and Shultz and Caine, o£. cit., pp. , [|.05.
20Edna Trull, Borrowing for Highways (New York: Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc., Municipal Service Department, 1937), 
pp. 3-13? Tax Foundation, Inc., Postwar Trend in State Debt:
A State-by-State Analysis, Project Note No. 27~TUew York:
15
The expansion in state borrowing in the twentieth 
century came to an end with World War I. Capital outlays 
declined and brought borrowing down with them. However, the 
first World War slowed debt growth only temporarily. There 
was soon a revival of borrowing for highway construction and 
for financing bonuses for war veterans. Borrowing continued 
at a relatively high rate for the whole of the twenties. 
Veterans1 bonuses were an important reason for bond authori­
zations until the mid-twenties when these payments declined
substantially. Highway construction continued to add to
21
state debts for the whole period of the 1920*s. Transporta­
tion needs thus were still shaping the pattern of state debts 
after over 125 years of development.
Tax Foundation, Inc., 1950)» P* 1| Studenski and Krooss, 
op. cit. , pp. 377”76; United States Bureau of the Census, 
Special Reports, Department of Commerce and Labor, Wealth.
Debt, and Taxation (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1907), pp. 131-32; United States Bureau of the Census, 
Department of Commerce, Wealth. Debt, and Taxation, 1913,
Vol. I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 19l5j, p. 37?
and United States Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, 
Financial Statistics of States, 1915 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 191677 PP- 118-19.
21Raymond, o£. cit.. pp. 21-78, 66-67; Ratchford, 
American State Debts, pp. 280-81; Shultz and Caine, ego. cit., 
p. 62I4.; Tax Foundation, Inc., Project Ho. 27, op.. cit., p. 2; 
Studenski and Krooss, o£. cit., pp. 377"76; Bureau of Public 
Administration, National Defense attd State Finance (University, 
Alabama: Bureau of Public Administration, University of
Alabama, 1971)> pp. 61-62; United States Bureau of the Census, 
Department of Commerce, Financial Statistics of States, 1922 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 19277, pp. 77-75;
1 9 2 3, pp. 128-31; 1 9 2 7, pp. 126-29; 1 9 2 7, PP. 117-175 and 
1928, pp. 110-15.
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During the 1930!s, relief "borrowing on the state
level became quite significant although total borrowing
began to decline. The market for municipals was a failing
22one from 1929 to 1933. In 1932, relief issues constituted 
about 20 per cent of the total while highways continued to 
account for over ij.0 per cent. By 1933» relief borrowing 
almost doubled to make up about 37 Pei* cent of the total 
while highway issues fell to only 23 per cent. The trend 
among the states toward more relief and less highway borrow­
ing was accentuated in 193̂ 4- and 1935?. Although the composi­
tion of the debt was changing, total state debt outstanding 
showed only a small absolute decline by 1937. Thereafter, 
the total state debt remained relatively stable until 19i}-2. 
During World War II, the total debt of the American states
declined in much the same manner as it had during World 
23War I.
For an impression of the situation facing state and 
local governments in 1933» see Evans Clark (ed.), The Internal 
Debts of the United States, Published for Twentieth Century 
Fund, Inc. (New York; The Macmillan Company, 1933)> PP. 25i}.-90.
^Ratchford, American State Debts, p. 262; United 
States Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, Historical 
Review of State and Local Government Finances, State and Local 
Government Special Studies No. 25 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 19^8), p. 22; United States Bureau of the 
Census, Department of Commerce, Compendium of State Govern­
ment Finances in 19il7. State Finances; 19H7, No. 2 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 19^8), p. 3J Shultz
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State borrowing entered another cycle with the boom 
in state spending and debt creation that began at the end 
of World War II. The total gross debt of the American states 
before the war was about $3*600,000,000, and it declined to 
about $2,i|_00,-000, 000 in 19ij-6. Subsequent state borrowing 
pushed gross debt to over $5»000,000,000 In 1950 and to 
about $13*000,000,000 In 1956. Part of the increase in 
spending which led to this borrowing was the result of 
Inflation, but there was also a major increase in spending. 
The purposes of post-World War II borrowing and spending are 
similar to those that operated in the debt cycles of the 
past. The Immediate post-war years brought veterans* bonuses 
back as a major purpose for borrowing. There was a great 
need for the replacement and addition of highways. By 1955* 
the fading veterans* bonus borrowing was replaced by 
borrowing for the expansion of educational facilities. One 
important characteristic of borrowing during this period was 
the widespread adoption of the agency or authority device
and Caine, op. cit.. pp. 665» 718» Tax Foundation, Inc., 
Project Note No. 27, op. cit., p 2; Tax Foundation, Inc., 
Recent Trends in State Debt, 19i+l-19h7. Project Note No. 22 
(New York: Tax Foundation, Inc., 19̂ -8), pp. 2-5; Studenski
and Krooss, op., cit., pp. I|31-32, 1+3l+, 1+57-58; National 
Defense and State Finance, pp. 61-62; and United States 
Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, Financial 
Statistics of States, 19lt-0, Vol. Ill (Washington; Government 
Printing Office, 19^2), pp. 1+2—1+1+.
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with a corresponding decline in the use of full faith and
2l\.
credit (general) obligations.
The end of the growth phase of the present debt cycle
25is not yet in sight. Transportation problems are far from 
solved. Although the Federal government is assuming a 
greater share of the responsibility for providing certain 
types of highways, this does not mean that state borrowing 
can be expected to decline either relatively or absolutely. 
There is some evidence that the shifting of functions (other 
than highway services) to the Federal level has halted, but 
even if the present division of functions between the Federal 
and state governments continues, states will still need to 
finance many expenditures by means of borrowing.
^Compendium of State Government Finances. State 
Finances; 191+7, No. 2, p . £; United States Bureau of the
Census, Department of Commerce, Compendlum of State Govern­
ment Finances In 1957. State Finances; 19^7 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 7-8; Tax Foundation, 
Inc., Project Note No. 27, op.. cit., p. 2; Tax Foundation, 
Inc., Project Note No. 22, ojo. cit., pp, 2-5; Allen D,
Manvel, "Postwar Trends in State and Local Finance," 
Proceedings of the Fifty-First Annual Conference on Taxation 
(Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: National Tax Association” 1959),
pp. 259-61+; Tax Foundation, Inc., Facts and Figures on 
Government Finance. 1952-1953 (New York: Tax Foundation,
Inc., 1952), p. 200; and Studenski and Krooss, op. cit., 
pp. 1+83-85.
2^Tax Foundation, Inc., Project Note No. 27, o£. cit., 
p. 1; and Dick Netzer, "The Outlook for Fiscal Needs and 
Resources of State and Local Governments," American Economic 
Review, XLVIII, No. 2 (May, 1958), 323.
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General Characteristics of American State Debts
Detailed principles drawn from the debt experiences 
of the American states appear in the next Chapter; however, 
there are certain general factors that stand out in this 
background. First, the roles of borrowing and taxation in 
state financial structures are indicated. Some states tried 
to finance their pre-Civil War operations by engaging in 
enterprises— sometimes highly speculative— as substitutes 
for taxation. The failure of these experiments indicates 
that taxation generally must be the keystone of a state1s 
financial structure.
A second conclusion that may be drawn from the 
experiences of the states is that borrowing to aid railroads 
and banks was very expensive and damaging to the credit of 
the states involved; states take chances when they pledge or 
involve their credit in supporting private enterprises. It 
would appear to be improper for states to borrow for this 
purpose especially in this age when capital is not as scarce 
as it was in the period before the Civil War.
The importance of having well trained and able state 
officials is very evident in some of the state experiences 
in the Reconstruction period. The activities of state 
officials were not always subject to public scrutiny.
Records frequently were not carefully compiled and were not
20
always made public. Candid, forceful, and courageous leader­
ship often made the difference between success or failure in
26
meeting crises.
The experiences of the states with debt limitations 
indicate that these restrictions have not been highly 
successful in preventing borrowing or in avoiding debt 
difficulties. (Of course, whether borrowing should be pre­
vented is still an open question.) The debt limitations did 
not prevent the ill-fated Reconstruction borrowing in the 
South. Inflexible debt limitations are no cure-all for debt 
difficulties.
Finally, the record of American state borrowing, 
especially in the nineteenth century, gives some insight 
into the market for state bonds today. There were far too 
many instances of lack of good faith on the part of states 
in the payment of their debts. For many bondholders and 
investment bankers, their dealings with the American states 
turned out to be traumatic experiences. The actions of the 
states in the past, therefore, go a long way toward explaining 
the conservative attitudes that prevail in the market for 
municipal bonds. These prevailing attitudes should be 
studied very carefully by states in formulating their debt 
policies.
• 26McG-rane, op. cit., p. 383*
CHAPTER II
PRINCIPLES OP DEBT MANAGEMENT
The consequences of debt management are most signifi­
cant. The method of handling debt will have import not only 
for credit standings, costs, and the ability of a state to 
meet crises, but it may also affect the general welfare of 
people within a state. If those charged with managing the 
state*s credit are careful In their selection of courses of 
action from the many alternatives, they will be in position 
to keep debt in manageable and orderly form, to maintain a 
good credit standing, and to reduce the costs of borrowing.
On the other hand, the consequences of improper debt handling
will be unwieldy debt structures, poor credit ratings, high
1
interest charges, and perhaps even default.
There is no real excuse today for debt management to 
deteriorate to the condition described above. The factors 
which go to make up the difference between "good” and "bad" 
debt management are not unknown. These factors can even be 
formulated into certain principles, the observance of which 
will contribute to the improvement of debt management.
^William J. Shultz and C. Lowell Harriss, American 




Principles of good debt management can be drawn from
three sources. The most reliable source probably is empirical
evidence. What has proved to be good practice in the past,
and what has been conducive to default and failure? The
experiences of the American states have provided sufficient
data for many sound principles to be established about
questions of state debt. Principles that are evident from
historical analysis seem to be unusually reliable. The
problems involved in debt management have not changed greatly
over the years. Why then have the errors in debt management
been repeated so often? The answer lies in the fact that
bonded debt is a long-term matter. Financial officials have
little opportunity, unless they possess a good measure of
political longevity, of seeing the full effects of their
mistakes. In the area of debt, one has little opportunity
to learn from his own mistakes. If progress is to be made
in debt management, those dealing with the problem must be
prepared to learn from the experiences of others. This
learning can be advanced if these experiences are formulated
2into principles.
A second approach to the formulation of principles of 
good debt management is based on the deductive method. What 
is the logical conclusion if certain propositions are
^A. M. Hillhouse, Municipal Bonds; A Century of 
Experience (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1936), p.TJI|.l.
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accepted? What are the consequences if it is assumed that 
most government spending should be financed by taxation?
These propositions or assumptions from which particular 
courses of action may be decided can sometimes be formulated 
from empirical observation. Conclusions then can be deduced 
from certain general assumptions about the nature of debt. 
Authorities in the field of public finance have reached 
agreement upon many points about debt management by this 
means.
The final major factor that must be considered in 
dealing with principles of good debt management turns away 
from formal methods of reasoning to a pragmatic attitude. 
Certain principles of good debt management must be based 
upon observations of what is logical in view of extant 
institutions. It does not matter that the institutions 
themselves may be irrational. For example, investors usually 
like to see that state property tax receipts are dedicated 
to the payment of debt, but property tax revenues are steadily 
declining in relative importance at the state level. Never­
theless, it is a sound principle for the state to provide 
the investor what he wants, to know the current styles In 
the market, and to provide necessary guarantees in bond 
contracts. Awareness of such institutional factors can be 
gained by investigation of the determinants of good bond 
ratings.
2k
The approach in this Chapter is, first, to analyze 
the institutional framework of state borrowing and the 
influence of this framework on the effective use of borrowing 
power on the state level. The next step is to move closer to 
the more detailed problems involved in the planning of a 
debt structure and the advantages to be gained by careful 
planning. Finally, this Chapter identifies some of the 
desirable practices which can be observed in the issuance of 
new bonds and in the management of existing debt.
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Institutional framework upon which debt management 
rests seems to have several different bases. The various 
institutions Involved will be the broad economic and 
political ones, the legal ones, and finally, the more 
specific financial practices that so importantly affect debt 
structures and debt management.
Economic and Political Factors
State borrowing cannot be viewed as an isolated
j
phenomenon or even as only a problem of state finance. In 
the most obvious instance, borrowing will be somewhat 
dependent upon the economic characteristics of the state.
i
Some use of the state1s borrowing powers will be Justified, 
but this use will be limited if the state is underdeveloped.
25
An underdeveloped state will need internal improvements to 
improve its economic position, but the income in such an 
area will effectively limit the ability to service debt.
The political characteristics of a state will also 
have a great deal of influence in shaping the debt structure 
that evolves. One state may have long before restricted its 
borrowing activities, refined its debt management, and estab­
lished an enviable credit standing. Another state may have 
had a series of experiences ranging from administrations that 
have used the state’s credit unwisely to administrations that 
have reacted radically against obviously wasteful borrowing 
and spending practices. It is unfortunate that reform admin­
istrations have sometimes reacted unwisely by introducing 
legislation that has proved to be highly inflexible and just 
as undesirable as the practices that it was intended to 
replace.
Another political factor which will influence the 
state debt structure and the management of that structure Is 
the over-all handling of state finance. The attitudes of 
people and politicians toward the taxing and spending func­
tions will certainly influence a state’s debt structure.
Many of the debt problems that plague state finance start at 
this point. Some of the debt difficulties in the states 
simply cannot be avoided if unfavorable fiscal relationships 
have already been established at this level.
26
The more general political and economic factors which 
may have an indirect influence on debt matters most likely 
cannot be reformed merely to improve debt structures. Little 
more will be said of such factors; however, it should never 
be forgotten that these elements are working to shape the 
debt structures and management. These distantly related 
institutional factors bear watching so that improvements can 
be made whenever possible and so that any favorable changes 
may be recognized and used to improve debt structures and 
management.
Legal Institutions
Policy concerning the use of a state*s credit should 
be clearly and carefully established in the constitution.
But, if this policy is perverted in some fashion in the 
basic document, another institutional problem has been 
created. The development of a sound debt structure and good 
debt management should start logically with the modification 
of the legal framework wherever this framework seems to be 
faulty. Policies that will make the debt structure more
efficient should be brought together, or codified, into one
3constitutional article. At present, Louisiana has debt 
provisions strewn throughout its Constitution under sections
^Ibld., p . Ijif.2.
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such as those concerning the limitations on legislative
kpowers and those chartering particular agencies of the State. 
Bringing these debt provisions together would he a very effec­
tive first step in the removal of complexity. Complexity is 
severely penalized when ratings are assigned to bond issues.
Topics that may be included in state constitutional 
sections dealing with debt are as follows: the delegation of
the borrowing power; the prohibition of borrowing for certain 
purposes as proper subjects for borrowing (provided that the 
amending procedure permits change if economic and social 
factors necessitate revision); and, the designation of 
certain flexible debt limitations where they seem necessary. 
Certain definitions should, of course, be included in 
the above provisions. A clear and careful definition of 
state debt, for example, could be used to put an end to 
the speoial fund doctrine which interprets debts of 
agencies or departments, or debt supported by special 
revenues (such as dormitory and bridge revenues), as something 
other than state debt. The main provisions above would also 
be expected to cover methods of debt authorization, funding
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. lj., Secs. 2, 12; 
Art. 6, Secs. 16, 21; Art. 12, Secs. 19-21; Art. 18, Secs.
1-5; Art. 20, Sec. 1; and Prolet of a Constitution for the 
State of Louisiana (hereinafter referred to as ProjeTT,
Vol. I, Part 2, prepared by the Louisiana State LawTnsti- 
tute, I9$k., pp. 11^5-61.
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and refunding procedures, certain safeguards in both policies 
and administration, and also perhaps some reference to the 
policy for determining maturity schedules.
It would probably not be desirable for much else to 
be included in a constitutional debt code. It seems unwise, 
for example, to place provisions in constitutions requiring 
that only serial bonds or only callable bonds be used.
These two provisions are often desirable, but there may be 
circumstances in which other types of bonds might be more 
appropriate. It should not be forgotten that a debt code is 
no guarantee of a good debt structure. A debt structure 
cannot be truly effective without good management or admin­
istration because financial conditions often change quickly 
and radically. A good debt code will be one that recognizes 
the importance of management and leaves enough flexibility
6
for administrators to take advantage of changing conditions. 
On the other hand, a faulty legal framework can so impede 
debt administration that no satisfactory debt structure 
could be designed or managed by anyone.
^Hillhouse, o£. cit., pp. i4i4.2 -l4.3 - Hillhouse suggests 
these provisions for municipalities, but they appear to be 
generally applicable for state constitutional debt codes.
^Ibld .« p. I4I43.
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One of the most obvious and important ways in which 
state debts have been influenced greatly by legal institu­
tions has been by the establishment of constitutional debt 
limitations. These limitations were established in many 
states as a result of excessive borrowing many years ago.
The major purposes of the limitations seem to have been to 
protect taxpayers against excessive tax rates and to protect
7the credit standings of the governments. Legislatures were
often deprived, by constitutional or sometimes by statutory
law, of the free and unrestricted use of borrowing power.
These constitutional debt limitations have not proved to be
very successful in operation. They are a good example of
practices that were well intended but that have not proved
8to be very beneficial in their application.
Constitutional debt limitations fall into several 
broad groups. First are the rigid constitutional provisions 
that prohibit legislatures from borrowing except under
^Scott viewed the limitations as a result only of the 
need for taxpayers to protect themselves. William A. Scott, 
The Repudiation of State Debts (ed. Richard T. Ely, Library 
of Economics and Politics, No. 2; Boston: Thomas Y. Crowell
& Co., 1893), PP. 2L]_6-V7.
Q
Harold M. Groves, Financing Government (fourth 
edition; New York: Henry Holt and Company, 195ij-), pp. 568-69;
and B. U. Ratchford, "State and Local Debt Limitations, ' 1 
Proceedings of the Fifty-First Annual Conference on Taxation 
(Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: National Tax Association, 1959),
pp. 2 1 5, 2 2 5 -2 6 .
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certain specified extreme situations such as war or insur­
rection. Other constitutional limitations are those which 
require that all laws concerning borrowing must be submitted 
to a popular referendum. This provision is similar to the 
first group insofar as the legislature is again deprived of 
the use of the state*s credit without approval of the people. 
The main difference between the two groups is that there is 
somewhat more flexibility and less formality in the rendering 
of the final decision by the people. A third major group 
into which the states would fall is that group in which 
there are limitations only of a procedural nature. Finally,
several state constitutions do not restrict legislative
9power to create debt.
In the first two cases above, the decision regarding 
debt creation is reserved by the electorate. It is not 
uncommon for constitutional provisions of states in this 
category to impose certain restrictions on the electorate 
itself. Constitutional provision may require that all
^B. U. Ratchford, American State Debts (Durham,
North Carolina: Duke University Press, 19if.l), pp. ij.29-33?
Ratchford, "State and Local Debt Limitations," pp. 216-19;
Pro .jet, Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 1130-31; William L. Raymond,
State and MunicInal Bonds (second edition; Boston: Financial
Publishing Company, 1932), p. 6 9 J Tax Foundation, Inc.,
Constitutional Debt Control in the States (New York: Tax
Foundation, Inc., 195̂ -)/ P* 13; and Jerry Peyton Simpson, 
"Oklahoma*s State Debt, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
The University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, 19^8), pp. 291-92.
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Issues authorized by constitutional amendment Include 
provisions for raising taxes to pay for the interest.
Another similar constitutional debt provision is that any 
debt authorized by the electorate by constitutional amend­
ment must also make adequate provision for repayment. 
Prohibitions against the pledge of the state’s credit to 
private enterprises are also not uncommon. Where borrowing 
can be authorized by legislative action, legislatures often 
are governed by procedural provisions concerning maximum
Interest rates, maximum bond maturities, and whether bonds
10shall be serial or otherwise.
Ratchford’s conclusions about debt limitations are 
qualified ones. Analyzing the existing limitations, he 
found several constitutions that needed redrafting of debt 
provisions. In other states, he found that legislatures 
were not restrained, but their records were such that they 
did not really require any constitutional restraint. In 
some of the remaining states, he thought that certain provi­
sions were altogether too rigid. His recommendations, conse­
quently, take Into consideration the various types of 
constitutional debt limitations and legislative performances
'^Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. ip30—ipO; 
Ratchford, "State and Local Debt Limitations," pp. 216-19; 
and Raymond, ojd. cit.. p. 69.
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that are found In the states. Some states do not need them
at all, but in other states Ratchford suggests that clear
and effective constitutional limitations would be 
11
beneficial.
The position taken by Harold M. Groves is somewhat 
similar to Ratchford*s. He finds the self-imposed discipline 
of debt limitation especially undesirable in view of the 
fact that there is such a clear movement in state finance 
away from the stable property tax to the more cyclically 
sensitive income and sales and excise taxes. These taxes 
make the likelihood of deficits very strong if there is a 
downturn in business activity, and if this should be the 
case, the states will need more freedom to use their credit. 
With this attitude toward limitation in general, Groves then 
notes the lack of self-control on the part of some govern­
ments that might require some type of limitation perhaps
12
less extreme than the common restrictions now in existence.
11Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. ♦ One
of the earliest evaluations of state constitutional debt 
limitation was by William A. Scott. In 1893, he noted 
the ability of debt limitations to restrict debt creation and 
thus prevent debt repudiation. He did not recommend their 
unqualified use, however, because he felt that the states 
would need to use their credit. The needs that he predicted 
were for irrigation, reforestation, education, and to finance 
natural monopolies. It is understandable that he did not 
foresee the higfcway problem. Scott, op. cit., pp, 2l̂ 2~k3-
1 PGroves, op. cit.. p. £69.
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The conclusion that debt limitations are sometimes necessary 
is accepted in this paper.
For the states needing debt limitations, Ratchford 
outlined the scope which limitations should cover. They 
should be written so that the special fund doctrine does 
not apply, i.e., the limitation cannot be circumvented by 
the process of agency borrowing. Some of the more important 
general characteristics that the debt limit should contain 
are as follows: the limit should be related to the wealth
or ability of the people and the state; the provisions 
should be designed to become more restrictive as the 
ultimate limit is approached; the actual limit should not 
be radically reduced when business is depressed; it should 
be written with the intention of reducing court interpreta­
tion to a minimum, but it should also be expressed concisely 
in the constitution; and it should be rigorous enough to
13control borrowing where it has been consistently abused.
These characteristics were the guides which Ratchford 
used in designing a limitation based upon average revenue 
receipts. Revenue receipts, of course, must be carefully 
and realistically defined to include such revenues as net 
collections from fees and taxes, donations from the Federal
13Ratchford, American State Debts, pp, 592-9llo See 
also Hillhouse, o£. cit.. pp.'
3k
governraent, and net returns on enterprises run by the
Ill-state .
The basic limit would be as follows: the
legislature could authorize borrowing so long 
as the net debt incurred under such authoriza­
tion did not exceed 100 per cent of average 
revenue receipts for the five preceding years.
The electorate could, by a referendum vote, 
authorize borrowing to a similar amount. The 
normal or basic limit for the debt would thus 
be an amount equal to twice the average revenue 
receipts, as above defined, for the preceding 
five years; it would be a moving limit to be 
recomputed each year. It would be desirable to 
keep the two parts of the debt separate to show:
(1 ) the part of the debt authorized by ttie 
legislature and by the people and (2 ) the amount 
of additional indebtedness which each might 
authorize.^5
The proposal above would seem to avoid the basic flaw 
that was present in most of the early debt limitation provi­
sions --inflexibility. Ratchford1s proposed limitation
offers the advantage of gradual increases in the pressure
16applied against debt expansion. Perhaps the greatest 
advantage in the above proposal, however, is that this type 
of debt limitation is really more of a debt plan than it is 
a debt limitation. It has some of the elements of determining
^■^Ratchford, American State Debts» pp. 59l}--95. 
^Ibid., p. 595. These proposals were endorsed in a 
special study of constitutional debt limitations which is 
included in the Louisiana Pro .jet. Pro .jet. Vol. I, Part 2, 
pp. 1135-36.
16Ratchford, American State Debts, pp, 7-6, 595? and 
Ratchford, "Statd'and Local Debt Limitations,” pp. 222-23, 
225-26.
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ability to pay or ability to bear debt. It is a method of 
embedding into the basic document, a place so prominent that 
legislators and citizens alike will be more aware of Its 
existence, a constant reminder to the effect that there are 
certain criteria which must be observed to promote good 
credit standing.
In his above-mentioned proposal, Ratchford made it 
clear that if any limitations were necessary, they should 
not be easily circumvented; they have been widely circum­
vented by the use of the special fund doctrine and the
17authority device. The special fund doctrine is the judi­
cial principle that some debts are not state debts because
18they are secured by special funds. The use of the doctrine
Ratchford, "State and Local Debt Limitations," 
pp. 219, 221-22; and Pro.jet, Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 1132-3h. 
There are methods of circumventing local debt restrictions 
other than by use of the authority. The creation of special 
districts and the use of lease-purchase arrangements are 
common on the local level, and they have been used widely In 
Kentucky. Legislative Research Commission, "Debt Adminis­
tration," Staff Report to Committee on Functions and 
Resources of State Government, Research Publication No. 30> 
(1952), p. 1 2 .
In Oklahoma, circumvention of debt control was 
possible before 19hl by incurring short-term deficits which 
were .then funded into long-term debt. See Simpson, op. 'bit/., 
p. 7 6 . This method of circumvention has also been used in 
other states. .See Ratchford, American State Debts.
pp. 3 7 6-8 2 .
l8See David M. Wood, "Legal Aspects of Revenue Bond 
Financing," The Journal of Finance, X (1955)» 20^.
36
depends upon the existence of some sort of revenues to 
establish the special funds. These revenues are often 
available from the operation of capital improvements, and 
this characteristic gives rise to the term "revenue bond." 
The widespread use of authorities is at least partly a 
result of the aforementioned debt limitations. This devel­
opment is a case in point that legal institutions greatly 
influence debt administration."^
The use of agencies has been, and is, an expensive 
way of doing things. Authorities rely almost exclusively 
upon borrowing to start their operations. This borrowing 
makes them expensive to start with, but they are also more 
expensive because they depend to such a great extent on
19Seven reasons for the creation of public authorities 
in New York State were analyzed by Charles ¥. Ingler in a 
paper before the National Tax Association in 1957. He found 
that most of the reasons involved the " . . .  avowed intent to 
circumvent continuing restraint by the electorate, the Con­
stitution, or the elected officeholder." Charles W. Ingler,
"Are Public Controls Over Authorities Adequate?" Proceedings 
of the Fiftieth Annual Conference on Taxation (Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania: National Tax Association, 195*3), p. 259.
Others have viewed this same phenomenon and concluded 
that the authority " . . .  gets things done expeditiously, and 
. . . contrasts favorably with the leisurely pace of achieve­
ment we have often associated with established, old^line 
governmental bodies." Lynn A. Stiles, "Economic Effects of 
Authority Operations and Financing," Proceedings of the 
Fiftieth Annual Conference on Taxation (Harrisburg. Pennsylvania: 
National Tax Association, 19^8), p. 269. See also Roger A. 
Freeman, "A Hundred Billion in State and Local Public Works," 
Municipal Finance, XXVII, No. 1 (August, 19514-)* 6 .
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20revenue bond financing with its attendant higher costs.
The authority device also represents a fragmentation of
sovereignty that is not desirable. "It would seem to be the
wiser course for the legislative body to exhaust every
possible governmental remedy, and to assume real leadership
21and educational responsibility . . ." This suggestion, of 
course, turns attention back to the constitutional framework.
Debt limitations and the authority device are 
political-legal problems that are both partly effects but 
also causes of debt difficulties. They cannot be neglected 
if a sound debt structure is the goal. Constitutional 
provisions should be carefully reviewed and revised wherever 
necessary so that they constitute a proper institutional 
framework for the debt— including detailed yet flexible pro­
visions pertinent to planning the debt structure, managing 
the issuance of new debt, and managing existing debt.
Financial Factors
After the economic, political, and legal factors, a 
fourth major influence on state debt is the whole set of 
financial customs that are so critical where debt management
^For an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages 
of revenue bonds, infra, pp. 112-lij.,
21Ingler, ojd. cit., p. 262,
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is concerned. Debt cannot be effectively managed until the 
bond market itself is thoroughly understood. There are the 
market mores that will determine whether or not an issue is 
well rated and well received. Certain demands by bond 
investors and the dealers affect the interest costs borne by 
the states. Complete cognizance must be taken of all these 
factors, even those that may appear to be illogical or minor 
in importance from the standpoint of economic analysis. At 
the present time, there is little alternative but to adjust 
to the market.
State and local governments can exercise little 
• control— other than to establish and maintain 
themselves as good credit risks— over the yields 
that must be offered on their new debt issues and 
the market quotations on their outstanding obliga­
tions. Their debt management problem is largely 
one of passive accommodation to the circumstances 
and demands of the investment market.22
Principles of good debt management, therefore, must be based
on thorough understanding and frequent review of financial
factors. Principles of good debt management based upon
these factors can, to some extent, be formulated by analyzing
the actions of bond dealers and investors and their reactions
to certain practices that states have used in issuing debt.
The problem thiis is basically one of determining what factors
affect the marketability of state bond issues.
2?‘Shultz and Harriss, op. cit.» p. 609.
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Leading investment surveys give an indication of the
standing of state bonds from the viewpoint of the investment
analyst. Although some analysts are more cautious than
others, the over-all view appears to be that state bonds as
a class have a very high standing and that they are held in
23high esteem by the investment community. This good
standing seems to depend upon two main characteristics of
state bonds: (1) they are generally secure, and (2) they
are tax exempt. Since they are exempt from Federal income
taxes, very wealthy people and even commercial banks and
corporations with large net taxable incomes often find them
2 ka distinct advantage. As a result, prices of the obliga­
tions are usually bid up to the point where the resulting
^Ralph E. Badger and Harry G. Guthmann, Investment 
Principles and Practices {fourth edition; Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951)* p. 569* and
George ¥. Dowrie and Douglas R. Fuller, Investments : (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 19^1), p. b77•
^^For discussions about who buys state bonds and why 
they do so, see the following sources: C. Cheever Hardwick,
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CLXXXI, No. 5^30 
I'T"hursday, May 19, 1955), 9; John S. Linen, "The Broad Field 
of Municipal Bonds," The Commercial and Finanoial Chronicle. 
CLXXXII, No. (September 15, 1955), 3? George B. Wendt,
"Why Municipal Bonds are Desirable Bank Investments," The 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle. CLXXXII, No. 5^88 (Thurs- 
day, December 8, 1955),27; and Fundamentals of Investment 
Banking, Sponsored by the Investment Bankers Association of 
America (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19lj.9), pp. 351-52.
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yields make the bonds unattractive to Investors in lower
25income brackets. As a result, investors with moderate
26means are flatly advised to seek other investments.
Other investors who buy state bonds in significant
amounts are those that are restricted in their options by
law. These investors are the institutional buyers such as
pension fund trustees, life insurance companies, trustees,
and mutual savings banks that are not permitted to invest in
obligations not on the "legal" list. State and municipal
bonds usually are on these approved lists. "Tax exempts,"
as they are called, are also in demand in some states where
they are accepted as security or reserve against deposits of 
27public funds.
25This tax exempt characteristic is the reason for 
the relatively small difference between the yields on state 
and Federal obligations even though the United States bonds 
have a higher credit standing. Tax exempt bonds, in fact, 
may sell at a lower yield" than Federal obligations that have 
the same maturity. Dowrie and Fuller, op. cit., p. lj.77*
26David F. Jordan and Herbert E. Dougall, Investments 
(sixth edition; New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), pp.
33^~35* This situation points up a problem that will have to 
be solved if the volume of state borrowing in the future 
becomes so great that it cannot be absorbed by the extremely 
wealthy and by institutional investors. Dick Netzer, "The 
Outlook for Fiscal Needs and Resources of State and Local 
Governments," American Economic Review. XLVIII, No. 2 (May, 
1958), 323.
^Badger and Guthmann, op. cit.. p. 570; Hardwick, 
loc. cit.; Linen, loc. cit.; Wendt, loc. cit.; Dowrie and 
Fuller, og_. cit.. p. i|.8&;̂ and Fundamentals of Investment 
Banking, pp."251-53.
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The over-all high regard for state and municipal
bonds and the popularity of these bonds with certain groups
of investors do not mean, of course, that investment bankers
who deal in these bonds do not evaluate each individual
28Issue with a great deal of care. Prospective buyers
concern themselves with such factors as the past records of
units in meeting obligations, economic reserves, political
structures and the quality of political administration,
legal provisions concerning the debt, and with certain
specific measures that show the strength of financial 
29structures. Other general criteria observed in evaluating 
the investment qualities of state bonds are the ability and
willingness to pay the debts, and the legal provisions
30concerning tax rates and debt limitations. The character 
of the community or the state (in respect to its general 
economic status and its degree of moral responsibility), as
Whether state and municipal bonds should be evalu­
ated by different criteria from that presently used is a 
question that is raised at another point. Infra, pp. £1-56. 
It is also suggested elsewhere that states may benefit from 
disassociating themselves from local governments. Infra, 
Chap. VI, pp. lj.01-2,
^Dovwle and Puller, 033. cit., pp. ij.7 9, h&l> and 
Raymond, op. cit.. p. 197*
^^Jordan and Dougall, 0£. cit., pp. 32i|-3£j and 
Raymond, op. cit.. p. 197.
indicated by historical fact, is also of vital Interest to
31the investment banker.
Some of the more specific questions which are raised
by investment analysts and investment bankers concern the
following! the amounts of existing debt and the plans for
debt retirement; the extent of delinquency in tax collections
the status of the annual budget; the various comparisons
32of taxable wealth and revenues with debt. Investment 
bankers are also Interested in details about outstanding 
debts its relationship to population and property values; 
the trend of borrowing; the schedule of service requirements; 
the ratio of service requirements to annual revenues; the 
rate of debt retirement In relation to the life of Improve­
ments that these debts financed; the existence of short-term 
or floating debt; the provisions made to retire term bonds; 
and the extent and type of protection provided to existing 
issues. Current operations of the governmental unit proposing 
any bond issues and data showing revenue collections and 
existing tax rates will be carefully scrutinized. Budgetary 
procedures to be followed in case of impending deficits, the
^Fundamentals of Investment Banking, pp. 37iv*lj-Olt.; 
and Raymond, op,, cit.. p. 197.
32Dowrie and Fuller, op. cit.. p. fy.87; and Raymond,
OP. cit.. p. 197.
k3
degree of centralized control or supervision, and the incli­
nation to avoid a pay-as-you-go approach are all usually
observed. Finally, legal opinion about any particular issue
33is generally sought.
If the foregoing review of questions that are fre­
quently raised by investment bankers concerning state credit 
is Insufficient to serve as a starting point to derive debt 
principles, there is available still another source of perti­
nent information. Useful principles of debt management can 
be formulated from a study of the rating systems employed by 
investors services. The Moody's rating system, described 
here, is not only well known and respected, but it is also
representative of the rating devices used by these institu- 
3ktions. Moody's uses nine rating symbols that range from 
the highest rating of "Aaa" through nC.,T The symbols are 
intended to represent investment risk or investment quality. 
This determination of investment risk involves economic 
judgment that is based not only on the past record of the 
borrower but also on the present and future potentialities
^ Fundamentals 0f Investment Banking, pp. 
and Raymond, op. cit., p. 197*
^+For this reason, and in order to limit the scope of 
this study, Moody's has been used throughout the study as 
representative of all of the rating services.
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of each issue. MoodyTs ratings thus are only estimates of 
long-term risks, and they are intended solely for the grading
35of bonds in terms of their investment quality.
Bond ratings are of great importance to the states
regardless of their intended purpose. There is a clear cor-
36relation between high ratings and low bond yields. Since 
this relationship exists, some very valuable debt management
-^Moody*s Municipal and Government Manual (hereinafter 
referred to as Moody's), 193>8 (New York: Moody* s Investors
Service, 1958)» PP. v-vi. A spokesman for Standard and 
Poor's, another rating service, described the bond rating as 
". . . the symbolic expression of the odds against loss to 
the investor in any given bond issue.” Walter H. Tyler,
"The Validity and Use of Bond Ratings,” Municipal Financet 
XXX, No. 1 (August, 1957), 52.
The average yields for state and local government 
bonds for several recent years were computed by the Federal 
Reserve System from samples of Moody's rated bonds as follows:
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS
Yearly Average Rating
Aaa Baa




Source: Compiled from the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
XLV, No. 3 (March, 1959), 285: and Federal Reserve 
Bulletin. XLIV, No. 2 (February, 1958), l65"I
When the four years above are averaged, the mean difference 
between the two ratings is more than one per cent. If this 
difference prevails for a sizeable issue or for a whole debt 
structure, the amounts involved obviously are extremely 
significant.
principles can be derived by observing and analyzing the 
types of structures and the particular management practices 
that are associated with high ratings.
There appear to be two main considerations that
determine the ratings given by Moody*s. The first and
probably the most important consideration is that which
concerns the protection afforded bondholders. The second
factor, which may not be fully appreciated by some fiscal
administrators and policy makers, is the characteristic of
"certainty" or "uncertainty." This feature is carefully
studied for each particular issue, but the rating process
does not rule out the uncertainty that revolves around the
complexity and instability of the whole of the state* s
37financial structure when a particular issue is rated.
The protection afforded to bondholders seems to be 
measured primarily by the ratio of pledged revenues to debt 
service requirements. There are frequent references in 
Moody's explanation of its ratings to the "margin of 
protection." This tendency is also reflected in the weekly 
bond survey by the same institution which sometimes reports 
the ratio of revenue to debt— the greater the ratio the more 
protection afforded or the greater the margin of protection.^
J 'Moody's, 1958, pp. v-vi.
-^For example, see Moody*s Bond Survey, XLVIII, No. 23, 
(June 1956), 522.
The ratio of revenue to debt is something that is 
often superficial and something which can be changed. One 
practice that usually results in small margins is the dedi­
cation of certain revenues or certain taxes to the repayment 
of specific bond issues. When this type of dedication is 
used, there may be some issues that have large surpluses 
over and above their service requirements. These particular 
issues will have extremely high ratios of revenue to debt 
requirements, higher ratios than are really necessary, and 
the result will be that the revenues or resources are not 
being used effectively. This type of dedication thus can 
result in overprotecting some issues and underprotecting 
others. Besides the strictly mathematical ratio of revenues 
to debt, there is also the disadvantage of having one tax 
alone as support for each issue. Dedication presumably 
makes risk greater than if several bond issues of a state 
were being paid from a pool of four or five major taxes. In 
the latter case, the failure of one tax probably would not 
cause default on any issue. Logic would seem to call for 
freeing taxes and other revenues from specific to general 
debt service. Debt service requirements could then be the 
first charge upon the entire receipts in the state. The 
ratio of revenue to debt service— the margin of protection—  
would be much greater. Ratings, in the hbsence of other
k l
undesirable factors, should improve, and bids for the 
state*s new obligations should be more favorable.
The second characteristic that distinguishes the nine 
different Moody*s ratings is the degree of certainty 
surrounding the bond issue. Here the key seems to be 
stability. For example, the difference between Aaa bonds and 
Aa bonds can be either a smaller margin of protection or 
else greater "fluctuations” in the protective elements.
Again, the A rating may result from a "susceptibility" to 
impairment in the protective elements— more uncertainty.
The Baa bond rating might result from "unreliability" in the 
protective provisions. "Uncertainty" is the cause for some 
bonds being rated Ba. Bonds rated B are those that lack the
characteristic of "assurance" of principal and interest
39payments.
The certainty or uncertainty factor which is so 
important in the rating of bonds can concern anything 
connected with the issue. The characteristic of stability 
must be interpreted very broadly. It is not just a question 
of whether or not the provisions in the bond indenture are 
clear. The degree of assurance provided to the investor and 
bond dealer will depend upon such things as the institutional 
factors that were mentioned earlier in this Chapter as well
^Moody*s, 1 9 5 8, pp. v-vl
as the specific provisions of the issue. It may take some 
time for the state to build up a reputation for certainty, 
stability, and assurance, but there is little doubt that 
success in the endeavor will be reflected in better ratings 
and lower interest charges.
The general criteria used for bond ratings are 
significant in themselves, but they provide still more 
information when they are analyzed from another point of view. 
This approach is to compare the ratings associated with 
certain states and certain issues and to determine from this 
certain principles for successful debt management on the 
state level. The characteristics of state debt structures 
with excellent bond ratings are indicative of what the 
market considers to be good debt management. What are these 
characteristics? An excellent study of this type was 
prepared by the staff of the Louisiana Legislative Council.
The Legislative Council study dealt only with general 
obligations but included all of the states and grouped them 
according to the ratings carried by their bonds. Thirteen 
states at the time of the study had no outstanding general
^Louisiana Legislative Council, ”A Comparative Study 
of the Bonded Debt of the Forty-Eight States,” Research Study 
No. 9 (hereinafter referred to as Louisiana Legislative 
Research Study No. 9)> Prepared by the Staff of the Louisiana 
Legislative Council, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, March, 1956, 
passim.
obligations, and another twelve had Aaa ratiqgs on at least
part of their general obligations outstanding. Seventeen
other states had ratings no higher than Aa on any of their
bonds, and six others had no bonds rated higher than A, The
State of Louisiana general obligation bonds held ratings
111that varied from Aa to Baa.
Only five of the twelve states with Aaa ratings had 
more than $£0,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 of general obligations outstanding. 
These five states were Connecticut, Maryland, Ohio, Massa­
chusetts, and New York. Connecticut had $111,831,000 of 
bonds which were all ultimately payable "automatically" from 
one main fund. A main characteristic of that state's general 
debt, therefore, was simplicity. Maryland, with $l£0,160,000 
of general obligations outstanding, provided for their pay­
ment from a single fund and had "no limit" an taxing power. 
The simplicity again is striking. Ohio had $l6£,7 0l4-, 000 of 
full faith and credit debt which was serviced from a single 
sinking fund from which payments were "required." Again 
there was no limitation on the ad valorem tax rate in the 
simple structure. Massachusetts had used its full faith and 
credit freely when the survey was conducted and had 
$1j.£9>8££,676 of general debt outstanding. The Massachusetts 
debt was serviced from dual funds which were sustained by
^ Ibid., p. 3
"unlimited" general revenues. The fifth of the large
issuers of Aaa full faith and credit bonds was New York, the 
largest borrower among the American states. New York did 
not have the simplest system of the group, but it did have a 
successful debt structure. A large sinking fund in that 
state, which had assets of $1 7 7 *7 5 9>6 9 1> contributed to this 
success. Besides having these assets, the debt structure in 
New York benefited as a result of the provision which made 
payment of revenues "mandatory" and "judicially enforceable."
The Louisiana Legislative Council concluded its 
analysis of state debt structures with bonds of the highest 
rating as follows:
Aaa bonds are supported by the pledge of the 
full taxing power of the state with no consti­
tutional limitations thereon and the bonds operate 
as a charge, which the Legislature may not touch, 
upon either the general revenue or general fund of 
the state or upon a sinking fund supported by dedi­
cated revenues far in excess of debt requirements
^ Massachusetts lost its position within this exclu­
sive group since the survey was conducted. All of its 
outstanding full faith and credit debt was given a revised 
rating of Aa in 1955* The reason for the change apparently 
is that the volume of the debt was great enough to damage 
the state's credit position. William A. Forbes, "The Billion 
Dollar Debt of Massachusetts," Boston University Business 
Review, IV, No. 2 (Fall, 1957)* 10-11.
^ I t  is noteworthy that self-supporting debt in New 
York, such as that connected with housing, was given the 
benefit of mandatory payment machinery to make it even more 
attractive. Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9*
pp. 16-32.
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or both. Alternative means are usually provided 
for payment of the bonds in the event of a deficit 
in the primary source of revenue allocated to the 
payment thereof, such alternate means of producing 
revenue being either automatic and/or enforceable 
by legal process available to bond holders.44
The characteristics of state debt structures that
have highly-rated issues reveal that there is some legal
basis for the difference in ratings, but also that there is
a significant tribute to convention involved. The legal
status of state debts differs from municipal debts in one
^Ibid., p. 3 . The state debt structures that had 
lower ratings had the following characteristics*
Aa bonds either are payable from a sinking fund 
with adequate minimum reserves and an excess of 
revenue over debt retirement requirements or are 
supported by dedicated revenue far in excess of 
debt retirement requirements with alternative 
provisions for added revenue in the event of 
deficit in the dedicated source. The length of 
time required to retire outstanding bonds, total 
state debt, and available assets or revenue for 
bond retirement are additional factors which may 
be considered in according this type of rating.
A bonds are payable from dedicated revenue 
sources with or without a sinking fund. Alternative 
means of payment usually are not provided and these 
bonds generally do not operate as a charge upon the 
general revenue or taxing power of the state with 
any means of enforcement thereof available to a 
bond holder.
Baa bonds ordinarily are not payable on a parity 
basis from dedicated revenues. Various issues often 
have different priority of lien upon or payment 
from a single dedicated revenue source. There are 
no sinking funds and no alternative means of payment 
of the bonds provided. Ibid.. p. 3 .
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very important respect--the state is a sovereign government 
and cannot be sued without its consent. The state therefore 
can repudiate its debt or default on interest with very 
little chance that the bondholders will gain any satisfac­
tion. As Ratchford points out, the bondholders, therefore,
h$generally must depend upon the state*s good faith. The 
whole gamut of "required," "mandatory," and "automatic" 
payments to bondholders may make it easier for bondholders 
to build a case if there is a breach of faith on the part of 
the state; however, there can be no assurance that payment 
will actually be made. Thus, one of the prime character­
istics that is used to separate state obligations into grades 
is certainly of questionable value.
The same thing might be said of the pledge of
unlimited ad valorem tax revenues. Ad valorem taxes have
lj.6long been losing their importance on the state level.
^Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. [j.82-96.
The full faith and credit pledge, incidentally, has 
been widely honored by the states. There were only three 
states in default in the 1930*s. Alvin H. Hansen and 
Harvey S. Perloff, State and Local Finance in the National 
Economy (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 19l|i}-), p. 52.
According to Business Week, full faith and credit 
munioipals have an even more impressive record of no final 
defaults. "Manning a Market in Municipals," Business Week, 
No. 15^9 (May 9, 1959), 55.
^Shultz and Harriss, op. cit.. p. 258.
The states that do not have this unlimited property tax 
pledge may also have certain ad valorem tax limitations in 
their constitutions, but how much weight should be given to 
these factors? How real is any tax or debt limit? Neither 
of these is more than temporary if it really needs to be 
eliminated or revised. It is difficult to imagine that any 
state would let a tax limitation interfere with the payment 
of a just debt. The pledge of unlimited ad valorem taxes, 
therefore, is very unconvincing— but it is still the proper 
thing for a state to use.
Even if the mandatory and judicially enforceable 
characteristics of Aaa bonds are granted, these provisions 
are questionable as criteria for ratings. Legal clauses 
requiring payment are not pertinent except in case of a 
default or repudiation on the part of the state, and this 
financial condition is quite rare In modern American states. 
When states are beset with such difficulties, it is appar-
klently largely a result of poor debt management — something 
that need not happen. At the present time, there appear to 
be no real reasons why states should ever have to default or 
repudiate debt.
If this optimistic opinion about state credit and 
about the techniques available for state debt management is
^Ratchford, American State Debts, passim.
correct, the characteristics summarized above, which affect 
ratings and interest rates to such a large extent, would 
appear to have been given far too much weight. Serious 
doubt may be raised as to the justification of the average 
difference of more than one per cent that existed between 
Aaa and Baa rated state and local bonds in the United States 
from 1 9 ^ 5 through 1 9p8 . ^
Several of the legal and administrative practices 
that have proved to be so successful in the five states 
referred to above are of questionable real value. States 
are to be imitated and complimented on their use of these 
devices, of course, but have they done much more than conform 
to the conventions of the bond market? It appears that the 
liberal use of such words as "mandatory," "required," judi­
cially enforceable," "unlimited taxes," and "first charge" 
has worked wonders in the market. Large measures of psy­
chology and semantics apparently are necessary in order to 
have successful debt structures. The successful states have 
bowed in the direction of conservative market desires, and 
the gestures have paid off handsomely.
If the market ratings of bonds are based so much on 
remote possibilities and questionable clauses, what should
Supra, p. [|4
be done to supplement or revise the criteria on which 
ratings are based? It would certainly appear that the basic
1+9strength of state obligations should be given more weight.
One way that states could help to accomplish this would be 
by offering only their full faith and credit as valid and 
sufficient security for bond issues. This full faith and 
credit pledge could probably be made more effective for the 
state and more attractive to investors (and not much more 
misleading).if the phrase were changed to read: "full faith,
credit, resources, and wealth of the state of 'X1 are 
pledged . . This change would serve to emphasize the
economic strength of the state while also making more effec­
tive use of the state* s name even though it would not 
necessarily give the bondholders any more real legal 
protection.
Surely, when it is apparent that, a state*s economy is 
strong and that there is every intention on the part of the 
state to honor its obligations, a penalty of one per cent 
because of a cluttered debt structure is heavy indeed.
Market standards as characterized by the bond ratings are
1+9The point here is that the economic condition is 
not given the weight it deserves. There is no question, of 
course, that the rating services do consider it in assigning 
their ratings. It is the first factor named, for example, 
by a representative of Standard and Poor*s. Tyler, op,, cit., 
P. 52.
not ultimate criteria. It would appear that some reexamina­
tion is in order in the bond market as well as on the state 
50level.
The questions raised about the validity of bond 
ratings do not, of course, absolve the states from making 
certain that they are not victims of the ratings. Bond 
ratings are important because they give a good indication of 
credit standing and because they have a clear relationship 
to interest charges that must be paid for borrowed funds.
It was indicated previously that the higher the rating, the 
lower the interest costs. Thus, if the factors affecting 
the ratings are known, the method of lowering interest costs 
should be very clear. Careful consideration of conventional 
market rules that Influence ratings and interest costs is 
still of great importance and is a major concern here.
Financial customs represented by these ratings must be given 
Important weight In the formulation of principles of debt 
management.
Principles of debt management must be directed at 
meeting the two basic criteria upon which ratings are based—
Personal interview with Dr. William D. Ross, Dean, 
College of Business Administration, Louisiana State University, 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, June 30, 1959.
The subject of bond ratings Is studied later from a 
different approach. Infra. Chap. VI, pp. 396-99.
protection and stability— as well as at some of the more 
specific characteristics discovered in the Legislative 
Council report and the recommendations of investment bankers 
and investment analysts noted above. The key elements of 
protection and stability clearly must be introduced into the 
debt structure by careful planning. Planning should be 
concerned with specific protective provisions, but good 
planning will also help to dissipate uncertainty in a debt 
structure. The next problem, therefore, is to develop a 
debt plan based upon given institutions,
II. PLAMING THE DEBT STRUCTURE
A major part of the constitutional section bearing on 
the question of debt should deal with planning the debt 
structure. Main provisions, which are suggested by 
Hillhouse for inclusion in a bond code, are merely debt
5lplans that are given the weight of constitutional law. 
However, since these long-term plans are not. always provided 
constitutionally, and since they can certainly be useful 
guides to the debt administrator whether they are codified 
or not, It is perhaps better to emphasize the plan rather 
than the constitution which may embody it. This shifting of 
emphasis does not mean that the constitution would not be a
Hillhouse, o]3. cit., pp. -[)!}-.
logical place to start in. planning. But if the constitu­
tion cannot be changed, this should not mean that planning 
cannot be used at all to improve the debt structure.
The plan of a debt structure must take cognizance of 
two distinct problems related to the efficacy of borrowing. 
The two problems concern the propriety and the safety of 
borrowing. Whether the borrowing is "proper” or not is 
mainly a question of whether the particular purpose of the 
borrowing is suitable. The "safety” problem concerns the 
whole fiscal structure. Is the state in a position where it
can safely add any debt to its existing structure no matter
52how proper any particular purpose might be? This section 
will deal with both of these questions in the order given.
When to Borrow
In order to determine when it is proper to borrow, 
some of the basic relationships in the area of public 
finance must be reviewed. These relationships are those 
between spending, taxing, and borrowing.
To determine when It is proper to borrow, It must
53first be established when it is proper to spend. After the 
Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 5>62;-65.
£3It Is generally agreed that spending should be 
carried only up to the point where the additional social 
benefit gained in the spending would balance that which 
would be sacrificed by the taxpayers. This conclusion Is
decision has been made to spend, the next consideration is 
to determine the method of financing--taxation or borrowing. 
The basic advantage of the first method of financing is that 
there are no interest costs involved, and the savings of 
interest costs would be available for other spending if 
needed. Taxes, however, are not always preferred over 
borrowing. There are certain characteristics of taxation 
that make it inappropriate in some situations, An obvious 
limitation is that taxation is not flexible enough to take 
care of sudden changes in needs. Then, of course, there is 
the case where large sums are needed all at once so as not 
to lose the advantages of large-scale operations. Tax 
systems may not succeed in raising the amounts that are 
needed at one time. Finally, borrowing may be a more equi­
table method of distributing the financial burdens connected 
with certain physical improvements over time among all of 
the users of these improvements.
Borrowing, therefore, will be appropriate for certain 
purposes and under some circumstances which are widely
widely accepted as a starting point in public finance even 
though it involves welfare economics and there is little 
agreement about how this principle can be applied. Shultz 
and Harriss, op. cit., p. 61).; Kenyon E. Poole, Public Finance 
and Economic Welfare (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc.,
19!?6) t PP. hk~k£ J and 0. H. Brownlee and Edward D. Allen, 
Economics of Public Finance (second edition; Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19f?6), p. 160.
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recognized in the field of public finance. These general
purposes are:
, . . (l) to finance large emergency or irregular 
expenditures--including wars, {2 ) to finance 
capital construction projects, (3 ) to harmonize 
the divergent rhythms of current expenditures
and current revenues, and (1|) to refinance
existing debt. A fifth reason . . . government 
borrowing should be an element of fiscal policy.
The first of these circumstances is inappropriate for the 
states insofar as it applies to wars, but the balance are 
applicable to at least some extent on the state level. The 
states have their emergencies in acts of God such as floods 
and other destruction by the elements. Another type of 
"emergency” which is usually somewhat reluctantly recognized 
and condoned is that which is due to past neglect of, say, 
institutional facilities. It is all too common for states 
to find themselves in the position of having obviously 
inadequate hospitals or prisons that require the replacement 
of entire systems. The cost of such replacements or addi­
tions is frequently so large that only borrowing will provide
55the needed sums.
^Shultz and Harriss, op. cit., p. 568. The first 
three of these conditions approximate those listed by 
Henry C. Adams in his list of proper circumstances for 
borrowing that was published in 1887. Henry C, Adams,
Public Debts, An Essay in the Science of Finance (New York:
D. Appleton and Company, 1 8 8 7), p. 78.
55Shultz and Harriss, op> cit., p. 571; and Ratchford, 
American State Debts, p. 56ij.*
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Borrowing to finance capital construction projects 
can involve several different circumstances. Borrowing for 
capital expenditures may generally be justified if one or 
more of the following factors appear: (1) the outlays are
large and nonrecurrent; (2) the borrowing finances certain 
state Enterprises;" (3) the expenditures finance improve­
ments that indirectly generate revenues.
Borrowing to finance large nonrecurrent capital out­
lays such as state office buildings, bridges, and highways 
is very common on the state level. The occasional large 
capital construction need which is nonrecurrent in nature 
can be properly financed by borrowing. Another type of 
capital expenditure borrowing that is rarely used in the 
American states but which is sometimes accepted as proper 
is "enterprise" debt. Examples of these enterprises are 
more easily found on the local and Federal levels; power 
plants and dam projects would be representative. Somewhat 
related to enterprise debt would be borrowing which generates 
income; this type of debt is called "self-supporting debt." 
The question of what is proper is profoundly influenced if 
the borrowing occurs in order to finance capital improvements
that directly generate revenues in amounts sufficient to pay
£6the principal and Interest costs. But, this concept need
^Shultz and Harriss, o£. cit., pp. $7 2 -7 6 ; and 
Batchford, American State Debts, pp. $63-61]-.
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not be limited only to operations which support themselves 
directly. For example, port development can be expected to 
contribute to economic growth and thus indirectly generate 
revenues that will ease the burden of borrowing. (Of course, 
port improvement would also normally be expected to result 
in certain operating revenues.) Highways may also fit Into 
this category of borrowing if they Indirectly generate debt- 
paying ability. Some highways may Increase state revenues 
indirectly by contributing to economic growth and this in 
turn may lead to greater revenues if more traffic results
57and thus increases gasoline tax collections.
Borrowing for the improvements described above may be
very sound economically. Borrowing is a way of getting
Improvements that are needed when they are needdd and of
providing for their payment as they are being used. There
may, in fact, be a responsibility to carry on such borrowing
If it is a significant factor In contributing to necessary
$8and desirable expansion in the economy. There is no need,
^The references to the revenue-producing nature of 
improvements here should not be Interpreted to mean that the 
borrowing should take the form of revenue bonds.
^William D. Ross, Financing Highway Improvements in 
Louisiana (Baton Rouges Division of Research, College of 
Commerce, Louisiana State University, 1955)# P* 18; and 
William D. Ross, "State-Local Fiscal Policy and Economic 
Growth,” National Tax Journal. X, No. 1 (March, 1957)> 76.
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if the timing and the method of retiring such borrowing are 
properly planned, of passing any burden on to a generation 
of taxpayers who will not have the use of the improvements. 
There would appear to be little justification for hesitation 
in borrowing Tinder these circumstances if available funds 
are insufficient. Furthermore, even if funds could be 
raised by taxation, this might not always be the most 
appropriate way of financing the improvements if the 
increased taxes would pose a serious threat to economic 
expansion.
When borrowing for large nonrecurrent construction is 
involved, whether the improvements are self-supporting or 
not, the most desirable method of planning the debt struc­
ture is to engage in "capital budgeting." Capital budgeting 
is simply a ". . . long-term capital improvement program, 
plus a coordinated program of the methods by which such
59capital expenditures will be financed." It is also some­
times referred to as "capital planning" which is defined as 
a continuous program in which the planning agency compiles 
and analyzes the requests for capital improvements for 
several years, assigns priorities to these requests, and
^Carl B, Chatters and Albert M. Hillhouse, Local 
Government Debt Administration (Hew York: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1939), P. 3S2:
puts these requests in financial terms which are then
60
related to the revenues or receipts available.
Viewpoints on the objectives of capital planning or 
capital budgeting differ somewhat, and the differences 
appear to be somewhat contradictory. One view would empha­
size three objectives: (1) to schedule public needs in the
61
order of their urgency; (2) to " . . . direct attention to
ascertaining the extent to which operating and maintenance
,.62
costs will be increased by a proposed capital project; 
and, (3) to 11 . . . require state officials and the legis­
lature to review all methods of financing, . . . and . . .
relate the amounts available from these sources to the needs
61of the state and its ability to finance various projects.” 
Other authorities recognize the objective of preplanning 
capital spending as a method of making installments more or 
less equal, but they also note the alternative objective of
AOPublic Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc., 
"Capital Planning,” No. 69 (hereinafter referred to as 
Public Affairs Research Study No. 69), March 15, 1958, p. 2, 
61
Ibid.. p. 3.
62Ibid. A similar interpretation of capital budgeting 
has been expressed by David M. Ellinwood, a Vice-President 
of Moody1s Investor Service, who has recommended it for 
municipalities. David M. Ellinwood, The Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle, CLXXXI, No. $b3k (Thursday, June 2,
195^),27.
^Public Affairs Research Study No. 69, p. 3.
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having unequal installments timed to counter the business 
cycle. ̂
In view of the generally accepted limitations of 
effective counter-cyclical fiscal policy on the state
65level, the more restricted objective of capital budgeting 
appears to be the more desirable one. Capital budgeting 
thus is planning directed specifically at capital improve­
ments. These capital Improvements may or may not require 
borrowing for their financing, and one main function of 
capital budgeting Is to decide this very question. Of 
course, the concept of the capital budget is much easier to 
grasp than it is to apply. One major difficulty In the 
process of capital budgeting as well as in financial planning 
in general is the problem of estimation. The estimation of 
revenues in preparing the capital budget is a problem that 
has been seriously neglected in the past. It has become a
more important problem since state spending has Increased so
66greatly in the last twenty or twenty-five years. There are 
also signs that fiscal problems on the state level will be
^Shultz and Harriss, 0£. cit., p. 57k*
65Infra, pp. 7*i--75.
66Eugene A. Myers, Revenue Estimation and State 
Fiscal Management,11 National Tax Journal. XI, No. ij. (December, 
1958), 3*4-7-53.
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even greater in the future. Finally, if capital planning or 
capital budgeting is adopted as is recommended by most fiscal 
experts, the states must of necessity make long-range projec­
tions and plans. The collection and analysis of adequate 
information is a responsibility of government which is 
necessary if the common good is to be furthered because
collecting information is basically a method of helping to
67determine what is the common good. Decisions about taxa­
tion, services offered, and borrowing all depend upon
68projections of revenue yields.
Much of the progress that has been made in the use of
estimation techniques and machinery in capital budgeting has
come from legislative committees acting somewhat upon their
own initiative when they have been dissatisfied with
available information. Taxpayers* research groups are also
69important in this area of research. These groups can help 
to force the government to accept its responsibilities in
67James H. Maloon, "The Progress of Research at State 
and Local Levels," Proceedings of the Fiftieth Annual Confer­
ence on Taxation (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: National Tax
Association, 1958), pp. 298-99.
/ Q
Myers, op., cit., pp. 3lj.7-lf.8.
69Carlton ¥. Tillinghast, "Governmental Research by 
Private Agencies," Proceedings of the Fiftieth Annual Confer­
ence on Taxation (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: National Tax
Association, 1958), pp. 318-22.
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providing adequate information. Where governmental research
units are operating, the taxpayer groups are also useful in
checking the official figures and perhaps in supplementing
70them in certain instances. Research units, as they exist 
today, have at least succeeded, in most cases, in moving 
away from the "rule of thumb" method of estimating revenue 
which was still used by a majority of states as late as 
1952.71
Obviously the whole process of revenue estimation in 
capital budgeting will be very complex if it is based on 
realistic assumptions— it must be complex since it deals 
with such a complicated problem. The technical nature of 
the problems together with this complexity indicate that a 
certain amount of specialization must be involved if the 
estimation of state revenues is to be done thoroughly. The 
following recommendations would seem to conform to the idea 
of capital budgeting and the method of establishing it.
First, it is recommended that the Division of the Budget be 
given responsibility for making final decisions. However, it
70For an example of a typical project conducted by the 
Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, supra, p. 61̂.,
71See Lawrence A. Leonard, "State and Local Govern­
mental Revenue Structures— A National and Regional Analysis," 
National Tax Journal, XI, No. 1 (March, 1958), 67-77? and 
Myers, op. clt.. pp. 350-51, for examples of statistical 
techniques which have been applied to revenue estimation.
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is also recommended that this agency employ a systematic 
method for making the estimates and that this systematic 
method should "be formulated hy a research unit within the 
Budget Division. Individual estimates probably should 
originate from the various agencies responsible for collect­
ing taxes and other revenues. A research unit could be 
utilized to check and evaluate these tax and revenue projec­
tions and to assemble the various estimates. Estimates 
could then be checked by independent tax and fiscal experts. 
Prom these sources, the Division of the Budget could then 
make its final report which should Include an explanation of 
the bases of the projections. The various units Involved,
but especially the research unit, would be expected to con-
72stantly analyze and review the latest pertinent data.
After revenue estimates are made, the next step In
setting up the capital budget is one of determining physical 
73needs; available facilities must be Inventoried and future 
needs must be estimated. This determination would probably 
best be initiated on the departmental or agency level with 
objective review by some central administration agency that
7%yers, 2E* clt.. p. 353.
'^Chatters and Hillhouse, op., cit., p. 3614-.
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is responsible to the executive branch. Capital improve
ment needs then can be listed chronologically in order of 
their relative importance in the £-, 6 -, or 1 0-year capital 
budget.
After physical needs have been considered and weighed 
by a central agency, the next step is to try to reconcile 
these needs and the ability to pay. If ability to pay is 
sufficient to care for the needs, the state probably should 
shift to a pay-as-you-go basis and restrict borrowing to 
approved purposes other than for capital improvement, On 
the other hand, if the physical needs outstrip the ability 
to pay, the traditional approach is one of adopting a 
partial pay-as-you-go program to whatever extent it is
75possible.
The pay-as-you-go or partial pay-as-you-go system has 
been widely accepted for many years as the soundest approach 
to the financing of public improvements. It has much to 
recommend it--it is a cautious approach that is appropriate 
to a problem which has such long-term implications. If 
needed revenues can be obtained by means of existing taxes,
has made a similar proposal that would create a planning 
agency to review construction requests and a management sec­
tion to check on office space utilization. See Public Affairs 
Research Study No. 69» pp. ^-5*
Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana
791 -^Chatters and Hillhouse, op., cit.. pp. 362-68
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or if needs are not pressing, it may be possible to raise
taxes soon enough to finance the planned improvement. The
character of the spending will also have a bearing upon the
efficacy of pay-as-you-go relative to borrowing. The more
regular the amount spent on improvements, then the more
feasible it is to shift to a pay-as-you-go basis because
there is more opportunity to plan taxes to take care of the
needs. The main advantage claimed for pay-as-you-go is that
it saves on interest costs; capital improvements reputedly
can be supplied more cheaply if the timing of the improve -
ment is not affected. Of course, lower interest costs
' 77will enable more capital improvements to be made. A second 
advantage which is sometimes claimed for the pay-as-you-go 
system is that costs are felt immediately, forcing more
78economical planning and eliminating extravagance.
 ̂Other advantages that have been noted are that 
pay-as-you-go saves on bond issue expenses and on referenda 
or the costs of amending constitutions. Prank Amandus Neff, 
Municipal Finance With Emphasis on Trends Since 1900 (McGuin 
Publishing Company, 1939), p. llj.0.
77This theory does not take into consideration the 
different effect that a secular trend of rising prices would 
have on a pay-as-you-go program as opposed to a long-term 
debt program. The long-term debt may prove to be cheaper in 
the long run if the timing of the improvement is advanced by 
brrrowing and thus entails lower construction costs.
^Chatters and Hillhouse, op. cit., pp. 375-80?
Shultz and Harriss, ojd. cit., pp. 57^-T^J and Hillhouse, 
op. cit., pp. 1 1, Jjl|-1 , 4557
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There is, however, one basic difficulty with the
pay-as-you-go system for state financing— it simply does not
provide a guide for the state that cannot pay but still needs
improvements. There is also a semantics problem involved.
It should be recognized that so-called ’’pay-as-you-go*’
really means "pay-before-you-go.” Present taxpayers are
asked to pay now for highways or other improvements that
will be enjoyed only by those around to use them after they
have been constructed. A public improvement financed by
bonds retired over the life of the improvement may involve
greater equity. Besides promoting equity in some cases,
borrowing permits benefits to be derived from the use of
improvements years before they could be provided on a pay-as-
you-go or "pay-before-you-go" basis and permits savings to
79be realized if there Is inflation of costs. Finally, the 
pay-as-you-go plan ignores the fact that certain improve­
ments have the ability in themselves to increase state 
Income. Borrowing, therefore, Is sometimes more appropriate 
than pay-as-you-go financing of capital improvements, and it 
definitely has a place in capital budgeting.
?9ross, Financing Highway Improvements in Louisiana, 
p. 18; and Neff-, 0£. cit.', p. IqO.
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Whether a borrowing plan or a pay-as-you-go plan is 
adopted, many real benefits can be realized from capital 
budgeting.
It gives perspective and method to capital 
spending and enables state officials and 
legislators to see the whole picture and thus 
to keep the various parts in correct propor­
tion. . . . its own reasonableness and logic 
and the publicity which goes with the plan 
give it considerable weight.SO
Perhaps the most important benefit of capital budgeting is 
the step that it makes toward planning commitments in rela­
tion to the ability to finance these improvements. Another 
striking advantage, however, is that needs of one state 
agency are reviewed relative to the needs of other agencies. 
Not only do priorities become clearer, but this comparison 
of needs should also serve to eliminate some overlapping 
projects. Finally, of course, there results an orderly
81arrangement of public needs in the order of their urgency. 
The result of this scheduling is an increase in social 
benefits.
Leaving the area of capital construction, a third 
major justification for the use of credit an the state level 
is to smooth budgetary Irregularities. Government spending
®°Ratchford, American State Debts, p. 590. 
^Public Affairs Research Study No. 69, p. 3.
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cannot easily be stabilized and tax revenues are often 
received on annual or quarterly terms. The discrepancy 
between the timing of expenditures and receipts makes some 
borrowing necessary, but this would justify only short-term 
borrowing
Borrowing for refinancing is another purpose for 
which credit has been used, but it is of relatively limited 
importance on the state level. Refinancing can refer to 
renewing a maturing bond issue by more borrowing. This type 
of refinancing or refunding is widely disapproved because it 
is an indication that the state has not made adequate provi­
sions for debt retirement. The term "refinancing," however, 
has other more pleasant connotations. Another type of 
refinancing has to do with the calling of debt prior to matu­
rity. Circumstances sometimes permit the refinancing of 
debt on terms more favorable to state governments. This 
benefit is dependent on the states having had the foresight
On
and the opportunity to reserve the call option.
Other refinancing which is somewhat less common would 
be the calling and converting of certain issues so that 
annual maturities can be rescheduled in more manageable form.
^Shultz and Harriss, op. cit., pp. 576-77.
®3ibid., p. 590. For a discussion of the call 
option, infra, p. lllj..
Finally, a less desirable type of refinancing would be the
8i(.funding of short-term issues into long-term debt.
The final reason for borrowing is to influence income 
and unemployment. But, this type of borrowing is not uni­
versally approved for states, and many would severely restrict 
its use on that level. The orthodox view on the role of 
state borrowing in fiscal policy apparently is that states 
should cooperate with the Federal government, while remem­
bering that they are not in a position to borrow to the same
86extent as the Federal government. The argument is that 
reluctance on the part of prudent state governments should 
result from the assumption that their debts are not inter­
nally held debts as is the Federal debt. States are 
considered to be in a midposition between individuals and 
the Federal government but more comparable to individuals. 
Repayments of externally held debts are thought to place a
D
real burden on the state and on its citizens. Furthermore, 
the state’s resources for servicing and repaying debts are
8IlShultz and Harriss, 0£. cit., p. 577.
85Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 562-63; and 
Hansen and Perloff, op. cit., pp. 53~54-*
^Groves, ojd. cit.« p. 577.
0*7
'The orthodox view about debt has recently been 
severely attacked. See James M. Buchanan, Public Principles 
of Debt (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1958),
p. 223.
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more limited than those of the Federal government. States
also differ in that they do not have the monetary powers of
88the Federal government.
Many fiscal authorities appear to he inclined to
accept as satisfactory any state fiscal policy that does not
seriously Impede the counter-cyclical policy followed by the
Federal government. This opinion is based upon the premise
that state fiscal policy has tended to aggravate business
cycles. But recent studies seem to indicate that this was
not really the case during the thirties. If this new thesis
is correct, there should be little or no difficulty in
satisfying a minimum requirement that the states not
intensify fluctuations and make more work for the Federal
government. These new findings would also seem to suggest
that perhaps the above requirement should be reviewed with
the thought in mind that the states might be able to make a
larger contribution and cooperate more in the area of fiscal
89
policy if it should ever be necessary,
88Groves, 0£. cit.. p. 568; and Ross, "State-Local 
Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth," p. 69.
®^Ansel M. Sharp, "The Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Role 
of State Governments During the *Thirties*," Rational Tax 
Journal. XI, Ro. 2 (June, 1958), 138-Zj.5» and Ross, ^'State- 
Local Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth," pp. 68, 75-77*
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When It Is Not Proper to Borrow
Since the careful planning of debt policy is the 
first step toward establishing a sound credit structure on 
the state level, this planning has recognized the conditions 
in which the use of credit is proper. It may be pertinent 
also, however, to examine purposes for which borrowing 
normally is not considered appropriate. Perhaps the great­
est danger of listing "improper" purposes Is that these will 
tend to become inflexible. Obviously, there can be no 
standard of what is proper that will endure the various 
financial, economic, and political changes that come in 
time. For this reason, a list of improper purposes may be 
inappropriate for a constitution and especially undesirable 
if the constitution is extremely difficult to amend. With 
these reservations about establishing a lasting standard, 
however, it is worthwhile to review the conventional views 
as to when borrowing Is proper. These conventional views in 
municipal finance naturally focus on financial factors and 
do not consider political and social forces which some 
people may consider even more important. This conventional 
financial approach was taken by Chatters and Hillhouse when 
they concluded that bonds should not be issued for the 
following:
(a) Subsidies to private enterprise, . . .
(b) Unneeded capital Improvements. . . .
77
(c) Minor capital expenditures. . . .
(d) The purchase of movable equipment. . .
(e) Deficits in the operating budget.
(f) Emergency relief purposes. . . .  go
(g) Regularly recurrent capital expenditures. . .
These rules were formulated with municipal or other local
forms of government specifically in mind, but they are
applicable to some extent to state governments as well.
Some of these rules have been arrived at by historical
analysis. The violation of some of these rules accounted
for many of the defaults and repudiations of state debt
which took place in the nineteenth century. The various
principles are worth reviewing separately.
The granting of subsidies to private enterprise is
undesirable on several counts. First, it opens the state*s
credit to political abuse. Certain influential or
"favorite11 groups have been the ones to get this state
backing in the past, and there is a good chance that collu-
91sion with the legislatures will take place. Another 
difficulty which is involved in the providing of subsidies 
to private industry is that public officials, perhaps not 
well trained in business matters, would have to pass judgment 
about the chances of success of private businesses. These 
state subsidies would also have one danger that is present
9°Chatters and Hillhouse, op. cit., p. 353. 
^Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 172-7£.
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in tariffs; private industries subsidized by the states
might tend to become dependent and continue to demand help
from the state. Still another possibility is that private
industry would put the states in the positim of having to
compete with each other. Industries could begin "whipsaw"
tactics that could eventually lead to widespread state
subsidies to Industry. Another objection to subsidies is
that capital no longer is so scarce in the United States
that worthy ventures essentially suited to private ownership
are unable to get sufficient capital without the help of the 
92state.
The use of state credit for "unneeded" capital 
improvements--extravagences— is traditionally considered 
undesirable. Normally, there should be a clear need before 
any expenditure is made and a still greater need before the 
expenditure is financed by borrowing. The obviousness of 
this general rule has not precluded its violation in the 
past, and for this reason it cannot be omitted. The same 
thing can be said about borrowing to finance minor capital 
Improvements, to finance regularly recurrent capital
9 2Ibid., pp. 5 8 7-8 8 .
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93expenditures, to cover deficits in operating budgets, to 
purchase movable equipment, and to finance minor emergency 
spending. In the aggregate, these expenditures are recurrent, 
and they should be provided for by means other than borrowing. 
The frequent sale of small bond issues to finance such 
expenditures is also undesirable because this type of borrow­
ing is generally expensive and complicated.
One of the recent types of borrowing that is not
considered proper by financial standards is borrowing for
veterans* bonuses. Bonus borrowing is somewhat different
from the Confederate pension borrowing that took place in
some of the Southern states. The Issuance of bonds in order
to finance cash bonuses became a major reason for borrowing
only after World War II, although some borrowing for this
914-purpose did occur in the 1920*s. Two objections are 
commonly directed against veterans* bonus borrowing. First, 
it Is felt that the obligation to veterans Is primarily an
91Regularly recurrent capital expenditures are not as 
patently unsuitable purposes for debt financing as are some 
of the other items listed above. The principal reason for 
their Inclusion at this point is that there Is an alternative 
which sometimes Is more desirable— a pay-as-you-go system.
The pay-as-you-go system was discussed in connection with 
conditions under which It was considered proper for the state 
to borrow. Supra, pp. 69-71.
^Ratchford, American State Debts. pp. 26I4., 313-32.
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obligation that must be settled on the national level. 
Secondly, and this is a value judgment, many feel that 
states should reserve the use of their credit for more
95urgent purposes than to pay bonuses. A third possible 
objection is that borrowing should be reserved largely for 
lasting and tangible benefits normally associated with 
capital improvements. Veterans' bonuses are highly ephemeral 
benefits.
Safe Amounts to Borrow
Once it has been determined that spending is desirable,
that no other method of financing is appropriate, and that
the particular purpose of the borrowing is a proper one, the
next question is one of determining the amount that can
safely be borrowed. There must be a determination of the
maximum debt load which the economy can safely bear and then
it must be ascertained whether or not the particular issue
in question exceeds this limit. Thus, a particular project
may be a distinctly proper subject for borrowing, but the
state may already have reached the limit beyond which it
cannot safely borrow. Obviously, if the state has reached
96
this point, it cannot justify further borrowing.
^Shultz and Harriss, o£. cit., p. 578.
^Ratchford, American State Debts. p. 561f..
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When a question of safety is involved, therefore, 
there must be some method of determining what the maximum 
debt burden should be for the governmental unit involved. 
This problem is basically a matter of determining ability to 
pay, and it encounters some of the same perplexing diffi­
culties that arise when taxpaying ability is being 
97me asured. 1
The ability of a state to bear debt burdens will 
depend in the first instance upon some very general factors. 
The population and population density, the wealth, income, 
and resources of the state, the character of the state*s 
economy (the degree of industrialization and urbanization), 
the state’s tax revenues, and the economic characteristics 
of the region of the country in which the state is located 
will all have some influence upon the state's ability to
98bear debt. Other factors influencing ability are the less 
tangible factors, such as the political stability of the 
people and their representatives and their collective 
attitudes toward debt. The tax philosophy of a people as 
evidenced by tax and debt limitations is also a pertinent
9?Shultz and Harriss, o£. cit. , pp. 19^-96.
98Chatters and Hillhouse, ojc, cit., pp. 391-93;
J. I. Bogen (ed.), Financial Handbook (third edition; New 
York: The Ronald Press Company, 19^0), pp. 298-300; and
Leonard, o]3. cit., pp. 70-71.
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issue. Some of these factors cannot he measured at all
and others can be only approximated.
One method of measuring ability is to select certain
factors which suggest ability and to combine them into an
index number to try to measure debt-bearing ability. For
example, an index designed by Edna Trull is based upon the
following factors: Federal income tax returns, retail sales,
the number of motor vehicles, per capita property values,
100
savings deposits, and gasoline consumption.
Some other more specific measures of debt-bearing 
ability are ratios of debt to single series which represent 
at least roughly the wealth or income of the state. Some of 
these measures are: (!) the ratio of net debt to assessed
valuation of taxable property; (2 ) the rate at which debt 
can be increased; (3 ) the safe per capita net debt loads;
(1̂) the ratio of debt service to total expenses; and
qq'These factors and other tests that follow, of 
course, are the very same factors that investment bankers 
analyze in determining the risk involved before making bids 
on any issues. These factors are also related to those that 
the investor services use in assigning bond ratings— they 
represent a state's credit position. Supra, pp. 2pl — -
■*-^Edna Trull, Resources and Debts of the Forty-Eight 
States (New York: Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., Municipal Service
Department, 1937)> PP. 91-105. See also Ratchford, Arnerican 
State Debts, pp. 528-33*
(5 ) the ratio of revenues to proposed debt service require- 
101ments. These measures are somewhat arbitrary and crude
indications of taxpaying and debt-bearing ability. The
first of these ratios, the ratio of debt to assessed property
values, has been used ^perhaps more widely than the other
concepts to arrive at ability, but this measure is losing
favor because of the instability of assessed valuations and
because of the declining importance of property taxes on the 
102state level.
The second idea above, that which stresses rates of 
increase rather than debt totals alone, takes cognizance of 
the fact that the timing of repayments is a more critical 
factor than just the total amount that will have to be 
repaid. The translation of all debts into a per capita base 
is beneficial if it makes the burden more comprehensible, 
but, of course, no fixed norm can be given that would be of 
any value. Any per capita debt figure will probably need to 
be revised frequently, but it may be useful for comparison 
with per capita revenue and per capita tax totals and for 
comparison with other states. A comparison of various per 
capita ratios from several states, especially those with
^^Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. cit.. pp. 356-57; &n3 
Financial Handbook, pp. 2 9 8-3 0 0 .
■'■^Chatters and Hillhouse, op. cit., pp. 356-57*
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better debt and financial histories, provides still more
information for the establishment of standards for safe 
107borrowing. J
The weight of debt service in the total budget has
been used as an indication of debt-bearing ability in the
past. Chatters and Hillhouse, in speaking primarily of
municipal debt, concluded that debt service should not
exceed 25 per cent of the total annual budget. This debt
service would include not only the interest requirements,
but also a sum equal to 5 P©r cent of the,principal.
Retirement of 5 P©r cent of the principle every year would
imply, of course, that the debt should not exceed twenty
1 0i(.
years in its maturity feature. While it seems to be 
desirable for the state to weigh carefully such factors, it 
is doubtful that inflexible norms are valid for all circum­
stances. Too much rigidity is to be avoided because of its 
conflict with the nature of debt management.
The various traditional measures of safety mentioned 
above shed some light on a very important problem, but there 
are still other factors that need to be considered. Any 
Judgment about the safety or suitability of borrowing 
depends to a large extent upon what assumptions have been 
made about economic conditions and about government's
103Ibid. Ibid.
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responsibilities in each of these circumstances. These 
economic conditions may be secular or cyclloal ones. A 
further characteristic that would have a great and a compli­
cating influence on determining the proper policy to follow 
is whether the short and the long-term changes in economic 
conditions are real or illusionary. Real economic growth 
may or may not accompany a long-run inflationary trend. 
Cyclical changes can be real changes in economic activity or 
changes in national income resulting mainly from changing 
price levels.
Has economic growth been assumed or is secular stag­
nation the thesis? Does it appear that inflation is the 
long-run problem? Has it been assumed that severe cyclical 
declines in business activity are no longer a threat? Is
one of the assumptions that depression is still likely and
10£
that states should engage in fiscal policy action? These 
different assumptions greatly affect the problem of whether 
a state should borrow and whether it can borrow with safety. 
If economic conditions can affect the question of safety and 
timeliness of borrowing, then the safe limit will change from 
time to time as economic conditions change. Therefore, there
105The theoretical base for fiscal policy seems to be 
shifting. Some of the important Implications of a reexami­
nation of the consumption function and Its effect on fiscal 
policy are noted by Ross, "State-Local Fiscal Policy and 
Economic Growth," pp. 7 0-7 7 .
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can be no universal rule as to what constitutes safe state 
borrowing.
If real economic growth is predicted, the state may
be justified in taking this into consideration in planning 
106its borrowing. This real growth would tend to Increase 
any safe limit upon which the state has previously settled. 
It would be prudent, however, to inquire whether the assump­
tion of real growth has been tacitly made all along.
Growth in real terms may or may not be accompanied by 
long-run inflationary tendencies. What Is the implication 
if long-term increases in price levels are assumed? How 
does the case of secular inflation affect the questions of 
safety or suitability of borrowing? A long-run inflationary 
trend not accompanied by real growth would still mean that 
the state's nominal revenues would increase, and, in the 
absence of escalator clauses in indenture provisions, the 
relative debt burden would decline. Secular Inflation, of 
course, would normally be considered advantageous to debtors 
because it is assumed that their incomes will increase 
thereby making it easier for them to pay their debts. State 
governments are no different from other debtors In this 
respect--Inflation will generally Increase state revenues
"^^William D. Ross and Bernard P. Sliger, "Dedication 
of State Revenues in Louisiana," Louisiana Business Review 
XXII (April, 19^8), 23.
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and make debt service less burdensome. If a state govern­
ment expected that the nation*s economy would experience
continued long-term inflation, the logical thing to do might
1 0?be to borrow to finance its major capital expenditures.
Borrowing under long-term inflationary conditions may result
in a saving to the state because improvements that are made
possible by borrowing cost less than they would after several
108years of inflation. Savings in construction costs may
more than offset interest costs on bond financing. If this
reasoning is carried even further, the conclusion may also
be reached that the state should borrow as much as it can,
and perhaps more than it really needs for immediate capital
improvements in order to avoid rising construction costs In 
109the future. Planning based upon this assumption might
] 07Ross, "State-Local Fiscal Policy and Economic 
Growth," p. 7 6 .
^®Carl H. Chatters, "Municipal Finance Needs v.
Credit Restrictions," Municipal Finance. XXX, No. 1 (August, 
1957), 17.
10^Chatters did not reach this conclusion in the 
article mentioned in the footnote above, but Instead he 
emphasized that high interest rates made it Important that 
greater attention be paid to the planning of construction 
programs. " . . .  delete as well as defer. Greater selec­
tivity is highly desirable. In other words, consider 
whether a project is necessary— is it necessary now— is it 
desirable or necessary enough so that it should be done 
Immediately even at a high price?" Ibid., p. 1 7 .
This conclusion is a conservative one that is probably 
the only responsible advice that could be given to all state
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even call for longer term borrowing and maximum payment 
deferments in order to take advantage of rising prices and 
increasing state revenues. Just how far the individual 
state should go in this type of inflationary debt policy, of 
course, is a difficult question to which there apparently is 
no clear or complete answer at the present time.
The last conclusion above— which suggests that the 
safe limit to state borrowing may be raised--is based on the 
assumption of inflationary bias alone. But this need not be 
the case--the long-term upward trend of pr.ices might be 
associated with economic growth in the real sense. If the 
inflationary bias assumption is combined with expectations 
of real growth, the conclusion about increases in ability to 
borrow and to service debt is reinforced. Borrowing by the 
individual state might be more appropriate under this combi­
nation of circumstances than in any other.
If It is decided that instead of economic growth 
there will be secular stagnation,--long-term equilibrium at 
less than full employment--the conservative approach would
and local governments faced with high interest rates and 
inflation. The suggestion that Inflation would lead logically 
to the policy of premature borrowing and building would not 
be consistent with the objective on the aggregate level of 
preventing inflation. However, If the concern is only with 
a single state, the suggestion of premature borrowing is not 
so preposterous.
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probably dictate a stable or even a reduced debt limit. On 
the other hand, the impact of the stagnation idea might well 
be an expanded role for state governments with continual 
large-scale spending and attendant borrowing if it is decided 
that it is proper for state governments to try to help to 
compensate for stagnation.
What are the consequences of debt management if 
fiscal authorities assume that the economy is still subject 
to short-run fluctuations in business activity? Short-run 
conventional fiscal policy would call for reduction in 
borrowing in advance of depression--cyclical declines in 
real income. The same conservative approach would call for 
reductions in borrowing in anticipation of national income 
declines resulting purely from falling prices. Both cyclical 
situations would reduce ability to pay debts. Again, 
however, the question of safety may not be paramount and 
many would question the traditional approach and consider 
borrowing appropriate if it aided in preventing depression 
and deflation. Furthermore, if the assumption about depres­
sion turned out to be correct and the state found itself in 
a depression, the state might find depression no longer a 
restraining influence on borrowing but rather a stimulant. 
Depression might make secondary the usual concern for safety 
in state borrowing and might bring about large-scale public 
works programs financed by borrowing. This case suggests
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that the question of borrowing is not only a question of 
whether borrowing is safe--perhaps a more important question 
might be whether it is appropriate or necessary.
Still another possibility would result from a combi­
nation of the various short-run possibilities. The recession 
of 195>7 -1 9 5 8 is an indication that depression and deflation 
are not necessarily synonymous--recession accompanied infla­
tion at that time. What is the traditional policy if this 
alternative must also be faced? The traditional debt manage­
ment reaction to this would probably be that the recession 
would eventually result in a matching deflationary tendency 
and that this would require restrained borrowing in antici­
pation of the recession-inflation. On the other hand, the 
same reasoning that was applied in the situation above might 
result in large-scale borrowing for two different reasons:
(l) in order to avoid recession; and (2 ) if the recession 
comes with its inflation, to borrow in order to finance 
counter-cyclical policy as well as to realize savings in 
construction costs.
Finally, what if it were evident to everyone's satis­
faction that there are to be no more depressions? The state 
would be relieved of a very great restraint in this situation. 
According to the traditional debt management approach, there 
would be no need to gear borrowing to the lower ability 
which would come during recession. On the other hand, the
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assumption that there will be no recession would eliminate 
the need for short-run counter-cyclical borrowing, and it 
would make possible the planning of public works and asso­
ciated borrowing on a capital budget basis strictly according 
to need. Even more important a result of this change might 
be its effect upon the financial market. The market is 
where the restraints resulting from the fear of depression 
are made effective.
The question of whether it is safe or appropriate for 
a state to borrow will depend, therefore, on a great many 
things and will go much further than ratios of debt measures 
to ability measures. Each period may have its own set of 
factors which indicate that borrowing is or is not appro­
priate or safe. Furthermore, it would not be fair to 
review the suitability or safety of borrowing in any past 
period of time except in the light of what the most accepta­
ble economic thinking was at that time. The conclusions 
about what was safe or appropriate borrowing in the 1 9 2 0's, 
therefore, may be different from conclusions in the 1 9 3 0*s 
and both may be different from conclusions applicable to the 
period since World War II,
Whatever criterion or criteria are finally settled 
upon as the test of whether or not the borrowing should 
proceed, it should again be emphasized that each particular 
project must have merit on the basis of being a worthy or
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proper purpose for borrowing. Then, if it is also safe or
appropriate for the state to borrow, the borrowing can
proceed.
Machinery for Debt Management
Another basic problem involved in debt planning is 
that of providing efficient machinery for handling debt.
The broadest aspects of this problem are related to the 
questions, considered elsewhere, about whether authorities 
should be used, whether bonds should be direct or indirect
obligations, and whether debt should be serviced from a
single or a dual source of funds or from many. Should bor­
rowing be the responsibility of one state board or should it 
be in the hands of half a dozen or so agencies, authorities, 
commissions or boards? It does not necessarily follow that 
any one board could manage all of a state's borrowing more 
efficiently than could several agencies--the one board could 
be completely uninformed or inefficient. However, if it is 
assumed that a single board or a pair of state boards are 
using the same rules of debt management that the individual 
agencies are using, then single or dual board systems would 
probably be more effective because of their ability to control 
the debt structure and their more efficient use of personnel 
and facilities. It may be that a single board would be the 
most efficient system possible; however, it does not appear
93
that this is absolutely necessary. It may be more realistic
to recognize that separate financing of highways (basically
because of the benefit principle) has become deeply engrained
in the American state governments. There would seem to be
no reason why a system of dual boards— one for highway finance
and another for other state finance— could not be made to 
110work. The use of one or two major boards to handle all 
of a state’s borrowing would help to eliminate much of the 
complexity and instability that is so objectionable in the 
market. Bond ratings under such a debt structure would 
normally be better and interest rates would tend to decline.
The debt management unit or units should probably be 
an integral part of the state government in the form of a 
board or administrative unit in the executive branch of the 
government. It is neither necessary nor desirable that debt 
management be divorced from the normal channels of govern­
ment as it has been in agency or authority borrowing in 
recent years. Agencies, authorities, commissions— whatever 
they are called— appear to have become more and more inde­
pendent and free of the regular checks and balances In state 
government. The result tends to be complexity and widely
110The Louisiana Legislative Council study of states 
with Aaa ratings showed that several of these states made 
special provisions, including dual funds, for highways. 
Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9, PP. 16-32.
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different debt management policies, for example, in the
timing of bond sales And in the indenture provisions used in 
111the issues.
The ideal state debt management unit would vary some­
what from state to state, depending upon existing state 
governmental structures. It can be suggested, however, that 
the debt management unit might have four important functions. 
One important function would be to aid in the formulation of 
a capital budget and to make recommendations about the need 
and timeliness of borrowing to the legislature and the 
governor. Recommendations should include advice on how bills 
or constitutional amendments should be written to make pos­
sible better debt management. It does little good to have a 
team of experts handling debt if authorizations prevent 
sound management practices. Secondly, when authorization to 
borrow has been provided, the actual process of borrowing 
should be turned over to the debt management unit, A constant 
study of market conditions, the economy, and developments in 
the theories of public finance would put the management unit 
in a position to borrow on the best terms possible. Funds 
raised by borrowing could then be turned over to the regular- 
agencies of government for their distribution as provided in 
the various authorizations.
^•^Louisiana agency borrowing during the 19IpT —19^9 
period is a good example of this. Infra, Chap. V, pp. 356-59.
A third function of any unit would be to retire debt
and to pay interest as it comes due. This duty of the debt
units would include supervision of any funds established to
retire debt serially, by means of sinking fund accumulations
or by use of the call feature. A final Important function
of the administrative machinery would be to engage in debt
112reporting, discussed below.
The discussion here serves only,.to indicate a general
approach that can lead to more efficient management of a
state debt structure. There are probably a number of
specific administrative plans that can be made to work. The
administrative machinery found in the American states that
113have efficient systems is not exactly the same. The
important thing in getting any plan to work is an under­
standing among the different state governmental units of the 
objectives and techniques of good debt management. This 
type of understanding will go a long way toward solving many 
debt management problems, even under the multiple unit 
system of debt management that exists today in many states. 
However, redesign of a complex system may be worthwhile.
The main objectives that should guide such redesign of debt
112Infra, p. 139.
-^Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9> 
pp. 16-32.
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management machinery and a debt structure should be clarity 
and simplicity.
Planning Indenture Provisions
The careful examination of alternative indenture 
provisions can profitably be included in any debt planning. 
Indenture provisions usually include considerations about 
the duration or life of the bonds, their form, and whether 
they are general, limited, or revenue obligations.
The first indenture provision should concern the 
maturity of the loan. Government loans can fall into 
several different categories. First, there are loans which 
are called "perpetual loans." It is possible for governments 
to issue bonds that have no definite maturities. These have 
been used often by European governments, but they have not 
been used by American governments. Of course, American 
governments have devised their own types of bonds, which are 
actually perpetual in nature, although they are not recog­
nized as such. On the state level, a debt is perpetual for 
all practical purposes when no adequate provisions have been 
made for its retirement and it has to be refunded. The 
result of this type of borrowing is that the margin of credit 
that remains and that can be used to meet any crisis or need 
is reduced. It is also possible that the creation of 
permanent debt will tend to weaken the future credit of the
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unit.'1’'1'̂  Also, permanent debts will require interest 
payments and will generally entail great interest expense.
The second type of government loan is the long-term 
loan. Nominal long-term debt often develops into the type 
of perpetual debt described above. This effect would occur 
where the life of an improvement is considered to be the 
proper maturity term. In this case, the issue would be 
retired at the same time that the improvement must be 
replaced, and the replacement of the improvement would 
likely be financed by more borrowing. This procedure is 
sometimes defended on the grounds that improvements should 
be paid for during the whole period when they are in use. 
Generally, however, the length of life of an improvement 
should not be considered anything but the maximum permissible
term and should not be considered the proper life of an
115 116 issue. This rule has often been violated in the past.
The life of the bonds should be as short as possible under
^■^Shultz and Harriss, op_. cit.» pp. 589-90.
^•^Ibid., pp. 591-92; and Ratchford, American State
Debts, pp. £91-92.
116One authority on the subject of highway finance 
remarked that if the life of highway bonds is examined, one 
would probably conclude that some of the issuers of highway 
bonds must have expected the highways to last as long as the 
Roman roads. Edna Trull, Borrowing for Highways (New York: 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., Municipal Service Department, 1937)» 
pp. 50-56.
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the prevailing market conditions and conditions of ability. 
Other things being equal {including economic conditions), 
the shorter the .term involved, the less the cost of the 
borrowing. The sooner debt is repaid, the sooner the state
frees itself to better meet subsequent emergencies or
. 117needs.
It is very likely that the debt activities of a state 
will be more concerned with the long-term loan than with any 
other variety. However, two other varieties of government 
loans are the intermediate loan and the short-term loan.
The intermediate loan is usually thought of as consisting of 
borrowing which matures in periods ranging from one year to 
five years. This type of borrowing has only limited appli­
cation on the state level. Intermediate loans may be used
117Chatters and Hillhouse, ojd. cit.. p. 3$ks 
Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. £91-92; and Neff, op. 
cit.. p. ll|.?n It has been suggested that an additional 
absolute limit be imposed on the life of bonds. Ratchford 
states that bonds should never run for more than twenty- 
five years, regardless of their purpose. While it is 
obvious that shorter maturities will save on costs (except 
perhaps in case of an inflationary secular trend), there 
seems to be little Justification for the insertion of such 
inflexibility into a debt structure. Emphasis should be 
placed on flexibility whenever good management is the goal. 
It is not inconceivable that certain circumstances could 
make longer terms more appropriate. Some port improvements, 
for example, may be expected to have a useful life of more 
than twenty-five years. Also, if there is a stated or tacit 
acceptance of a long-term inflationary trend, the length of 
bond terms may perhaps be extended to take advantage of 
inflated state revenues.
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when a debt has to be refunded, but at the same time it is 
desirable to eliminate it from the structure as soon as 
possible. Another circumstance where it maybe appropriate 
to make an intermediate loan would be where it appears that 
a major refunding of a certain type of debt, say highway 
debt, (or even a revision of the entire debt structure) is 
due in a few years. It is also possible that the interme­
diate term loan may offer such attractive interest rates
from the point of view of the borrower that It is advisable
118for the state to take advantage of it.
Short-term borrowing by state governments takes the 
form of notes or certificates sold to banks or warrants paid 
out to those selling goods and services to the state. These 
short-term instruments were, in the past, often called 
"floating debt." This type of borrowing is somewhat differ­
ent in its application from those just mentioned. It should
properly be used only to smooth out discrepancies between
119expenditures and receipts, and even in this use it should
120be minimized by better budgeting.
•l-l̂ Shultz and Harriss, op.. cit.. p. 592.
11(?Ibid., pp. 5 9 2-9 3 .
I 20Hillhouse, o£. cit., p. k-77 •
100
Methods of Debt Retirement
The problem of debt retirement is closely related to 
the question of the life of bonds. In line with the conclu­
sions reached about short maturities being more desirable, 
it is not surprising that one of the first recommendations 
about the method of debt retirement is that retirement 
should normally begin within the same fiscal year, if 
possible, or at least in the year following the issue of the 
bonds. Payments should also be mandatory and on as regular 
a basis as possible. Serial retirement is usually preferred, 
but sinking fund retirement can be acceptable. Debt retire­
ment requires that plans be carefully laid concerning the 
source of the revenues to be used for this purpose. It has
been recommended that the most productive revenue source be
121
dedicated for debt service. Judging from the criterion
used in rating bonds, however, it might be more appropriate
if all revenues were dedicated for debt service. Total
dedication would make full faith and credit obligations more
meaningful. All revenues could be paid into the single or
122dual funds that were described above. The first charge
upon these funds would be for the debt service requirements
1 21 Chatters and Hillhouse, op. cit., p. 3^5.
122The whole question of dedicated revenues was the 
subject of a special study in the Pro jet in 1954* The recom­
mendation drawn from this study was that dedication of reve­
nues to the service of individual bond issues be abolished.
Pro jet. Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 1175-1220 and Vol. II, pp. 220-2l|..
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of the state*s full faith and credit obligations. These
changes would probably increase tremendously the ratio of
revenues to debt service, improving bond ratings and lower-
123ing interest costs. If only full faith and credit—
general obiigations--were issued, there would then be no 
subsidiary liens, and all debt would be paid on an equal or
12kparity basis.
It is difficult to see how a carefully organized plan 
for debt payment based on full utilization of all of the 
resources of the state could result in anything but very 
high ratings in the bond markets. It is unfortunate that 
the dedication of revenues for debt retirement (with 
resulting inefficiency and added expense of interest costs) 
has been practiced in several states because of institu­
tional deficiencies in policies guiding bond financing.
This is one area in the planning of debt structures that is 
extremely promising.
Kinds of Bonds to Issue
The kind or type of bond will depend upon three major 
characteristics. First, how is the issue to be repaid,
l23These changes could also obviously simplify the 
debt structure and the machinery for administration of the 
debt.
12kRoss and Sliger, op. cit., pp. 20-23.
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serially or by sinking fund accumulations? A second charac­
teristic is the security feature— whether the bonds are 
general obligations or revenue bonds. Finally, the issue
125can be either callable or noncallable.
Mention has already been made of one of the types of
bonds which can be issued; this type is the serial bond.
The serial bond is one in which part of the issue is retired
every year until the issue is completely retired. Serials
126can be of several subspecies. The "straight serial is
an issue that has approximately equal annual payments for
the retirement of principal. If an issue of $1,000,000 Is
involved, it might be paid at the rate of $50,000 for each
of twenty years. This payment schedule would eliminate the
principal and, since the interest charges would be based on
the unpaid balance, the annual amount of interest due would
decline over the years. Thus, in the case of straight
serials, the total annual payments would decline steadily
127from a maximum amount in the first year.
A second major type of serial bond issue is the 
"serial annuity." In this case, the characteristic of the
•'■^Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. cit., pp. 19-21.
126Ibid., and Shultz and Harriss, o£_. eft., p. 598.
127Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. cit., pp. 19-21.
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issue is equality of total annual payments. This equality 
is accomplished by having the serial maturities of the prin­
cipal increase steadily from the first year onward. At the 
same time, the amount of interest paid would be declining 
because the unpaid balance is declining. These divergent 
tendencies can be calculated so that the total payments are 
approximately the same over the life of the issue.
A third type of serial bond is the "deferred serial." 
This type of issue is one in which the initial maturity 
installment is deferred, For example, if an issue is sold 
in 1958 but its first serial block does not mature until 
1963, it would be a deferred serial issue. A final type of 
serial is the "irregular serial" which does not attempt to 
equate either the annual principal payment or the total
annual payment. This type of issue does not have any
129consistent pattern.. These irregular types may be some­
what misleading.because they can give the illusion that pro­
visions have been made for serial retirement while in fact
130there may not be adequate provisions for paying the debt.
128Ibid.
l29Ibid., p. 21.
130Ratchford, American State Debts, p. 269. Infra. 
Chap. V, p. 290, for an example of an irregular serial issue. 
The serial retirement of the Bonus Debt Refunding Bonds of 
1953 comes in the final three years of the life of the issue.
lOLf.
Of the various types of serial bonds, the straight
serial is perhaps best known and is also the most preferable
131under normal circumstances. The reason for the prefer­
ence is that it causes the heavier burden of the debt to be 
carried during the first years of the issue. Heavier burdens 
in the years immediately after the issue are generally 
desirable because they automatically create ", , , a margin
for increasing maintenance costs, or for new capital improve- 
132ments," Of course, the bearing of heavy burdens soon
after issue will also have the effect of reducing the
average life of the bonds and will thereby lower the total
133interest cost of the issue.
The serial annuity tends to be more appropriate if 
the market conditions at the time of issue favor long-term 
borrowing. Since the average life of the bonds is longer, 
or, to put it differently, since the serial maturities paid 
increase over the years, the serial annuity would represent 
a movement toward longer term borrowing. If the circum­
stance should be reversed (that is, if long-term maturities 
carry higher interest rates than the short-term obligations),
■̂ -̂It should not, however, be considered a panacea 
for all debt problems, Hillhouse, op. cit., pp. 260-61, lUjlf..
132Chatters and Hillhouse, op. cit., p, 22,
^•^Ibid.: and Ratchford, American State Debts, p. £67.
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it would then be appropriate to use straight serials instead
1 3kof serial annuities.
A further necessary consideration in selecting the 
maturity characteristic of an issue is a study of the exist­
ing debt structure. If any peculiar maturities have so 
dominated bond financing in the past to the extent that the 
general goal of having declining total annual payments is 
impaired, a special type of serial--deferred or perhaps even 
irregular— may be appropriate. The chances are, however,
135that these types will rarely be used.
The serial bond is not, of course, the only type of 
bond that can be issued. Instead of being either of the 
three varieties of serial bonds described above, an issue 
could consist of sinking fund bonds. This feature of a bond 
issue is closely related to the method of retirement. In 
the case of sinking fund bonds, a fund is established and 
annual contributions are made into the fund so that upon 
maturity there will be sufficient funds accumulated to pay 
off the debt. If this type of bond is issued, the most 
advisable plan is for mandatory levies to be made, and it 
is sometimes considered advisable that these levies be
^■^Chatters and Hillhouse, o]3. cit., pp. 19-23.
X3 W
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incorporated into the bond contract. Perhaps the greatest 
disadvantage in using the sinking fund is that the fund must 
constantly be guarded against raids for other purposes. The 
sinking fund issue can be made to work. The most important 
consideration is that definite provisions be made for repay­
ment of debt so it will not have to be refunded and will not 
become a perpetual debt.^^
Another major decision which must be made in deter­
mining the type of bonds to issue is whether the bonds
137should be general, limited, or revenue bonds. General 
obligations are backed by the full faith and credit of the 
state whereas revenue bonds are payable from more specific 
resources, usually, but not always, from revenues derived in 
the operation of certain enterprises or agencies. Revenue 
obligations are usually not backed by the state's full faith 
and credit. A third category of bonds would be the limited 
or special obligations, also frequently referred to as 
revenue bonds, which are state obligations and payable from 
state revenues, but they are not backed by the full faith 
and credit alone or even primarily. A final category of
•^^Ibld.% p. 3 5 5 ; and Shultz and Harriss, op. cit.. 
pp. 596-98.
^-^Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. cit., p. 355*
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bonds would be direct obligations— those that are issued in
138the state’s own name.
The definitions given previously are not universally 
accepted and caution must be exercised when the terms are
 ̂There is a great deal of confusion in the litera­
ture about the meaning of these various terms. "General 
obligation bonds" are those "Bonds for whose payment the 
full faith and credit of the municipality has been pledged. 
More commonly, but not necessarily, general obligation bonds 
are payable from ad valorem property taxes and other general 
revenues." Ibid,., p. lj.95>.
The reference here to municipalities does not materially
affect the applicability of this definition to state 
obligations.
Even the phrase "full faith and credit" poses certain 
problems. The term has been used to mean not only that the 
state intends payment and pledges all of its credit, but 
also that the full faith and credit obligation has a first 
claim on all ad valorem tax revenues. The full faith and 
credit obligation apparently is also frequently expected to 
be associated with an unlimited ad valorem tax. It is also
sometimes interpreted that full faith and credit obligations
are a first claim on all revenues.
The term "direct" debt is sometimes used almost synonymously 
with the term "general obligations" because it appears that 
general obligations will generally be direct if direct debt 
is defined as "Debt which a government has incurred in its 
own name . . ." Ibid,., p. There are, however, some
exceptions to this. In Louisiana, the full faith and credit 
of the State has been pledged to some agency issues which 
are indirect debts. Infra, Chap. IV, p. 231.
Indirect debt, on the assumption that it is the opposite of 
direct debt, would be debt which is not incurred under the 
name of the government itself, but under some other name.
There is confusion surrounding the terms "limited obligations," 
"revenue bonds," and "indirect debt." The term "limited" 
apparently is used primarily to differentiate from "general" 
obligations or full faith and credit obligations so the
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found in some sources. For example, Moody’s discusses 
Louisiana bonds under two headings: (l) General and limited
obligations, and (2) Bonds of the agencies of the state. In 
this usage, It would seem that limited obligations would still
connotation here seems to be nothing more than that the full 
faith and credit of the state is not pledged. In this sense, 
revenue bonds normally would be considered limited obliga­
tions because the full faith and credit of the state is 
seldom involved. The terms are undoubtedly closely related, 
Ratchford, for example, in the index of his classic book, 
under limited obligations simply refers the reader to revenue 
bonds. Ratchford defines "revenue bonds" as ". . , all 
obligations of political units or their agencies, institu­
tions, or departments which do not bear the full faith and 
credit of any political unit but which are payable from 
certain designated sources of revenue, whether such sources 
be tax revenues, fees, or earnings of proprietary enterprise." 
Ratchford, American State Debts, p. I(.97.
Another similar but narrower definition Is that the revenue 
bond is "An obligation payable solely out of the revenues 
derived from a particular utility or enterprise and not a 
general obligation . . ." Chatters and Hillhouse, og.. cit.,
P. k99.
The Financial Handbook is somewhat different in that it 
includes under the term "revenue bonds" those obligations 
". . . serviced from the revenues of publicly owned facili­
ties rather than taxes." Financial Handbook, p. 300.
These definitions would seem to lead to the conclusion that 
revenue bonds are limited obligations for all practical 
purposes since there is usually no unlimited pledge Involved. 
But, limited obligations and revenue bonds would not neces­
sarily be Indirect debts because they could be issued In the 
state’s own name. Of course, it would be more common for 
the revenue bond to be issued by some agency so that they 
would frequently not only be limited obligations but also 
indirect ones. In view of the difficulties posed by these 
various interpretations, it appears desirable that these 
terms be used in the most general sense and that when a 
certain meaning is involved it will have to be clearly 
explained.
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be considered direct debt so that the breakdown In this case 
is basically one of directness and indirectness. The publi­
cations of the State of Louisiana have not always been
139consistent in their usage of these various terras.
It must be decided which of these types of obliga­
tions should be issued. Should the state use Its own name 
and make the bond a direct obligation, or should the lia­
bility be incurred through some agency, in which case it 
would be an Indirect obligation? As a basic principle, it 
would probably bfe most desirable for the state to use its 
own name and its full faith and credit.
It would appear to be unfortunate that the full faith 
and credit pledges of state governments have been given 
limited and specialized meanings. The ad valorem tax pledge, 
for example, Is of limited value, and if this meaning is the 
only one attached to the bonds, their marketability might 
logically be impaired. There is little chance that the 
meaning of the full faith and credit pledge will ever be 
uniform; however, the state can attach Its own meaning to 
the pledge and make it as narrow or as broad as it wishes.
It would probably be wiser to use the broadest meaning of 
this term. This procedure would be more consistent with the
■^^Moody*s, 1959, pp. I-iv; Biennial Report of the State 
Treasurer (hereinafter referred to as Louisiana, Treasurer* s 
Report). 1922/23-1928/29: Report of the Department of Finance, 
Division of the Budget (hereinafter referred to as Louisiana, 
Financial Report). 19W^-1 9 5 7 / 5 8 .
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use of the word "full" in the full faith and credit pledge. 
It would also be more consistent with the idea of a credit 
standing. The state's advantage in the money market is its 
normally high credit standing. The main advantage which the 
state has that makes its credit so strong is that the state 
has a wide assortment of taxes upon which it can draw to 
make good its word. As in corporation finance, the unit 
with the highest credit standing is the one which can use a 
general pledge most efficiently. Of course, use of the 
state's full faith and credit pledge in its broadest sense 
would have to be accompanied by effective debt reporting. 
(When the question is whether the state should borrow 
directly or through some authority, another analogy to 
corporation finance is suggested. It would be a rare case 
when the large corporation could profit by issuing bonds 
through a smaller and lesser known subsidiary that has 
fewer assets and less attractive prospects for raising 
more.) If a state makes effective use of its full faith and 
credit and does not give it as an afterthought and in a 
meaningless fashion, the full faith and credit guarantee can 
have the weight of a sovereign government pledging all of 
its various resources and revenues first and foremost to 
the honoring of its obligations. The wise use of general, 
direct, and full faith and credit obligations can make state 
borrowing easier and cheaper.
Ill
The general conclusion drawn above cannot always be
applied in the American states today. There are certain
institutional factors which actually force states to issue
less effective and more expensive indirect or revenue bonds.
This unfortunate condition is largely the result of the debt
restrictions which were adopted in most states many years
ago. These restrictions, both statutory and constitutional,
limit the amount of direct or general obligations that can
be issued. The courts have contributed to the growth of
revenue bond financing by ruling that agency funds are
special funds and that debts payable from these funds are
not really state debts. The states thus have frequently
been driven to the use of this subterfuge by well intentioned
but very inflexible laws. This ability of revenue bonds to
circumvent debt limitations when borrowing is imperative is
the only important advantage for this type of borrowing which
llj.0
is recognized by Ratchford. Chatters and Hillhouse do
not approve of revenue issues for this purpose, but they do 
see some advantage in using revenue bonds where credit
Iklstandings are very poor. This conclusion, however, was
Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 512-13.
Simpson views the use of revenue bonds as undesirable but 
apparently necessary. Simpson, op_, cit., p. 3 3 8 .
^■^Chatters and Hillhouse, o]o. cit., pp. 2I1J4.—i+7•
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oriented to municipalities and other local governments, and 
it is doubtful or at least rare for this type of credit 
standing to be associated with a modern American state.
Revenue bonds are subject to serious criticisms on 
financial grounds. The contention that revenue bonds help 
to distribute costs according to the benefit principle has 
not been given much weight. Ratchford points out that the 
benefit theory could be implemented by means of general 
obligations supported by the same fees, charges, and tolls 
that support some of the revenue bonds. Furthermore, justi­
fication of revenue financing because of compatibility to 
the benefit theory assumes that the benefit principle is the 
most equitable method of distributing costs. There is no 
widespread agreement to this effect. Another fallacy in the 
argument that revenue bonds assure the application of the 
benefit principle is that most revenue bonds in state 
financing are serviced by special taxes or state appropri­
ations that often have no relation to the services received
by the contributors. The financial advantages of revenue
li|_2bonds thus are quite limited.
Some of the more direct disadvantages of revenue 
obligations are as follows: (1 ) They are generally more
■^2Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. £12-13; and 
Shultz and Harriss, op.. cit.. p7 &01.
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expensive than full faith and credit bonds. Greater expense 
is the rule because bidders must investigate the bonds more 
carefully before making bids and then the successful bidder 
must exert greater effort to dispose of these bonds, which 
(other things being equal) are less marketable than general 
obligations. (2) They are usually more complex than full 
faith and credit obligations. This greater complexity 
associated with revenue issues normally will be reflected 
in bond ratings as well as in yields. (3) Revenue bonds are 
no match for general obligations in most instances because 
they are protected by limited assets whereas general obliga­
tions can generally draw upon much greater protective assets. 
Usually, of course, the revenue bond is secured only by 
operating revenues while on the other hand the general obli­
gation may be backed by all of the assets plus the taxing 
power of the state. (ip) Revenue bonds are generally not 
subject to any of the traditional controls imposed on borrow­
ing and this is inconsistent if there is a logical basis for•t ] A
control. The use of the general, full faith and credit,
issue thus is normally superior to the use of revenue and
•*-^Daniel M. Kelly, "The Prospective Market for 
^ Municipal Securities," Municipal Finance, XXXI, No. 1 
(August, 1958)» Freeman, op. cit., p. 6 ; Ratchford, 
"State-Local Debt Limitations, pp. 223-25; and Ingler, 
op. cit., p. 262,
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limited bond issues. It can be concluded that state bonds 
should generally be the full faith and credit type.
Another important feature of a bond as well as of a 
debt structure concerns the call option. The inclusion of a 
call feature in a particular issue may or may not be desirable 
depending upon the price that is charged for the privilege. 
However, there are at least four general situations in which 
it may be desirable to include the call provision in an 
issue if the cost of the option is not considered prohibi­
tive r (l) When Interest rates are relatively high and they 
are expected to decline; (2) When revenue bonds are being 
issued and ultraconservative revenue estimates often asso­
ciated with this type of issue make it likely that fupds 
will be available for retiring all or part of the debt prior 
to Its maturity; (3) When the state’s offerings are 
unpopular because of flaws in the state’s debt structure and 
management and something will definitely be done to correct 
these flaws; and (Ij.) When the market is unreceptive to a 
state’s issues but without good cause.
^^Chatters and Hillhouse, oj3. cit., pp. 295-96;
Alan K. Browne, "Municipal Underwriting Syndicates," The 
Commercial and Financial Chroniclet CLXXXI, No.
(Thursday, April 28, 1955), 38; Shultz and Harriss, o£. cit.. 
p. 590? £>. Lvnn Crossley, "Value of Call Feature in
Municipal Bonds, Municipal Finance, XXX, No. 1 (August,
1957), lj-8 .
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The ability to reserve the call option will differ 
somewhat under the various conditions outlined above. It 
will normally be more expensive and less feasible to issue 
callable bonds when market conditions have driven up bond 
yields because this circumstance would be typical of a mar­
ket where the state may have trouble even finding all of the 
funds it may need. The price that is associated with the 
call feature may thus tend to be prohibitive in cases where 
callable bonds appear to be desirable.
The call feature is equally desirable and probably 
much more feasible in the next three cases. A state that 
recognizes flaws in its debt structure and plans remedial 
action should use either short or intermediate term borrowing 
or else long-term borrowing that can be retired--by call-- 
prior to maturity. If the state has significantly improved 
its debt structure and this fact is overlooked or ignored, 
the state should again refrain from creating noncallable 
long-term debt until debt reporting can correct the situation.
The situations above are those in which the inclusion 
of the call feature among the bond provisions would seem to 
be appropriate. A related problem deals with when the 
feature, if it has been included, should be exercised. If 
interest rates are favorable and other conditions are 
favorable, callable bonds of the following descriptions 
should be called: (l) old issues that need to be
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consolidated into a simpler and more effective debt struc­
ture! (2 ) term bonds, in order to convert them into serials
lij.5or otherwise to provide for their retirement; (3 ) bonds
that were sold at unfavorable rates because of structural or 
administrative handicaps which no longer exist; (Ij.) bonds 
that were sold at unfavorable rates because of inadequate 
debt reporting; and (5 ) bonds that were sold in such unfa­
vorable market conditions that a saving can be realized by 
calling and refunding them.
Even with these advantages of the call feature, it 
must not, of course, be concluded that all bonds should 
necessarily be callable. The call feature is not so desira­
ble from the point of view of the investor, and the state 
must expect to pay a slightly higher rate to enjoy the 
privilege.'*'^ It has been recommended that the borrowing 
unit ask for alternative bids on a callable and noncallable
^ Chatters and Hillhouse, op_. cit., pp. 295-96; 
Shultz and Harriss, o£. cit., p. 590; and Crossley, 
loc. cit.
■^^The fact that the cost of the call option may be 
wholly or partly in the form of a premium, which is paid 
when and only if the option is exercised, is a complicating 
factor. It is not clear whether the contingent cost com­
pletely covers the expense of making a more complicated 
analysis before the bids are made. If the entire cost is 
covered, then the state would apparently obtain the call 
option at no cost whatsoever although there would be a cost 
if and when the option is exercised.
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basis in order that the cost of the privilege can be ascer- 
lh.7tained. This technique probably is desirable; uowever,
it may, because of its complexity, increase somewhat the
costs of planning and computing bids and thus eventually the
lk8costs of borrowing. If the consensus in the market is
such that the cost of the call privilege appears to be
exorbitant, then it would be better not to include it.
The three major elements determining the character or
type of bonds described above are: the serial or sinking
fund method of retirement; the use of the state's full faith
and credit pledge as opposed to the use of specific revenue
pledges to secure bond issues; and, the callable or noncalla-
ble nature of issues. Of course, bond issues can consist of
any combination of the three elements and obviously no one
combination can once and for all be considered superior in
all circumstances. Fiscal officials should carefully decide
what conditions will require the use of each of the specific
provisions. Then, it should be easier to apply these criteria
li+9to any particular issue.
Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. cit.. pp. 295-99* 356; 
and Shultz and Harriss, ojc. cit., p. 590.
"'■^Browne, loc. cit. 
l!±9Chatters and Hillhouse, ojc. cit., p. 356.
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III. MANAGING THE ISSUANCE OP BONDS
After the staters borrowing plan has been reviewed 
and It Is decided that an issue is necessary, proper, and 
safe, fiscal authorities are then concerned with the actual 
process of issuing bonds. The problems of issuing bonds 
will depend upon some of the institutional factors that have 
already been recognized. Since the managing of an Issue of 
bonds will depend so much upon such circumstances as the 
legal and financial practices of the time, the principles 
for managing the flotation of bonds obviously cannot be 
detailed ones. Circumstances dictate the best course of 
action not only where the planning of a debt is concerned, 
but especially when the debt is being incurred.
Authorization of Bond Issues
In a case where the state is free of any limitation 
on debt creation, the state legislature usually is completely 
responsible for the authorization of any debt. The legis­
lature can, in this case, authorize either direct (full faith 
and credit) obligations or it may choose to operate indi­
rectly through some agency to issue revenue bonds. The 
first choice would usually be preferable for the reasons 
previously given.
But, either a statutory or a constitutional limita­
tion may prohibit the creation of debt; it may prohibit
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direct or full faith and credit (general) obligations to be 
issued in excess of a certain amount except under certain 
circumstances. These exceptional circumstances generally 
include wars or insurrections and other unlikely events that 
might require the utilization of the state’s credit. In the 
event that the purpose of the borrowing in question is not 
in this special permissible category, the constitutional or 
statutory limitation must be circumvented if borrowing is to 
proceed. If the limitation is a statutory one, the legisla­
ture can free itself without much ado. However, if the
limitation is a constitutional one, it may be very difficult
150
to get the issue authorized. One approach Is to try to
get the constitutional limitation cancelled. States have 
not done this to any appreciable extent. A much more popu­
lar approach is to amend the constitution to permit a 
particular Issue,
It is extremely important, whether debt authorization 
is constitutional or statutory, that authorizations be 
framed or written in such a manner that they are consistent 
with principles of good debt management. Basically, this 
means that authorizations should not run counter to the
■^^Oklahoma voters, for example, rejected every amend­
ment proposing debt creation during the period from 1907 to 
19lj-l. Simpson, op., cit., p. 33I4..
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objectives of simplifying debt structures while increasing 
the protection afforded to bondholders. If these objectives 
are to be achieved, it is imperative that many decisions 
about the nature of the authorized bonds be left to debt 
administrators. Flexibility through lack of detail, there­
fore, should be one of the characteristics of a good debt 
authorization. Another important characteristic of a good 
authorization is the generous use of phrases that will
provide assurance to bondholders and to those who influence
them.
The state has still another method of borrowing even 
where there is a constitutional debt limitation-through 
agencies or authorities. Use of this method is possible 
when there is an appropriate agency and sufficient precedent 
in the courts to the effect that borrowing by this agency 
does not constitute state borrowing. Courts have frequently 
ruled that the bonds issued by state agencies are paid from
"special funds" (the "special fund doctrine") and that obli­
gations payable from these funds are not really state obli­
gations. If they are not state obligations, of course, they
l£lare not subject to the debt limitation provision.
1E>1Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 1)46-66; and 
Ratchford, "State-Local Debt Limitations," p. 221.
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Whatever particular circumstances surround the authori­
zation of a bond issue, required legal steps must be followed 
meticulously whether they concern the procedure for getting 
the constitution amended or whether they outline the steps 
necessary for a state agency to sell bonds. Carelessness at 
this point can cause the whole procedure to be repeated.
Any neglect of the law will also give opponents of the issue
l£2opportunities to delay or defeat the issue. These flaws 
may create uncertainty in the minds of investment bankers 
and investors and cause the bonds not to be well received. 
Dealers are quite conscious of these dangers and usually 
suggest that issuing units consult bond attorneys and often 
insist on unqualified legal opinions regarding the legality 
and regularity of the issue. If the state has not secured 
such an opinion, the bids submitted may be subject to such 
cleanse.153
Pitting the Debt Instrument to the Circumstances
The variables In a debt instrument have been mentioned 
In connection with the general planning of the debt struc­
ture. The basic plan should contain a careful outline of
1^2^ Chatters and Hillhouse, op. cit.. p. 1$.
■i qo^ Fundamentals of Investment Banking, p. 35>9J and 
Browne, op. oj t., p . 37.
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the general conditions under which the alternative features 
should be employed. If this recommended procedure has been 
followed, the problem at this point is to observe conditions 
present in the bond market and in the state’s debt structure 
and to make appropriate choices as to the form of the instru­
ment. This description, however, makes the problem look too 
simple. It is at this stage that the decision is made 
between a serial bond and a sinking fund issue, between a 
full faith and credit or a revenue issue, and between a ealla 
ble or noncallable issue. If there is sometimes a difficulty 
in implementing the most appropriate plans because of rigid­
ity imposed by statutes authorizing the bonds (or by consti­
tutional provisions in some states), then the responsible 
officials should use whatever flexibility they possess to
fit debt instruments to the market conditions and to all of
151+the institutions that confront them.
The term of the new issue should be consistent with 
the life expectancy of the improvement with which it is 
associated, and it generally should mature in an even shorter 
time if this is possible. Any decision about the maturity 
schedule should be influenced somewhat also by the desire to 
have the future debt load declining steadily to make way for
■'-^Chatters and Hillhouse, ojj. cit., p. 17.
new borrowing. It may be important that maturity dates be 
planned to coincide with revenue collections in order that 
there will be a minimum of time during which funds remain 
idle. Another consideration is that savings can be achieved 
in the amount of interest paid by having the first serial 
maturity due within less than a year of the date of issue. 
When this is done, the life of the bond issue will be short­
ened by six months or more, and the interest saved Is at the
155given rate on the whole principal.
Conventional Provisions in Bond Contracts
The provisions in bond contracts are important 
because of their Impact upon the debt structure, but they 
are also Important because they directly influence the 
marketability of an issue. This point might seem to be a 
superficial consideration, but financial institutions and 
individual buyers of municipals are particular In their 
requirements, and failure to take into account their desires, 
even whims, may result in a narrower market, possibly in­
creasing the interest charges that will have to be paid.
Some of the provisions that are considered conventional 
would concern the following details: (l) the date of issue,
1^Ibid., pp. 2 3 - 2k..
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(2 ) denominations of the bonds, (3 ) interest due dates,
156(Li.) places of payment, and (5) maturities.
The date of sale is an important matter because 
unless bonds are dated very soon after the date of sale, the 
investor will have a problem of paying back interest. On 
the other hand, if the bonds are dated ahead of the sale 
date, the dealer is placed in a position of having to specu­
late on what will happen in the future. Finally, the bond 
is really not a legal instrument until the day it is dated, 
and any opinions by attorneys are qualified until that
157time.
A second common provision in bond indentures concerns 
the denomination of bonds. The most acceptable denomination 
for bonds is $1,000. Institutional investors and large 
individual buyers favor this size bond and sometimes even 
larger ones because larger bonds require less bookkeeping 
and coupon clipping and less storage space than would 
several smaller denominations of bonds. Odd amounts are not 
popular even if they are greater than $1,000. If an odd 
amount of bonds is issued, the odd bond or bonds should be
156Ibid., pp. 27-29. The importance of these provi­
sions is evident in the treatment given to them in Moody*s. 
Normally, each one of these details is given for every issue 
described in the manual. Moody*s, 1959» pp. 672-77.
l^Chatters and Hillhouse, oj). cit.. pp. 27-28.
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part of the first serial maturity if the issue is a serial 
158one. This procedure will serve to simplify the accounting
and reporting on the issue. These preferences about the 
denominations are rational, and the state should not hesitate 
to provide the investors what they want.
Investors are also inclined to prefer semiannual 
interest dates over a single annual payment. After it has 
been decided that interest payments will be on a semiannual 
basis, the next question involves a determination of when 
these two pay dates will come. If the date of the issue has 
been decided on the basis of tax receipts, then a date six 
months later will usually be satisfactory as the first
159interest due date.
A third important conventional provision concerns the 
place of payment. The place selected for the payment of 
principal and interest can be the deciding factor for some 
investors. They will usually demand that payment be made in 
a convenient and leading financial center. The thoughtful 
fiscal authority will provide for payment in Chicago, New
York, and one or more of the largest cities within the state
160issuing the bonds.
■L̂ ^Ibid., p. 28; Fundamentals of Investment Banking, 
PP. 353- 5 b > and Browne, 0£. cit., p. 38".
•'■'̂ Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. cit., p. 28.
■L̂ °Ibid_., pp. 28-29; and Browne, loc. cit.
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Still another convenience which is often favored by
bond dealers is the scheduling of serial maturities in
conveniently sized blocks. Dealers prefer annual maturities
161that come in blocks of five to twenty-five or more bonds.
Of course, the size of annual maturities is seldom the 
problem in state finance that it is for local governments. 
Dealers not only find large blocks easier to handle but also 
more attractive to large investors.
Timing the Issue
Proper timing in the issuance of bonds means that
borrowing should take place, insofar as it is possible, when
interest rates are favorable for the state. One authority
162has described it simply as picking the proper spots. This
description gives some insight into the difficulty involved, 
but how does one pick these spots? What are the chances of 
being correct? How important is it to find the right time? 
How often do these opportune times present themselves?
Timing would not be so important or so promising if there 
were not significant changes in interest rates,
i Chatters and Hillhouse, 033. cit., p. 29J and 
Browne, loc. cit.
162George T. Ragsdale, "Revenue Bond Financing and 
Interest Rate Trends," The Commercial and.Financial Chronicle, 
CLXXXVI, No. 5652 {July"Tji7 1 9 5 1 ) , 23.
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The right times or spots should be picked on the
basis of knowledge. Officials must be familiar with the
163literature available in the field, not only as it applies 
to municipals in general, but also as to how the outstanding 
bonds of the state are selling and how recent offerings have 
been received. Attention must also be given to the many 
factors that can influence bond prices. Among the more 
important of these are the tax exempt nature of the obliga­
tion, the maturity terms, the quality of the obligation, 
salesmanship, and the innumerable other factors which influ- 
ence the demand and the supply of these securities.
Many of the factors which influence bond prices are 
subject to rapid changes. Furthermore, knowledge about 
these factors is very imperfect. The probability that the 
timing of particular, issues will be exactly right, therefore, 
is not great. Over a long period, though, careful estimates 
of market conditions— the variables that influence bond 
prices— should prove to be superior to chance placement.
Timing would not be so important or promising if 
there were not significant changes in interest rates. The 
importance of timing in bond sales can be appreciated from a
^^See Chatters and Hillhouse, o]3. cit., p. 33» for a 
list of this material.
^Ragsdale, loc_. cit.
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review of the range of yields in recent years. The current
yields of Aaa state and local bonds during the months from
February through December of 1958 ranged from 2.72 in
February to a low of 2.69 in May and then increased to a
165high of 3.28 in September. For the 1957 calendar year,
the low was 2.79 in February and the high reached 3.^3 in 
166September.
There are, of course, other fluctuations besides 
167seasonal ones, but these highs and lows suggest that 
there may be a significant seasonal pattern to bond yields. 
If there is a seasonal pattern to these yields, one tech­
nique that might be of some value in timing issues would be 
to use a seasonal index such as the one shown in footnote
^Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Federal Reserve Bulletin (Washington: Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, March, 1959), p. 285.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Federal Reserve Bulletin (Washington: Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, February, 1959), p. 165. For an 
example of market conditions conducive to timing in 1956, 
see C. Canby Balderston, "Present Problems and Possible 
Plight of Local Finance," Municipal Finance, XXX, No. 1 
(August, 1957), 10.




168. The recognition and use of a seasonal index such as
this would be only a small part of the over-all knowledge 
that good timing requires, and it is certainly not an infal­
lible method of anticipating market conditions. With these 
important reservations, it is apparent that interest rates 
are normally lower in the spring and early summer and higher
SEASONAL INDEX OF YIELDS OF STATE 
AND LOCAL BONDS RATED Baa
Month
Per Cent of Normal:
Month









January 99.8-- 99.7 July 98.5 98.9February 97.8 9 8 ,2 August 101.9 1 0 2 .1
March 97.5 97.7 September lOJp.O 1 0 5 .2April 97.2 95. k October 1 0 1 .7 1 0 1 .0May 97.il- 98. k November 103 Jl 1 0 5 .6June 97.8 97.3 December 102.3 1 0 0 .6
Source: Computed from information available in the
Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1955-1958* Volumes lj-1—Zpip, and 
April, 19%9~.
&This index was constructed by centering 12-month 
moving averages. The monthly yields used in this computa­
tion date from November, 195*1 to March, 1959 inclusive.
The fact that local issues are included should not 
invalidate the findings since it is logical to expect that 
state and local bonds would be subject to the same forces 
because they are traded together. The Baa rated bonds 
probably typify all bonds as far as any seasonal pattern is 
concerned— there is a very close correlation between the 
interest paid on Baa bonds and that paid on, say, Aaa bonds. 
(Supra, p. ll-lf.). Finally, this index is based on the yields
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in the fall and winter. If this is the case, and the index 
in footnote 168 Is offered as evidence, then it is obvious 
that state bond financing (other things being equal) should 
be timed to take place in the spring months— preferably In 
April. A seasonal index can also be applied more specifically
of outstanding bonds. But, the yields paid on new issues 
are very close to the yields paid on outstanding bonds.
They tend to be slightly higher because new Issues presumably 
represent a more risky investment than tested bonds. The 
point, however, is that yields which must be offered on new 
issues will approximate current yields on similar outstand­
ing securities.
The reasons for this apparent seasonal pattern are 
neither clear nor simple. Probably the most important cause 
is the same factor which tends to influence all interest 
rates: the normal increase in the demand for funds which 
corresponds with the rise in business activity In the late 
months of the year. The increase in the demand for money 
and the availability of investment opportunities elsewhere 
in the economy evidently cause the demand for bonds to 
decline, thereby lowering bond prices and raising bond 
yields. This tendency is most apparent in November and 
December, before and during the holiday season.
The explanation for the relatively high August and 
September yields may rest on another institutional factor. 
Yields in these months seemingly are influenced by the 
apparent practice of financial intermediaries of taking 
vacations as well as by their apparent tendency to slow the 
pace of their activity In general at these times.
Another factor may be that the seasonal pattern is 
partially self-generating. That is, the sale of bonds in the 
early months fixes the interest and principal at Intervals of 
six months. Thus interest and principal payments are being 
paid to the same people who make the demand for the bonds.
This factor would tend to explain the drop in yields In October 
which follows the most active month of April by half a year.
It would be expected that these individuals and Institutions 
would normally tend to return a great portion of these funds 
to the same market. This practice would tend to strengthen 
the demand and drive up prices at regular intervals.
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in estimating yields for future months when historical rates
are available. For example, if the seasonal index for
January {based on the mean) is about normal (100) and the
yields of Baa bonds in that month averaged Ap.0 per cent,
then the average April yields could be expected to be about
3.89 per cent, and the September yields would be around I|.,l6
per cent. These estimates are based on the fact that April
yields average 97.2 per cent of normal and the September
169
rates, IOJ4. per cent of normal. These estimates are based
on the assumption that the seasonal pattern will not change. 
Changes in the trend and cyclical patterns, of course, may 
also upset these estimates, and any irregular fluctuation 
will also influence yields. These other fluctuations would 
require just as thorough a review as would the seasonal 
pattern in the estimation of future yields and in the timing 
of bond offerings.
Timing, especially that based on the use of a seasonal 
index, depends upon whether or not borrowing can be postponed 
for several months without incurring other costs which might 
be prohibitive. An example would be cost incurred as a 
result of uncertainties in the letting of construction 
contracts. Proper planning will thus be the determining 
factor in timing a bond sale. If the issue is planned well
169The change between April and September would be 
even greater If the index based on the median were considered 
more representative.
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enough in advance of the time when the funds will be actually
required, the state will be better prepared to take advantage
of the difference in interest rates that a few months more
170
or less can make. Selling bonds earlier than the funds
will be used entails a cost that must be calculated to see 
if it is worthwhile. The best approach would be to plan 
needs for the favorable periods and to make plans as flexible 
as possible.
Sale of the Bonds
The actual sale of bonds is a highly complicated and 
171
technical operation. The marketing of the issue starts
with advertising and the publication of financial statements. 
A prospectus or circular should always be supplied to finan­
cial institutions and should be very complete as to related 
facts as well as to the details of the specific issue.
After the information has been circulated as widely as 
possible, the next step is to set up the procedure of 
actually soliciting bids. In order to get the widest market 
possible, it is advisable that bond dealers be contacted.
170Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. cit., pp. 31-37-
1711 For an interesting description of the preparations 
carried on by bidders, see "Manning a Market in Municipals," 
Business Week, 0£, cit., pp. 52 ff.
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The guiding principle in these steps always should be to try
172to get as many bids as possible.
The advertisement previously mentioned, which is also 
called the "notice of sale," contains information needed by 
dealers in preparing their bids. The notice of sale, there­
fore, should provide clear and complete information about 
the time and place of the sale as well as the details of the
bidding. The state must make its position clear on all
173questions such as whether or not split-rate bids will be 
entertained, whether the bid can be for only part of the 
bonds, whether all bids can be rejected, whether the interest 
rate can be named by the bidder, whether there is any maxi­
mum rate of interest, and any other features that may be 
currently handled in different ways. These questions deter-
..X7U-mine the bases of bidding. Sales conditions obviously
should be made clear, but another objective should be to 
establish bid conditions that are reasonable and
175conventional.
^^Chatters and Hillhouse, oj>_. cit., pp. ipO—L̂ 7? 
Fundamentals of Investment Banking, pp. 358-59; and Browne, 
op. cit.. p. 37.
-*-73a split-rate bid consists of two or more interest 
rates on one issue.
I7J1Chatters and Hillhouse, o]3. cit., pp. l|l-i|8; 
Fundamentals of Investment Banking, pp. 358-59; and Browne, 
op. cit., pp. 38-39.
175'^Browne, o£. cit., pp. 37> Ĵ-0*
Finally, the sale of the bonds must be conducted at
the appointed time and place. At public sales (and it
almost goes without saying that public sales are highly
desirable) bids should be opened promptly and read whether
they are presented by messenger or received by mail. Bids
176should be examined to determine the best one, and if this
bid is acceptable and is made by a responsible party, the
177bonds should be awarded officially to that bidder.
Auction sales, when the buyers are given the opportunity to
make several bids, are generally not desirable. It is
doubtful if they ever bring more favorable bids, and it is
178possible that they can result in higher interest rates.
Of course, there are certain circumstances in which 
the state may not wish to accept any of the bids. These 
circumstances would include changes in the market since the 
notice of sale was given. The fluctuation in yields noted
 ̂ The most common method of calculating the best bid 
is by the "net Interest cost" method— "Ascertain the total 
amount of interest required to carry the issue through to 
maturity at the coupon rate or rates specified in the bid. 
From this total deduct the premium bid, or add the discount 
bid, as the case may be." Chatters and Hillhouse, ojd. cit., 
p. 52.
^-^Bidders are often required to post good faith 
deposits to ensure that only responsible bids are submitted. 
Ibid., p. 5>1; Fundamentals of Investment Banking, pp. 3^9-61 
and Browne, op_. cit., pp. 37-39.
178Browne, o£. cit., p. 39.
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above would indicate that this is not a rare occurrence.
It is also possible that even the lowest yield is higher
than the situation really warrants. Another possibility is
that the issue is a refunding one which was offered in order
to save on interest costs. If the anticipated saving does
not materialize when the bids are received* there would be
ample justification to reject all of the bids. It has been
suggested that the governmental unit rejecting bids should
explain legitimate rejection to the bidders in order not to
180cause misunderstandings and to keep their good will. 
Thoughtful and considerate relations with all bond dealers 
would be a commendable procedure under all circumstances.
Once the bid is accepted, the fiscal authorities 
must turn their attention to the preparation of the bonds. 
Certain precautions must be taken to protect against counter­
feiting and forgery. These precautions entail authentica­
tion or certification of the bonds by some bank or trust 
company. This process consists merely In attesting that the 
bonds have been prepared properly and that signatures and
^ ^ Federal Reserve Bulletin. February, 1958? P« 165? 
and March, 1959 > p. 2 8 5 .
■^°Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. cit.. p. 59; and 
Browne, ojd. cit., p. lj.0.
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seal are in order. One authority has remarked about the 
poor quality of paper and printing used by some borrowers
181
and the deleterious effect of this action on their credit. 
When these and other routine but important steps have been 
taken, the bonds remain only to be delivered to the success­
ful bidder. It is good practice for this delivery to take 
place within three weeks after the sale. If for some reason 
the bonds cannot be prepared in such a short time, temporary 
securities may have to be issued. This additional step, of
course, is a complicating and costly factor that should be
182
avoided if it is possible.
IV. MANAGING EXISTING DEBT
Obviously not all problems connected with debt are 
settled when the instruments are issued. There are at least 
four major and common considerations which may arise in 
connection with existing debt: (l) All debt, no matter what
the type, will sooner or later require interest and principal 
payments; (2) The management of sinking funds is a very 
challenging problem to the fiscal officials; (3 ) Another 
very important function connected with existing debt is that 
of debt reporting; (!}.) Finally, a problem that sometimes
n ft nBrowne, ojd. cit., p. lj.1.
Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. cit., pp. 62-68.
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requires careful watching and control concerns the
183possibility of voluntary refunding.
Making Bond and Interest Payments
It is very important that the responsibility for
making bond and interest payments be carefully outlined.
Provisions should be made also for continuing authority to
make payments whenever they come due without any further
18 )|executive or legislative process. Another related and
very important problem associated with making payments will 
be the handling of debt service revenues. Whether the 
revenues come from a general fund or whether there is a 
separate bond fund or funds, the revenues will need to be 
guarded carefully and used only as they are authorized. 
Promptness should not be neglected in making payments 
because failure to meet the payments for any reason whatever 
can bring unfavorable publicity that may hurt the state’s
^There are other miscellaneous problems which can 
arise in connection with existing debt. For example, debt 
adjustment might conceivably result from depression, and 
this would require debt management skill. Chatters and 
Hillhouse, o£. cit., pp. 8^-l6I(.. For an example of debt 
management proposals that were recommended in 1933» s e e  
Evans Clark (ed.), The Internal Debts of the United States 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933T, p. 255.
■'-̂ -̂Chatters and Hillhouse, op_. cit., pp. 85-86; and 
Projet. Vol. Ill, p. 207.
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credit rating. Promptness will be promoted by careful 
recording of the various payments to be made. Funds due 
then are transferred to the authorized paying agents, and 
the bonds and coupons are dully cancelled, recorded, and 
filed.186
Managing Sinking Funds
Although serial bonds seem to be more popular today 
than sinking fund bonds, there are still some situations 
where sinking fund bonds may be appropriate. Also, there 
are many issues still outstanding that will be paid by this 
device. One of the problems involved in administering 
sinking funds is that different issues usually have their 
own sinking funds. Whoever is responsible for the various
lg£An example of this unfortunate situation, which 
was related by a public official who does not wish to be 
identified, occurred in Louisiana in the 1930?s. The State 
was technically in default for a few days during the depres­
sion because one of the New Orleans banks acting as a paying 
agent for the State closed. Among the funds frozen was 
$500,000 which the State had deposited for debt service. The 
Governor at that time, Huey Long, arranged for another 
$500»000 "to be deposited for debt service in order to 
reassure bondholders. This case is the nearest approach to 
default that Louisiana has experienced since the turn of the 
century.
Louisiana has been included in a short list of states 
that defaulted in the 1930*s. If this is the incident that 
caused Louisiana to be placed in this category, the State 
has suffered an injustice. See Hansen and Perloff, op. cit.,
p. 52.
^Chatters and Hillhouse, o£. pit.. pp. 9 $ - 1 0 2 .
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sinking funds must keep track of the contributions, protect
them at all times, and either invest them, use them to call
outstanding bonds if they are callable, or, if it is inappro- 
187priate, to buy the bonds of the particular issue on the 
open market.
Debt Reporting
An extremely important function of management of
existing debt is the careful reporting of all conditions
affecting outstanding obligations. The reporting of new
offerings is an important and obvious part of good debt
management, but the concept of debt reporting should also be
extended to include outstanding issues. Sustained reporting
will certainly be welcomed by all of the reporting services
188
and by investment bankers and bond dealers, but the 
benefits of continued reporting in connection with existing 
issues is not merely a matter of accommodating these groups. 
The state has a great deal to gain if it can show any 
improvement in its credit position. Economic growth, the 
discovery and utilization of new tax or other revenue 
sources, improvements in political and legal institutions,
1 O n
Ibid., pp. 119-61;; and Ratchford, American State 
Debts, pp. 268-69.
1 ftfiBrowne, op_. cit., pp. 6, 37? and Ellinwood, op.
cit., p. 2 7 .
improvements in the debt structure and debt management, and 
any changes connected with one outstanding issue in particular 
all of these things can lead to improved ratings on outstand­
ing bonds as well as to increases in their prices. How can 
the state benefit from rising prices on its outstanding 
bonds? Investors will probably be inclined to look favorably 
upon future issues of states whose bonds have given them
appreciation in value. Careful reporting of outstanding
189issues thus may have significant indirect results.
The recording and reporting of debt changes to tax­
payers and citizens is another extremely important part of 
the reporting function and should not be neglected. Tax­
payers and legislators should receive accurate and complete 
reports from the proper agencies in order to discharge their 
respective duties. This grade of information, unfortunately, 
is not always available. Agencies of the states are begin­
ning to involve state credit more and more, and this is not 
always made clear in state reports. It is very desirable
that agencies be required to report to the legislatures and 
190the public.
189Ragsdale, o£. cit., p. 3*
190For example, In Louisiana the Financial Reports 
are incomplete. In Oklahoma, debt reporting is not required 
of agencies of the state. Simpson, op_. cit. , p. 338*
Ikl
Debt Retirement
There are three different methods of eliminating 
debt: serially, using sinking fund accumulations, and using
call options. Whatever the method of repayment, a major 
objective of debt management must be the retirement of debt. 
This conclusion does not mean, of course, that states should 
try to eliminate their total outstanding debts. The indi­
vidual issue is what must be retired. This retirement is 
the only conclusion to borrowing that can presently be 
tolerated in the American states. Refunding of bonds may 
create perpetual debt, which is inconsistent with the 
conventional objectives of state borrowing and finance.
CHAPTER III
LOUISIANA BORROWING BEFORE 1921
Chapter I briefly outlined the major debt trends in 
the American states in order that developments in Louisiana 
would not be considered in isolation. This Chapter presents 
a background that deals in general terms with the early 
Louisiana debt.
I. BORROWING BEFORE 1913
Louisiana’s early debt experiences arose out of 
circumstances and practices that are no longer present in 
state borrowing and are not likely to be repeated. Perhaps 
the two most important developments of this nature in 
Louisiana before the twentieth century were the borrowing to 
provide bank capital and the Reconstruction borrowing.
Ante-Bellum Borrowing and Default
The bank lending experience in Louisiana began in 
1 8 2/4. and reached a climax when the State defaulted in 18/43. 
While most of the rest of the states were concerned with 
transportation improvements during the boom before 1837? 
Louisiana was borrowing mainly to provide capital for banks. 
There was no restriction on borrowing in the Louisiana
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Constitution of 1812 to impede wide use of the State’s
credit.^ In fact, the hank borrowing in Louisiana was the
largest amount borrowed by any state for a single purpose
2during the period. ' In 1840, Louisiana’s debt outstanding
3was $23,309,2Ap6.14.3. At the end of the boom period, Louisiana 
shared the fate of eight other states--she defaulted in 1843. 
Payments were resumed in 1844, and the State succeeded in 
the rest of the l81|0! s in reducing its debt by selling bank
4stocks and using the proceeds for retiring debt.
Louisiana, Constitution (1812), passim.
^Tenth Census, Vol. VII, p. £26.
3The amounts of debt outstanding given in this
Chapter are not only bonded debt but include floating debt
which consists of various warrants, certificates of indebt­
edness, and other short-term borrowing,
^Louisiana, Acts (1824), pp. 92-130; (1827), pp. 96- 
116; (1828), Act 1 9, pp. 30-36; (1830), pp. 68, 70; (1 8 3 1 ),
Act 18, pp. 38-62; (1833), PP. 172-92; (1 8 3 6), pp. 16-24;
(1837), Act 111, pp. 110-13; (1842), Act 22, pp. 34-62; Act 
98, pp. 234-54; (1843), Act 92, pp. 56-59; (1844), Act 8 3,
PP. 49-52; (1846), Act 1 8 2, p. 161; (1847), Act 100, pp. 7 6“
7 8 ; Act 216, p. 158; (1848), E.S., Act 5 9 , P. 34; Act 32,
pp. 16, 17; Stephen A. Caldwell, A Banking History of
Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1935), PP. 44-52, 102-3; B, U. Ratchford, American State 
Debts (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1941),
pp” 54-88; J.D.B. DeBow (ed.), DeBow* s Review of the Southern 
and Western States, XIII, New Series, Vol. 1 (New Orleans:
1 6 5 2 ), pp. 633-35; Henry Wallace Stopher, "The Public Debts 
of the State of Louisiana" (unpublished Master’s thesis,
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, 1920),-pp. 7, 182; 
William A. Scott, The Repudiation of State Debts, (ed. Richard T. 
Ely, Library of Economics and Politics, No. 2; Boston:
Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., 1893), P* 107; United States Bureau
iM
Another reaction to Louisiana* s default of I81f3 was 
the addition in 18lj.$ of a constitutional debt limitation.
The Legislature was prohibited from pledging the State’s 
credit for the payment of the bonds of any corporation. The 
debt was limited to $100,000 except as provided by specific 
legislative authorizations for single objects or works.
These authorizations were required to provide for payment of
5any borrowing they permitted.
Louisiana*s experiences during this period were not
at all unique. The theory that states could engage in
various enterprises--such as banking— and thereby reduce or
6eliminate the need for taxation was being tested. If the 
experience before 181|5 is considered in the context of the 
activities of other states and of the thinking at that time, 
the State of Louisiana cannot be condemned for its actions. 
However, by today1s standards (e.g., the principles developed 
in Chapter II), most of the borrowing which took place 
before 1837 would not be considered proper.
of the Census, Department of Commerce, NLnth Census of the 
United States: 1870. The Statists cs of the Wealth and
Industry of the United States» Vol. Ill (Washington: Govern­
ment Printing Office, I8 7 2), pp. 6, 10, 35? and Tenth Census, 
VII, pp. 523-26, 597-98.
^Louisiana, Constitution (1845) > Arts. 113 and lllj..
Ratchford, American State Debts, p. 8l.
Louisiana*s credit recovered sufficiently from the 
experiences of the l8l).0's to permit modest participation in 
the state internal improvements borrowing cycle of the 
l850*s. Borrowing was possible under the new Constitution 
of 1852 which permitted State subscription, by separate 
authorizations, to the stock of companies engaged in 
internal improvements— up to one-fifth of their capital 
stock. The debt limitation, however, reflected the banking 
disillusionment of the previous decade— aid to banking was
7now prohibited. In 1853, Louisiana subscribed to one-fifth 
of the capital stock of three railroads and paid for these
g
subscriptions with State bonds. Borrowing during the l850*s 
was on a much smaller scale than in the previous period; 
Louisiana*s total debt outstanding never approached the peak 
that had been reached during the previous boom in state 
borrowing. When the Civil War came, the total Louisiana 
debt was about $10,000,000. The parallel between aid to
^Louisiana, Constitution (1852), Arts. 108, 109, and110.
Q
Louisiana, Acts (1853)» Act 176, pp. llpl—ip2; Act 177, 
pp. ll(.2-lj.3; and Act 17&, pp. lljl).-̂ .
^Louisiana, Acts (l8ij.8), E.S., Act 32, pp. 16, 1 7 ; 
(185;?), Act 231, pp. 19^-97? Act 277, PP. 252-53; (1857),
Act 182, pp. 175-78; Tenth Census, VII, pp. 597-98;
Reginald C. McGrane, Foreign Bondholders and American State 
Debts (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935), PP. 192, 311-12;
llj.6
banking and aid for railroad construction apparently was not 
realized— Louisiana had again given aid to private ventures. 
Again, however, borrowing to aid railroad construction was 
not uncommon and was accepted as proper at that time.
Civil War and Reconstruction Borrowing and 
and Subsequent Debt Reduction
During the Civil War, Louisiana borrowed just as did
the other Confederate states. The constitutional amendment
in l8 6l, under which this borrowing took place, did not
10
noticeably change the 1852 debt provisions. The amount 
borrowed in Louisiana during this period is estimated to 
have been over $13,500,000, but the Civil War debt did not 
remain outstanding for very long. A loyal assembly meeting 
in the occupied part of Louisiana in 1 8 6)4. adopted a Consti­
tution in that year which declared that there was no liability 
for any debts connected with the rebellion. At the end of 
1865, the State debt, much of which was not bonded debt, 
amounted to $11,182,377. The same Constitution provided
Ratchford, American State Debts, p. 127; Louisiana, State 
Auditor, ”An Exhibit of the Public Debt for the Years 1861,
I8 7O to June, 1 8 7 1 ,11 p. 3; Ella Lonn, Reconstruction in 
Louisiana after 1868 (New York: G. P. Putnam1s Sons; The
Knickerbocker Press, 1918), p. 83; and Scott, ojd. cit., p. 107.
"^Louisiana, Constitution (1852), Arts. 9I4., 108-11, 
as amended 1861, This Constitution, as amended, changed 
Louisiana from an American state to a Confederate state.
The document of 1861 is the one which is disputed and which 
raises doubt about whether the present Constitution is the 
ninth of tenth one.
147
that aid could "be granted to companies engaged in constructing
public improvements to a maximum of one-fifth of the capital
stock of such companies. The maximum of debt incurred to
aid the financing of such improvements was limited to 
11$8,000,000.
Louisiana borrowed heavily during the Reconstruc-
12tion. Heavy borrowing was made possible when the borrow­
ing power was liberalized by still another Constitution 
adopted in 1868. This new Constitution required only that 
borrowing in excess of $100,000 have the method of payment 
of principal and interest designated in the authorization.
This provision did not include any limit on the maximum debt
13that could be incurred in this manner. In Louisiana, 
major reasons for borrowing during the early Reconstruction
Louisiana, Constitution (1864)> Arts. 96, 112, 113, 
111;, 12Ip,' 129; Walter L. Fleming, Documentary History of 
Reconstruction, Vol. I (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Co.,
1906), pp. l 8 o - 8 l ,  4 7 7 » 479; Henry E. Chambers, A History of 
Louisiana, Vol. I (Chicago: American Historical Society,
Inc., 1925), p. 6£l; Scott, op.. cit. , p. 107; Tenth Census, 
VII, p. 598; and Ratchford, American State Debts, p. 13>1.
12Estimates of the extent of this borrowing are com­
plicated by several factors: (l) the officials generally
were untrained and many were dishonest; these factors had an 
influence on the records they kept; (2) the bonds authorized 
during the period were not always all sold; and (3 ) some of 
the debt was contingent in the sense that it actually had no 
definite limits, e.g., the railroad issues were on a per-mile 
basis. Lonn, op. cit., p. 8 3 .
^Louisiana. Constitution (1868), Art. Ill,
1^8
period were to finance levee repair and to cover current 
expenses."^ During the latter part of the Reconstruction, 
the nominal purpose of Louisiana borrowing was mainly to
15subsidize construction of railroads. This purpose, however,
was clouded by many questionable activities that were taking
16place in the State during this period.
^Louisiana, Acts (1866), Act 3, PP* 6 , 8 ; Act 5, 
pp. 8-12; Act 15, pp7“2S, 28; (1867), Act 115, pp. 213-17; 
and Scott, oj>. cit.. p. 108. .
15
Louisiana, Acts (1868), Act 108, pp. 136-41, (1869) * 
Act 26, pp. 22-30; Act 55, pp. 56-58; Act 116, pp. 166-69;
Act IJ4.6 , pp. 21-22; (I8 7O), Act 3 1 , pp. 55-63; Act 32, 
pp. 63-66; Act 59, p. 8 7 ; Act 84, pp. 116-17; Act 105, PP* 
174-76; (1 8 7 0), E.S., Act 4, pp. 5-10; Act 10, p. 52; Act 69, 
PP. 153-54; (1871), Act 4, PP* 29-38; Act 28, pp. 66-72;
Act 31, pp. 79-80; Act 35, pp. 83-81;; Act 40, pp. 88-97;
Act 1;!, pp. 98-103; Act 45, PP. 137-38; Act 53, p. 155,*
Act 70, pp. 173-74? Act 95, PP. 211-13; and Scott, op. cit.,
p. 108.
16Louisiana is usually mentioned as having had some 
of the worst officials and one of the most effective "rings” 
of any of the Southern states. The activities of the ring’s 
members apparently extended to debt matters. Governor 
Kellogg described one bond issue as follows: "Two and a
half millions of these bonds were issued without any of the 
safeguards required by law. The bill providing for their 
issue was hurried through the Legislature during the last 
hours of the session. It was kept by my predecessor for 
several weeks, and was finally signed one day, promulgated 
the next, and the bonds issued the next. They were delivered 
by the Secretary of State at his house, in the night, without 
the Governor’s signature, the Secretary of State having been 
required first to sign them and attach the seal of State.
They were signed by the Governor in a hurried and surrepti­
tious manner and immediately removed from the State. It is 
even asserted, and I believe can be substantiated, that they 
were signed on a train of cars between this city and Mobile. 
No record was made of the issue of these bonds in the offices
\
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The State of Louisiana fell into financial difficul­
ties even before Reconstruction ended, and an attempt was 
made to restore the State's credit in 1870. Act 69 of I8 7O 
provided for the payment or funding of floating debt. Up to 
•$3*000,000 could be issued for this purpose. The agency 
established to direct the funding was the Board of Liquida­
tion of the State Debt. This act was the origin of the 
Board of Liquidation, which is still an important part of 
Louisiana's debt structure. A constitutional debt limita­
tion of $2 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 was also established in 1 8 7 0, but it was 
ignored and exceeded. The debt on June 1, 1 8 7 1, would have 
amounted to over $4 1 *0 0 0,0 0 0, if the liabilities contingent 
on railroad construction had been counted, and $22,295,790.58 
if they were not included. The $25,000,000 debt limitation, 
therefore, was significant mainly because it later provided
where the law directs such records to be kept, nor does such 
record now exist.’1 William P. Kellogg, ’’The Louisiana 
Funding Bill, A Reply to the Protest of Certain New York 
Bondholders,” (New Orleansi February 4* 1874)* P» 8. For 
other examples of irregularities and for descriptions of 
officials, officials* acts, and debt statistics during this 
time, see; William 0. Scroggs, The Story of Louisiana 
(revised edition; New York; Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1936), 
pp. 2 7 8, 287; Albert Phelps, Louisiana, A Record of Expan­
sion (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company,~~1905), pp. 3o7-71» 
Chambers, I, o]D. cit., p.: 6 6 7. Lonn, o£. cit., pp. 79* 8 3 ; 
Louisiana, State Auditor (1 8 7 1), 0]D. cit., pp. 3-8; Louisiana, 
State Auditor, ’Statement of Debt and Liabilities of the 
State of Louisiana on May 1, 1 8 7 2,” Auditor’s Office, James 
Graham, Auditor, June 10, 1 8 7 2, p. 1; Moody's, 1922, 
pp. 839-41> and John Rose Ficklen, History of Reconstruction 
in Louisiana (Through 1868), Johns Hopkins University Studies 
in Historical and Political Science, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1910), p. 76.
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grounds for the repudiation of bonds that were sold after
17the amendment was adopted in 1870.
The $25,000,000 constitutional debt limitation of 
I8 7O was reestablished in 1 8 7 4 by another consitutional 
amendment which added the provision that this limit would be 
lowered to $1 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 whenever the state debt was reduced 
to that sum. The $15,000,000 debt limitation of 187J4. was 
part of a comprehensive adjustment which included scaling 
down part of the debt and declaring some of it "not fundable” 
(repudiated). The debt was refunded by the Board of 
Liquidation under the authority of the Constitution as 
amended by Act 4 in 1874* Act 111 of the Extra Session of 
1 8 7 5, and Act 86 of 1 8 7 6. The Board supervised the exchange 
of old bonds and warrants for new consolidated bonds at the 
rate of 60 cents on the dollar--this exchange Is estimated
Louisiana, Acts (1 8 7 0 ), E.S., Act 12, pp. 53-54? 
Act 79, pp. 153-54? William L. Raymond, State and Municipal 
Bonds (second edition; Boston: Financial Publishing
Company, 1932), p. 116; Louisiana, State Auditor (1871), 
op. cit., p. 7» McGrane, 0£. cit., pp. 316-17? Scott, 
op. cit.. pp. 109-10; Lonn, op_. cit., pp. 8 3 , 94? 
^Louisiana*s *Little Legislature*,n A Study of the Board 
of Liquidation of the State Debt, 1870-1945, Research Mono­
graph No. 1 (New Orleans: Bureau of Governmental Research,
Inc., 191+5), PP. 3-4? and Moody*s, 1922, pp. 839-41.
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to have reduced the debt by over $8,000,000 to about
18
$12,000,000 by January 1, l88l.
The debt.adjustment of 1 8 7^ took place during the 
Reconstruction, and the native Louisianians were not satis­
fied with its results. The State was also troubled with 
unpaid interest that accumulated every year from 187)1 to
1 8 7 8 . In l879> after the Reconstruction ended, the debt 
adjustment of 187)1 was changed by a new debt ordinance. The 
scaling down of the debt which had been accomplished in 187)1 
was accepted, but the interest rates on the refunded debt 
were greatly reduced and part of the unpaid interest was 
”remitted,” i.e., repudiated. These changes were not 
acceptable to the bondholders and major attempts were made 
in 1882, 1 8 8)1, 1892, and 189)1 to effect some compromise and 
to provide for the exchange of old bonds. The results of 
the various adjustments of 1 8 7)1, 1882, I8 8I1, 1892, and 189)1 
were simply that the State defaulted on the payment of 
interest and repudiated some of its debt. The actions of
T ftLouisiana, Constitution (1868), as amended 1875,
Act i}. of 1 8 7)1? Louisiana, Acts (l872), Act 8l, pp. 13b~37'> 
{l87)l), Act 3, PP. 39-il2; TTBT5), E.S., Act 111, pp. 110-11; 
(1 8 7 6), Act 86, pp. 130-31J Raymond, ojd. cit., pp. 116-17? 
McGrane, o£. cit., pp. 317-20; Scott, op_. cit., pp. 111-14? 
’’Louisiana* s *Little Legislature loc. cit.; Moody*s, 1922, 
pp. 839-)ll; and United States Bureau of the Census, Depart­
ment of Commerce, Eleventh Census of the United States:
1890. Report on Wealth, Debt, and Taxation at the^Teventh 
Census: 1890. Part 1, Public Debt" (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1892), pp. 97-99.
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the constitutional conventions and the Legislature were of
doubtful value in improving the State’s credit, although the
amount of debt was reduced. Default and repudiation are
19usually damaging no matter what the reason.
The Constitution adopted in 1879* in addition to its
other changes, provided the strongest prohibition against
borrowing that the State had ever had. The General Assembly
was prohibited from borrowing except to repel invasion or to
20suppress insurrection. The appearance of such an inflexi­
ble debt limitation at this time was no coincidence. Debt 
limitation was a common reaction to the Reconstruction in 
all of the Southern states. An inflexible debt limitation 
probably was not inappropriate at the end of the Recon­
struction. The State’s credit had to be reestablished and 
restraint in borrowing was one method of repairing the 
damage that had been done. But, the maintenance of this
Ip
Louisiana, Constitution (1879)* Arts. 1 and 3 under 
State Debt; Louisiana, Acts (i860), Act 121, pp. l51|.-56; 
(1882), Act 76, pp. 96-97; (1892), Act 65, pp. 85-86; (l89lp), 
Act 75, pp. 88-89; Raymond, pp. cit. , pp. 116-18; Stopher, 
op. cit., pp. 127-28, 130; Scroggs, op. cit., pp. 261̂ .-65,
27)4.-7^7 278-79, 281-82, 287, 290, 2 9 3-9I1; Phelps, pp. cit. , 
pp. 367-71; Lonn, op. cit., pp. 79, 8 3 -8J4., 91+-95; Louisiana, 
State Auditor (I87TT, op. cit. , pp. 3-8; Louisiana, State 
Auditor (1872), op. cit., p. 1 ; Governor Kellogg's Letter of 
187^, op. cit.. pp. 1 , 5-6; Scott, op. cit., pp. ■ llip-1 9 ; 
Moody’s, 1922, pp. 81p0—1(,1; and Eleventh Census, Part 1, 
pp. 6 8, 73, 77, 97-99.
^Louisiana, Constitution (1 8 7 9), Art. ipTp.
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type of debt limitation after the credit position has been
repaired is another matter. The present debt limitation in
21Louisiana is very similar to the provision of 1879, and 
since no serious debt difficulties occurred between that 
time and 1921 (when the present limitation was adopted), it 
can be concluded that the present debt limitation is probably 
a result of the Reconstruction evils.
The difficulties described resulted directly from the 
Reconstruction. Another problem during the same period, 
however, could not be attributed directly to the Recon­
struction. This problem was the 1879 issue of "baby11 bonds 
sold to pay State expenses which were in the form of 
auditor's warrants. Of course, the condition of the 
Treasury which made this issue necessary was certainly 
partly the result of the Reconstruction. The baby bonds 
were in denominations of $5, paid 3 per cent during their 
6-year term, and were secured by uncollected taxes from
1879. The State subsequently refused to retire some of 
these maturing intermediate term obligations, maintaining
that there were irregularities in their issue and that some
22of them were fraudulent.
PI Ibid.1 and Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. Zp,
Sec. 2.
22Louisiana, Acts (1880), Act 93, pp. 120-21; Act 10lj., 
pp. 129-31; (l89l(.), Act 150, pp. 188-89; Caldwell, ojd. cit.,
After new, "clean" bonds were Issued in 1892 (to
replace bonds which had been stamped in the earlier scaling),
debt controversies subsided temporarily until they were
revived by the approach of the 191J+ maturity date of the
l|_0-year consols. The debate about what to refund began in
earnest around 1910 when the holders of unpaid coupons and
23bonds revived their claims. Bondholders were unsuccess­
ful in getting the State to pay these overdue obligations 
and coupons, but they did cause a flood of apologies and 
rationalizations to be made in defense of the State’s past 
actions. Despite pressure from the bonholders, the
pp. 108-10; "Joint Report of the Auditor and Treasurer to 
the Governor; Result of the Investigations of the Deficien­
cies and Irregularities of the Consolidated, Constitutional 
and Baby Bonds of the State of Louisiana," (1916), p. 3; and 
Moody’s, 1922, pp. 8i).0-[|.l.
23The $911,000 of baby bonds was the largest portion 
of unpaid debt in 1912. Other elements of this debt were 
certificates of indebtedness, various warrants, and certain 
interest coupons on the old consols. There was $126,733*96 
of coupons one to eleven that had never been presented to 
the State for payment. Coupon number twelve on the old 
consols was also still held by some of the bondholders who 
wanted them refunded. United States Bureau of the Census, 
Department of Commerce, Wealth, Debt, and Taxation, 1913, 
Vol. I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1915),
p. 57,* and Stopher, o]3. cit., p. 1 3 8 .
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recognized debt was not Increased— it stood at $1 3 ,5^6 ,1 5 0
21;in 1 9 1 2.
Louisiana debt experiences during the Civil War and 
the Reconstruction were similar to the experiences of the 
other Southern states. The period after the Reconstruction 
was also typical in the South, where the problem centered on 
restoring ruined credit. Louisiana's actions in this connec­
tion certainly were not always wise, but they can be viewed 
sympathetically because of the circumstances.
Port of New Orleans Borrowing Before 1913
The Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans
was established in 1 8 9 6, but it did not start borrowing 
immediately. The first Board issue of $750,000 was sold 
under the authority of Act 1;!; of 1901;, but this act was of 
such doubtful constitutionality that the issue was refunded 
after a new authorization was provided in Act 180 of 1908. 
These acts marked the beginning of agency borrowing in
^Louisiana, Constitution (1 8 9 8), Art. ll;6 ; Louisiana, 
Acts (1910), Act 299, pp. 503-4J Act 3 0 3 , pp. 521-22;. Dally
[New Orleans} Picayune. October 21;, 1912, p. 1;; October 30,
1912, p. ij.; June 21)., 1913, P. 5; Times ^New Orleans} Democrat 
and Daily Picayune, April 1 1 , 1911;, p. 5? Ratchford, American 
State Debts, p. 25k? Caldwell, o£. cit., pp. 108-10; 
Louisiana, "Joint Report of the Auditor and Treasurer," 
(1916), p. 3? United States Bureau of the Census, Department 
of Commerce, Wealth, Debt, and Taxation, 1913, Vol. I,
PP. 37, 58; and Moody's, 1922, pp, 81;0-1;1.
156
Louisiana. The State did not contribute directly to the 
security of Port bond issues which followed, but the State's 
credit was involved. The refunding issue amounted to 
$3,500,000 and was known as the Serial Gold Issue of 
January 1, 1909. The purpose of the borrowing was to finance 
dock improvement— more transportation debt. The $3,500,000 
issue, which exhausted the authorization, was a noncallable 
serial issue scheduled to mature between 1921), and 1958. The 
5 per cent bonds were payable from Port revenues and were 
also considered general obligations of Louisiana although
25they constituted only indirect debt.
It might have been better if the Port of New Orleans 
debt had been incurred directly. The State certainly had an 
Interest in developing the Port and could not avoid involve­
ment. Direct participation by the State might have increased 
the marketability of early issues and would have simplified 
the debt structure. The State could have participated
Louisiana, Constitution (1898), Art. 32; Louisiana, 
Acts (1 9 0 8), Act 180, pp. 262-66; Board of Commissioners of 
the Port of New Orleans, "Statement of Amortization Require­
ments for All Outstanding Bonds of the Board of Commissioners 
of the Port of New Orleans," {hereinafter referred to as Port 
of New Orleans, "Statement of Amortization," 1922), (June, 
1922), pp. 1-2; Louisiana, Acts (1 8 9 6), Act 70, pp, 102-5, as 
amended by Act 26 of 1900, pp. iqip—Ip6; A. M. Smith, Compila­
tion of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds (New Orleans:
A. M. Smith Investment Company, 1933), PP» viii, 9-10; 
Louisiana, Acts {190lp), Act [}![., pp. 98-102; Ratchford, 
American State Debts, p. 375; and Moody's, 1918, pp. 191-92; 
1938, pp. 639-lj-O.
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directly without losing the services of the Port Commission 
in their other responsibilities, It is very doubtful, 
however, that the public would have approved direct borrow­
ing for this purpose at this time. The debt limitation of 
1 8 9 8, which was Just as strong as the one of l879» was not
simply an outmoded institution but was a very clear indica-
26tion of public opinion. Any attempt to amend this limita­
tion probably would have been doomed to failure. Under 
these conditions, therefore, it probably was better that the 
borrowing took place indirectly rather than not at all 
because the Port undoubtedly has played an important role 
in the Statefs growth.
Another significant feature of this early Port 
Commission issue was that it consisted of serial bonds.
None of the Louisiana refunding and consolidating issues 
starting in I8 7I; provided any method whatsoever of retiring 
the debt— neither the serial feature nor any sinking fund 
was provided. The use of the serial device in this 1909 
issue, therefore, was important not in itself, but because 
it provided for systematic debt retirement.
Port of New Orleans, "Statement of Amortization," 
1922, pp. 1-18; and Louisiana, Constitution (1 8 9 8), Art. lj.6.
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II. LOUISIANA BORROWING, 1913-1921
There was relatively little borrowing during the 
years from 1913 bo 1921, but the period has more importance 
than the earlier years because what borrowing did take place 
had a distinctly modern character. This borrowing consisted 
of both direct and indirect issues. (See Table I, Appendix 
A. ) The direct issues were the refunding issue of 191i). and 
the early highway borrowing. The indirect borrowing 
consisted of the Port of New Orleans and the Penitentiary 
issues.
Serial Gold Bonds. The Refunding of 191ii-
Article 321). of the Constitution of 1913 dealt with 
maturing debt by establishing conditions under which the 
Board of Liquidation could refund the Reconstruction obliga­
tions. The General Assembly was again prohibited from 
contracting any debt, but the Board of Liquidation was
27authorized to issue enough bonds to refund most of the debt.
27'The portions of the recognized State debt that were 
not to be refunded consisted of a "Perpetual Loan" to the 
State and a certain sum that was held for the exchange of 
old bonds. Louisiana, Constitution (1913)* Art. 32; Louisiana, 
Treasurer1s Report, 1922/23-1934/35> Louisiana, Financial 
Report, 19III7112-1957/58: and Louisiana, Board of Liquidation, 
"Constitutional Provisions in Reference to Louisiana Bonded 
Debt," certified by Auditor of Public Accounts on Minutes of 
the Meetings of the Board of Liquidation (Baton Rouge:
November and December, 1913), pp. 2, 7-8.
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Refunding bonds authorized by the new Constitution of 1913 
were prohibited from running more than fifty-one years or 
from bearing more than 1|.5 per cent interest and were 
required to be callable serial bonds. In conjunction with 
the debt authorization, the Constitution of 1913 also levied 
a tax of one and three-twentieths (1 .15) mills on all 
property subject to the State property tax. The revenue
raised was to be put into the "State Bond and Interest Tax
28Fund" for debt service. This fund and the tax dedicated
to it are still part of Louisiana*s debt structure.
The constitutional authorization of 1913 was the
basis for the 191U refunding issue of "Serial Gold Bonds."
(See Table II, Appendix A.) The bonds amounted to
$10,991,5°° ar*d were scheduled to mature serially until
29I96J4.. The rate of interest was ij.,5 per cent, and the
Louisiana, Board of Liquidation, "Constitutional 
Provisions in Reference to Louisiana Bonded Debt," p. 2; 
Louisiana, Constitution (1913), Art. 32ij.; and Huey P. Long 
(comp.), Constitutions of the State of Louisiana (Baton 
Rouge: 193°), P.
Interest rates given throughout this thesis are 
nominal or coupon rates unless it is otherwise indicated.
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State reserved the right to call outstanding bonds. The 
Serial Gold Bonds of 19!l| (later often called the "Old"
Serial Bonds) were direct or general obligations of the 
State, i.e., they were issued in the State's name. Provi­
sion was made for payment of the bonds from the 1.15 will 
State property tax that had been dedicated for that purpose 
in the Constitution of 1913* A further safeguard was the 
constitutional provision for the levy of a "special tax" in 
the event that the 1.15 mill tax proved insufficient at any
31time.
The Serial Gold Bonds were an important link
between the nineteenth and the twentieth century debt devel­
opments in Louisiana. The bonds bore the scars of the 
Reconstruction in the difficulties associated with their 
sale, but they also exhibited definite provisions for retire­
ment as had the Port Commission debt. The two previous
^Louisiana, Board of Liquidation, "Constitutional 
Provisions in Reference to Louisiana Bonded Debt," pp. 10-12, 
22-23; Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal 
Bonds, 1933* p. 1; Louisiana, Constitution (1913). Art. 32kt 
Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report, 1922-23, p. ix; "Schedule of 
Bond and Coupon Maturities Handled by the Treasurer, State 
of Louisiana," compiled by H, B. Conner, State Treasurer 
(corrected to December 31 , 1929), p. 2l(.; and Moody's, 1918, 
pp. 191-92.
^Louisiana, Board of Liquidation, "Constitutional 
Provisions in Reference to Louisiana Bonded Debt," p. 6; 
Louisiana, Constitution (1913), Art. 321+; and Moody's, 1918, 
pp. 191-92.
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refundings, in 181|.? and l87l|, had followed default in one 
case and default and repudiation in the other. In 1913> 
there were signs of forethought in the refunding that took 
place in a relatively more favorable climate. The use of 
the serial feature was a step in the direction of better 
debt management; its use was an indication that retirement 
of debt was being planned. Another very desirable feature 
of this issue was the provision of a special tax in case the 
1*1? mill tax proved insufficient. This type of provision 
is very attractive to bondholders and can add to the markets' 
bility of bonds if it does not unduly complicate the debt 
structure.
Highway Borrowing Before 1921
The only other direct debt created before 1921 was 
incurred to finance the Chef Menteur and Hammond-New Orleans 
Highways--another transportation project. Act 18 of the 
Special Session of 1918 provided that bonds authorized for 
that purpose would be payable from a newly created fund that 
would be called "Highway Fund Number 2." The fund was to be 
supported by the motor vehicle license revenues from the six 
interested parishes of Jefferson, St, Charles, St. John the 
Baptist, Tangipahoa, St. Tammany and Orleans. The first 
issue under this act was Series A of 1919 that consisted of 
$700,000 of ? per cent noncallable obligations. (See Table
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III, Appendix A,) These Highway Fund Humber 2 bonds were
not full faith and credit obligations although they were
called " . . .  State Highway Bonds" and thus were direct
obligations. The $700,000 issue of 1919, which comprised
the total amount authorized by Act 18 of the Special Session
of 1918, matured in 1939. However, both the tax dedication
and the special fund established during this period remain
part of the debt structure and add to its complexity until 
32this day.
Port of Hew Orleans Borrowing Before 1921
The most significant debt expansion in Louisiana 
during the first quarter of the century took place in the 
category of indirect debt. This borrowing was the Port 
of Hew Orleans borrowing. Bond issues sold for Port 
development continued under the powers granted in 1910 and 
reenacted in the Constitution of 1913. The Board of 
Commissioners was given continuing authority to build 
warehouses and other structures and to finance these
-^Louisiana, Constitution (1913), as amended 1918, 
Special Session, Act 1 8; Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report. 
1922-23, pp. ix-x; "Schedule of Bond and Coupon Maturities 
Handled by the Treasurer, State of Louisiana," 1929, p. 25; 
"Tax Laws and Revenues, State of Louisiana," Bulletin Ho.
2 3 6, Compiled by John A. Barrett, Assistant to the State 
Treasurer (New Orleans : March 15, 1936), p. 2l\,; Moody* s,
1919, p. 21̂ 4; 1939, p. 559; Smith, Compilation of Louisiana 
State and Municipal Bonds, 1933, P. 9; Louisiana, Acts- TT̂ Ti}.), 
Act 260, pp. l;98-50l4.; (1917), E.S., Act 1̂ 0, pp. 67^597
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structures by selling bonds. Bond issues were not limited 
as to their amount except that they could not be greater 
than the value of the buildings. Bonds were to be paid from 
warehouse revenues and secondly from the general revenues of 
the Port subject to prior liens. The authorization speci­
fied that issues sold under these provisions would be 
subordinate to previous issues sold under the same consti­
tutional provisions. Other authorizations in 191^ and 1918 
enabled the Board to borrow still more for a related purpose. 
Act of 19ll|. amended the Constitution of 1913 to give the 
Board power to construct a Navigation Canal between the 
Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain. Act 3 of 1918 
affirmed Act 2l|4 of 1911-1- and authorized the Board of Commis­
sioners of the Port to cooperate with and to receive 
financial assistance from the various jurisdictions in and 
around New Orleans for the construction of this canal.
Bonds issued under these acts were to be backed by the real 
estate involved and to be paid from net receipts of the 
canal. 33
Serial Gold Bonds totaling $3?000,000 were sold in 
1911+ under the terms of the Constitution of 1913» and this
^Louisiana, Constitution (1913), Art. 322; As 
amended 19!l|* Act 2liE; Louisiana. Acts (1910), Act 1 3 3, 
p. 209; (1918), Act 3» PP. 5-10; Port of New Orleans, 'State­
ment of Amortization, 1922, pp, 3-8.
sale was followed by another offering in 19l£ for $1,2£0,0 0 0. 
(See Table IV, Appendix A.) The Port Commission floated a 
fourth issue of Harbor Improvement Bonds in 1917 for 
$1}.,000,000, and a fifth one of Serial Canal Bonds in 1918 
was for $6,000,000. Two more Port Commission Issues in 1919 
were as follows: $2,000,000 of Harbor Improvement Bonds,
and $6,000,000 of Canal Bonds. In 1920, the eighth and 
ninth Issues produced $£,000,000 and $2,£00,000 respectively
34for canal purposes< The Port Commission Bonds Issued from 
1913 to 19 2 1 were revenue bonds to be serviced first from 
the structures or facilities they financed, and then from 
general Port revenues that consisted of wharfage, tollage, 
and storage fees. These issues before 1921 were also 
considered full faith and credit obligations of the State 
although there was no specific acknowledgment of this in any 
of the authorizations. The indirect debt added to the 
State*s liabilities during the period from 1909 through 1920
3I1
Louisiana, Constitution (1913)> Art. 322; As 
amended 19l4> Act 2I|1|., pp. 18-19, (this act was continued in 
force by Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art, 6 , Sec. 16; 
Louisiana, Acts (1910), Act 133» P. 209; Port of New Orleans, 
"Statement of Amortization," 1922, pp. 3-17; Moody*s, 1918, 
pp. 191-92; 1919, P. 2i+4; 1920, p. 302; and Louisiana, Acts 
(1918), Act 3, PP. £-10.
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for the purpose of furthering the development of the New
35Orleans Port area came to a total of $33»250,000.
All of the Port Commission bonds sold during this
period were noncallable deferred serials. The minimum
36period of deferment was six years. Normally, deferment 
is undesirable because it adds to interest costs. In this 
case, however, the reason for deferment is obvious— it would 
take many years from the time funds were first raised before 
the canal and various structures could be put into opera­
tion. Deferment in a case such as this probably should not 
be considered improper, although it does add to costs, as 
payments are deferred only until the facilities become 
operable and productive.
These issues were also all scheduled to be completely
37retired in forty years. If the life of the improvement is
-^Port of New Orleans, "Statement of Amortization," 
1922, pp. 1-18; Port of New Orleans, "Information Concerning 
Bonded Obligations of the Board of Commissioners of the Port 
of New Orleans (An Agency of the State of Louisiana)," com­
piled by Tiley S. McChesney, Assistant Treasurer (New Orleans: 
June 1, 1928), pp. 1-19; Smith, Compilation of Louisiana 
State and Municipal Bonds, 1933> PP« viii, 9-12; Ambrose M. 
Smith, A Supplement to the Compilation of Louisiana State 
and Municipal Bonds TNew Orleans: A. M. Smith Investment
Co., June 3 0, 1 9 3 M » P« Moody*s, 1918, pp. 191-92; 1919, 
p. 2UU; 1920, p. 302; 1922, p. 839; and 1938, pp. 6 3 9-ij-O.
"36Port of New Orleans, "Statement of Amortization," 
1 9 2 2, loc. cit.
37Ibid
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used as a criterion, forty years would seem to be a reasona­
ble term for the issues used for digging the Navigation 
Canal. For warehouses, however, a 1̂ .0-year term may be 
questionable. If the term of the retirement is questionable, 
however, the method of this retirement certainly was not.
The use of the serial method of debt retirement by the Port 
Commission throughout the period showed good debt management.
State Penitentiary Borrowing Before 1921
Other indirect borrowing in the 1913 to 1921 period 
consisted of relatively minor amounts used to operate and 
maintain the State Penitentiary. (See Table V, Appendix A.)
A $2^0,000 Penitentiary Issue of noncallable 5 P©*1 cent 
Coupon Notes was authorized in 1912 and sold In 1911|. The 
State pledged its full faith and credit for the support of 
the 25-year Penitentiary serial bonds although they were to 
be serviced from the revenues of the Penitentiary. The 
Penitentiary debt thus was very similar to the Port of New 
Orleans debt. The only other Penitentiary issue before 1921 
was a flj.00,000 Issue of Penitentiary Liquidation Notes. The 
funds raised by this bond sale were to be used to retire 
floating indebtedness of the Penitentiary. These 1917 bonds 
were also noncallable and were secured in the same manner as 
the I91J4. issue. The interest paid on these obligations was
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£ per cent, and the bonds were to mature serially between
38
1918 and 1927.
The appearance of Penitentiary borrowing in the
indirect portion of the debt structure probably was at least
partly the result of the debt limitation provisions in the
39Constitutions of both 1 8 9 8 and 1913. Again, however, the 
nature of the debt limitation at this time made it more than 
just a legal obstacle to be surmounted. Indirect borrowing 
probably was the only type of borrowing that would be 
tolerated by public opinion.
Summary of Borrowing, 1896-1921
The debt change probably of most practical signifi­
cance during the period from 1 8 9 6 to 1921 was the beginning 
of the indirect Port of New Orleans borrowing. This devel­
opment was to be one of the more lasting legacies of the 
nineteenth century. The Port borrowing was to outlast and 
overshadow the Reconstruction debt which was refunded in
-^Louisiana, Constitution (1913)* as amended 1916,
Act 13̂4-5 Louisiana, Acts (1912), Act 71> p. 82; "Schedule 
of Bond and Coupon Maturities Handled by the Treasurer,
State of Louisiana," Corrected to December 31» 1931> 
compiled by H. B. Conner, State Treasurer, p. 32; Smith, 
Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds, 19333 
p. 5; and Moody’s, 1918, pp. 191-92.
^Louisiana, Constitution (1 8 9 8), Art. J16; (1913)» 
as amended 1916, Act 13!{.; and Louisiana, Acts (1912), Act Jl, 
p. 82.
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1911+. Finally, the period before 1921 brought some early 
highway borrowing. The amount of this highway borrowing, 
however, was not large enough to place it higher than third 
in importance.
CHAPTER IV
DEBT STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT IN LOUISIANA, 1921-19i|.6
Much of the present structure and management of the 
debt in Louisiana is a legacy of the 1920*s and 1930*s.
After these decades, activity in Louisiana halted temporar­
ily during World War II. This Chapter emphasizes the 
purposes of Louisiana borrowing during these recent eras. 
Each type of debt that was created is examined to determine 
the purpose, authorization, and the amount of such debt, 
from whence and how it was payable, whether it was direct or 
indirect borrowing, and the maturity or redemption provi­
sions. The relationship of this debt to the constitutional 
framework of the State is also explored.
I. THE CONSTITUTION OF 1921
It was noted in Chapter II that some of the basic 
factors which will influence a state*s debt structure as 
well as its financial structure are constitutional or legal 
ones. This influence of institutional factors Is very much 
the case in Louisiana today. Many of the difficulties that 
confront the State in debt matters can be traced to the 
Constitution of 1921 which is still in effect. Since this
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document has had such a hearing on the present debt 
structure of Louisiana, it is appropriate to analyze care­
fully the pertinent provisions of that document and to note 
the changes that have been made in It from time to time.
Historical Background
The Constitution of 1921 was either the ninth or the 
tenth constitution adopted in Louisiana depending upon 
whether a disputed one is counted. Constitutional changes 
in Louisiana have always had important effects upon the debt 
structure. Assuming that there were nine constitutions, the 
second and third constitutions came at the end of the first 
and second debt booms of l8!}.5 and 18£2 and contained articles 
which attempted to restore the State’s credit. The docu­
ments of 1861}. and 1868 were Reconstruction constitutions, 
and the one in 1879 dealt with Reconstruction debt problems. 
The Constitution of 1913 provided for the refunding of 
Reconstruction debt into Old Serial Cold Bonds. The present 
Constitution of 1921 has been equally important in debt 
developments since that time. The document of 1921 resulted 
from the unsatisfactory nature of the 1913 Constitution.
The 1913 instrument had failed to repeal specifically the
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provisions of the 1898 version, and the result was conflict
1and confusion in the law.
The Constitution of 1921 Appraised
The corrective action of 1921 was treated rather 
severely by Alden L. Powell.
An examination of the long, wordy, detailed 
Constitution of 1921, which probably includes 
within its provisions all of the fundamentals of 
democratic government, and most of the non­
fundamentals as well, reveals that the framers
seemingly disregarded all of the precepts which, 
political scientists say, constitution makers 
should follow. 2
A recent Louisiana Legislative Council study revealed that
the Louisiana Constitution is the longest in existence among
the states. It was reported to contain approximately
181^,000 words— more than twice as many as the next longest
state constitution. The conclusion that the Constitution
of 1921 is too long and detailed was concurred in by
Kimbrough Owen. He points out that a constitution is
Alden L. Powell, "Amending the Louisiana Constitu­
tion," The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XVIII 
(June, 1937'-Mar'ch, 1938), 25-28; and Kimbrough, Owen, "The 
Need for Constitutional Revision in Louisiana," Louisiana 
Law Review, reprinted from Vol. VIII, 1-lOlj. (November, 1947)>
pp. 1 -2 .
2Powell, op., cit.. p. 28.
^Louisiana Legislative Council, "Constitutional 
Revision In Louisiana— An Analysis," Research Study No. 3, 
(hereinafter referred to as Louisiana Legislative Research 
Study No. 3), p. 1.
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supposed to "be primarily an instrument which outlines funda­
mental policy. The Louisiana Constitution contains detailed 
provisions, for example, concerning the levying of taxes and 
the floating of bond issues. This characteristic of too 
much detail almost inevitably brings a large number of
constitutional amendments on even minor provisions as they
1+are found to be unsatisfactory. Louisiana's Constitution 
practically insures a multitude of amendments by adding to 
its detail a relatively easy amending process. Furthermore, 
the actual process of amendment can be considerably speeded 
by the practice of the State Legislature of passing self- 
operative acts which automatically become law if and when 
their substance is accepted by the voters as a constitutional 
amendment •
^Owen, cit.. p. 3 . See also Powell, o£. cit., 
pp. 25-28; and Louisiana Legislative Research Study SoT 3»
pp. 3-15.
5Between the adoption of the Constitution in 1921 and 
the year 1 9 3 7# there were 127 amendments proposed and 118 
adopted. By 191+7» the number of amendments had reached 219. 
In 1953* the total number of amendments that had been added 
to the 1921 Constitution was 302. Between 1951+ and 1957# 31 
more were approved. Debt creation contributed its share to 
these totals in each period. Powell, oj). cit.. p. 28; Owen, 
op. cit.. pp. 1, 3j 1+7> 60; Public Affairs Research Council 
of Louisiana, Inc., The Debt of the Louisiana State Govern­
ment, 1950 and 1951,” No. 6 (March 3 1, 1952), pp. 8-9;
Prolet. Vol. I, Parts 1 and 2, pp. 1+95, 1392; Louisiana, 
Constitution (1921), as amended 1951+; and 1957 Supplement, 
p. 3.
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Another major flaw In the Constitution of 1921 is its 
lack of systematic codification— subject matter is scattered 
throughout the instrument. When the mass of detail is com­
bined with this dispersion, the problem of determining basic 
policy is made more difficult. But even this is not all: 
according to Kimbrough Owen, the Constitution of 1921, as 
amended, also contains "confusing terminology," "inconsist­
encies," "errors," "references to other legal documents," 
"informal amending procedures," "duplication of material," 
"contradictions," and "omissions." These are all difficulties 
which are encountered in any attempt to determine the basic
structure and policy of Louisiana government in the original
6Constitution as well as in the amended versions.
An appraisal of the Constitution of 1921 based on 
principles of debt management produces conclusions that are 
not much more favorable. There are at least three serious 
flaws in the Constitution in its fiscal provisions: (l) the
debt provisions of the Constitution are scattered throughout 
the instrument; (2) the Constitution contains specific tax 
dedications and other provisions for the payment of bond 
issues; and, (3) the Constitution contains an inflexible 
debt limitation.
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), as amended 19$k>
Owen, oj>. cit.. pp. l-l'6 ; and Louisiana Legislative Research 
Study No. 3 , pp. 3-15.
m
The various constitutional articles that deal directly
with the debt structure in the 1921 Constitution are as 
7follows: Article 12 deals with public education and
interest payments to certain educational funds; Article 18 
deals with Confederate veterans* pensions and the dedication 
of the 0.75 mill tax for their payment; Article 6 deals with 
administrative officers and boards and contains provisions 
relative to the Port of New Orleans; Article Ij. deals with 
the limitation of legislative borrowing and the pledging of 
the public credit; and, Article 20 deals with Penitentiary
g
borrowing. In addition, there is another type of disper­
sion to be found in the 1921 Constitution. An example Is 
found in Article 6 , Section 2lj., In which it is stated that 
the provisions of Act 18 of 1918 are not changed; but, it is 
not indicated exactly what these provisions consist of other 
than that they concern the building and financing of the
9New Orleans-Chef Menteur and New Orleans-Hammond Highways.
Both types of dispersion are regarded by Owen as weaknesses
7In order to avoid repetition, the various articles 
mentioned here are explained at length below where they 
resulted In borrowing or otherwise affected the debt structure.
8Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. Ij., Secs. 1, 2,
12; Art. 6, Secs 16, 21; Art. 12, Secs 19-21; Art. 8 , Secs.
1-5; and Art. 20, Sec. 1.
QLouisiana, Constitution (1921), Art, 6 , Sec. 2I4..
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10in constitutional planning. The ideal constitution 
probably would have an article or two carefully planned to 
cover policy questions that concern the State*s credit. 
Louisiana was far from this norm of a codified debt policy 
when the Constitution of 1921 was ratified, and it is even 
further from it today.
The specific tax dedications which contributed to the 
lack of organization found in the original version of the 
1921 Constitution were in Articles 6 and 18. These articles 
dealt with the 2 -cent gasoline tax, the motor vehicle 
license tax, and the 0.75 mill ad valorem tax. The 0,75 
mill ad valorem tax was dedicated to the payment of Confed­
erate veterans* pensions. (The original Constitution of 
1921 did not authorize any borrowing for this purpose.) In 
addition to these specific tax dedications, other provisions 
were made for the payment of bond issues in which Louisiana 
had an Interest. Article 20, for example, authorized the 
general manager to issue Penitentiary bonds which would be 
payable primarily from the revenues of that Institution but 
which were also backed by the State*s full faith and credit. 
The Board of Commissioners of the Port of Few Orleans was
100wen, oe.. cit.. pp. 3 , 9 .
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authorized, in Article 6, to carry on "both short and long­
term borrowing which would be payable from the revenues of 
the Port.'*’'1'
Only one of the articles mentioned above restricted
the use of the State*s credit. Article Ij., paradoxically,
prohibited the State Legislature from borrowing.
The Legislature shall have no power to 
contract or to authorize the contracting of any 
debt or liability on behalf of the State; or to 
issue bonds or other evidence of indebtedness 
thereof, except for the purpose of repelling 12 
invasion, or for the suppression of insurrection.
Kimbrough Owen considers this particular provision
one of the serious defects of structure and policy in the
13Louisiana Constitution of 1921. It was also concluded 
in Chapter II that inflexible debt limitations are generally 
unsatisfactory. The shortcomings of debt limitations should 
have been suspected even in 1921, but it is since that time 
(since large-scale borrowing has become necessary) that they 
have come to be considered especially questionable.
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. Ij., Secs. 2, 
12; Art. 6, Secs. 16, 21; Art. 18, Secs. l-£; and Art. 20, 
Sec. 1.
12Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. Ij., Sec. 2.
13 .,Owen, op. cit., p. 2 3 .
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The debt limitation provision made it necessary for 
the Constitution of 1921 to be amended before any debt, other 
than that constitutionally provided for, could be incurred. 
However, a significant amount of Louisiana*s debt has been 
authorized by this method of constitutional amendment 
because of the relative ease of the amending process.
Powell considered the skill of State leaders in getting 
people to vote the amendments into law as perhaps even more 
significant in explaining the wide use of the amending process
lkin Louisiana.
There was, also, another way whereby Louisiana 
borrowing could proceed regardless of constitutional debt 
limitations. This method was by the use of the agency or 
authority device which had grown out of the special fund 
doctrine. The Constitution of 1921 contained provisions 
which concerned the Port of New Orleans, and the State Peni­
tentiary. The Board of Commissioners of the Port of New 
Orleans was given borrowing power far in excess of its
immediate needs so that later borrowing, if it was necessary
1$would not require additional amendment. Agency borrowing
^Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9* p. 79 
Powell, op> cit.. p. 30j and Owen, oj). cit.. p. 60. 
l£In fact, according to the Louisiana practice of 
detailing the constitutional provisions, the Board was 
authorized to engage in a great deal of borrowing without 
even legislative enactment. This was not the case with the 
Penitentiary authorization which is discussed later.
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thus was also to play a role in Louisiana* s debt structure 
along with constitutional amendments as a method of debt 
creation*
II. DIRECT BORROWING, 1921-1927
There is little question that the burden imposed by 
the borrowing during the 1921 to 1927 period was within the 
State*s ability to pay. Moody*s general analysis, which 
represents so well the traditional viewpoint about safety in 
borrowing, indicated in 1920 that Louisiana*s economy was 
sound. Some of the conventional measures of debt-bearing 
ability also point to the same conclusions the assessed 
valuation of property, which was based on 5 0 per cent of 
estimated true value, was $587,008,713 in 1916 and $7 2 6,2 9 1,114.5 
in 1919. In 1920, when 100 per cent valuations were used, 
the assessed value of all property rose to $1,698,561}.,216.
The total amount of taxes collected by the State increased 
from $5*086,569 In 1919 to $8,lj.92,7lj.9 in 1920 and to 
$9,021,183 in 1921. The assessed valuation of all property 
and the amount of taxes collected both declined between 1922 
and 19214., but they were still much greater than the 1919 
figures. On the debt side, the general bonded debt declined 
from $28,935*500 in 1918 to $25,750,000 in 1919 and then 
increased sharply to $^,588,500 in 1920. Per capita debt 
declined from $7.79 in 1917 to $7.2lj. in 1919 and then
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16increased to f>7*i]-5 in 1922. The State Treasurer*s Reports
indicate that total State receipts were increasing steadily
17during the same period.
The per cent of taxes collected to the amount of debt 
outstanding in 1919 was 19.8; in 1920, it was 19.0 per cent. 
In 1919, debt outstanding was 1.77 Pen cent of the assessed 
valuation of property, but this increased to 2.63 P®** cent 
in 1920. These measures indicate that the Louisiana debt 
burden was increasing; however, it would appear that, by 
even conservative standards, the State was in a position, 
around 1920 and 1921, to borrow without seriously endanger­
ing its ability to pay its debts.
The 1921 to 1927 period in the history of Louisiana
debt was, like the 1913 to 1920 era, a relatively quiet one. 
Some of the scattered borrowing that had marked the 1913 to 
1920 period was continued after the new Constitution was 
adopted. The total amount of borrowing from 1921 to 1927 
was $13,^00,000. (See Table VI, Appendix A.) This debt 
creation consisted of both direct and indirect borrowing, 
but borrowing in the name of the State was of secondary
importance. There were only two types of direct borrowing
l^Moody* s, 1918-1925.
^Louisiana, Treasurer's Report. 1920-21, pp. 6, 2lj., 
lj.8; and 1922-23, pp. 6, 28, 35, !>o.
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carried on during the period: Confederate veterans* pension
borrowing and special highway borrowing. Special highway 
borrowing was not considered direct borrowing by the State 
reporting agencies, but it is so considered here. The total 
direct debt incurred for the payment of Confederate pensions 
and the construction of certain highways together totaled 
$3,000,000.
Highway Borrowing. 1921-1927
The only highway borrowing in Louisiana before 1928 
consisted of a relatively insignificant amount of specialized 
Highway Fund Number 2 borrowing. . No questions may be raised 
concerning the purpose of this borrowing. Highways— even 
specific ones— belong with those improvements which may 
justify the use of the State*s credit. The lack of other 
activity resulted directly from the provisions in the 1921 
Constitution relative to general highway finance. A pay-as- 
you-go highway plan was contained in Article 6, Section 21, 
of the Constitution, as follows:
No debt shall be created, or certificates of 
indebtedness or bonds issued, to be paid in the 
future out of the proceeds realized from any State 
tax or license to be collected under and by virtue 
of this section, or imposed thereunder by the 
Legislature, but the said licenses and taxes shall 
be collected from year to year and expended for 
the purpose of the construction and maintenance 
of the system of State highways and bridge s.
1 ftLouisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 21(c).
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The taxes which were to pay the way were the motor vehicle
tax and a 2-cents per gallon tax on gasoline and other motor
fuels. The Legislature was also authorized to provide
revenues to the General Highway Fund from any other sources
19except borrowing.
The pay-as-you-go approach to highway construction 
had been very strongly entrenched in most of the American 
states for several years. Only eleven states had borrowed 
for highway purposes by 1918; thirteen more states borrowed 
for this purpose between 1919 and 1922. Others joined the ■ 
borrowing movement in 1927. The delay in highway programs 
in many states resulted from controversies over whether the 
states or the local governments would finance them and
20
whether pay-as-you-go financing or borrowing would be used. 
The bias against borrowing was still very strong in 1921—  
it was to take several more years before large-scale borrow­
ing would be socially and politically acceptable in 
Louisiana.
The constitutional prohibition against highway 
borrowing did not in any way affect the Highway Fund Number 
2 provisions which authorized limited borrowing for a
•^Ibid.. and Pro let. Vol. I, Part 1, pp. ij.80-1.
20B. U. Ratchford, American State Debts (Durham,
North Carolina: Duke University Press, 19̂ -1), pp. 2 7 8-8 2 .
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specialized purpose. Borrowing for special highway purposes
in Louisiana had its origin with the $700,000 issue of 1919
for the purpose of constructing the New Orleana-Chef Menteur
and Hammond-New Orleans Highways. These bonds were authorized
by Act 18 of 1918 (which was carried over by the 1921 Consti- 
21
tution), and were the only ones issued until 1927 when 
Series B was sold. In the interim, another amendment was 
necessary before this 1927 borrowing could take place. The 
amendment came in the form of Act 179.of 1921; which author­
ized up to $2,000,000 additional borrowing. This act 
authorized the funding of the excess of motor vehicle license 
tax receipts in Highway Fund Number 2 over the annual 
service requirements on the original issue--the new issue 
would thus be subordinate to the 19 1 9 bonds. The purpose of 
the 1927 issue was to complete the two highways, and the 
Board of Liquidation was again responsible for the borrowing, 
subject to the same restrictions that had been imposed in 
1918. Series B bonds were scheduled to mature between 1928
and 1939 and carried the maximum allowable interest rate of 
225 per cent. (See Table VII, Appendix A.)
21Louisiana, Constitution (1913), as amended 1918,
Act 18 of the Special Session; and (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 21;.
22Louisiana, Constitution (1913), as amended 1918,
Act 18 of the Special Session; (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 21;;
(1921), as amended 1921;, Art. 6, Sec. 21;.1, Act 179; and 
Moody*s, 1928, p. 1211;.
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Series B bonds, like the first issue, were direct
obligations (as defined here), but they were not backed by
the full faith and credit of the State. The bonds were
secured by the motor vehicle license tax receipts from the
23
six parishes that supported Highway Fund Number 2. It 
would normally not seem advisable for a State to dedicate 
specific taxes for the support of individual bond issues. 
But, if there is a dedication of state funds, such borrowing 
probably would be best accompanied by the full faith and 
credit pledge if the State is really the issuing party.
This pledge was not given in the case of the Highway Fund 
Number 2 borrowing in either 1919 or 1927.
Confederate Veterans1 Pension Borrowing.
1921-1927
The second and final component of the direct debt 
added in Louisiana during the 1921 to 1927 period was the 
Confederate veterans1 pension borrowing which started at the 
end of 1925. The paying of Confederate veterans1 pensions 
was common in the Southern states, but borrowing to finance
^Louisiana, Constitution (1913)» as amended 1918,
Act 18 of the Special Session; (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 21}.; 
(1921), Art. 6, Sec. Z\\, 1, as amended 1921}., Act 179;
Moody1 s, 1928, p. 121 [(.; 1939# p. 559? Louisiana, Treasurer*s 
Report. 1922-23# p. x; and Ambrose M. Smith, Compilation of 
Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds (New Orleans: A. M.
Smith Investment Company, 1933J» P. 8.
iBk
2l|these pensions was not widespread. In Louisiana, the 
Constitution of 1921 did not mention borrowing in connection 
with Confederate veterans. There were Included, however, 
several general provisions relative to the payment of 
veterans1 pensions; a number of legislative acts and consti­
tutional amendments had to be added before this evolved into 
borrowing. Article 18, Sections 1 through 5> of the Consti­
tution of 1921 provided that pensions be paid to Confederate 
veterans or their widows in an amount of $ 3 0 per month as 
long as the incomes of the applicants were less than $1,000 
annually. These pensions were authorized to be paid from
the receipts of the 0.75 mill ad valorem tax which was25
dedicated for that purpose.
Borrowing for the purpose of paying Confederate 
veterans* pensions in Louisiana was authorized by a legisla­
tive act and a related constitutional amendment in 192!}..
The constitutional amendment validated the actions of the 
Legislature in appropriating $1,620,000 for pensions and in 
authorizing borrowing for pension purposes. The significant 
change was that the Board of Liquidation of the State Debt 
was empowered to anticipate the proceeds of the tax and
i?atchford, American State Debts. pp. 3 2 6-2 7 .
25Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Secs. 1-5.
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borrow annually an amount equal to the expected annual
revenues of the tax. It was further permitted to borrow up
26to $5 0 0 ,0 0 0  more which was to be secured by the same tax.
Even this borrowing, however, was insufficient to finance the
full $ 3 0 per month pension, and the pension soon had to be
A 27 reduced to $20.
Bond sales under the 1921}. constitutional pension
provision came In 1925 and 1926 and totaled $1,000,000.
Series A was dated December 15* 1925* and consisted of
$500,000 of i;.5 P©** cent bonds. (This first issue was paid
in full In 1931*) Series B, which was dated November 1,
1926, duplicated Series A in amount and terms except that it
28paid 5 P®** cent and matured in 1932. The total borrowed 
to finance Confederate veterans* pensions between 1921 and 
1927 thus was $1,000,000. (See Table VIII, Appendix A.)
There is a very important lesson to be learned from 
the developments in the Confederate veterans* borrowing.
What started out as the dedication of certain revenues for
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, as amended 
192t(., Act 176; and Louisiana, Acts (1921).), Act 1^6, pp. 250-51.
27Another amendment was added in the next period— In 
1928— to pay veterans the amount that was lost when the 
pension was cut.
nQ
Louisiana, Treasurer's Report. 1926-27, p. 59; and 
Moody's, 1927, p. 1128; 1931,-p. 1 W .
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the payment of pensions eventually required borrowing; this 
debt financing was introduced after the pension was already 
established and could not easily be removed. These develop­
ments in Confederate veterans* pension borrowing indicate 
that the debt structure can be affected by revenue dedica­
tions even though these dedications start out with no mention 
of borrowing.
Borrowing for Confederate veterans* pensions was 
introduced in anticipation of tax receipts. But all borrow­
ing, in the final analysis, is in anticipation of tax 
receipts or some other revenue. This feature would not seem 
to modify the general and conventional conclusion that 
borrowing for veterans* pensions and bonuses is undesirable 
and improper when viewed from the standpoint of conservative 
finance.
III. INDIRECT BORROWING, 1921-1927
Direct borrowing which took place during the 1921 to 
1927 period amounted to only $3,000,000, while indirect 
borrowing amounted to $10,^00,000. {See Table VI, Appendix 
A.) Dependence upon the indirect form of borrowing in 
Louisiana was not a new development but was a continuation 
of the trend established by the Port of New Orleans 
borrowing of the 1913 to 1920 period.
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Port of Hew Orleans Borrowing, 1921-1927
The purpose of the borrowing by the Board of Commis­
sioners of the Port of New Orleans was basically the same in 
this period as it was in the preceding years. Port develop­
ment again seems to have been a worthy reason for debt 
creation. The constitutional provision in the 1921 Consti­
tution which had a bearing on this borrowing was the one 
that dealt with administrative officers and boards— Article 
6, Section 16 of this article provided that acts and amend­
ments relative to the Port of New Orleans in existence before 
1921 would be continued in force to fulfill the obligations 
on existing bonds, but the new Constitution prohibited the 
issue of any further debt under such prior acts, except for 
the New Orleans Navigation Canal. The Board of Commissioners 
was specifically authorized to borrow $6,£00,000 for "public 
purposes," except current expense; it was authorized to 
borrow further for similar purposes if certain revenue 
requirements were satisfied. The Constitution stipulated 
that the total debt was not to exceed $3£>000,000, but this
sum did not include, nor did the article affect, the borrow-
29
ing for the development of the Navigation Canal.
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art, 6, Sec. 16; 
and Moody*s, 1926, p. 1122.
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The Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans
was also empowered to issue refunding obligations. Thus,
the debt could be maintained at $35,000,000 if the Port
Commission decided that it was necessary. The bonds were
required to be serials, and it was Indicated that the annual
payments should be as nearly as practicable equal serial
annuities. The Constitution of 1921 also provided that the
retirement of bonds issued by the Board could be deferred up
30to not more than ten years from the date of their issue.
One thing which was not contained in Article 6, Sec­
tion 16, was a statement of the precise support pledged for 
Port of New Orleans issues. Lengthy passages prescribed the 
procedures that the Supervisor of Public Accounts, the State 
Auditor, the Governor, and the Board of Commissioners would 
follow in determining whether the revenues of the Port (none 
of which came from the State) were sufficient to justify 
issues beyond the $6,500,000 specified. But, it was not 
indicated in the Constitution whether the State*s full faith
31
and credit was pledged for any or part of the $35»OOOjOOO» 
This factor is one which should have been made very clear. 
Yet, it could only be assumed, from the impressive list of
3°Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 16. 
31Ibld.
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State officials reviewing prospective issues, that the State
32
was at all concerned in the issue.
This situation was the institutional setting when the 
Port Commission of New Orleans returned to the bond market 
after the new Constitution was adopted. The Port borrowing 
declined in importance, but the Port Commission was still 
the State*s heaviest borrower from 1921 to 1927. (See Table 
VI, Appendix A.) The tenth issue of Port bonds was sold 
under the new authorization shortly before the end of 1921 
and amounted to $3 ,£00,000. These deferred noncallable 
serial bonds, which were simply called "Serial Bonds," were 
given a £0-year term. Issues of $3*000,000 each with 
similar provisions were floated in 1923 and 1927. The pur­
pose of all these issues was to finance general Port
3^The Treasurer*s Report, after some of these bonds 
had been issued, indicated that the full faith and credit was 
pledged for the Port of New Orleans Issues. A. M. Smith of 
the A. M. Smith Investment Company, in his compilation of 
Louisiana bonds, also indicated that Port bonds were con­
sidered full faith and credit obligations by bond attorneys. 
Moody*s considered these obligations of the State or "general 
obligations" although they were payable primarily from 
revenues of the Board. A statement published by the Board 
of Commissioners in 1922 also affirmed that the first issue 
sold under the new constitutional authorization was a full 
faith and credit instrument of the Port and the State. 
Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report, 192lj.-2£, p. £7; A. M. Smith, 
Compllatlon of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds (New 
Orleans: A. M, Smith Investment Company, 193&), P. l^J
Moody*s, 1927, p. 1129; and Port of New Orleans, "Statement 
of Amortization," 1922, passim.
190
33improvements. (See Table IX, Appendix A.) Totaling 
$9,500,000, this Port of New Orleans borrowing accounted for
f
about 70 per cent of all Louisiana debt incurred during the 
period 1921 to 192?* An important characteristic of the 
Port bonds was that the first maturity installments were 
deferred for ten years. This deferment procedure, of 
course, usually adds greatly to the cost of borrowing; as a 
general rule, bonds should be retired as quickly as possible. 
Another questionable practice made its appearance in the 
bond denominations. Some of the bonds issued were in 
denominations of $500. Any unit smaller than $1,000 is
generally undesirable because small units are less marketable
3kthan large and even denominations.
State Penitentiary Borrowing. 1921-1927
The State Penitentiary was the second agency to issue 
Indirect bonds under the provisions of the hew Constitution of
1921. There were some similarities between the Port of New 
Orleans and the Penitentiary authorizations. Both agencies
^ L o u i s i a n a ,  Treasurer’s Report. 1926-27, p. 59? 
Moody’s, 1923, p. 970? 1925, P. 939! 1928, p. 121ij.; Smith, 
Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds, 1933, 
pp. 10-11; Port of New Orleans, hiStatement of Amortization,"
1922, pp. 1-30; and Port of New Orleans, "Information 
Concerning Bonded Obligations of the Board of Commissioners 
of the Port of New Orleans (An Agency of the State of 
Louisiana," compiled by TIley S. McChesney, Assistant 
Treasurer (New Orleans: June 1, 1928), pp. 16-30.
^Supra, Chap. II, p. 12k»
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could issue bonds secured by their revenues. Bonds issued 
by both of the agencies were full faith and credit as well 
as indirect obligations. The difference was that the Port 
of New Orleans could have up to $35>,000,000 of indebtedness 
outstanding while the Penitentiary was authorized to borrow
3 5only $1,000,000. This type of limited authorization is 
not what is ordinarily meant when reference is made to the 
special fund doctrine and authority borrowing. These terms 
are usually used in connection with blanket and/or at least 
very broad borrowing powers which are delegated to agencies 
without severe limitations as to amounts that may be 
borrowed. The Penitentiary borrowing obviously was not of 
this type. If the Penitentiary should have reason to borrow 
more at a later date, it would require another constitutional 
amendment.
The manager of the Penitentiary issued the authorized 
$1,000,000 of coupon bonds in January, 1922. The purpose of 
the issue was to acquire 5>000 acres of land adjacent to 
Angola Plantation on which to construct levees and to recon­
struct a drainage plant. Part of the proceeds of the bond 
sale were also intended to pay $150,000 owed on Angola 
Plantation. The life of the noncallable serial bonds was
35Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 20, Sec. 1
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36set at forty years, from 1923 to 1962. (See Table X, , 
Appendix A.)
While the purchase of the land in question might have 
been necessary and proper, it doe3 not appear desirable that 
the State should have issued long-term debt in order to 
raise $1,000,000 to finance the acquisition. Short or 
intermediate term borrowing might have been more appropriate 
to raise such a relatively small amount. Under the circum­
stances, the life of the issue also seems to have been 
excessive. This case is an illustration of the danger cited 
in Chapter II. Whenever a maximum term Is established (be 
it the life of the improvement or any other standard), there 
is a danger that the maximum term will also be the modal 
term.
Another questionable feature of the Port Commission
and the Penitentiary debt was that the Interest on this debt
was payable only locally. Interest on the Port Commission
and the Penitentiary obligations was made payable in Baton 
37Rouge. In order to make bond issues more marketable, it 
is usually desirable for interest and principal payments to
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 20, Sec. 1; 
Moody’s, 1922, p. 81j.0; Financial Report. 19lj.l-ij.2, p. 80; 
Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds. 
1933# p. 55 and 19357 P. 6.
^Moody’s, 1 9 1 9, p. 2ijl|.; and 1922, p. 8J4.O,
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be payable in the large financial centers of the nation for 
the convenience of the bondholders.
Summary of Borrowing. 1921-1927
The total amount borrowed both directly and indirectly 
in Louisiana from 1921 to 1927 amounted to $13*500*000# 
Indirect borrowing continued to be the more important 
borrowing during the period. The Indirect debt consisted of 
$9,500,000 of Port of New Orleans borrowing and $1,000,000 
of Penitentiary borrowing. The direct borrowing over the 
same span was made up of $2,000,000 of highway borrowing and 
$1,000,000 of Confederate veterans* pension borrowing. (See 
Table VI, Appendix A.)
IV. DIRECT BORROWING, 1920-19^0
The State»s credit position near the beginning of the 
1928-I9ij.0 period can be estimated from the following data: 
the assessed valuation of property in the State showed an 
increase from $l,72i;,95!;,0i;2 in 1927 to $1,733,#2,71!; in 
1928, and State tax collections were $9,958,758 in 1927 and 
$9,995,9!;! in 1928. The significant debt figures were the 
$8 .5 1  of per capita debt in 1927 and the $8.77 in 1928 
compared to the $7.I;5 P0r capita owed in 1922. The total 
debt reported as of August 1, 1927, was $57»319,i;20 end on
19lj.
38September 22, 1928, It was $52*, 099,1*20. Taxes collected 
were 1 7 ,2* per cent of the debt outstanding in 1927 and 1 8 .5  
per cent In 1928. In 1920, this measure had been 19.0 per 
cent. The debt outstanding was 3.29 pen cent of the total 
assessed valuation of property in 1927 and 3.12 per cent in 
1928. The comparable figure In 1920 was 2.63 P«r cent.
These comparisons Indicate that the debt burden was 
somewhat greater in Louisiana in 1927 and 1928 than it had 
been in 1920, but it does not appear, by the criteria of the 
market, that Louisiana had exceeded her ability to pay. The 
State seems to have been in a position to borrow conserva­
tively. Whether the market would view the large-scale 
borrowing that was to come very shortly in Louisiana as safe 
is another question. The bond ratings again provide some 
insight into this problem. The continuation of Aaa ratings
•50on all Louisiana bonds through 1931 is a fairly good indi­
cation that there was no immediate alarm over the large- 
scale borrowing (general highway) that began in 1928,^
3®Moody*s, 1 9 2 6 -1 9 2 8 and 193k-* Louisiana, 
Treasurer's Report. 1922-23, 1921*-2h, and 1926-27.
^The ratings did begin to change radically in 1932 
when they were all reduced to Aa and in 1933 when they fell 
to A. Moody*s, 1931, p. ll*99; 1932, p. 11*82; and 1933,
P. 1512.
^ I f  criteria other than the bond market*s had been 
used in assessing the safety of Louisiana borrowing at the
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The yardstick by which Louisiana’s borrowing was
measured at the beginning of the 1928 to 19^0 period was the
conventional market criteria which did not indicate that the
State’s credit was questionable until 1932. The State’s new
borrowing was accepted for a while on traditional grounds,
but Louisiana actually had embarked on a spending program
that was not at all common among the states at that time.
Louisiana was one of the very few heavy borrowers among the
states in the middle of the Great Depression. This heavy
spending program apparently was not Intended as counter-
I4.Icyclical fiscal policy; it took place at a time when
heavy state governmental spending was considered inappropriate.
Debt changes from 1928 to 19^0 were quite different 
from those during the preceding period. First, there was 
large-scale borrowing where before there had been relatively
beginning of the 1 9 3 0’s, the conclusion about the appropri­
ateness of borrowing might have been reinforced but for a 
different reason. For example, if counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy had been recognized, states in the early thirties 
might have found themselves in a position where the consid­
erations about safety in borrowing would have been relegated 
to a subordinate position. Or, it might have been concluded 
that it was appropriate and even safe for states to borrow 
at the start of this depression because borrowing and 
spending might have been expected to contribute enough to 
recovery to revive debt-paying ability. Neither of these 
views, of course, was prevalent In the 1930’s.
^Ansel M. Sharp, "The Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Role 
of State Governments During the ’ Thirties *,11 National Tax 
Journal. XI, No. 2 (June, 1958), 139.
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little use of the State*s credit. Secondly, where the 
greatest previous activity had been in the indirect cate­
gory, direct borrowing now assumed the greater importance. 
Direct borrowing was for the following purposes: the
financing of Confederate veterans* pensions, the building 
of a new capitol building, the payment of flood and drought 
relief, and highway construction. Highway construction was 
by far the most important purpose for Louisiana borrowing, 
(See Table XX, Appendix A.)
Highway Borrowing, 1928-19h.O
In Louisiana by 1928, the pay-as-you-go approach to 
highway financing had been given a 6-year test, and the 
improvements were far from sufficient. Was borrowing now 
proper? Highway borrowing had characteristics which recom­
mended it at the beginning of the 1928 to 19^0 period as a 
proper use of the State*s credit. First, it could be 
expected that highway improvements would help by promoting 
economic growth. Highway borrowing was also proper because 
highways are long-term, nonrecurrent, and durable improve­
ments that are suitable for long-term Indentures, In 
addition to financial propriety, highway construction, and 
borrowing for this purpose, were becoming more and more 
accepted as desirable functions of state governments at that 
time. Thus, highway borrowing at the start of this period
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was not regarded as improper on political, social, or
U2economic grounds,
Large-scale highway borrowing could not take place in 
Louisiana, however, until the 1921 constitutional pay-as- 
you-go plan was modified. The modification took the form of 
seven constitutional amendments affecting highway finance in 
the space of twelve years. Act 219 of 1928^ raised the 
gasoline tax to h cents and authorized the Board of Liqui­
dation of the State Debt to fund the proceeds of 1 cent of 
the [{.-cent tax. There was no indication in the amendment of 
any specific limit to the amount of bonds that could be 
issued on this basis. It was provided, however, that the 
bonds were not to pay more than 5 per cent nor to run for 
more than twenty years. Bond denominations were required to 
be not less than $5>00. Finally, it was stipulated that the 
obligations offered should not be sold for less than par.^"
^ Edna Trull, Borrowing for Highways (New York:
Dim & Bradstreet, Inc., Municipal ServiceDepartment, 1937), 
p. l£j and Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 2 7 8-8 2 .
^There was another amendment in 1928 relative to the 
construction of toll bridges, but it was never implemented 
because it was legally impaired. William D. Ross, Financing 
Highway Improvements in Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Division of
Research, College of Commerce, Louisiana State University,
19i>5>), p. hh-5 and Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, 
Sec. 25.1, as amended 1926, Act 2o6.
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22(d), 
as amended 1928, Act 219.
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An important point that was not covered in the 
authorization was whether the bonds provided for would be 
full faith and credit obligations. Two other unfavorable 
elements in this first general highway policy were the 
sanction of denominations as small as $5 0 0, and the dedica­
tion or pledge of one-fourth of the lj.-cent gasoline tax as 
security for the bonds authorized. Bonds are normally more 
expensive and less attractive to investors when they are 
offered in denominations smaller than $1,000. The dedica­
tion of revenues to a specific bond issue was undesirable 
because it would prejudice the position of subsequent issues.
The constitutional amendment of 1928 resulted in
$21,000,000 of general highway borrowing which was to be '
serviced and retired from the proceeds of the gasoline tax.
Two issues were sold under this authorization during the
next year. (See Table XII, Appendix A.) Series A and B
together totaled $15,000,000. Both issues consisted of
noncallable serial bonds that matured in 19k9» The third
issue under this authorization, sold in 1930, amounted to
$6,000,000 and brought the total general highway debt to
ij.6$21,000,000, The bonds of the A, B, and C issues paid the
^ Ibid.
^Frora 1918 through 1931, all of the Louisiana obliga­
tions were rated Aaa by Moody1s. Therefore, the Moody’s 
ratings are not analyzed until the next period when they 
began to change.
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maximum interest rate of 5 per cent permitted under the 1928 
authorization, and they also made use of the maximum life
klauthorized--twenty years.
Twenty-one million dollars of borrowing in two years 
made a big change In Louisiana*s debt structure, but it was 
minor compared to what was about to happen. Act 3 of the 
Extra Session of 1930, which was accepted as a constitutional 
amendment in 1930, established a large-scale highway plan. 
This time, the Louisiana Highway Commission was given the 
responsibility of borrowing under the supervision of a newly 
created State Advisory Board, The main purpose of the 
authorization was to construct paved State highways and 
bridges required in connection with these highways. The 
Commission was authorized to borrow $68,000,000 for this 
purpose. Another purpose, in the same act, was to finance 
the construction of a bridge over the Mississippi River in 
New Orleans. The sum of $7,000,000 was granted for this 
purpose bringing the total borrowing authorized to 
$72,000,000. Act 3 of the Extra Session of 1930 further 
provided that no more than $35,000,000 could be borrowed in
^Louisiana, Treasurers Ren or t. 1926-27, p. 59? 
1928-29, p. 77; Louisiana, Financial Report. I9I4.I-I4.2, p. 81; 
Moody*s, 1930, p. Iii22; 1932, p. llj.82; and Smith, Compilation 
of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds, 1933» p. 6.
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any single year. The bonds were required to be advertised, 
to be sold publicly to the highest bidder, to be sold for 
not less than par, to pay no more than 5 per cent, and to be 
retired in not more than twenty-five years. Bonds were to 
be in denominations of not less than $1,000, and the first 
maturity installment could not be deferred more than four 
years. Finally, the bonds were secured by the following 
pledges: the surplus of the previously dedicated 1-cent
gasoline tax, the remaining 3-cent gasoline tax, and the
USState1s full faith and credit.
Before 1930 came to an end, $15,000,000 of bonds were 
sold Tinder the new authorization. This sale was the fourth 
highway issue, Series D, and the bonds had a maturity date 
of 1955* Borrowing for the purpose of paving highways and 
the constructing of bridges continued in 1931 when another 
$15,000,000 issue was floated. This Series E issue also 
matured in twenty-five years, A third issue under the same 
authorization was Series F of $15,000,000 which came early 
in 1932. The three issues of $15,000,000 each ran for the 
maximum allowable term of twenty-five years. Series G-
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22(e), 
as amended 1930, Act 3, E.S.j Louisiana, Financial Report, 
19l+l-l|-2, p. 81; Moody's, 1931, p. lij-9̂ ; and Smith, Compila­
tion of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds, 1933, P." 6.
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bonds, which amounted to $7*000*000* were sold to the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1932 and were also 
given a 25-year life. Five of the seven issues, from A 
through G, paid the maximum interest rate provided under 
the authorization— 5 per cent. The other two issues paid 
ij.,5 per cent.^
The final highway issues sold in the 1930 to 1932 
period of heavy general highway borrowing were Series H and 
I, dated in September and October of 1932. Series H 
amounted to $7*500,000 and I amounted to $2,500,000. Both 
of the issues were callable at par. This instance was the 
first use of the call option on the provisions of any high­
way bonds sold in Louisiana. The two issues were designed
to pay 5 per cent and to mature between 193& end 19^0. The
50bonds thus were deferred callable serials.
The reservation of the call feature on Series H and I 
bonds later made possible a very profitable and efficient
k9Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report. 1932-33* P. 82; 
Louisiana, Financial Report. 19i^l-h2, p. 81; Smith, Complla- 
ticn of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds, 1933, pp. 6-7; 
Moody*s, 1932, p. 1I4.S2 ; 1933* P. 1512; and Ambrose M. Smith, 
A Supplement to the Compilation of Louisiana State and 
Municipal Bonds (New Orleans: A. M. Smith Investment
Company, June 30, 193k)t P. 5.
^Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report. 1932-33, p. 8 3 ; 
Moody*s, 193^, p. 5I3J Smith. Compilation of Louisiana State 
and Municipal Bonds. 193^* P* £» and 193&, P."1H
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debt refunding. It appears at first glance that much 
wider use should have been made of this feature during the 
whole period when interest rates were so high. None of 
the nine issues (amounting to $83*000,000) sold between 1929 
and 1932 carried interest rates of less than per cent, 
and seven of the nine issues paid f> per cent. The rates on 
these bonds were so high that the State would have been 
fortunate if it could have retained the call privilege. By 
this time, however, Louisiana was having a great deal of 
trouble floating bonds of any description. The State 
probably would have been unable to sell any callable bonds 
with its credit standing in the market which prevailed 
during this period.
There are several other Interesting features of 
highway Issues D through I. There was a shift of responsi­
bility from the Board of Liquidation of the State Debt, 
which had been responsible for the earlier issues, to the 
Louisiana Highway Commission, subject to the approval of the 
newly created State Advisory Board. Such shifts of adminis­
trative responsibility should occur very infrequently and 
only when the change will clearly bring more efficient
51Infra, p. 206.
^Ratchford, American State Debts. pp. 2 7 0-7 1.
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operation. Abuse of this principle can cause uncertainty 
In the minds of the investment analysts and their customers 
and can conceivably lead to higher interest costs. Although 
it cannot be concluded that the shift in this case was 
undesirable, there Is no Indication that the change had any 
important favorable implications. Another noteworthy 
characteristic of the highway borrowing which resulted from 
Act 3 of the Extra Session of 1930 was that the bonds issued 
from 1930 to 1932 all had maturities equal to the maximum
53time allowable. When maximum terms are stipulated In 
constitutional provisions, some effort should be made to 
encourage shorter terms.
The differences in the security provisions of issues 
A, B, C and of issues D through G were also Important. The 
first three issues were given the security of 1 cent of the 
gasoline tax. No other bonds could henceforth be issued 
payable on a parity from that portion of the gasoline tax. 
Bonds subsequently issued, of course, might not be as 
desirable to investors as the senior issues, and they would 
consequently tend to require higher interest rates to attract 
buyers.
Louisiana, Financial Report. 19l|.l-̂ 2, p. 81.
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Series D through P were payable from the surplus of 
the 1-cent tax, from the remaining 3 cents of the lj.-cent 
gasoline tax, and they were also secured by the State*s full 
faith and credit. Pledging the surplus of the first 1-cent 
tax to issues D through P may conceivably have done more 
harm than good because it lent a second lien flavor to those 
issues and introduced undesirable complexity into the pro­
tective features of the bonds.
The next development in Louisiana highway finance was 
another constitutional amendment which came in 193ij.. For a 
change, Act 2 of 193̂ 1 did not make any important debt manage­
ment revisions and served mostly to bring together and 
reenact all of the constitutional provisions relative to 
highway borrowing that had been added since 1921. Some of 
the bonds issued after this time thus were issued under the 
terms of Act 3 of the Extra Session of 1930 as amended and 
reenacted by Act 2 of 193^» Series J through N and P (there 
was no Series 0) that were so issued in 193U» 1 9 3 and 1936 
totaled $13,000,000. Of this total, $5,000,000 was intended 
for the completion of the planned road system and the remain­
der was for the continuation of farmer and feeder road
$kconstruction.
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22, as 
amended 193^» Act 2; Louisiana, Financial Report, 19l|l-ij.2, 
p. 8l; and Ambrose M. Smith, A Supplement to the Compilation 
of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds (Hew Orleans: A. M.
Smith Investment Company, June 1, 1935)> P. 7.
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Series J, the only highway issue sold in 1 9 3 was a 
relatively small one of $500,000. It was also somewhat 
•unique in that it contained the call feature and was 
scheduled to mature in only five years— in 1939. The 
interest rate of 5 pen cent was typical of those of the 
period. The call feature was not exercized in this case, 
and Series J was retired at the end of the 5-y®ar term. The 
rest of the general highway issues in 1 9 3 5 and 1936 were 
Series K of $1,000,000; Series L of $5,000,000; Series M of 
$1,500,000; Series N of $2,500,000; and, Series P of 
$2,500,000. Series J through P (except 0) thus amounted to 
$1 3,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 and completed the $7 5,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 of borrowing that 
had been authorized initially in Act 3 of the Extra Session
55of 1930. None of these obligations except Series J was 
callable. Interest rates continued to be relatively high—  
between I4..25 and 5 pen cent.
Act 66 of 1936 authorized $2lj.,500,000 of regular 
general highway borrowing in addition to $5 ,5 0 0 * 0 0 0 Ton 
refunding. The bonds were secured by the proceeds of the 
[j.-cent gasoline tax subject to all of the prior pledges in 
Acts 219 of 1928, 3 of the Extra Session of 1930, and 2 of
^Louisiana, Financial Report. 19lpl—14.2 , p. 8l; 19^7-11-8 , 
p. 58; Moody*s, 1936, p. 573* 1937* P. 588; and Ambrose M. 
Smith, A Supplement to the Compilation of Louisiana State 
and Municipal Bonds 7Wew Orleans: A. M. Smith Investment
Company, June 1, 1936), pp. )j-5.
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193l+« All of these bonds, except for the refunding bonds, 
therefore, were junior to the outstanding general highway 
obligations. Other requirements were unchanged: the bonds
were to be general obligations of the State, denominations 
were to be not less than $1,000 each, the interest rate was 
not to exceed 5 psr cent, and the life of the bonds was
56
limited to twenty-five years.
Three issues sold under the terms of Act 66 of 1936 
in 1937 were followed by two more in 1938, three in 1939* 
and a single one in 191+0. Series Q of 1937 was the first of 
these issues and differed somewhat from the rest of them 
because it was the refunding issue authorized by Act 66.
The call option reserved on Series H and I of the highway
57issues of 1932 was partially exercised in 1937 6y means of 
this sale. There was still $£,500,000 of the bonds outstand­
ing by 1937 when prevailing interest rates fell below 5 Per 
cent. Sufficient funds were not available, however, to take 
advantage of these lower rates without further borrowing.
The refunding was authorized by the aforementioned Act 66 of 
1936. The sum authorized was exactly $5,500,000, and it was
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22(f), 
as amended 1936, Act 66.
57^'Some of the serials had already matured, and some 
of the outstanding bonds due in 1939 and 19i+0 had been 
called in 1936 and paid from Highway Commission revenues.
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specifically stated that the funds raised would be used to 
retire Series H and I prior to their maturity. Bonds issued 
to raise the $5 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0  were assigned the same protective 
provisions as had the bonds they were replacing. The 
refunding issue was scheduled to be retired between 19it-l and 
I960. The interest rate paid on these refunding bonds was 
3.75 as opposed to the 5 Per cent on the H and I issues they 
replaced. This issue was noncallable and was rated Baa by
59Moody1s at the time of issue and A the following year.
Series R and S were the other issues sold in 1937
under the authority of Act 66 of 1936. Series R amounted to
$6,500,000 and paid 3*5 Pe^ cent. Series S of $5*000,000
was sold at split rates of lj. per cent on the serials
maturing from 19̂ -1 to 1957 and 3*75 P©** cent on those
maturing from 1958 to I960. These two issues, like those
60
of Series Q, were not callable. The use of split rates here 
was the first instance of their use in Louisiana up to this
■^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22(f), 
as amended 1936, Act 66; and Smith, Compilation of Louisiana 
State and Municipal Bonds, 1938, p. FI
^9Moody*s, 1938, p. 6 3 6; 1939, p. 558; and Smith, 
Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds. 1938,
pp. 9-10.
60Moody»s, 1938, p. 639; and 1939, p. 558.
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time. Split rates would appear to be a proper technique of
debt management since they can add to the marketability of
61
bond issues and thus perhaps to better interest terms.
The remaining Issues authorized by Act 66 of 1936 
were Series T through Y sold in 1938* 1939* and 19^0.
Series T and U of 1938 were both split rate issues totaling 
$6,500,000 together. Both were designed to mature serially 
by I960, In 1939* $lj., 000,000 of bonds was sold under the 
1936 authorization. These Series V through X bonds were 
scheduled to mature in 1961. Series Y of 19^0 amounted to 
$2,500,000 and matures in I960. Like the 1938 bonds, these
^The rating of Series R and S at the time of their 
issue was Ba— a very low rating for state bonds. The Ba 
rating at that time was given the following meaning:
Bonds carrying the Ba rating generally 
have some elements of uncertainty. Invest­
ment characteristics are not entirely absent, 
but speculative elements begin to dominate,
Moody's, 1928, pp. viii.
These Ba ratings on Series R and S were lower than those 
that had been assigned to the other Louisiana highway issues. 
This lower rating was probably a result of the subordinate 
nature of the security pledged for the payment of the bonds. 
However, it may also have been Indicative of the undesirable 
complexity and the pressure on the ability to pay that was 
growing in the Louisiana debt structure with each additional 
highway issue. The raising of the ratings on the same 
issues, R and S, in 1939 to Baa still recognized them as 
less attractive than the prior lien A through Q, Issues that 
were rated A. Moody's, 1939* p. 558.
209
62issues were all noncallable and were rated Baa. The 
remarks relative to the split rates and the junior security 
of these bonds apply equally here.
Still other bonds were being sold in 1939 under a 
separate authorization. This authorization was Act 39 which 
was adopted as a constitutional amendment in 1938. The 
total amount of bonds authorized under this amendment was 
only $^,000,000. The purpose of this borrowing was to 
construct farm-to-market roads and to finance maintenance of 
State highways and bridges. The bonds were to be general 
obligations and the [(.-cent gasoline tax was also dedicated 
to the payment of these issues subject to three substantial 
prior claims. The retirement of these bonds was required by 
the constitutional amendment to begin not more than three 
years after the date of issue and to be completed in not 
more than eight years from that time. The interest maximum 
continued at 5 per cent and the administrative relationship 
between the Highway Commission and the State Advisory Board 
was also maintained for this authorization.
The bonds sold under the second authorization of 1938- 
Act 39— were Series AA, BB, and CC, which together totaled
62Louisiana, Financial Report. I9I1.I-I4.2 , p. 81; Moody*s 
1 9 3 8, p. 636; 1939, p. 558; 19IJ.0 , p. 1̂ 39; and iglj.1# P. lf-63.-
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22(h), 
as amended 1938, Act 39.
$5*000,000. Series AA and BB were of $1,000,000 each while 
Series CC, which bore split rates, accounted for the remain­
ing $3,000,000. These three issues carried strikingly 
different interest rates; Series AA of May 1, 1939, bore a 
3.5 per* cent rate; Series BB of June 15, 1939, had a 3»2f? 
rate; and Series CC was split between $2,500,000 at 2 per 
cent and $500,000 at 1.75 per cent.^ The security pledged 
In each ca3e was the same, and the complexity factor was not 
different between the bond issues. There was one major 
difference between the first two issues and the last one; 
this was the fact that the first two matured in 19lj-7 while 
the CC issue would be fully retired in 19l|4* The difference 
in the life of the bonds is more than enough to explain the 
difference between the interest rates of Series CC and those 
of the other two issues, but there is no such obvious reason 
for the 0.25 per cent difference between the AA and BB 
issues except six weeks of time. This difference does not 
mean, of course, that the rate paid on the AA bonds was too 
high or could necessarily have been avoided, but it does 
indicate how much interest rates can change from one month 
to another and how borrowing must be planned sufficiently in 
advance so that the debt managers can try to take advantage 
of the changes which seem inevitably to come.
6*Hbld.s Moody*s, 19l|.0, p. lj.39? and 19l|l, p. 1̂ 63
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All of the highway borrowing discussed thus far in 
this section was for general highway purposes. The total 
amount of this borrowing during the 1928 to 19l|-0 period was 
$12^,500,000. (See Table XII, Appendix A.) There was, 
however, other State highway borrowing for a more limited 
purpose. The motor vehicle license tax collected in six 
parishes had been used to issue $700,000 of bonds in 1919 
and $2,000,000 more in 1927. How, by a constitutional 
amendment accepted in 1936, Act 71 authorized the dedication 
of funds to State Highway Fund Number 2 for the purpose of 
constructing and completing a highway and bridges between 
Mandeville and New Orleans and to purchase the Pontchartrain 
Bridge. The funds set aside for this purpose consisted of 
5 0 per cent of the license fees collected on farm trucks, 
$7 .5 0  of the fees on all other trucks, and 25 cents per 
rated horsepower on all automobile licenses sold in the six 
parishes. The Louisiana Highway Commission was empowered, 
with the consent of the State Advisory Board, to fund these 
revenues except for an annual amount sufficient to service 
prior issues. It was further specified that the bonds were
65to be general obligations of the State. The limitation on 
the amount of bonds that could be issued was set at
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22(g), 
as amended 1936, Act 71.
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$5,000,000. The usual terras about Interest rates and the
life of the bonds were also included— per cent and twenty-
five years. The permissible deferment before the first
66installment was paid was four years after issue.
The Highway Fund Number 2 amendment of 1936 brought
two issues, C and D, of $1,000,000 each in 1938. (See Table
XII, Appendix A.) Series C and D mature in 1961. Series E
and F followed quickly in 1939! the first of these was an
issue of $600,000, and Series F totaled $1,000,000. Both E
and F mature in 1962, Series C through F are subordinate to
the Highway Fund Number 2 issues of the earlier periods.
The total debt added during the years from 1928 to 19^0 for
the Chef Menteur and Hammond-New Orleans State Highways was 
67$3,600,000. 1
The Highway Fund Number 2 debt was a direct debt of 
the State just as was the general highway debt, and they 
were both used for highway construction. The period that 
lasted from 1928 until I9I4.O brought $1 2 5,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 of general 
highway borrowing and $3,600,000 of Chef Menteur debt— a 
total of $129,100,000. (See Table XII, Appendix A.)
66Ibid.
67 Ibid.; Louisiana, Financial Report. 19l|l-l}-2> 
pp. 80-81; 191)-5-ij.6, p. 63; Moody*a, 1939, p. 558; and 19^0, 
P. i+39.
213
The State of Louisiana had two highway funds before 
1 9 2 8, so complexity in highway financing did not originate 
between 1928 and 19^0. What had happened in this period, 
however, was that these separate funds had evolved, through 
constitutional amendment, into somewhat complex units in 
their own right. By this time, each of the funds had junior 
lien bonds to service. This growth of complexity and 
uncertainty in the Louisiana highway issues may have 
penalized the State through higher interest rates. This 
loss may have been quite large because highway issues made 
up such a great portion of the total borrowing in the State. 
Flaws in highway borrowing in Louisiana during the 1928 to 
I9I4-O period affected a large part of the total debt 
structure.
Confederate Veterans1 Pension Borrowing. 1928-19ii0
The second type of direct borrowing between 1928 and 
I9I4-O was for the purpose of financing Confederate veterans* 
pensions. The constitutional amendment pertinent to 
Confederate veterans* pension bonds mentioned in the 
preceding section carried over into the 1928 period. Acts 
II4.6 and 176 of 1922]. had authorized the Board of Liquidation 
of the State Debt to anticipate the proceeds of the 0.75 
mill ad valorem tax and to pledge the proceeds of that tax 
as security for any indebtedness incurred. The Board was
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allowed to borrow annually under the blanket authorization a
sura equal to the anticipated proceeds of the tax as well as
an additional $£00,000 annually. Funds so borrowed were to
be used to pay $30 per month to eligible Confederate 
68veterans. A sum of $£00,000 of Series C bonds were sold
under these terras on October 1, 1928. Bonds of Series C
were full faith and credit obligations of the State payable
from the Confederate Veterans1 Fund and thus the 0.7£ mill
ad valorem tax. The issue paid the maximum allowable
interest rate of £ per cent and was noncallable. Series C
was scheduled to mature in 1933* The issue had much in
common with the Confederate veterans' pension issues sold in
69the 1921 to 1927 period. (See Table XIII, Appendix A.)
Series D of the Confederate veterans' pension borrow­
ing, dated January 1, 1929, had a separate authorization and 
a different purpose from Series C. The purpose of the issue 
was Indicated In Act 23 of 1928 which amended the Constitu­
tion to permit the payment of back or overdue pensions.
Back pensions had accumulated from October 1, 1922, to
68Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, as amended 
1921;, Act 176; and Louisiana, Acts (1921;), Act lq.6, pp. 2£0-£1.
^Louisiana, Treasurer's Report. 1928-29, p. 77; 
Moody's, 1929, p. 1314-1; 1930, p. 11*55; 1939, p. ££8; and 
Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds,
1933, Pn n
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July 1, 1921}., when the pensions had to be cut from $30 to
$20 because of lack of funds. Pensioners had lost $210 each
for a total of $589,260 because of the cut, and Act 23
provided for the borrowing of funds sufficient to restore
this amount. The security which the Board of Liquidation
was empowered to pledge for the support of the bonds was the
proceeds of the 0 .7 5  mill tax for the years 1933 through 
70
1938. The back pensions were financed by the January 1,
1929, bonds of Series D, The $589,260 of bonds was noncalla-
ble like the rest of the Confederate veterans* issues and
matured fully in 1938. The interest rate on the obligations
71was 5 per cent, and they were rated Aa by Moody*s.
Not long after back pensions were restored, there was 
another development in Confederate veterans* pension borrow­
ing. Act 7 of the Extra Session of 1930, adopted as a 
constitutional amendment in 1930, raised Confederate veterans* 
pension payments to $60 per month. The Board of Liquidation 
was again authorized to offer as security the unpledged 
annual proceeds of the 0.75 mill ad valorem tax for payment 
of any bonds issued to finance the increase. Act 7 also
70Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 6 , as 
amended 1928, Act 2 3 ; and Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report. 
193*4.-32, P. *4-2.
71Louisiana, Treasurer* s Report. 193*4--3 2 , P* *4-2? 
Louisiana, Financial Report,19*il-lf-2, P. 80; Moody’s, 1930, 
p. 1*4-52; and Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and 
Municipal Bonds. 1938, p. 5.
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pledged the State's full faith and credit to the payment of 
the bondse The resulting offering was the noncallable 
Series E of April, 1931, which amounted to $2,000,000. The 
bonds paid lj.,5 P©r cent and matured serially from 1 9 3 9 to
72
19^2, Series E bonds ranked on parity with Series C and E>.
The third constitutional amendment pertaining to 
Confederate veterans' pensions in the 1928 to 19lj.O period 
was Act 82 of 193if-* The act had two significant provisions. 
First, it provided that bonds could be issued to pay pen­
sions and that these bonds would be paid and secured by the 
unpledged portion of the 0.75 mill tax. ^Bonds issued under 
this 193^ act were subordinate to the previous Confederate 
veterans' issues. The use of multiple lien bond financing 
thus had spread to another area of Louisiana's debt struc­
ture. The difference was Immediately recognized by Moody's
through a lower rating, than the other Confederate veterans'
73bonds carried. This difference in the rating was justified,
72Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Secs. 2,
3, as amended 1930, Act 7, E.S.; Louisiana, Financial Report. 
19U-il2, P. 80; Moody's, 1932, p. 1^82; 1939, p. 559; and 
Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds, 
1933, pTTir**--------------------------------------------
73Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec, 3, as 
amended 193^, Act 82; Louisiana, Treasurer's Report, 1934-35, 
p. ij.2: Louisiana, Financial Report, 19lil-k2, p. 80; and 
Moody's, 1939, p. &9l-------- ----
)
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from the viewpoint of the prudent Investor, because the 
bonds had a smaller margin of protection and were more 
complex.
The second significant change which was made in the 
Confederate veterans* pension borrowing by Act 82 of 193U- 
was the revision of the maximum Interest rate provision. 
Where the maximum interest rate had been constitutionally 
fixed at 5 P©** cent, this amendment added the alternative 
that the bonds could be sold for not less than 95 cents on
7^the dollar. Of course, this had the effect of raising the
75maximum effective rate that could be paid on the bonds. 
Confederate veterans* pension Issues sold during the period 
had all paid £ per cent except Series E, and it may have 
been necessary to raise the limit to ensure selling future 
bonds. It appears, however, that if the maximum allowable 
rate needed to be raised, it should have been done more 
directly.
^Loui siana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 3, as 
amended 193^» Act 82; Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report. 193̂ 1-35> 
p. lj.2; Louisiana, Financial Report. 19kl-ii2. p. 80; and 
Moody*s, 1939, p.
75A bond paying a rate of 5 P©** cent that is sold at 
par has an effective current rate of $ per cent. But the 
same 5> per cent coupon rate on a bond sold at 95 bears an 
effective current rate of 5*26 per cent.
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As a result of Act 82 of 1934> Series P of $2,000,000 
was sold in 1935. Like the other Confederate veterans* pen­
sion issues of the period, Series P consisted of full faith 
and credit bonds and was payable from the 0 .7 5  mill ad 
valorem tax proceeds. But this time, the bonds were subor­
dinate to the outstanding D and E bonds (Series C bonds had 
matured by 1933). The Moody’s rating given to the bonds of 
Series P was A; the senior issues of D and E were rated Aa. 
Series P was noncallable like the other issues payable from
the Confederate Veterans' Pension Pund, and it was retired
78serially between 19̂ -3 and 1950. This Series F issue was
sold more than seventy-five years after the beginning of the
Civil War, By this date, 1935» there were still 1,891 pen- 
77sioners left. Borrowing primarily for the purpose of 
paying pensions to Confederate veterans and their widows was 
ndw ended. The remaining pensions continued to be paid, 
of course, but borrowing primarily for this purpose was 
discontinued. The Confederate Veterans' Pension Pund 
continued in operation and was supported by the same 0 .7 5  
mill tax dedication.
"^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 3 , 
as amended 1 9 3 4̂-5 Act"T527""Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report. 
193l|-“35> P. 42; Louisiana, Financial Report. 1 9 4 1 - ^ 2 p . 80; 
Moody's, 1939, p. 559; and 1936, p. 573.
"^Moody's, 19lj-2, p. 1(48.
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Probably the most important change in the Confederate 
Veterans* Fund and in the 0.75 mill ad valorem tax dedica­
tion between 1 9 2 8 and 19lj.O was the change which permitted 
their use for a new purpose. The authorization for this 
change was provided by Act 61 of 1936, and the new purpose 
which it recognized was mothers* and children aid and 
welfare. This act seems to have been a logical extension 
of the earlier pension borrowing. Part of the rationaliza­
tion for the Confederate veterans* borrowing had been that 
the pensions were a reward for their service but another 
apsect was their age and infirmity. It is not surprising 
that other aged and infirm would claim assistance from the 
same funds. Furthermore, a movement toward welfare legis­
lation throughout the whole economy at the same time 
probably contributed to the passage of this amendment.
The 1,713 Confederate pensioners living in 1936 were 
not neglected in the new act. The Legislature was authorized 
to provide for the merger of these pensions with those for 
the aged needy. The Legislature was responsible for estab­
lishing the security and welfare system as well as the 
management of the 0,75 mill tax. Borrowing was to be 
processed through the Board of Liquidation in the same
nO
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 7 , as 
amended 1936, Act 61.
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79manner as in the previous authorizations. Act 61 of 1936 
allowed more latitude to the Legislature than most of the 
debt acts mentioned thus far. The act also established a 
new type of relationship between the Legislature and the 
Board of Liquidation of the State Debt. The proceeds of the 
0.75 mill tax had heretofore been dedicated to the Board of 
Liquidation together with the power to borrow. Now, the 
funds were to be used by the Legislature for the purpose 
indicated, but the collections could again be anticipated by 
the Board of Liquidation.
The bonds sold under the authority of Act 61 were 
those of Series G in 1939. This Series was a relatively 
small one of $5 0 0,0 0 0, but it was split into three parts: 
$7 0 ,0 0 0  at 2.3 per cent; $180,000 at 2.5 per cent; and, 
$250,000 at 3 per cent. The bonds were also noncallable 
full faith and credit obligations just as were the previous 
Confederate veterans* issues, but the margin of protection 
was narrower for this issue because of pf*ior liens on the 
0.75 mill tax. Series G bonds were junior to both the first 
lien E bonds and the second lien F bonds. The A rating 
assigned to Series G was the same as the subordinated P 
bonds carried, in contrast to the Aa rating that had been
^ Ibid.: and Moody* s, 19^2, p.
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given to D and E. The use of split rates was the only new 
factor involved in this issue. Normally the provision of 
split rates aids marketability and is therefore quite 
desirable. In this instance, however, the advantage may 
have been offset by the small size of the offering.
State Bond and Interest Tax Pund 
Borrowing. 1928-I9h-0
The final component of the direct debt created from
1928 to 191+0 was the debt supported by the 1.1$ mill ad
valorem tax. Act 109 of 1921 pledged the proceeds of the
1.15 mill tax to the State Bond and Interest Tax Pund. The
act also recognized several prior debts payable from this
fund. These senior charges were the various constitutional
debts and the Serial Gold Bonds of January, 191^. The act
did not, however, authorize any borrowing, and none of the
borrowing which took place during the 1921 to 1927 period was
secured by the 1.1$ mill tax. The next period was quite
different; between 1928 and 19^0, five separate issues of
bonds were sold that were payable from the proceeds of the
81
1.1$ mill ad valorem tax. (See Table XIV, Appendix A.)
RnLouisiana, Treasurer1s Report. 1938-39» p. 5$; 
Louisiana, Financial Report, 19hl-u.2, p. 80; Moody* s, 19̂ -0, 
p. 14.3 9 » and 19*42, p. W .
^Louisiana, Acts (1921), E.S., Act 109, pp. 2 3 3-3$.
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Although the l.l£ mill ad valorem tax had been dedi- { 
cated to the State Bond and Interest Tax Pund by Act 109 in 
1921, several authorizations were required before the five 
issues could be sold. The first amendment concerning the
1,15 mill tax after 1927 resulted from the flood of that 
year. Act $ of the Extra Session authorized the postpone­
ment of taxes and the borrowing of money in case of
n. . . overflow, general conflagration, general destruction
82of crops, or other public calamity. The actual borrowing 
of funds was predicated upon a separate authorization by the 
Legislature. The management of the borrowing would then be 
the responsibility of the Board of Liquidation of the State
O  *3
Debt. This act was another somewhat rare instance of 
power being reserved to the Legislature. The nature of this 
amendment would seem to indicate that it should have been 
incorporated, if it was otherwise desirable, into Article 
dealing with limitations of legislative authority. Instead 
it was included only in Article 10, which deals with revenue 
and taxation.
While the amendment which added Act of the Extra 
Session of 1927 to the Constitution did not directly authorize
Op
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 10, Sec. 11, 
as amended 1928, Act E.S., 1927.
83ibid.
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the borrowing, it enabled Act 6 of the Extra Session of 1927
to become law without further constitutional amendment. The
Legislature took the necessary steps in Act 6 of the same 
8i|.Extra Session, and the Flood Relief Bonds were issued dated
December 1, 1928. The issue was quite small, amounting to
only $29ij-,6^2.35. The bonds, which matured from 1930 to
1 9 3 8, carried the maximum permissible rate of 5 pci* cent.
As were all of the issues payable from the State Bond and
Interest Tax Fund, the bonds were full faith and credit
obligations of the State. This issue was now the sixth item
paid from the fund; some of the prior liens were minor, but
there was still $9,8^7,1+00 of Old Serial Gold Bonds outstand-
89ing on April 1, 1928.
The next State Bond and Interest Tax Fund borrowing 
some two years later was similar to the flood relief Issue 
insofar as the purpose was to repair the damages of nature. 
Drought relief borrowing came in April, 1931 under the 
authority of the same acts that had permitted the flood 
relief borrowing--Acts I4. and 6 of the Extra Session of 1 9 2 7.
^ Tbid.; Louisiana, Acts (1 9 2 7 ), E.S., Act 6, pp. 18-
20.
89Louisiana, Treasurer* s Report, 1926-27, p. 99» 
1928-29, p. 77* Moody1 s, 1930, p. llf.55̂  and Smith, Compila­
tion of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds, 1938, pp. 1-3.
22\\.
The issue consisted of $502,000 of obligations that matured
in 1914-1. The bonds were full faith and credit obligations,
86
but they were subordinate to six other issues.
One observation seems to apply to both the flood and 
drought relief issues which took place during this period. 
Considering the number of acts involved and the wording of 
the provisions, one would have expected large issues to 
result in case such calamities occurred. This tendency was 
not apparent; the two issues were quite small and together 
amounted to only $796,6I4.2 .3 5 . Yet, long-term issues were 
sold to finance this relief. If the disasters had been more 
costly and greater borrowing had been required, long-term 
borrowing might have been appropriate, but the sums needed 
were so small that they probably should have been covered 
either out of current revenues, or if that was impossible, 
by short or intermediate term borrowing. It would have "been 
better if the State had not issued long-term debt, freezing 
certain tax receipts and complicating debt structure, to 
raise such a small sum of money.
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 10, Sec, 11, 
as amended 1928, Act I]., E.S., 1927; Act 6, E.S., 1927; 
Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report, 1930-31, p. 77? Moody*s, 
1932, p. Ik82; and Smith. Compilation of Louisiana State and 
Municipal Bonds. 1933t p. 2.
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The third issue between 1928 and 19^0 secured by the
1 .1 5  mill ad valorem tax was the $5*000,000 borrowed to 
finance the construction of a new state capitol building.
The general authorization for this borrowing was granted 
when the voters adopted Act 5 of the Extra Session of 1930 
as a constitutional amendment. The amendment was then 
implemented by Act 10 of the Extra Session of the same year.
Act 10 provided that the Board of Liquidation of the State 
Debt could fund the unpledged surplus of the 1.15 mill tax 
up to the sum of $5*000,000. The subordinate bonds so 
authorized were to be full faith and credit obligations.
The maximum interest rate was established at 5 PQr cent, and 
it was required that the bonds be retired in twenty years 
from the date of their issue. It was further required that 
the annual maturity installments should not exceed $2 5 0,0 0 0.
The most detailed part of the act, however, was that which
87specified in advance the date of issue, February 15, 1931.
This specification of the date of issue was unique in Louisiana 
borrowing. Many of the constitutional amendments investi­
gated thus far were somewhat detailed. But the establish­
ment of the date of issue in advance of even their
o*7
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. If., Sec. 12, as 
amended 1930, Act 5* E.S.; Louisiana, Acts (1930) E.S., Act
10, pp. 39-Ul.
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advertisement was especially undesirable. The practice must 
be strongly condemned because it completely disregards the 
fact that the timing of bond sales is Important. The 
setting of the date of issue in advance is a partial repudi­
ation of debt management. There can be no management in the 
real sense when the fiscal authorities have their hands tied 
to this extent.
The ninth item to be paid from the proceeds of the 
1.15> mill ad valorem tax and the State Bond and Interest Tax 
Fund was authorized by a new constitutional amendment in 
1932. This amendment, Act 122 of 1932, provided that the 
Board of Liquidation could fund the surplus of the 1.1S> mill 
tax for the following purposes:
. . .  to pay or refund the indebtedness of the 
State of Louisiana to the fiscal agent banks of 
the State, aggregating approximately the sum of 
•$3,^82,l5U.OO, more or less, incurred prior to 
May 9, 1932, and the outstanding indebtedness of 
Louisiana State University . . . amounting to 
the sum of $1 ,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0, . . .8 8
This act authorized the conversion of short-term bank debt
and certificates of indebtedness into bonds. It may be that
the depression upset carefully laid plans to repay these
short-run liabilities and made this funding operation the
only alternative at that time. Generally, however, it
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. I4., Sec. 12, as 
amended 1932, Act 122.
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is undesirable for bonded debt to be created in this 
fashion.
The "more or less" authorization of Act 122 turned
out to be "more." The amount of the new Serial Gold Bonds
sold was $1|.,9 5 0,0 0 0--almost half a million dollars more than
the act had indicated. The maximum interest rate to be paid
had been established at 6 per cent, but the rate carried by
the obligations was £.5 per cent. The new noncallable
Serial Gold Bonds were general obligations, but they were
Junior to the various State Bond and Interest Tax Pund
89
issues described above.
The final Board of Liquidation action in this period 
in connection with the l.l£ mill tax resulted from the adop­
tion of Act 3 of 1938. This act provided for the refunding 
of the $8,612,000 of outstanding Old Serial Gold Bonds of 
191^ which were originally scheduled to mature in 196^. The 
Old Serial Golds bore rates of Ij.,5 per cent, but rates on 
new Louisiana issues in 1937 and early 1938 were generally 
much lower than Ij-.5 per cent. It thus provAd fortunate that 
the call privilege had been reserved when the bonds were
®^Ibid.: Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report. 1930-31* 
p. 7 7 ; Louisiana, Financial Report, 19lll-k^« P« 80; Moody1s, 
193l|, p. ^13; 1939, p. 559* Smith, Compilation of Louisiana 
State and Municipal Bonds. 1938, p. 3* and Ratchford, 
American State Debts, p. 3 8 2.
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sold in 191 This illustrates the desirability of con­
sidering the inclusion of the call feature when interest 
rates are extremely high. It may take many years, but the 
opportunity may present itself for the option to be 
profitably used.
Act 3 of 1938 which provided for the refunding was an 
unusual statute in more ways than one. The passage of legis­
lation in Louisiana providing for the calling of outstanding 
issues was rare in itself. The most striking thing about 
this act, however, was the way the refunding was accomplished. 
The plan to refund, which was under the auspices of the 
State Board of Liquidation of the State Debt, had actually 
reached contractual form before the act was ever signed by 
the Governor.
Section 5. That the Contract heretofore 
entered into on the 26th day of May, 1938* 
between the Board of Liquidation of the 
State Debt and Edward Jones and Co., Inc., for 
the purchase and underwriting of said refunding 
bonds is hereby ratified, validated and 
confirmed, . .
It is not clear whether any public bidding preceded the 
awarding of this contract or whether it was a private agree­
ment. If there was no public bidding, of course, there
90Louisiana, Acts (1 9 3 8 ), Act 3, pp. 28-31; Moody’s, 
1938, p. 639; and 1939, pp. 558, 562.
^Louisiana, Acts (1 9 3 8 ), Act 3> P. 30.
should have been. But even If the bidding'was public, the 
letting of the contract before this action was legally 
authorized could not have lent certainty or security to the 
State*s offering. It is possible that the State might have 
gotten better terms under more usual circumstances.
The refunding bonds offered were to be subordinate
only to approximately $87*182 of annual payment due to the
various school funds and other constitutional debt. Since
the refunding bonds were to replace the 191fy. bonds, they
would be the fifth item to be paid out of nine. The bonds
were further secured by the full faith and credit status
like all of the other issues payable from the 1 .1 5  mill
tax.^ The refunding of August, 1938* was quite successful
despite the unusual authorization. The lj.,5 per cent was
converted to 2 . 5  per cent on $2 1 2 ,0 0 0 maturing between 1939
and 19^1 * 3 . 5  per cent on $5 *2 2 0 ,0 0 0 maturing from 19ij.2 to
1 9 5 6? and, 3 .2 5  per cent on $3 *1 8 0 ,0 0 0 maturing between 1957
and I960. Equally important, but not so obvious, was the
saving that would accrue from the reduction of the life of
93the bonds. The new bonds are noncallable and are to be
lbid.: Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report. 1938-39* p. 55 
Loulsianal financial Report. 19kl-ii2. p. 80; and Moody*s, 
1939, PP. 5!>8-!>9.
93ln comparing the rates on the original issue and the 
refunding issue, it should be noted that part of the differ­
ential may perhaps be attributed to the fact that the issues 
were unlike in their call provisions.
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fully retired by I9 6 0 while the previous ones were to run
until I96ij.. The saving from earlier retirement was partly
offset by the new retirement schedule which decreased the
size of the early installments and Increased the later 
9kones. Nevertheless, the total interest savings from the 
refunding was approximately $2,2i|8,000. The new bonds in 
1938 were simply called "State of Louisiana Refunding Bonds.^ 
This refunding, of course, did not add to the State debt 
outstanding since it merely replaced the Old Serial Gold 
Bonds. The security on the new issue duplicated that which 
had been provided for the bonds it replaced.
V. INDIRECT BORROWING, 1928-19^0
Indirect borrowing in Louisiana was relatively insig­
nificant from 1928 to I9I4.O. There was little reason to use 
authorities to circumvent the debt limitation when the Con­
stitution could be so easily amended. What Indirect borrow­
ing did take place may have been influenced more by the 
depression and counter-cyclical fiscal policy considerations 
than by the debt limitation. All of the new indirect 
borrowers in Louisiana were educational or charitable agen­
cies, and they were all authorized to borrow from the
^Louisiana, Acts (1938), Act 3, p. 30; Louisiana, 
Treasurer*^ Report. 1938-39, p. £5; Louisiana, Financial 
Report. 19b.l-li2, p. 80; and Moody*s, 1939, pp. 5>5>8-̂ 9.
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Federal government. The use of the agency in Louisiana 
during this period, therefore, may have been partly a 
method of attempting to borrow or otherwise obtain Federal 
funds.
The Port of New Orleans was again one of the agencies 
creating indirect debt. New borrowing agencies were the 
Board of Administrators of the Charity Hospital of Louisiana 
in New Orleans, the Louisiana State Board of Education, and 
the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University.
Port of New Orleans Borrowing. 1928-19lj0
The Port of New Orleans had been relatively free of 
restraint in its borrowing prior to the 1928-191+0 period.
The obligations it issued were considered full faith obliga­
tions, but there was no involvement of State funds in any of 
the issues described previously. This status of the Board 
of Commissioners underwent a change in 1930. The depression 
made itself felt on Port revenues to the extent that the 
State was obliged to aid in debt service. The aid came in 
the form of a constitutional amendment which adopted Act 1 
of 1930. The amendment levied a 1-cent gasoline tax in 
addition to the cents already collected. The new 1-cent 
tax was not dedicated exclusively to the Port of New Orleans, 
but the Port did get 9/20ths of the tax. The main purpose 
of the dedication was to assist the Board in meeting
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principal and interest payments. A secondary provision
stipulated that revenues resulting from the dedication would
be considered revenues of the Board of Commissioners and
would thus be counted in determining whether revenues were
sufficient to justify further borrowing as authorized in the
95?Constitution of 1921.
Act 1 of 1930 obviously contributed more complexity 
to Louisiana*s debt structure as well as to the Port*s: the
gasoline tax was being diverted from highway uses and being 
split between three different agencies; the Port*s revenues 
now would not consist solely of operating revenues but would 
be dependent upon tax support. This situation is somewhat 
ironic; one of the justifications for agency borrowing is 
that sometimes state or municipal credit is so weak that the 
pledge of specific revenues can be more attractive on the 
market than the full faith and credit pledge. Now, however, 
the Port issues had to be secured by State tax revenues.
The characteristic of this important change in the 
Port of New Orleans debt that may be the most significant 
(as far as providing an insight into debt management 
practice in the future is concerned) is the fact that the
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 16; 
Art. 6, Sec. 22, as amended 1930, Act 1; and Smith, Compila­
tion of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds. 1938, p. lip.
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borrowihg had started out with the State involved only as a 
guarantor. There was no indication or intention that the 
State would ever have to contribute to the support of this 
Port debt. It would be well to recall this case, along with 
all of the other pertinent factors, when the persuasive 
argument is made that "the statefs credit is needed only to 
lend prestige to these issues, but no state funds are needed 
or will ever be needed." What happened in Port borrowing is 
also ample reason for including under the category of State 
debt all issues in which the State has either pledged its 
credit or contributed any funds.
The first Port of New Orleans offering during the 
period came in 1936. The authorization for the issue came 
from a provision of the Constitution of 1921 which had here­
tofore not been used for any Port issue. The Constitution 
not only had authorized $6,^0 0 ,0 0 0 0f borrowing and set up 
conditions whereby up to $35>»0 0 0 > 000 could be borrowed, but 
it had also provided that the Port Commission could refund 
maturing debt. This refunding provision was the basis for 
the July 1, 1936, sale of $l,30Jj.,000 of Ij. per cent Serial 
Gold Refunding Bonds. The refunding bonds replaced those 
obligations maturing from July 1, 1936 to July 1, 1937» 
inclusive. The noncallable refunding bonds issued were 
designed to mature between 1938 and 1961. The issue was
23k
rated Ba by Moody*s in 1938* but the rating was raised to
96
Baa in 1939 with all of the other Port debt. (See Table
XV, Appendix A.)
The final Port of New Orleans borrowing before World
War II was another refunding issue in 1939. This issue of
$6^8 ,0 0 0  was sold under the same circumstances as were the
refunding bonds of 1936. This time the refunding bonds paid
3.25 per cent and were to mature in 1959. They were non-
97callable and bore a Baa rating. Port of New Orleans 
borrowing for the 1928 to 1 9i}-0 period thus totaled $1 ,9 6 2,0 0 0 ; 
it was all for the purpose of refunding maturing debt.
The practice of refunding maturing debt is not 
compatible with the principle that provision should be made 
for the retirement of debt. When the maturing principal of 
an issue is refunded, there is no retirement but rather a 
perpetuation of the debt. Economic conditions at the time 
of these Port refundings may have made it necessary to take 
extraordinary measures to pay maturing principal. There is 
no question that refunding is preferable to default.
However, the blanket authorization to refund, with only the
^ L o u i s i a n a ,  Constitution (1921), Art. 6 , Sec. 16; 
Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report, 1938-39, p. 56; Louisiana, 
Financial Report, 19kl-ij2, p. 8 3 ; Moody*s, 1938, p. 61j.0;
1939, p. 558; and Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and 
Municipal Bonds, 1938, p. 17.
^Moody*s, 19^0, p. Ijlj.0.
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approval of the Governor, probably was an undesirable provi­
sion because it did nothing to ensure that the Port would 
not refund all of its debt as it matured while diverting 
Port revenues to operating or current expenditures.
Charity Hospital Borrowing, 1928-1914-0
One of the new, indirect, and somewhat narrow uses of 
the State1s resources in this period was for the financing 
of a new Charity Hospital in New Orleans. The hospital 
borrowing was authorized by Acts 166 of 193̂ 4- and 72 of 1936. 
The powers and limitations imposed on the Board of Adminis­
tration were: (l) to demolish the bid hospital and to
construct a new building; (2 ) to borrow up to $8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 and 
to borrow from Federal agencies; (3) to pledge its own but 
not the State* s credit to secure obligations; (ij.) to pay 
obligations out of its revenues and such revenue as it was 
authorized to receive from the State; and, (5) to pay the 
bonds within thirty years and at a rate not exceeding 6 per 
cent. Section 2 of the authorization contained a sign of 
the times in its reference to the acceptance of Federal 
grants from the Federal Emergency Administration of Public 
Works or any other Federal agency dispensing funds. The 
State pledged, in Act 10 of the First Extra Session of 1935* 
aid in the payment of any obligations issued under the above 
conditions. The State revenue pledged was the first $lj.00,000
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collected annually from the proceeds of the corporation 
98franchise tax.
The Legislature alone was responsible for the provi­
sions above? there was no constitutional amendment in this 
case. Amendment was unnecessary because there was no pledge 
of the State*s credit; the bonds were neither direct, full 
faith and credit, nor general obligations. The bonds were 
obligations of the Board of Administrators of Charity 
Hospital of Louisiana in New Orleans, This borrowing was 
possible because of the existence of the special fund 
doctrine. Even the fact that certain State revenues 
($1̂ .00,000 of the corporation franchise tax) were pledged did 
not make borrowing by the Board of Administrators subject to 
the debt limitation. However, it is doubtful that this 
agency borrowing in Louisiana was primarily or solely a 
result of the constitutional debt limitation? there had 
not been much difficulty in getting constitutional amend­
ments adopted in Louisiana since the late 1920*s. There is 
no doubt that this indirect borrowing helped to complicate 
the debt structure.
The Board of Commissioners of the Charity Hospital in 
New Orleans sold its bonds in October, 1936. The noncallable
"Louisiana, Acts (1931*-), Act 166, pp. 537-^2? (1935), 
1st E.S., Act 10, ppTTpT-511-; and (1936), Act 72, pp. 190-92.
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issue consisted of three serial blocks! $3lj.l, 0 0 0 bore an 
interest rate of 1|..5 per cent and matured from 1 9 3$ to 1 9^ U  
$1,92^,000 paid I4. per cent and matured from 19^2 to 1956J 
and, $2 ,1 3 ^ ,0 0 0  carried a rate of 3 . 5  P©*1 cent and matures
from 195? to 1966. The Moody’s rating for the issue was
99Baa.
The full amount of bonds authorized under Act 166 of 
193U- was never sold; the next borrowing for the Charity 
Hospital in Hew Orleans had another authorization. Act Ij. of 
1938 was very similar to the earlier act--the purpose was 
the same, and the provisions relative to a maximum interest 
rate of 6 per cent and a maximum term of thirty years were 
identical. The basic difference was that this act author­
ized the borrowing of an additional $1|.,500,000. The protec­
tion offered again did not contain any pledge by the State. 
Instead, the issue was protected specifically by an addi­
tional $ij.00,000, dedicated by Act 5 of 193$, from the 
corporation franchise tax. This amount was the second 
$lj.0 0 ,0 0 0  earmarked from corporation franchise tax receipts. 
The bonds issued under this 1938 authorization thus were to
^Louisiana, Financial Report. I9L1.I-I4.2 , p. 82; 
Moody’s, 1937, P. 590. This borrowing was not reported in 
the Louisiana, Treasurer’s Reports in 1936-37, p. 51, or 
1938-39, PP. 55-56. Presumably, this was in keeping with 
the special fund fiction that certain agency obligations are 
not State obligations.
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have a first lien on this second $I|.00,000. Additional pro-
tection was afforded in that any other fees and revenues of
the hospital were to be used to pay the 1938 bonds subject to
100
the prior charge of the bonds sold in 1 9 3 8 .
The full $1).,500,000 authorized by Act 4 of 1938 was
sold in August, 1938, at 3.85 pen cent. The call privilege
was not reserved in this Charity Hospital issue either. The
retirement of this issue was to begin in 1 9 4  ̂ and end in
1968. (See Table XVI, Appendix A.) The serial bonds were
rated Baa in 19^0, and because of the complexity of the
issue, there would appear to be no question of overrating 
101here. The issue was secured by a first lien on the
second dedication from the receipts of a certain tax and by 
a second lien on all other revenues and receipts of the 
agency. This Charity Hospital issue of 1938 is almost a 
classic in its complexity— it was indeed an issue that 
required a great deal of analysis to determine the nominal 
protection and stability afforded to the bondholders. Such 
complexity obviously tends to impair marketability and thus 
to lead to lower ratings and higher interest costs. If this
100Louisiana, Acts (1938), Act 4» pp. 31-38; and Act
5, PP. 38-ill.
1 (̂ Louisiana, Financial Hep or t, 1941 -i+2, p. 82; 
Moody’s, 1939, pp. 562-63; and 1940, p. 44£.
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Charity Hospital borrowing in the 1930*3 was a classic of 
complexity, this does not mean that it was necessarily 
■unique. On the contrary, it was representative of 
Louisiana1s debt management and debt structure during the 
period.
Board of Education Borrowing, 1928-19U.0
The next indirect Louisiana borrowing from 1928 to 
19lf.O was incurred by the Louisiana State Board of Education. 
The only State Board of Education borrowing came in the 
closing years of the depression, apparently as a reaction to 
the economic conditions of that period. Act 6 of 1938 
permitted the Board of Education to accept Federal grants 
and to enter into agreements with the Federal Emergency 
Administration of Public Works or any other Federal instru­
mentality in order to secure a loan. A related act, Act 7 
of 1938, amended and reenacted Act 100 of 1922 and granted 
the Board of Education power over certain institutions. It 
also indicated that the Board could incur debt which was to 
be secured by any funds granted for that purpose by the 
Legislature. The more specific Act 6 of 1938 provided the 
Board of Education with certain funds and granted the power 
to borrow up to $6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  for the purpose of constructing 
and furnishing State educational and charitable institutions. 
Bonds sold under the authorization were required to be
completely retired not more than thirty years after their
date of issue. The maximum permissible deferment in the
first maturity installment was four years, and interest
rates on the bonds could not exceed 6 per cent. The Board
of Education was given the responsibility of deciding
whether the bonds would be callable and was permitted to
sell the bonds either publicly or privately. The security
provisions of the bonds made it clear that they were not a
liability of the State of Louisiana. Other security pledged
consisted of a "first lien" on one-fourth of the surplus of
the corporation franchise tax remaining after the payment of
certain expenses and prior dedications (the Charity Hospital
of New Orleans had a prior claim of $800,000), Finally, it
was provided that the tax and the Board (or a replacement)
would both be continued until the bonds were fully 
102retired.
The State Board of Education exhausted the entire 
authorization granted in Act 6 of 1938 with the sale of a 
single issue in August, 193®• bonds of this issue were
serials; the schedule of principal retirement shows an 
increase from $126,000 in 191+2 to $1+05>000 in 1966. The
1 ̂ Louisiana, Acts (1 9 3 8), Act 6 , pp. 1+2-1+6; and Act
7, pp. 1+7-1+9.
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interest rate on all of the bonds was 1}..75 P®*» cent, and the
103
call option was not reserved. (See Table XVII, Appendix A.)
The Board of Education borrowing in this issue was not 
unique in any important respect. It was very similar to the 
Charity Hospital borrowing: the year of the sale, the rela­
tionship with Federal fiscal policy, the security used in 
the bond pledges, the indirectness, and the nonrecurrent 
nature of the borrowing all were similar. It probably would 
have been desirable for the State to provide for State educa­
tional and charitable institutions directly, if not by means 
of taxation, by means of direct State borrowing. This 
practice would have contributed to the achievement of the 
objective of simplicity. The combined and related circum­
stances of depression and Federal policy, however, may have 
justified a temporary departure from this objective.
Louisiana State University Borrowing. 1928-19lt0
The Constitution of 1921 in one section authorized the 
Legislature to create the Board of Supervisors, and in 
another it dedicated, beginning in 1 9 2 1, up to $1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  
annually of a 0.5 mill tax to support the University. An 
amendment to the Constitution, adopted in 1932, provided 
still more funds. This time it was up to $1,000,000 of the
1 0-^Loulsiana, Financial Report. 192+1—2+2, p. 82;
Moody* s, 1939» P. 56l7 This borrowing is not mentioned in
the Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report of 1938-39, pp. 55-56.
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excise-licnese taxes collected on insurance policies and
101;from Insurance companies. The third source of finds for
the University was not provided until 1938 when the surplus 
of the soft drink tax was dedicated to Louisiana State
105University.
The Board of Supervisors of the University used these 
dedicated revenues and operating revenues to become one of 
the more important borrowers in Louisiana during the period 
before World War II. Borrowing by the Board was indirect 
because it was in the name of the Board of Supervisors. For 
this reason, there was no need for constitutional authoriza­
tion of all of the borrowing, and legislative acts or reso­
lutions of the Board of Supervisors sufficed as 
authorizations for the issues.
The first borrowing by the Board of Supervisors was 
carried out on its own authority. "By resolution of the 
University Board of Supervisors dated October 22, 193U there 
was authorized for issuance $300,000 of 51$ Series Revenue 
Bonds . . , " 106 Only $119,000 of the authorized $300,000
^^ouisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 12, Secs. 7 , 
175 (1921), Art. 12, Sec. 17, as amended 1932, Act 116.
105Louisiana, Acts (1938), Act 18, pp. 106-7.
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Louisiana, Financial Report. 19J|1 -J|.2, p. 8 3 .
22+3
was ever sold. The bonds, which were predated June, 1934*
paid 5.5 per cent and were payable from revenues of the
stadium and cafeteria. The obligations were callable serials
107and were scheduled to mature between 1939 and 19+2,
A second issue of 5.5 per cent serial revenue bonds 
sold in 1935 amounted to $1,500,000. A $500,000 issue which 
followed in April, 1937> ranked on par with these 1935 bonds. 
The purpose of the $2,000,000 of 1935 and 1937 sales was to 
provide for the construction of buildings. The bonds sold 
were secured by rental and other operating revenues of the 
University as well as by the BoardTs pledge of up to $200,000 
annually from the receipts of the insurance excise tax 
revenues received by the University. (Up to $1,000,000 
annually from the proceeds of this tax was appropriated to 
the University under provisions of the constitutional amend­
ment, Act 116 of 1932.) The $1,500,000 of bonds sold in 
1935 paid 5.5 per cent and was due between 1937 and 1955.
The 1937 issue was split with $300,000 at 2+.25 per cent and 
$200,000 at I4..5 per cent. The 2j..25*s were due from 1939 to 
1951 and the 4*5* s between 1951 and 1956. Only the 1932+
107Louisiana, Financial Report. 192+1—14-2, p. 82; 
Moody!s, 1939» p. 562; 194°* p. I4I+6 ; 192+1* p. 470; and 
Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds, 
1938, p. 19.
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issue of the Louisiana State University bonds was 
108
callable. (See Table XVIII, Appendix A.)
The next Louisiana State University borrowing was
authorized by the Legislature in Act 223 of 1936. The act
was somewhat similar to other acts passed around 1936 because
it granted the Board the authority to borrow from any agency
of the Federal government. The borrowing powers given to
the Board of Supervisors in this act were quite broad:
. . . the Board . . . shall have full authority 
to borrow . . .  in sums sufficient to provide 
funds necessary to accomplish or execute any 
purpose, power, or authority, now or hereafter 
vested in said Board of Supervisors bv the 
Constitution and laws of Louisiana,
In addition, the Board was given the right to issue refunding
bonds if funds were insufficient to retire the indebtedness
incurred under the above authorization. Such refunding
bonds were not to exceed the amount of the indebtedness due
and were to conform to the same requirements that were
110placed on other bonds sold under the authorizing act.
The usual requirements about interest rates and maturities 
were included: Interest rates were not to exceed 8 per cent,
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), as amended 1932, 
Act 116; Louisiana, Financial Report. 191+1-1J-2, p. 82; and 
Moody*s, 1938, pp. 6 3 8-3 9 .
109Louisiana, Acts (1936), Act 223, P* 896. 
110Ibid., pp. 896-600.
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the first retirement installment could not be deferred more
than three years, and all bonds issued would have to be fully
retired in not more than forty years from their dates of
issue. The security provisions made it clear that the bonds
sold under the act would not be State obligations, but it
was indicated that the Board of Supervisors could pledge
its full faith and credit as security if it was deemed
proper. More specific protection was made available for
prospective bondholders by the Legislature when the Board
was directed to pledge a sufficient amount of its gross
revenues including part or all of the undedicated portions
111of the insurance excise tax.
Act 223 of 1936 was put to use almost immediately in 
an issue of $1,000,000 dated December 1, 1936. The purpose 
of the issue was to construct and furnish buildings. The 
bonds were noncallable serials due December 1, 1938* to 
1955. The provisions of the authorizing act were followed, 
and the bonds were general obligations of the Board of 
Supervisors. The 1}. per cent bonds were further secured by 
the pledge of up to $100,000 annually from the University1s 
$1,000,000 share of the Insurance excise tax if revenues 
from the operation of the University facilities were 
insufficient to pay the principal and interest requirements.
111Tbid.
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The 1936 bonds thus were ranked after the issues of 1935 and
1 9 3 7» to which were pledged $2 0 0 ,0 0 0 of insurance tax
112receipts in case of need.
Act 18 of 1938 was the next important development in 
the growth of the Louisiana State University debt structure. 
Act 18 amended and reenacted Act 95 of 1938, which had dedi­
cated the first $1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0  collected from the tax on bottled 
soft drinks to the Governor for financing the construction 
and improvement of educational and charitable institutions. 
In Act 18, a further dedication was made that the surplus of 
the tax after $1,500,000 would be set aside for Louisiana 
State University, The purpose of the dedication was to
finance the construction and improvement of facilities at
113the University.
The $2,000,000 of bonds resulting from Act 18 was 
dated October 1, 1938. The bonds matured from 19I4-I to 1958 
in amounts ranging from $8 0 ,0 0 0  in 19l|l to $1 5 0 ,0 0 0 in 1 9 5 8. 
The interest rate was Ip.25 per cent, and the issue was non- 
callable. Security for the obligations consisted of a 
pledge of the first $2 0 0 ,0 0 0 of the soft drink tax dedicated 
to the University. (Of course, the soft drink tax revenues
1 1 2 Louisiana, Financial Report, I9I4.I-I4.2 , p. 82; and 
Moody* s, 1938, p. 639*
"^Louisiana, Acts (1936), Act 95» pp. 288-307? and 
(1938), Act 18, pp. 10^7.
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received by the University were subject to a prior annual
appropriation of $1,500,000.) The bonds were also full
Ilkfaith and credit obligations of the University.
The pledging of the first $200,000 of surplus revenues 
remaining after a dedication of $1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0  of soft drink 
taxes was more the result of the legal framework than it was 
a matter of debt management. The Board of Supervisors 
obviously was getting its funds in a piecemeal fashion and 
was never really able to consolidate its funds to make more 
effective use of them for borrowing purposes. The use of 
the Boards full faith and credit in most of the issues of 
the period may have been an attempt to overcome this weakness 
of having dedicated revenues, some subject to prior charges, 
as support for the issues. The degree of complexity that had 
been reached in the University borrowing in the short space 
of five years, from 193̂ i- to 1938, was remarkable.
Summary of Borrowing, 1928-19k0
The total amount of money borrowed by Louisiana in 
the twelve years after 1928 was $165 A55,000. (See Table 
XI, Appendix A.) Highway borrowing in the direct category 
accounted for $1 2 9,1 0 0 ,0 0 0 or 78 per cent of this total.
Louisiana, Financial Report. 19lll-ij.2, p. 82; and 
Moody's, 1939, p. 562.
2lj.8
This borrowing occurred roughly in the same period during 
which all of the states were devoting approximately JL4J4. per
115
cent of their borrowing to highway development. Other 
direct borrowing during the 1 9 2 8-19lj.O period was as follows: 
Confederate Veterans1 Pension Fund borrowing, $5,589,000; 
State Bond and Interest Tax Fund borrowing, $10,7l}-7,000.
The later years of the period, after 193k-* brought 
three new agencies into the Louisiana debt structure: the
Board of Administrators of the Charity Hospital of Louisiana 
in New Orleans borrowed $8,900,000; the Louisiana State 
Board of Education borrowed $6,000,000; and the Board of 
Supervisors of the Louisiana State University borrowed 
$5,119,000. The final agency active in the period was not 
a new one— the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New 
Orleans refunded $1,962,000, but this did not add to the > 
debt.
VI. DIRECT BORROWING, 191+1-191+6
In 19̂ .1, the total assessed value of property in
Louisiana was $l,l}.06,759,000, and the total taxes collected
amounted to $61}.,959,759. The debt outstanding at the time
116was $185,692,020. The standard ratios were as follows:
^"^Ratchford, American State Debts. p. 262.
^"^Louisiana, Financial Report. 19lf.l-l;2, p. 8 3 ; and 
Moody*s, 19l|-3, PP. i+38, ^50.
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taxes collected were equal to 35 P0n cent of the debt out­
standing; debt outstanding was 1 3 .2  per cent of the assessed 
valuation of property. The ratio of taxes collected to the 
debt outstanding had increased markedly from 18.5 in 1928 to 
the 35 cent. This comparison, therefore, was indicative 
of an improvement in debt-paying ability. This was not the 
case, however, in the ratio of debt to property values. The 
13.2 per cent in 191+1 did not compare favorably with the low 
3.12 per cent in 1928. The measure of taxes collected to 
debt outstanding seems to be the more significant of the two 
ratios--the other ratio is indicative of the decline in 
importance of the property tax in Louisiana and the failure 
of assessments to keep up with values. The improvement in 
the collection of taxes by 191+1 is a good sign that the 
State was in a fairly strong credit position in 191+1. Using 
market standards, it might have been concluded that it was 
safe to borrow.
However, World War II was to make heavy borrowing on
the state level inappropriate. The War had a marked effect
on state borrowing; the gross debt of all the American states
declined from a peak of $14,614-2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 in 191+0 to a low of
117$2,367*000,000 in 191+6. The same trend occurred in
■^■^Tax Foundation, Inc., Facts and Figures on Govern­
ment Finance, 1952-1953 (New York: Tax Foundation, Inc.,
19^2i p. 200.
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Louisiana— the State was back in harmony with the other 
states. Louisiana borrowed for only four purposes: high­
ways, institutional improvement, welfare (for Confederate 
Veterans* Pension Fund), and for funding and refunding.
There were no new indirect obligations issued through 
agencies, and the direct borrowing was for purposes that 
were already established in the debt structure except for 
the State institutional improvement borrowing.
Highway Borrowing. 19kl-19b-6
There was no new highway debt creation from April,
19l]-0, 'until July, 19̂ -3. When borrowing resumed, it added
only of highway debt during the course of the
war. This relatively small amount of borrowing is even more
remarkable because of the fact that Act 377 of 191+0— three
years earlier— had authorized $10,000,000 of bonds. The
purpose of the 191+0 authorization was to provide funds for
the construction, maintenance, and extension of State
highways and bridges. Authority to borrow was vested in
the Louisiana Highway Commission with the approval of the
118State Advisory Board. Besides the State*s full faith and
■j n  Q
The borrowing was eventually carried out under the 
auspices of the State Highway Department, which replaced the 
Louisiana Highway Commission in 191+2. Ross, Financing High­
way Improvements in Louisiana, p. 1|.8.
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credit, the other security pledged for the issues sold under
the provisions of Act 377 was the [(.-cent gasoline tax. This
lien on the gasoline tax was subordinate, however, to the
claims of all of the outstanding general highway issues.
Another feature of the security was the stipulation that no
further bonds payable from the [(.-cent gasoline tax could be
issued on a parity with the $10,000,000. If the l4.-ce.nt
gasoline tax was to be used as security for any later
issues, the claim would be subject to all of the prior
claims. This practice was far from unique in Louisiana, of
119course, but this does not make it acceptable.
The maximum interest rate permitted under the provi­
sions of Act 377 of 191+0 was 5 per cent, and it was further 
stipulated that the bonds should not be sold at less than 
par. Act 377 also provided that the first principal retire­
ment could be deferred up to four years, and limited the
120maximum life of the bonds to twenty-five years. Serial
issues sold under the authority of Act 3 7 7 were Series DD,
EE, FF, and GG. (See Table XX, Appendix A.) Series DD of 
$2,000,000 and Series EE of $2,000,000 were both sold In
^^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22'('i), 
as amended 19l(-0, Act 377? and Moody's, 19l+l+> p. J4.2 6 .
1 ?nLouisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 , Sec. 22(1), 
as amended 191+0, Act 377* and Moody's, 191+1+, p. 1+26.
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July, 19l̂ 3. These split-rate bonds were set to be fully
retired in 1961. In 19lfij- and 19l|-5, Series FP and GG sold
for sums of $2,000,000 and $1,000,000. The retirement of
these bonds will not be complete until 1963 and I96I4.. The
DD through GG bonds were made callable at par, and their
interest rates ranged between 1 .2 5  and 2.5 per cent on all
121of the larger blocks.
The Moody's rating in 191+5 on the $7,000,000 of bonds
122
in issues DD through FF was Baa. These ratings seem to
have been appropriate from the traditional viewpoint because
of the complexity which the authorization had contributed to
the highway debt structure and because of the subordinate
nature of the bonds. Fourteen years later, by 1958, the
Series DD through GG bends had been upgraded to A, and in
1231959 they were rated Aa. This does not mean, of course, 
that there was anything wrong with the original rating. 
Changes in the Moody's ratings can usually be traced to 
improvements in the general credit standing of the govern­
mental unit involved or to improvements in the protection
~\
121Louisiana, Financial Report, 19H5-U6, pp. 62-63; 
191+6-1+7, P. 67; Moody's, 19l|4, pp. ^25-26; 191+5, P. 1+21;
191+7, PP. 1+21—22; and 1959, pp. 663-65.
122Moody's, 19U5, PP. U21-22.
123Moody's, 1958, p. 623; and 1959, pp. 663-65.
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afforded to specific issues. In the case of the DD through 
GG highway bonds, by 1958 and 1959, the large highway Issues 
of the 1 9 2 8 -1 9 3 2 period had been retired, and the prior 
claims were so greatly reduced that the amount of protection 
afforded the remaining bonds was very large. At the same 
time, there was also an unmistakable growth In the Staters 
wealth.
The highway issues described in this section were all 
general highway issues, and there was no special Highway
1 2I4.Fund Number 2 borrowing during the World War II period.
In the six years of war, therefore, an average of only a 
little more than $1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 was added each year for highway 
purposes. This amount was the smallest sum of highway debt 
created in any period since the first borrowing for general 
highway purposes began in 1928. During the war years, high­
way debt redemptions were greater than $7 *0 0 0 ,0 0 0 so that 
the total outstanding highway debt, including the Chef
Menteur debt, declined from $106,328,000 in June, 19^1* to
125
$89,217,000 in June, 19i+6. Louisiana highway debt and 
the total Louisiana debt were still moving in concert,
■^^Act 71 of 1938 would have permitted more borrow­
ing from this fund, but the authority was not exercised 
during the 1 9̂ i-l—19 4̂-6 period.
■^^Louisiana, Financial Report. 19^-1-42, PP. 81-82; 
19ll-5-̂ 6, pp. 62-63.
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Confederate Veterans* Pension 
Borrowing, 19Ul-l9ll6" ~
Act 61 of 1936, discussed in connection with borrow­
ing in the 1928-19l+0 period, provided that the Legislature 
and the State Board of Liquidation could use the surplus 
proceeds of the 0 .75? mill ad valorem tax for the support of 
an economic and social welfare system. The first activity 
in the Confederate veterans* segment of the debt structure 
during the World War II period, in April, 191+1, resulted 
from that authorization. (See Table XXI, Appendix A.) The 
obligations sold were the Certificates of Indebtedness—
Series A. The amount of the issue was $£0 0,0 0 0, a n <3 the
certificates, which could not be sold for less than par, 
carried an interest rate of 3 pez* cent. Pull retirement of 
these noncallable obligations was set for 191+1+. ^he 
security provisions were as follows: the bonds were full
faith and credit obligations of the State, and they were 
protected by a fourth lien on the revenues from the 0 .7 5  
mill levy. In 191+2, Moody* s gave a rating of A to the 
Series A Certificates of Indebtedness. Series B of the 
Certificates of Indebtedness followed two years later in 
May, 191+3; this issue totaled $2,000,000 and matured in I9£l. 
The rates on this group of certificates was 3 per cent on 
$1,££0,000 and 1+ per cent on the remainder. The bonds were 
not rated since they were sold to the State Teachers*
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Retirement Fund. The critique of Series A and B bonds Is
the same as that which was presented In connection with the
127
previous issues authorized by Act 61 of 1936.
The next Confederate Veterans* Pension Fund offering 
depended upon Act 390 of I9I4-O. The act provided:
That each Confederate Veteran, and each widow 
of a Confederate Veteran, whose name was on the 
pension roll on June 1, 1932, and who was entitled 
to receive the pension provided for by this 
Article, and whose pension was reduced from Sixty 
Dollars per month to Thirty Dollars per month on 
June 1, 1932, shall be paid the sum of Thirty 
Dollars per month from June 1, 1932 to June 1,
1 9 3 5> "the date when said pension was again 
increased to $ 6 0 per month or a total sum of 
One Thousand and Eighty Dollars.^2°
The Board of Liquidation was authorized to borrow up to
$9 0 0 ,0 0 0 to raise the funds needed to pay these back
pensions. Although the act did not provide as much detail
as usual, it did specify a maximum interest rate of 5 per
cent. The lack of further detail did not seem to affect the
status of the bonds, and they were accepted as full faith
and credit obligations without question. This acceptance,
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 7 , 
as amended 1936, Act 61; Louisiana, Financial Report. 
p. 80; 19^5-46, p. 64; and Moody*s, 1942* p. Iplp7? and 19lii|, P. 425.
^ ^ Supra, pp. 2 2 0-2 1 .
128 ,Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 6 ,
as amended 1940» Act 3 9 0 .
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of course, was not unusual since the obligations were issued 
payable from an ad valorem tax and by a State Board. The 
Board of Liquidation did not avail itself of the whole 
authorization, arid in July, 191+1, issued only $675*000 of 
Series H bonds. This issue was now the fifth charge upon 
the Confederate Veterans1 Pension Fund. The rates on the 
intermediate term bonds— maturing from 191+5 to 19l+7--were
from 1 to 1.5 per cent. The issue was noncallable and got
129
an A rating from Moody1s.
The three sales of Confederate Veterans* Pension 
Bonds during World War II added $3,17^*000 to Louisiana*s 
debt and brought the total borrowing for this purpose since 
1925 to $9,761+,260.
State Bond and Interest Tax Fund 
Borrowing. 19hl-19l+6
Borrowing payable from the State Bond and Interest
Tax Fund during the World War II years depended upon Acts
138 and 383 of 191+0. Act 1 38 of 191+0 raised the amount of
the ad valorem tax that was dedicated to the State Bond and
Interest Tax Fund from 1.15 to 1,1+7 mills. The 1.15 mill
tax had been dedicated to the State Bond and Interest Tax
Fund originally by Act 109 of the Extra Session of 1921.
‘L2^Ibid.; Louisiana, Financial Report, 19i+l-i+2, p. 80; 
191+5-1+6, p. 61+; and Moody* s, 191+2, p. 1+1+7̂
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The same act had also provided for the payment of 0.32 mills
to the "General Engineer Fund." Now, in 19lj.0, the 0.32 mill
dedication was shifted to the State Bond and Interest Tax
Fund to make the total dedication 1.1|.7 mills. The funds
from the l.Ij.7 mill tax were to be used to pay interest on
bonds authorized by: Act 6 of the Extra Session of 1927
(Flood Relief Bonds and Drought Relief Bonds); Act 10 of the
Extra Session of 1930 (New State Capitol Building Bonds);
Act 122 of 1932 (Louisiana Serial Bonds); and Act 3 of 1938
(Refunding Bonds). In addition, the State Bond and Interest
Tax Fund was to continue to provide the minor funds needed
to pay the interest on the Free School Fund, the Seminary
Fund, and the Agricultural and Mechanical College Fund, as
required in Article 12, Sections 19-21, of the Constitution
of 1921. Act 138 also authorized the use of the State Bond
and Interest Tax Fund to pay any bonds that might later be 
130authorized.
Subsequent authorization was not long in coming. Act 
383 of 19^0 , adopted as a constitutional amendment in 
November, 19i|0, provided that the surplus of the l.lj.7 mill 
tax could be funded Into general obligations up to $7,000,000. 
It was also pledged that the State Bond and Interest Tax
^Louisiana, Acts (19I4.O), Act 1 3 8, pp. 5̂ -3-J+5
258
Fund would bo maintained as long as any obligations were
outstanding. The purpose of the funding was threefold:
(l) to pay short-term indebtedness incurred before May 15*
19 4̂-0 ; (2) to pay overdue Confederate veterans1 pensions; and,
(3) to reimburse the General Highway Fund for certain funds
transferred from it to the Public School Fund by the Board
of Liquidation. The maximum interest rate prescribed for
any issues under the authorization was 5 per cent, and the
maximum life of the bonds was set at twenty years. The
Board of Liquidation was again named to administer the 
131issue.
The Serial Bonds of April 15, 19^1, were sold under
the authority of the act described above. The amount of the
bonds was $6 ,ll]-5 ,0 0 0, and they bore split rates as follows:
$1,173»000, maturing fully in I9I46 paid L|..75> per cent
(noncallable); $3 ,0lj.l,0 0 0, maturing between 1 9^7 -1 9 5 6 paid
2 ,2 5  per cent; and $1 ,9 3 1*0 0 0, maturing between 1957-1961
pays 2.5 per cent. The two larger blocks were callable.
The whole issue was scheduled to be fully retired in 
, 132
1 9 6 1, but the bonds were not destined to remain outstand­
ing that long; they brought the next State Bond and Interest
■*•3̂ Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. I4., Sec. 12(a), 
as amended I9I4O, Act 3 8 3 .
Louisiana, Financial 
I4.6, p. 62; and Moody's, 19^2, P
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Tax Fund activity a few years later— in 19l|6. (See Table 
XXII, Appendix A.)
By 19lj.5> and early I9I46, the State of Louisiana was 
selling obligations at the following rates: Institutional
Improvement Bonds from 1.5 to 1.75 Pe** cent on large blocks; 
highway issues from 1 .2 5  to 1 . 5  cent on the longer 
maturities; and, in May, I9I46, more Institutional Improve­
ment Bonds were sold with the majority of them carrying
133interest rates of 1.25 per cent. Conditions in the bond 
market, thus, made logical a refunding of the callable 2 .2 5  
and 2.5 per cent Serial Bonds of 19^1. Act 3^8 of I9I4.6 was 
intended solely to provide for the refunding of the 
flj.,972,000 still outstanding from this I9I4-I Issue, The act 
provided that the Refunding Bonds would be payable from the 
same taxes as the bonds they replaced. This provision meant 
that they would also be given the same lien. It was further 
stipulated in the authorization that the bonds would not be 
sold for less than par and that the average interest cost of 
2 per cent should not be exceeded. The bonds were again to 
be issued by the Board of Liquidation of the State Debt, but 
this time the State Bond and Tax Board was required to review
13k
and approve of the bonds before they could be issued.
•^Moodyts, 1914-6, p. l|.l5; and 19klt PP. 14-2 1-2 2 .
1 "^Louisiana, Acts (1914.6 ), Act 3I4.8 , pp. 1103-5*
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The Refunding Bonds were sold in September, 19^6, at
a rate of 1.7^ per cent on $ij.,397»000 and 1.5 per cent on
$5>75>*000. The bonds were to be fully retired in 1958
whereas the bonds they replaced would have matured fully in
1961. According to the Financial Report of 19lf7> the
refunding reduced average interest rates from 2J-J.93 per cent
to 1.6952 per cent. The noncallable issue was given a Baa
135rating by Moody*s. The only new feature of this issue 
was the role assigned to the State Bond and Tax Board. The 
Board had been originally established in 1935 to deal with 
the financing of subdivisions of the State, but it had not 
been a practice even to mention its existence in the various 
constitutional amendments authorizing State debt.
State Institution Improvement Borrowing.mi-mb
One of the most important changes in Louisiana’s debt 
structure during World War II was the appearance of borrow­
ing for a new purpose. This new direct debt was authorized 
by constitutional amendment (Act 361}-) in 19lj-2 to finance the 
repair, improvement, and construction of designated State 
correctional and charitable institutions. The practice of 
dedicating taxes or revenues for the payment of bonds was
1 ̂5Louisiana, Financial Report, 19l|_5-l}-6, p. 62; 19J4.6-
I4.7, pp. 6, 66; and Moody’s, 19lj.7> P. lj.21.
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extended to this institutional improvement borrowing. In 
this case, it was certain mineral lease royalties received 
on State land that were pledged. This case was not the 
first time that these revenues had been earmarked; the 
institutional improvement dedication was subject to the 
following prior claims! (l) 10 per cent paid into the "Road 
Fund," (2) the portion pledged to cover office expenses, and 
(3) the amount credited to State agencies and levee boards. 
Besides the subordinate claim on the mineral royalty reve­
nues, the State Institution Improvement Bonds resulting from
Act 361). were further secured by Louisiana*s full faith and
136credit.
These provisions relating to institutional improve­
ment borrowing merely carried on the practices that had 
become well established in the State. More revenues were 
frozen, a new layer of dedications was established, and 
another explanation would have to be given to anyone who 
might be interested in buying the bonds.
The constitutional provisions of 191+2 authorized the 
Board of Liquidation to issue $5>,000,000 of Institution 
Improvement Bonds and required that the bonds be retired 
between four and twenty-five years from the date of their
■'■^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. Ij., Sec. 2(a), 
as amended 19i|2, Act 3̂ >b*
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Issue. The bonds were also required to pay no more than 
5 pen cent, to be sold for not less than par, and to be in 
denominations of not less than $1,000. It was further pro­
vided that the bonds be sold to the highest bidder at public
137auction and that they should be callable.
This last feature— requiring that bonds be callable -- 
was the only unusual requirement. The unqualified provision 
that the bonds be made callable would appear to be an 
undesirable requirement. It was noted earlier that the call 
option usually has a price attached and that this price may 
sometimes be prohibitive. It would normally be more advisa­
ble to leave some discretion to the fiscal authorities to 
Include the call feature if it seems desirable. The consti­
tutional determination of the exact provisions In connec­
tion with the call feature of bond Issues again is 
Inconsistent with the meaning of debt management.
During the 195-1 to 195-6 period, two series of State 
Institution Improvement Bonds were sold under the provisions 
described. Series A amounted to $378,000 and ran for ten
years~it was sold in March, 195-5. These A-rated bonds bore
138split rates of 0 .7 5  and 1 .2 5  per cent and were callable.
^■^Louisiana, Financial Report. 195-5-5-6, p. 65; 195-6-
57, p. 68; 1951-52, p. 59; and Moody*3, 195-6, p. L}.l5•
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(See Table XXIII, Appendix A.) It Is very doubtful that 
bonds with such low rates will ever be called. The low 
interest rates that prevailed in 191+1+ and 191+5 on Louisiana 
bonds were a good indication that the rates would be low on 
Series A also, and thus it would have been undesirable to 
pay anything extra for the call privilege when it was so 
unlikely that the bonds would ever be called. There is no 
evidence, however, that the inclusion of the call option 
raised the cost of borrowing in this case.
Series A was one of the several issues sold in
Louisiana during this period which raises the question of
whether long-term debt should be incurred for such small
amounts. Series B of Institution Improvement Bonds was sold
on a parity with Series A and closed out the $5*000,000
authorization of Act 361+ of 191+2. The amount of this May,
191+6, Issue was $1+,622,000. These bonds, which were also
rated A, carried rates of 2 per cent on $622,000 and 1.25
per cent on $1+,000,000. The issue was not made callable and
will not be fully retired until 1967. Since Series B was a
relatively large issue and was not callable, the observations
139
made in connection with Series A do not apply here.
139Louisiana, Financial Report. 191+5-1+6, p. 61+;
191+6-1+7, p. 68; 1951-^2, p. 59; and Moody*s, 191+7, P. 1+22.
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Summary of Borrowing. 19li-I-19li6
The only four purposes of borrowing in Louisiana from 
191+1 through 19^6 were Confederate veterans1 pensions, high­
ways, institutional improvements, and funding and refunding. 
The largest amount of bonds sold was the $7,000,000 for 
highways. A second component of the debt was the funding
issue of $6,ll|.$,000 that was serviced by the l.ij.7 mill ad 
llj.0
valorem tax. Institution Improvement Bonds, which made
their first appearance during the period, amounted to an 
even $$,000,000. The fourth and final borrowing during the 
war period was the Confederate Veterans1 Pension Fund welfare 
borrowing that amounted to $3,175,000. The four purposes 
together totaled only $21,320,000 for the war years, (See 
Table XIX, Appendix A,) in contrast to the $165,^-55,000 
borrowed from 1928-19J4-0.
VII. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS, 1921-19l|.6
A chronological study of the Louisiana debt structure 
overlooks certain general characteristics that are evident 
only when all of the Issues are considered together. Some 
of these general factors are: the ratings received by
Louisiana bonds, the use of the call feature in the State,
ll±0The balance of this issue, $If.,9 7 2,0 0 0, was 
refunded in I9I4-6 .
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debt reporting, the timing of bond sales, and the machinery 
for managing the debt.
Ratings of Louisiana Bonds. 1921 -19ii6
Between 1918 and 1932, all Louisiana obligations were 
rated Aaa by Moody1s. The meaning of the ratings during 
that time was not radically different from today— Aaa was a 
top-grade issue. Louisiana may not have deserved the high- 
est rating in this period because of its record of repudi­
ation and default in the earlier periods. The complexity 
that was building up slowly from the time the Constitution 
of 1921 was adopted was also a factor which might have' 
caused the ratings to be qualified. Finally, the Stated 
economy was certainly not among the strongest of the states 
at that time. These factors, together with the depression 
and the $51*000,000 of highway borrowing from 1928 to 1931* 
may have been what prompted Moody’s in 1932 to lower the 
rating on all Louisiana bonds to Aa (while the meaning of
the ratings remained unchanged). The 1933 edition of
ll+lMoody’s showed another lowering of the ratings to A. The 
lower ratings assigned to Louisiana obligations in the 1933 
Moody’s manual probably were more appropriate than the 
earlier ones.
^ M o o d y ’s, 1931, p. 11+99; 1932, p. 11+82; and 1933, 
p. 1512.
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The practice of assigning blanket ratings for all of 
a statets obligations did not take into account the issuing 
of layers of subordinate bonds. This practice of assigning 
blanket ratings was abandoned around 1939. By this time, 
there was apparently enough fear, although only three states 
had d e f a u l t e d , f o r  the rating system to be revised. The 
present practice of assigning ratings to individual state 
issues, therefore, is probably attributable to the depres­
sion of the 1930's. Whether this method is still appropriate 
is questioned elsewhere.
Table A gives the distribution of the different bond 
ratings according to directness for selected years since 
1939. (Bee also Tables XXIV, XXV, and XXVI, Appendix A.)
The $182,227*000 of Louisiana bonds outstanding in 1939 was 
rated as follows: almost $0 per cent were direct bonds
rated A; all of the Aa bonds (there were no Aaa bonds left) 
were direct obligations; there was also $28,27^,000 of 
direct obligations rated Baa--this was l£.£ per cent. Most 
of the indirect obligations outstanding in 1939, some 
$lj.8 ,077,000, were rated Baa. The remaining $8,000,000 of
ll+^Alvin H. Hansen and Harvey S. Perloff, State and 
Local Finance In the National Economy (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, Inc., 191}I|J> P»
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TABLE A
MOODY*S RATINGS OF LOUISIANA DIRECT AND INDIRECT DEBT 






BONDS RATED Aa 
b
Direct $10,169 $ 8 ,9 0 0 $ 7,525
Indirect 0 0 9,300
TOTAL $10,169' $ 8,900 $16,825
BONDS RATED A
Direct $87,706 $ 8 3 , ^ $67,875
Indirect 0 0 0
TOTAL $87,706 $83All; $6 7 ,8 7 5
BONDS RATED Baa
Direct $28,275 $39,14-79 $14.1 ,8 3 1
Indirect 1i8.077 H.5,366 28,073
TOTAL $76,352 $8^,8^ $69,9014.
BONDS NOT RATED
Direct $ o $ 0 $ 2,009
Indirect 8,000 8.000
TOTAL $ 8 ,0 0 0 $ 8,000 $ 8,001
Ratings range from Aaa to C. These ratings are some-
times changed when new information indicates that the invest­
ment quality is different. The ratings in the Table are as 
of the reporting date and not at the time of issue.
V»The classifications used here are the same as those 
used in the text.
Source: Compiled from Tables XXIV, XXV, and XXVI,
Appendix A.
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indirect bonds was not rated. In 19lj.l, the only change that 
was noticeable in the ratings was that there were now more 
direct bonds rated Baa, but the amount was still less than 
the amount of Baa indirect bonds. This tendency changed in 
19ll-6— 'by that time there was $lj.l,8 3 1 * 0 0 0 of direct bonds in 
the Baa category. An unfortunately minor change in the war 
period was a relative and absolute Increase in the amount of 
bonds rated Aa— they increased from $8,900,000 in I9I4I to 
$16,825,000 in 19̂ 4-6. But, the most important fact about the 
bond ratings in the war years is that there was no signifi­
cant improvement In the ratings even though the State* s 
economy was expanding and the debt was declining.
Use of the Call Feature in Louisiana 
Bond Issues. 1921-19li6
The call privilege was reserved in only one of the 
issues outstanding In 1921. (See Table B.) The twelve non- 
callable issues outstanding were mostly the Indirect Port of 
New Orleans Issues. In 1928, there was still only one calla­
ble issue, but there were now nineteen noncallable issues. 
These nineteen issues were composed of fourteen indirect 
ones and five direct ones. By 1914-1* even the lone callable 
issue had disappeared. It had been called in 1938 and 
brought a saving of over $2,2lj.8,000 during the life of the 
bonds. Thus, there were fifty-eight noncallable issues in 
1 9I4.I. By 1914-6, there was an important change: there were
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TABLE B
THE INCLUSION OP THE CALL FEATURE IN LOUISIANA BONDS 






Direct 1 1 0 $Indirect 0 0 0 0
NONCALLABLE ISSUES
Direct 1 5 37 37
Indirect 11 11+ 21 21
NOT INDICATED
Direct 0 0 0 0
Indirect 0 0 1 1
Source: Moody1 s, 1922, p. 81|,0; 1929, p. 13*1-1? 191+2,
p. 1+1+7? 191+7, pp. 1+21-22, 1+28-29? and A, M. Smith, Compila­
tion of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds (New Orleans:
A. M. Smith Investment Co., 1 9 3 8 ), pp. 3-20.
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still fifty-eight noncallable issues, but there were also 
five callable ones. These five callable issues were all 
direct issues of the State.
The success of the one refunding that depended upon 
the call option is an indication of the difference which the 
wider use of the feature might have made in the cost of the 
borrowing in Louisiana. At first glance, the use of the call 
feature thus appears to have been very desirable in the case 
of the expensive and large highway issues of the late 
twenties and early thirties. However, the State was having 
such difficulty marketing its bonds that callable issues 
might not have been sold at all.
Reporting of Louisiana Debt, 1921-19il-6
The classification of issues in the Treasurer1s 
Reports placed the Highway Fund Number 2, Chef Menteur-New 
Orleans and Hammond-New Orleans, borrowing in the indirect 
category. This misclassification probably is attributable 
to the fact that the debt was not full faith and credit 
debt. Confusion surrounding the terms "full faith and 
credit," "general," and "direct" debt apparently existed in 
the reporting agencies. Perhaps the most serious reporting 
fault of the whole period was that the Treasurer1s Reports 
did not include information about any of the indirect issues 
of the Louisiana State University, the State Board of
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Education, and the Charity Hospital Board of Admlnlstra- 
IIlIj.tors. The only excuse which can be given for this omis­
sion is that the indirect debt technically is not a part of 
the State debt. This reasoning may be satisfactory in the 
courts; however, it is not acceptable in the bond market. 
Indirect debt that is supported with state funds can obviously 
affect the state*s ability to service its other direct obli­
gations. If the market is to evaluate all pertinent factors, 
It must take into consideration the indirect debt. If the 
state makes It difficult for Interested parties to determine 
how much indirect debt it is responsible for, there may be 
damage to the state's credit standing. It is advisable to 
report all debt in which the state is involved, no matter 
what the relationship.
The Financial Reports which took over the reporting 
of State debt In 19i+2 corrected the omission of the indirect 
debt and provided more information about authorization, 
original amounts of the issues, and interest rates on the 
bonds. There still seem to have been a few errors or cases
of incomplete information on some of the details of particu-
lb-9lar issues even after the change. However, the Financial
1^ o u i  slana, Treasurer*s Report, 1938-39, pp. 55-^6. 
lh-3For example, the 19i|.l-̂ 2 Financial Report showed 
the Port Commission per cent bonds of 193^ as authorized 
by Act 180 of 1908 when the bonds were sold In accordance
2?2
Report was a definite improvement in debt reporting; it had 
the merit of providing more information and being more 
consistent in its reporting.
Louisiana debt reporting from the standpoint of 
trying to provide enough information to all interested 
parties in the market (so that the value of the State’s 
obligations would not be underestimated) was not so success­
ful. The State should have gotten its bond ratings raised 
to reflect strength of the outstanding obligations near the 
end of the war period. If Louisiana could have entered the 
post-war borrowing period with better bond ratings, it might 
have added greatly to the marketability of the post-war 
Issues.
Timing of Louisiana Bond Sales, 1921-19ii6
Although seasonal fluctuations are only one of several 
types which can occur in interest rates, the study of the 
seasonal pattern may offer more promise in improving the 
timing of bond sales than any other single timing technique. 
The seasonal index that was suggested in Chapter II was
with the provisions relative to Port borrowing in the 1921 
Constitution. The 19lj5-[j.6 Financial Report shows only 
$1,000,000 of Series EE issued, while other reports give the 
amount as $2,000,000. Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art.
6, Sec. 16; Louisiana, Financial Report. 19lil-l|2, pp. 80-86; 
19li5-M>» pp. 62-66.
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based only on several recent years. It probably would not
be correct to try to apply that Index to the issues sold
from 1921 to 19if.6 since it is possible and perhaps even
likely that the seasonal pattern has changed over this time
period. It is obvious, however, that there was a great deal
of diversity in the dates of issue of obligations during the
period from 1921 to 19^6. (See Table C.) The years of
heaviest borrowing were from 1928 to 19lj.O; there were fifty-
one issues. Forty-one of the issues were direct issues with
highways accounting for thirty-one of this number. The
large number of highway issues was scattered throughout the
year with concentrations in January, October, and 
llj.6December. It is difficult to imagine that such scattered
borrowing could have taken advantage of anything but the 
most unusual pattern which might have existed.
Administrative Machinery. 1921-19ll6
A review of the various constitutional amendments and 
acts which provided for bonded debt creation in Louisiana 
from 1921 to 19l;6 reveals thoroughly confusing intragovern- 
mental relationships. The governmental unit most frequently
'L̂ I f  there was a seasonal pattern at all similar to 
the one of the 19f?0’s, about one-third of the highway obli­
gations would have been in the high-yield months.
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TABLE C
DATES OP ISSUE OP LOUISIANA BONDS SOLD 








1 9 2 1
1927
INDIRECT




JANUARY 1 0 9 0 1 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0
FEBRUARY 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 2 0 0 0 0
MARCH 1 0 2 1 0 0 o'
15 1 2 0 0 0 0
APRIL i 0 0 0 0 1 0
15 0 5 2 0 0 0
MAY l 0 3 2 0 0 0
1 5 0 3 0 0 0 0
JUNE i 0 1 0 0 1 0
15 0 3 0 0 0 0
JULY i 0 2 3 0 2 0
15 0 0 1 0 0 0
AUGUST i 0 1 0 1 2 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0
SEPTEMBER i 0 1 1 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0
OCTOBER i 0 k 0 0 2 0
15 0 1 0 0 1 0
NOVEMBER l 1 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0
DECEMBER i 0 1 1 2 1 0
15_ ... 1 It 0 0 0 0
Source: Compiled from Tables VII-XXIII, Appendix A.
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authorized to borrow for the State was the Board of Liquida­
tion of the State Debt. The Board of Liquidation was made 
responsible for borrowing specific amounts for the following 
purposes: (1) highway construction, (2) Confederate veterans*
pensions, (3 ) funding of short-term debt, (Ij.) construction 
of a new capitol building, (5 ) improving institutions, and
147(6 ) welfare.
The administrative machinery might have been rela­
tively simple if only the Board of Liquidation of State Debt 
had managed all bonds issuedj this was far from the case.
Other governmental units that were involved at one time or 
another in the borrowing during the 1921 to 19M> period were 
the Legislature, the State Advisory Board, and the State 
Bond and Tax Board. These units were only concerned with 
the different types of direct borrowing. The indirect debt 
was managed by several agencies or authorities: the Board
of Supervisors of the Louisiana State University, the State 
Board of Education, the Board of Administration of the 
Charity Hospital, the Manager of the State Penitent!ary, and 
the Board of Commissioners of the Port of Hew Orleans.
"^^See various constitutional amendments mentioned 
in this Chapter and "Louisiana*s *Little Legislature*," A 
Study of the Board of Liquidation-of the State Debt, I8 7O- 
1945* Research Monograph No. 1 (New Orleans: Bureau of
Governmental Research, Inc., 1945)» PP« 6-7.
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There does not seem to have been a definite pattern
in the assignment of functions to the various bodies that
dealt with the direct debt. The State Advisory Board
replaced the Board of Liquidation in the handling of highway
llj.8issues after 1930. However, the State Board of Liquida­
tion seemed to manage most of the remaining direct authori­
sations. One exception was the direction in Act 3̂4-8 of 191+6 
that the Board of Liquidation should sell a refunding issue 
subject to the approval of the State Bond and Tax Board.
This amendment was the only one which mentioned the State 
Bond and Tax Board in connection with any State direct or 
indirect debt during the period. The State Bond and Tax 
Board is a unit established to oversee the borrowing activi­
ties of subdivisions of the State. The general authority 
of the State Bond and Tax Board does not seem to cover 
State issues, although the act which created the Board
does mention protecting the State’s credit as one of its
lIj-9purposes.
Besides naming boards and other governmental units to 
issue debt, it was also a practice in many of the constitu­
tional amendments during the 1921 to 19^6 period to charge
■^^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22(e), 
as amended 1930* E.S., Act 3.
^^Louisiana, Acts (19^}, Act 285, pp. 8 32-35» and 
(191+6), Act 3I+8 , pp. 1103-5.
certain State officials with specific responsibilities.
Again, the assignments of responsibilities to officials 
seemingly did not follow any orderly plan. Provisions 
differed radically from one amendment to another. The State 
Treasurer and the State Auditor were mentioned about as 
frequently as they were omitted in the debt amendments 
during the period. The Governor was also mentioned in some 
cases and even the Manager of the State Penitentiary was 
involved in one issue. The most important of the State 
officials connected with debt management in Louisiana during 
the whole period were the members of the Board of Liquidation. 
The power of these men and their influence on both the long­
term and short-term borrowing in Louisiana during the period 
requires closer examination.
The management of bond issues was one of the more 
obvious functions of the Board of Liquidation. The authori­
zations for this function were given in the various consti­
tutional amendments analyzed in this Chapter. But, the 
management of bond issues was not the most important func­
tion of the Board of Liquidation of the State Debt during 
the period. The Board was probably more powerful and more 
important in its control of spending and short-term 
borrowing. The Board was still operating under several
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legislative acts that provided for borrowing from fiscal
l£oagent banks in case of "grave emergency."
The short-term borrowing of the Board from 1921 to 
1936 was repaid by several methods. As had been the 
practice earlier, repayment of Board liabilities by legis­
lative appropriation continued throughout the period. This 
method of payment was supplemented in 1931+ by a legislative 
grant of power to the Board to use the surplus in the 
general fund for debt retirement. The Board in turn gave 
the Treasurer continuing authority to use the general fund 
surplus to pay debts. A third method of repayment used both 
before and after 1936 (in 1932 and 19ll-0) was the funding of 
short-term debt into long-term obligations.1'’1 There is no 
question about the validity of these two amendments although 
the wisdom of creating long-term debt in this manner is 
questionable.
There were, however, many questions directed at some 
of the other acts under which the Board operated. It was 
claimed that there was neither clear-cut nor sufficient 
authority for all of the functions which the Board performed
1'^"Louisiana*s *Little Legislature*," pp. 9-11.
1^1Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 12, 
as amended 1932, Act 122;'”Art. Ij., Sec. 12(a), as amended 
191+0, Act 3 8 3 ? and "Louisiana*s *Little Legislature*,"
pp. 1 1-2 3.
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before 1936. Skepticism about the authority of the Board
of Liquidation led to the passage of Act 73 of 1936 which 
had the following purpose:
To protect the faith and credit of the State 
and of its parishes, municipalities, political 
subdivisions, public boards, or corporations; 
authorizing the Board of Liquidation of the 
State Debt, when it deems such action necessary to 
protect the faith and credit of the State or any 
of its parishes, municipalities, political sub­
division, public boards or corporations or to 
adjust their financial affairs or that it is to 
the best interests of any of them to suspend 
the provisions of any law of this State providing 
for the appropriation, deposit, expenditure or 
dedication of public funds and to transfer any 
sum of money appropriated, deposited, or dedicated 
by any law of this State from the purpose for 
which such appropriation, deposit or dedication 
was made to other purposes by decreasing, adding 
to or increasing one or more items, or adding new 
items, of appropriation, deposit, expenditure or 
dedication or by providing that such increases 
or additions shall be paid out of the general 
fund; providing that any finding of fact under 
this act by the Board of Liquidation of the State 
Debt shall be final, and that its action hereunder 
shall be mandatory upon the State Treasurer and 
State Auditor, and other officers. -̂53
Act 73 of 1936 has been described as almost an abdica­
tion on the part of the Legislature in favor of the executive 
branch of the government. The new legislation was put to 
full use for almost every conceivable purpose from 1936 until
132For example, see "Louisiana1s *Little Legislature*," 
pp. 1, 1^-15.
■^^Louisiana, Acts (1936), Act 73, PP. 192-93*
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19l+fy-. One of the most impressive actions taken by the Board 
of Liquidation during those years added another method for 
financing the Board's activities. This action was the 
transfer of funds from the Bond and Interest Account of the 
General Highway Fund to the State Public School Fund, 
despite a constitutional provision that required that the 
Bond and Interest Account maintain a sum sufficient to cover 
the principal and interest requirements on highway bonds for 
one full year.
The Board of Liquidation of the State Debt operated 
without any challenge in the courts until 19̂ 4-1. A series of
specific decisions by the courts at that time served only
to curb slightly the powers of the Board. It was not until 
19J-J-U- that the Supreme Court ruled directly and conclusively 
on the basic authority of the Board of Liquidation. The
ruling was that Act 73 of 1938 and all previous acts intend­
ing to give the Board rights to manage State money and tol£5borrow were unconstitutional. The basis of the ruling
was the first section of Article Ij. on limitations:
No money shall be drawn from the treasury 
except in pursuance of specific appropriation 
made by law; nor shall any appropriation of money
^ I b i d  .; Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6,
Sec. 22(f), as amended 1936, Act 66; and "Louisiana's 
'Little Legislature'," pp. 22-26.
^^"Louisiana's 'Little Legislature*," pp. 32-39.
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be made for a longer term than two years. A 
regular statement and account of receipts and 
expenditures of all public moneys shall be 
published every three months, in.such manner 
as shall be prescribed by law. 5°
The stripping from the Board of Liquidation of its 
power left the problem of providing for necessary spending 
between legislative sessions. The solution was a reconsti­
tution of the Board of Liquidation to fill this need without 
leading to another shift of power from the Legislature to 
the executive branch of the government. This plan was 
recognized and advocated by the privately supported Bureau 
of Governmental Research, Inc., of New Orleans, which had 
been instrumental in bringing the disputed acts before the 
courts for review. The reconstitution was provided in Act 
327 of 191^, which was approved by the voters in November, 
19lji|-j and provided the following: (1) The Board would be 
composed of the Governor (or his executive counsel), the 
Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House, the Chairman 
of the House Appropriations Committee, the Chairman of the 
Senate Finance Committee, the Auditor and the Treasurer.
This change from the composition of the earlier boards added 
the representatives from the House and Senate who were 
responsible for appropriations. The Attorney General of the
•^^Louisiana, Constitution (1921)* Art. Ij., Sec. 1
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State was omitted to ensure that legal advice to the Board 
would not he prejudiced by membership upon the same Board.
(2) The Board was limited to $100,000 of borrowing or to a 
$100,000 appropriation for any budget unit in a fiscal year 
and to $1,000,000 for all budget units in the same year. It 
was also provided that there should never be more than 
$2,000,000 of outstanding debt. (There is no indication in 
the act about whether this borrowing is limited to short­
term obligations.) (3) The borrowing or appropriations to 
the budget units depended upon a recognition of insufficiency 
by the Board of Liquidation and the written consent of a 
majority of the members of the House. (1+) Borrowing by the 
Board of Liquidation could be retired from the General Fund 
whenever the Treasurer certified that there was a surplus 
and requested authority from the Board of Liquidation to use
l£7it for this purpose.
The activities of the Board of Liquidation from 1921 
to 191+6 were very significant in many respects. Hone of the 
activities was more important than the way the Board incurred 
short-term debt and then presented the accomplished borrowing 
to the voters with requests to fund this debt into long-term 
bonds. The Board of Liquidation was an instrument for
^^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), as amended 19J+i+> 
Act 327.
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turning what were largely minor, recurrent, and operating 
expenses of the government into long-term debt. This 
practice appears to have been an undesirable use of the 
borrowing authority.
This handling of short-term debt was one of the more 
specific faults of the Board of Liquidation borrowing during 
the period. However, there was a more serious flaw in the 
administration by the Board. Management of state debt 
obviously should be entrusted only to properly constituted 
bodies. Any questions about the authority of such bodies to 
manage debt will be reflected in lower bond ratings and 
higher interest rates.
Besides having so much of its debt managed under such 
questionable conditions, Louisiana probably should not have 
impaired its credit standing in this period by maintaining 
such complex administrative machinery. There appear to have 
been too many officials and boards involved in Louisiana^ 
debt structure. Furthermore, no apparent order or plan 
existed in the relationships between the various bodies and 
officials of the government. This undesirable tendency 
toward complexity was also being paralleled in the indirect 
sector of the debt where there were three new agencies added 
during the I9 2 8-I9I4-O period.
CHAPTER V
POST-WAR BORROWING IN LOUISIANA, 1914-7-1959
World War II produced a temporary pause in the growth
of debt in Louisiana and in other states. The grand total
of all debt outstanding in Louisiana was $160,76I4.,020 on
June 30, I9I4-6 , and $171}., 873,020 on June 30, 191+7. These
debt totals did not differ significantly from the pre-war
total of $162,938,020. The State collected $9 8 ,9 1 5,14-58 in
taxes in 1914-6 and $111,8 5 2,514-6 in 19^7* Assessed value of
property in I9I4-6 was $1 ,614-1 ,0 0 0,0 0 0, and in 19̂ 4-7, it was
$1,738,5^7,000. The ratios between the debt and these
ability measures were as follows: In 1914-6 , tax receipts
were 61.5 pe** cent of the debt outstanding, and the debt
outstanding was 9 .8  per cent of the assessed value of
property; in 1 9l}-7 , taxes were 614-.0 per cent of debt, and debt
outstanding was 10.1 per cent of assessed valuation. By
comparison, taxes in I9I4-I were only 3 5 * 0 per cent of debt
outstanding, and debt outstanding equalled 1 3 .2  per cent of
1the assessed valuation of property. The ability to bear
Goody's, 1914-7, PP. U21-21+, [4.36J 19lj-9, p. lj-52; and 
Louisiana, Financial Ren or t. 19I4.6-I4.7 , p. 9? 19l|-7-li-8, p. 6.
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debt, according to these ratios, was greater in 1947 than it
had been in 1 9 4 1.
Louisiana was probably in a better position to borrow
in 1947 than ever before. The actual amount which the State
could safely borrow in this improved situation is another
question and one which cannot be definitely answered. It
appears that there was no abuse of borrowing at the start of
the post-war period. The debt outstanding had increased to
only $169*658*020 by 1948. The question of safety, however,
became more relevant in 1949 when veterans* bonuses were
proposed. It appears debatable whether Louisiana was in a
, 2position at the beginning of 1949 bo increase Its debt by 
35 pei* cent. But this large Increase was exactly what was 
about to take place.
2Moody* a Bond Survey analyzed the debt structure In 
Louisiana at this time (In an article entitled "Complex 
Credit Environment Limits Appeal") in connection with a 
proposed veterans* bonus bond issue of $60,000,000. This 
reference to complexity, Incidentally, set the stage for the 
Baa rating which was to follow the actual issue some time 
later. The analysis had bearing not only on that particular 
issue, but it also dealt with the question of whether or not 
It was safe for the State of Louisiana to be borrowing at 
that time. Conclusions about the debt structure were;
(1 )". . . each appreciable addition . . . has a cor­
rosive effect upon the state*s general credit."
(2)"Including the . , . veterans* bonus bonds, the 
direct general obligation debt will be . . . decidedly high 
for a state of limited wealth."
(3)"The general level of resources . . . remains 
quite modest and well below the average for the country as a 
whole."
(4)”As a result of its lavish use of bond proceeds
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I. DIRECT BORROWING, 191+7-1959
The direct obligations sold during the post-war 
period consisted of the various veterans* bonus, highway, 
and institutional improvement obligations. Bonds issued for 
all of these purposes were backed by certain dedicated taxes 
and also generally by the State*s full faith and credit.
The taxes were the beer tax, the gasoline tax, certain motor 
vehicle license revenues, and the 0 .7 5 mill ad valorem tax.
Veterans* Bonus Borrowing. 19li7-1959
The first Important borrowing after World War II was 
for a new purpose— to provide bonuses for World War II 
veterans (See Table XXVII, Appendix A.) Louisiana had 
previously incurred debt in favor of Confederate veterans 
and their widows. The Confederate Veterans* Pension Bonds
for capital improvements, Louisiana has worked its general 
affairs Into a somewhat vulnerable position.”
(5>)”The weight of debt service upon the state* s taxing 
powers is such that the pledge of general state credit is of 
limited value.”
(6 )”ln a period of unusually depressed business condi­
tions, it is not inconceivable that some of the taxes ear­
marked for debt might fail to produce revenues adequate to 
meet specified bond charges."
(7 )"The state is already finding it difficult to meet 
all of the demands being made upon a heavy and exceedingly 
diverse tax structure.”
The above Moody analysis can be summarized as follows: 
it was considered unsafe for Louisiana to borrow any substan­
tial amounts In early 191+9. This pessimistic analysis appears 
to have underestimated Louisiana*s potential. Moody*s Bond 
Survey. XLI, No. 3 (January 17, 1 9I+9 ), 673-71+.
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3did not appear until 1925 — about sixty years after the 
war's end. This new veterans* debt after World War II was 
for bonuses rather than for pensions, and the bonds were 
authorized and sold within three years after the conclusion 
of the war. Veterans* lobbies, eager politicians, and a 
grateful public combined to make bonus debt a thing familiar 
In many states. Ten states issued veterans* bonus bonds 
between 191+6 and 191+9 , and seven more borrowed for this
kpurpose In 1950. Louisiana was an enthusiastic participant
in this movement.
Veterans* bonus borrowing is not consistent with good
fiscal management. Prom the standpoint of finance alone,
veterans* bonuses are not considered a proper purpose for 
5borrowing. Of course, good fiscal management is not an end 
In Itself, but it is simply a means of furthering the general
3Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report. 1921+-25, p. 57.
"̂Tax Foundation, Inc., The Financial Challenge to the 
States: An Analysis of State Fiscal Deve1opments. 19kipl957»
Project Note No. 1+3 (New York: Tax Foundation, Inc., March,
1958), pp. 11+-15,* Tax Foundation, Inc., Postwar Trend in 
State Debt: A State-by-State Analysis. Project Note No. 27,
(New Yorks Tax Foundation, Inc., 1950/, PP. 2, 8 ; and 
Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9, PP. 83, 87-88.
^William J. Shultz and C. Lowell Harriss, American 
Public Finance (sixth edition; New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
195^), pTfFST
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welfare. After World War II, public opinion dictated that
that the general welfare would be furthered by paying
bonuses and borrowing took place.
The actual veterans* bonus borrowing had much clearer
undesirable aspects in Louisiana; it further complicated the
unwieldy debt structure. The proceeds of another tax— the
beer tax— were dedicated to this specific purpose. The tax
had just been raised from $1.50 to $10 a barrel by Act 8 of
19lp8. This $10 tax would have brought in an average $l+.9
million annually in the pre-war period and $9 .7  million in
the year before the issue. Here was another significant
amount of revenue being channeled away from the payment of
6governmental services.
The issue of the veterans* bonus bonds had still 
another flaw besides complicating the debt and financial 
structure. The constitutional authorization did not indi­
cate whether the bonds would be general obligations of the 
State. Through lack of planning or poor management, the State 
of Louisiana approached the conservative bond market for 
$60,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 with no more than the advice of counsel that the
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 8 , Sec. 10, 
as amended 191+8, Act 530? Louisiana, Acts (19lp8), Act 8 , 
pp. 28-1+9; Louisiana, Financial Report. 191+9-50* P» 58; and 
Moody's Bond Survey, XLI, No. 3 (January 17, 191+9), 529-31+.
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bonds would be general obligations. There had been earlier
instances of this type of uncertainty, but this case
occurred after World. War II when enlightened management
should have been the rule. The purchasers of the issue made
their bid subject to a Supreme Court ruling that the bonds
were full faith and credit obligations. This instance is a
flagrant example of an offering of bonds fraught with need-
7less uncertainty. It is Impossible to calculate how much 
this unfortunate circumstance cost the State, but It is 
logical to assume that it did have a cost. It Is dangerous 
to oversimplify, but in a case such as this, the consequences 
are not hard to trace: the uncertainty created by the poor
handling probably influenced the Baa bond rating to some 
extent and thus indirectly raised the interest rate that had 
to be paid for the funds. Finally, the higher Interest 
charges incurred meant that fewer government services could 
be made available for the residents of Louisiana with 
existing revenues. Such are the consequences of poor 
planning and management.
The World War II veterans* bonus debt, which was not 
to exceed $60,000,000, was authorized by Act 530 In 19̂ -8.
"^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art, 8, Sec. 10, as 
amended 19^8, Act 530: Moody*s Bond Survey, XLI, No. 3 
(January 17, 19^9)> 673-7V; and hoody*s Bond Survey, XLI,
No. 5 (January 31, 19l*9), 651.
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(See Table XXVII, Appendix A,) Series A was sold in 
January of 19lj.9 for #50,000,000. This first series was 
composed of four blocks that paid different interest rates 
and matured serially from 1953 to I96i|. Here is the explana­
tion of how the State was able to add to its debt burden: 
the serials were deferred serials— there was no provision 
for retiring any of this debt for four years. Then, after 
four years, the following maturities were due: $3 ,5 °0 ,0 0 0
on January 15, 1953» #3,605,000 on- January 15, 195^, and 
#3 ,7 1 3 ,0 0 0 on January 15, 1955. The debt retirement plan 
was not intended to eliminate the bulk of the debt until 
between 1956 and 196^. With the 1953» 195U* and 1955 
maturities eliminated, this would leave $3 9,1 8 2 ,0 0 0 outstand­
ing out of the total $5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 sold seven years previously.
Earlier retirement than this was possible, however, since
8the Series was callable.
The use of deferred serials in veterans' bonus borrow­
ing compounded the evils of financially improper borrowing 
and borrowing in amounts that raised doubts about safety. 
Deferred serials are generally undesirable because they
Q
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 8, Sec. 10, as 
amended 19i|£, Act 530? Art. 8, Sec. 10, as amended 1950,
Act 558? Moody's Bond Survey. XLI, No, 5 (January 31, 19i^9), 
651? Louisiana, Financial Report. 19l}.9-50, p. 58; 1952-53* 
p. 57; 1951+-55» p. 57; and Louisiana Legislative Research 
Study No. 9, pp. 8 3, 8 7-8 8.
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ignore the traditional criterion that the life of the bonds 
should be as short as possible in order to save on interest 
costs. Series B of the veterans* bonus debt was also a 
deferred serial issue and can be criticized on these same 
grounds.
The rest of the World War II bonus debt amounted to 
$10,000,000. This second issue— Series B— was sold in June, 
19l|-9» less than six months after Series A. Series B was a 
noncallable deferred serial issue, maturing from June 1,
195>1 to June 1, 1961. One curious thing about Series B was
that it was sold privately to a syndicate of investment
9dealers. This fact and the reasons for the action are not
10revealed at all in the Financial Report for that year. It 
appears that the issue was sold privately because the syndi­
cate, at the time of sale of Series A, offered to buy Series 
B at a better price. Actually, though, it is not clear that 
the rates were really better. The two issues of bonds were 
not the same because Series B was noncallable whereas Series 
A was callable. The higher price paid for Series B by the 
buyers could have been equal to, greater, or less than the
^Moody*s Bond Survey. XLI, No, 20 (May 16, 19i+9)> 
24-7 1 ; Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9» pp. 8 3, 87-88.
10Louisiana, Financial Report. 19i|-8 —24-9» pp. vi, vii,
58; and 19149-^0, pp. vi7
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prevailing cost of avoiding the possibility of having the 
bonds called.
Even if there is no reason to believe that the nature 
of the sale had any adverse effect upon the rates paid by 
the State, this does not mean that private sales can be 
condoned. Private sales eliminate competition that could 
trim interest costs. Furthermore, the closed nature of the 
sale can lead to collusion between a state*s fiscal authori­
ties and the investment dealers, although there is no indica­
tion that this was the case here. It is not clear why a 
state should ever have to engage in private selling. For 
small municipalities where the authorities cannot be 
expected to be experts in financing, the whole process of 
borrowing may be placed in the hands of bankers who are 
sometimes given the opportunity to buy the whole Issue with­
out public sale. But certainly a state should not have to 
depend upon outside help to this extent. Should a private 
sale be necessary for some reason, the details surrounding 
It ought to be fully publicized before and' after the 
transaction takes place.
The World War II veterans* bonus debt added a total 
of $60,000,000 to Louisiana*s debt structure in less than 
six months* time. This addition brought the total debt 
outstanding at the end of the 19^8 -1 9ll9 fiscal year to about 
$220,000,000. The two issues of bonus debt, in their first
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appearance in the financial reports, were equal to over 27
per cent of the total Louisiana debt outstanding. This
ratio compared with the 3 8 .9  per cent of total long-term
debt outstanding in all of the states in 195>0 that was for
11
bonus purposes. The 27 per cent in Louisiana was second
only to the lj.2 per cent of outstanding debt that was
12attributable to highways.
The fact that most of the World War II bonus debt was 
callable provided the opportunity in 1 9 ^ 2 for the next 
development in this area of veterans* bonus debt— a refund­
ing operation. The refunding issue was clearly authorized 
to be a direct issue of the State, but the full faith and 
credit again was not specifically mentioned in the authori­
zation. There was no question about the State*s full faith 
and credit this time, probably because the bonds refunded 
Series A which had been eventually accepted as a full faith 
and credit issue. The interest rate had ranged from 3.1 to 
Ij. per cent on Series A, and this relatively high rate 
provided one Inducement for a refunding. Another inducement 
was the amount of veterans* bonus debt scheduled to mature
■^Tax Foundation, Inc., Project Note No. Ij.3, op. oit.. 
pp. l^-l£.
12Louisiana, Financial Report. 19i|-8-lj-9* P* £8; and
19l*9-£0, p. £8.
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starting in 1953. The legislation came in Act 109 of 1952,
and the refunding issue appeared on January 1, 1953. This
new 1 0-year issue amounted to $!|.6 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0  and refunded all
but $1^,500,000 of Series A. The lowering of the interest
rate to a mean rate of approximately 2.5l per cent, in
contrast to the 3.2Ij. per cent paid on the original Series A,
was estimated by the State reporting agency to have saved
the State $2,500,000 of interest over the life of the bonds.
This reduction in interest may have been at least partly the
result of the exclusion of the call feature in the new issue.
The new issue was noncallable even though its authorization
would have permitted this type of issue. The refunding
issue was given the following maturity schedule: $3 0 ,1 0 0 ,0 0 0
in I9 6 0 ; $5 ,2^0 ,0 0 0  in 1 9 6 1 ; and $1 1 ,1 5 0 ,0 0 0 in 1962 and 
131963. The refunding bonds of 1953 had a better rating
than the issue which they replaced; the original obligations
llj-were rated Baa, but the refunding bonds were rated A.
■^Louisiana, Financial Report, 1951-52, p. iv; 1952- 
53* P. 57; and Louisiana, Acts (1952). Act 109, pp. 2 7 2-7!$..
^^oody* s Bond Survey. XLIV, No. 1+7 (November 17,
1952), 139; and Moody*s Bond Survey. XLIV, No, 1+5 (November
3, 1952), 162. The beer tax dedication for the payment of 
the new issue was no different from that provided for the 
initial bonds. Thus the improved rating could have been due 
to several factors: (l) the larger margin of protection
resulting from the retirement of some of the debt and/or the 
productivity of the beer tax (as noted in Moody* s Bond Survey. 
of November 3> 1952); (2) the difference in the call feature/
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The calling of such a large amount of veterans* bonus 
debt in 1953 was an unusual occurrence for Louisiana. Most 
of the highway debt of the late twenties and the thirties 
was not redeemable prior to the maturity date. The call 
feature had been exercised on the following issues: the
H and I highway issues of 1932, the Old Serial Gold Bonds of
15191i|- in 1938, and the Serial Bonds of 19UI in 19^6. In 
the other few cases where the call was included, the interest 
terms happened to be so favorable that there was no advan­
tage in refunding. The inclusion and the exercise of the 
call option on Series A of the veterans* bonus debt may not 
have been a significant improvement in debt management 
despite the interest savings. If the call feature was 
included in 1 9^9 in order to avoid prompt retirement of the
and (3 ) an improvement in the over-all credit standing. It 
is possible that all of these factors operated to cause the 
rating to improve. The fact that the beer tax had provided 
ample revenue prior to the refunding and that this may have 
contributed to higher ratings is a mixed blessing at best. 
The bonds issued originally as well as the refunding bonds 
had a first lien on the beer tax revenues and any issue sub­
sequently sold to be payable from the tax would be subject 
to prior claim. If second lien bonds were sold, they could 
be expected to reflect the fact that they were subject to 
prior charges In lower ratings and higher rates of interest. 
The State thus loses the full effectiveness for bonding 
purposes of any surplus revenues that may be received from 
this source.
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 , Sec. 22(f), 
as amended 1936, Act 6 6 ; Louisiana, Acts (1938)> Act 3 , 
pp. 28-31; (I9if.6), Act 31*8, pp. YL0?,-Z7~
296
debt, then the calling of the bonds In 1953 was a mockery of 
good debt management made possible partly by the chance of 
favorable ratings and partly by the sacrifice of the call 
feature in the refunding.
By 1953, veterans* bonus debt had become an estab­
lished and accepted fiscal phenomenon in the State of 
Louisiana. It was axiomatic that Korean veterans would also 
receive bonuses and that these payments would also require 
borrowing. The borrowing, which came in the form of two 
issues, differed only in title as a result of the fact that 
the Korean action was not officially considered a war. The 
title carried by the new $12,000,000 of bonds was "Korean 
Combat Bonus Bonds." These obligations were sold in two 
separate issues in 1955 and 1 9 5 7, under two different authori­
zations. The first issue of $10,000,000, which had been 
authorized by Act 7l|8 of 195̂ 1-, was inadequate and had to be
supplemented to the extent of $2,000,000 under Act 6ll| of 
16
1956.
The $10,000,000 issue of Korean Combat Bonus Bonds 
was rated A by Moody* s— the beer tax, which was dedicated 
to the service of the bonds, had been adequate, and 
the success of the tax seemed to overcome the fact that
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 11, 
as amended 195U, Act 7lj.8; Art. 18, Sec. 12, as amended 1956, 
Act 6II4.; Louisiana, Financial Report. P» £7j and
1956-57, P. 57.
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the issue was Junior to the existing veterans* bonus debt.
The $2,000,000 issue of 1957 was also subordinated to all 
existing veterans* bonus bonds and thus became a third lien 
on the beer tax receipts. This supplementary issue of 1957# 
which was also a general obligation issue, was given an A 
rating.17
The next activity in the veterans* bonus area came in 
1957 • The purpose of this flotation was to finance bonuses 
for the veterans of the Spanish American War, the Boxer 
Rebellion, the Philippine Insurrection, and World War I.
The Board of Liquidation of the State Debt was authorized to 
borrow up to $16,000,000 for this purpose. Bonds sold under 
the authorization— Act 620 of 1956— are secured by a fourth 
lien on the beer tax as well as by the full faith and credit 
of the State. The whole $16,000,000 of bonds was originally 
scheduled for sale on June 6, 1957# fent market conditions 
were so unfavorable that the offering was withdrawn. As a 
result, the $16,000,000 offering was abandoned, and the 
State placed $10,000,000 of bonds with the State retirement 
system shortly after the bonds were removed from the open
^Louisiana, Financial Report. 1956-57# P« 57# Moody*s 
Bond Survey. XLVII, No* 8 (February 21, 1955)# 613; Moody* s 
Bond Purvey. XLVII, No. 10 (March 7# 1955)# 591# Moody*s 
Bond Survey. XLIX, No. 22 (May 27, 1957)# 525# and Moody*s 
Bond Survey. XLIX, No. 2l± (June 10, 1957)# 501*
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market. A second issue, Series B, was successfully sold in
1958, but it amounted to only $1,000,000. Series B, which
was described by Moody* s as ’’Various Combat and War Veterans*
Bonus Bonds," was rated A. The fact that only $11,000,000
of the authorization has been utilized means that $5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
X 0more can be borrowed for this purpose at any time.
The placement of the various war and combat bonus 
bonds in 1957 showed some skill in debt management. The 
withdrawal of securities from sale when conditions are not 
as favorable as expected is a good practice. The actions of 
the fiscal authorities in the case of the $1 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 issue 
indicates that discretion was used in the timing of the sale.
Even if the management of the sale was satisfactory, 
there remains the question— was the borrowing that took 
place proper? This borrowing took place in 1957 and 1958 to 
pay bonuses for wars that were fought in the period from 
1898 to 1920. Certainly the post-war enthusiasm for 
rewarding veterans had subsided by 1957* What seems to have 
happened is that the State and its politicians had gotten 
themselves into a position where they could hardly refuse to
x0Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 13, 
as amended 1956, Act 620: Moody^a Bond Survey. XLIX, No. 22, 
(May 27, 1957), 525; Moody*s feond Survey. XLIX, No. 28 
(July 8 , 1957), iUf-9; Moody* s Bond Survey. XLIX, No. 30 
(July 22, 1957), and Moody*s, 1959, P* 665.
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extend the bonus to all veterans. It is not hard to visu-
19alize what will happen if there should be other conflicts.
Highway Borrowing, 19li7-1959
After the conclusion of World War II, highway borrow­
ing in Louisiana resumed on four fronts. Bonds were again 
issued that were payable from the proceeds of the l|.-cent 
gasoline tax and the motor vehicle tax-supported Highway 
Fund Number 2. A third and new tax dedication for general 
highway purposes was part of the nine-twentieths of the 1- 
cent gasoline tax. Finally, a new Long-Range Highway Pro­
gram, inaugurated near the end of the period, permitted the 
issue of bonds payable from the £-cent gasoline tax and 
certain mineral revenues. The total highway debt outstanding 
in 19̂ 4-7 was $103,676,000. The four types of highway bonds
to be issued in the subsequent period were to amount to
20
another $6 8,0 0 0,0 0 0.
19Even more serious is the possibility that the prece­
dent set by Confederate veterans* pensions will bring stag­
gering pension expenditures and borrowing when the veterans 
of World War II and the Korean War reach retirement age.
The Old Age and Survivors* Insurance program may offset 
these demands to some extent.
20Louisiana, Financial Report. 19f?6-£7» PP. £6 -£8 ; 
Moody*s, 195>9» pp. 663-65>; and Louisiana Legislative Research 
Study No. 9, pp. 82, 86-87.
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Was this highway borrowing safe, and if it was safe,
was it proper? It was debatable in 19^8 or at the beginning
of 19i+9 whether or not the State had reached a position from
which it could wisely engage in large-scale borrowing.
References noted earlier first show a definite pessimism
about the safety of borrowing in January, 19i}-9* “but nine
months later, the same source noted that the State*s economy
showed such growth that the general credit, though only
21
fair, was improving. The State*s economy continued grow­
ing at a rapid pace after 19^-9 so that restrained use of. 
credit by 1 9 5 3 &n<3 1 9 5 -̂ (when most of the significant post­
war highway borrowing took place) probably was not a serious 
impairment to the safety of the debt structure.
If restrained use of credit was not unwise in 1953 
and 1 9 5^» then it appears that borrowing for the construc­
tion and improvement of highways was probably desirable.
The extension and repair of the highway network was postponed 
during the war, and the needs grew accordingly. It was 
noted In discussing principles of debt financing that It Is 
usually proper to borrow when the sums needed are too great 
to be raised by taxes and when the purpose of the borrowing
21Moody* s Bond Survey. XLI, No. 3 (January 17, 19^9)# 
6?3-7^J Moody* s Bond Survey. XLI, No. 5 (January 31, 19l}.9)» 
6515 and Moody* s Bond Survey, XLI, No. ij_7 (November 21,
19U-9), 138:
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is for nonrecurrent capital construction. Therefore, it 
appears that highway borrowing in this post-war period not 
only was reasonably safe but also proper.
The l|.-cent gasoline tax secured the January, 1914-7, 
sale of Series HH. (See Table XXVIII, Appendix A.) This 
serial issue of $3,000,000, authorized by Act 377 of 19l|-0, 
is scheduled to mature in 1965. A new act, number 393 of 
I9I4.6 , authorized the next post-war highway debt— up to 
$25,000,000 payable from the J^-cent gasoline tax. The 
pledge of the gasoline tax revenue for this new authoriza­
tion was subordinate to almost $7 0,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 of highway bonds
22already issued. The junior lien status of Series 1A and 
IB, offered under the 19lj.6 authorization, was supplemented
/̂tfhen the first bonds of the new authorization were 
offered, Moody*s cautioned that having debt service as a 
first charge on the receipts of the ij_-cent gasoline tax was 
not especially significant because part of the taxes are 
used for highway maintenance and are not available for 
debt service. This criticism does not seem to have been 
legitimate. A first charge means that the debt service 
will be handled before maintenance. The State pledged 
this specifically; it was not necessary to pledge that all 
revenues would be used for servicing the debt. Louisiana, 
Constitution (1921), Art. ij., Sec, 22(i), as amended 19l|-0, 
Act 3771 Art. 6 , Sec. 22(j), as amended I9I4-6 , Act 393? 
Louisiana, Financial Report. X9̂ +7 —If-8 , p. 59? Louisiana 
Legislative Research Study No. 9, pp. 82, 8 7-8 8 ; and 
Moody1 s Bond Survey, XLI, No. 7 (November 21, 1914-9), 138.
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by the fact that they were general obligations. Both
Series 1A and IB were rated Baa at the time of their issue,
and Series IB was provisionally rated lower medium grade or
Baa before the issue was sold. Both of these ratings were
21+subsequently raised to Aa.
The two general highway issues authorized by Act 393 
of 191+6 and payable from the l+-cent gasoline tax raised 
$25,000,000 for highway purposes. Series 1A was dated 
January 1, 191+7» and consisted of $15,000,000 of serial 
bonds that will be fully retired in eighteen years. The 
issue IB of November, 191+9» amounted to $10,000,000 and will
25
mature in 1961}..
2^This pledge was also discounted in Moody’s 
analysis— shortly before the issue of Series IB— on grounds 
that the wide use of credit based on dedications left few 
revenues unallocated. This charge was, unfortunately, 
altogether valid. Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 , 
Sec. 22(i), as amended 191+0, Act 377? Art. 6 , Sec. 22(j), as 
amended 191+6, Act 393? Louisiana, Financial Report. I9I+7-I+8 , 
Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9* pp. 82, 8 7 -8 8 ? 
and Moody’s Bond Survey. XLI, No. 1+7 (November 21, I9I+9 ), 
138.
^Louisiana, Financial Report. 191+9-50* P« 57
Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9» P. 82; Moody’s, 
1950, p. 1+69? 1959, pp. 672-73? Moody’s Bond Survey. XLI,
No. 1+7 (November 21, I9I+9 ), 1 3 8 ; and Moody’s Bond Survey. 
XLI, No. 1+9 (December 5* 191+9), lll+.
^Louisiana, Financial Report„ 191+7-1+8, pp. 67^68;
191+9-50, p. 57? and Louisiana Legislative Research Study No.
9, pp. 82, 86.
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The second type of highway debt added during the
post-war period is that which is payable from surpluses in
Highway Fund Number 2 over and above existing dedications
and thereby from certain motor vehicle tax revenues. Act 90
of 1952 disposed of surplus vehicular license tax revenues
collected from Orleans, Jefferson, St. John the Baptist,
St. Charles, Tangipohoa, and St. Tammany parishes. The
surplus funds in Highway Fund Number 2 were dedicated
according to the following priority: (l) $5 0 ,0 0 0  annually
to St. John the Baptist parish to be used for improving
roads and drainage facilities, (2) $200,000 annually until
1982, which could be funded, to finance an expressway in
New Orleans (3) $300,000 annually until 1982 to finance the
construction and improvement of U.S. Highway 5l, (Ij.) $750,000
annually until 1956 to the Mississippi River Bridge 
26Authority, and (5) $350,000, plus up to $5,000,000 of 
surpluses in Highway Fund Number 2, for the construction of 
approach roads to a causeway across Lake Pontchartrain 
(Greater New Orleans Expressway). Other surpluses remaining 
in the fund are dedicated to pay interest and principal on 
the Greater New Orleans Expressway debt until it is fully 
retired. These annual dedications were authorized to be
26Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. (22)g, 
par. ij., as amended 195̂ -, Act 71|5«
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funded as followss the $200,000 expressway dedication could 
he used to secure $lj.,000,000 of bonds, the $3 0 0 ,0 0 0 dedica­
tion for Highway £l could service $6,000,000 of debt, the 
$7£0,000 dedication to the Mississippi River Bridge Authority 
could be used to secure bond issues, and the $3 5 0 ,0 0 0 and 
$£,000,000 dedications for the causeway could support 
revenue bonds. These several purposes and dedications set 
forth in Act 90 of 19£2 served to complicate the debt struc­
ture. In this one authorization, a State fund which was 
supported by part of the motor vehicle license proceeds —  
Highway Fund Humber 2— was pledged to the payment of both
direct and indirect obligations and these pledges were given
27certain priorities.
The indirect obligations issued under the provisions 
of this act are described with the other indirect debts, but 
the direct issues sold under these terms In 19£3 and 195U- 
were as follows* Series A of $£00,000; Series A1 of 
$3*750*000; and Series B of $£,l£0,000. (Series A2 of 
$2£0,000 and Series C of $3£0,000 were not sold until 19£8
at which time they exhausted all of the direct authorize-
28tions.) (See Table XXVIII, Appendix A.) These new
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 22(g), 
as amended 19£2, Act 90,
2®It Is somewhat Ironic that the debt structure of 
Louisiana should have been so complex and confusing at the 
time these bonds received A ratings from Moody* s while the 
aforementioned highway issues received Baa ratings.
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Highway Fund Number 2 issues are classified with indirect 
State debts in the annual financial reports; however, they 
are really obligations of the State and can rightly be 
considered direct obligations. The circumstance which 
caused the State reporting agency to classify these bonds as 
Indirect probably is the fact that they are ’'special” obliga­
tions payable from a specifically allocated portion of reve­
nues in State Highway Fund Number 2, and they are not backed 
by the State*s full faith and credit pledge. But these con­
siderations ignore the fact that directness depends upon 
whether or not the State issues the debt in its name. If the
bonds bear the State’s name, the State’s credit is at stake
29just as surely as if it had been formally pledged.
The question of whether or not certain issues are 
direct obligations of a state is Important on at least two 
counts: First, it is apparent that contradictory listing or
classification of a particular issue breeds uncertainty 
concerning that Issue and the whole debt structure. More 
important, however, Is that direct debts— debts incurred in 
the name of a sovereign state--should, under normal
- - ■» r - -i ii—  -  -PQ7This peculiar reporting was noted by Moody*s.
Notice was taken that the issues were not classified as 
direct obligations by the State. But, Moody’s did include 
the Issue with the bonded debt of the State of Louisiana—  
with direct obligations. Louisiana, Constitution (1921),
Art. 6, Sec. 22(g), as amended 1952, Act 90; Art. 6, Sec. 
22(g), par; 4* as amended 1954* 745* Moody* s, 1959*
pp. 663-65; Louisiana, Financial Report. 1956-57, p. 58* and 
Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9, pp. 8l, 85-86.
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conditions, receive higher credit ratings than indirect 
debts. Direct obligations should have higher standings than 
bonds sold through authorities or agencies that control rela­
tively limited assets and do not enjoy the state*s ability 
to levy taxes. If an obligation is really a direct obliga­
tion, its status as such should be fully exploited. Exploi­
tation should take the form of clear and definite pledges, 
advertisements, statements, and reports that the bonds are 
direct obligations and, if so, general obligations.
More highway debt serviced from the gasoline tax-- 
this time the nine-twentieths of 1-cent tax (and, in case of 
emergency, any excess revenues from the [{.-cent tax)--made 
its appearance in 195>3 811,3 19!?̂ . A new amendment, Act 281]. of 
1952, authorized the borrowing of $3 0,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 for the follow­
ing purposes: (1) the construction of a bridge or tunnel
over or under the Inner-Harbor Navigation Canal in New 
Orleans; (2) the construction of approaches and an expressway 
to the Mississippi River Toll Bridge; and (3 ) the construction 
of roads in the State in connection with Federal aid. The 
bonds issued under the authorization were to be general 
obligation bonds. They were to be payable, however, from 
excess revenues of the nine-twentieths of 1-cent gasoline 
tax after certain other claims against the tax were satis­
fied. The charges against the tax were established as 
follows: (1) the service requirements on Port of New Orleans
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obligations over and above those that can be paid with funds
transferred from the Orleans Levee District and the New
Orleans Public Belt Railroad Commission, (2) the payment of
up to $5 0 0 ,0 0 0  from any excess after the first charge to a
fund for current operations by the Port Commission Board,
(3 ) the payment of any remainder after the prior charges to
the General Highway Fund. This third charge on the nine-
twentieths of 1-cent gasoline tax is the primary source of
30
funds for the service of the $3 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 issue.
The "First Series" of $7,500,000 was sold in two lots
as follows: $636,000 to mature from January 1, 1958 to
January 1, 1963, and $6,861*, 000 to mature between 1961* and
1988. The $6,861*, 000 portion of the Series is callable on
thirty days* notice. The original rating of the First
Series Bonds was Baa (later changed to A) for both lots—
the funds from which they are paid are subject to prior
charges which impair both the elements of protection and of 
31stability.
 ̂Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6-A, Sec. 5*1»
5.2, as amended 1952, Act 2 8I4.; Louisiana, Financial Report. 
1953-£^> P. Louisiana Legislative Research Study No, 9, 
pp. 8 2 -8 3, 86-87; Moodv*s Bond Survey. XLV, No. 9 (March 2, 
195>3)» 601; and Moody*s Bond Survey. XLV, No. 7 (February 16,
1953), 623-21*.
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6-A, Secs. 5.1>
5.2, as amended 1952, Act 281*; Louisiana, Financial Report. 
19£3-5>1*» P* 51*; Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9, 
pp. 82-831 8 6-8 7 ; and Moody* s Bond Survey, XLV, No. 9 
(March 2, 1953)* 601.
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The "Second" and "Third Series" of highway bonds
payable from the nine-twentieths of 1-cent gasoline tax also
amounted to $7,£0 0 ,0 0 0  each, and they were similar to the
First Series in purpose as well as in the call and security
provisions. The bonds were callable in all three series
except for small blocks with relatively short maturities.
The Second and Third Series issues were both rated Baa before
and after they were sold. These ratings, however, have also
been revised; the First and Second Series are currently
32
rated A in the latest Moody's manual.
The next development in the highway debt came in 1955.
This development was the most important improvement in
Louisiana debt management of the decade and perhaps even of
the ceiitury. The costly complexity repeatedly noted in this
Chapter had been recognized by the Louisiana Legislative
33Council and the Public Affairs Research Council, There had
Louisiana, Financial Report, 1953-5^ P.
Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9, pp. 82-83, 8 6- 
8 7 ; Moody's Bond Survey, XLV, No. 26 (June 29, 1953), 396; 
Moody's Bond Survey. XLV, No. 28 (July 13* 1953), 373? Moody's 
Bond Survey. XLVI, No. 15 (April 12, 19$k)* 533? Moody's 
Bond Survey. XLVI, No. 17 (April 26, , 510; and Moody's,
1959, pp. 672-73.
^Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc.. 
"The Debt of the Louisiana State Government, 1950 and 1951*
No. 6 , March 31, 1952, pp. 1-11; and Louisiana Legislative 
Research Study No. 9, pp. l-ll|.0.
also been a study of highway finance in the State. All of 
these studies contributed to the formulation and eventual 
adoption of a Long-Range Highway Program in which the ele­
ments of capital planning were evident— both physical needs 
and fiscal needs were considered. The plan, which was imple­
mented in the form of five acts and two constituticnal 
amendments, was as follows! (1) It established a state­
wide system of highways and provided fixed engineering 
standards; (2) It established a Parish Road System and pro­
vided aid to the System contingent upon the adoption of 
better administration; (3 ) It established regulations for 
acquiring property and settling damages and established 
rules for limited access roads; (Ij.) It established an open- 
end method of debt creation that would make all new issues 
rank on a parity basis as full faith and credit, general, 
obligations of the State payable as a first charge from the 
Long-Range Highway Fund; (5) lb dedicated revenues from 
mineral leases and bonuses directly to the Long-Range Highway 
Fund and to debt service as a first charge; (6 ) It dedicated 
all highway revenues to the Long-Range Highway Fund and to
^William D. Ross, Financing Highway Improvements in 
Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Division of Research, College of
Commerce, Louisiana State University, 1955)*
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debt service as a first claim, after all existing prior
35claims have expired.
The part of the plan dealing directly with debt bears 
closer examination. The Long-Range Highway Fund was to be 
sustained not only by the newly dedicated mineral revenues 
(amounting to $1^,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 annually) but also by surplus 
revenues from prior dedications of motor fuel, lube oil, and 
motor vehicle license taxes. Surpluses in the Long-Range 
Highway Fund, after the payment of all debt service require­
ments, are available for highway operations and new construc­
tion. Another important change was the consolidation of the 
two gasoline taxes— the lj.-cent tax and the 1-cent tax— into 
one 5 -cent per gallon tax which is pledged for debt service 
as long as any bonds are outstanding. Bonds authorized 
under the amendment can be issued up to $6 0,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 over a 
5 -year period with no more than half of this sum being sold 
in any one year. These bonds are not to be issued unless
35Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. lu Sec. 2(c), 
as amended 1956, Act lij.2 of 1955? Art. 6 , Sec. 23.1, as 
amended 1956, Act llj.1 of 1955; Louisiana, Acts (1955)> Act 
lj.0, PP. U9—li|-3; Act 9 2, pp. 197-98; Act 12HTpp. 293-9^;
Act 129# pp. 2I1I4.—14.7 * Act 130, pp. 2^7-148; Louisiana Legis­
lative Research Study No. 9, pp. 8 8-8 9 ; and Moody*s Bond 
Survey. XLVIII, No. 23 (June 2ij., 1956), 522-23.
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certain revenue requirements are satisfied. The Long-Range
Highway Program does not prevent subsequent authorizations
36of parity issues.
One possible flaw in the Long-Range Highway Program 
is that the maturity limit of twenty-five years appears to 
be excessively generous. Highways in Louisiana typically 
have not lasted well. It is not clear that highways in 
Louisiana can be expected to last twenty-five years. Issues 
of the maximum duration may do Injury to the traditional 
principle that bond issues should never have longer terms 
than the life of the improvement. Shorter terms generally 
are desirable because of the interest savings they usually 
bring.
Another provision of the Long-Range Highway Program 
which is questionable is the 1| per cent maximum interest 
rate. If the predictions of a tremendous Increase in the 
value of state borrowing noted In Chapter II should come to 
pass, and if inflationary tendencies continue, it is possible 
that states will have to pay more than ij. per cent for the 
funds which they borrow. The limitation on the Interest
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. Ij., Sec. 2(c), 
as amended 1956, Act 11|.2 of 1955>» Art. 6 , Sec. 23.1, as 
amended 1956, Act II4.I of 1955? Louisiana, Acts (1955), Act 
lj.0 , pp. lj.9-Uj.3J Act 92, pp. 197-98; Act 1287pp. 293-91J-;
Act 129, pp. 2ljlj-i|.7; Act 130, pp. 2I4.7-I4.8 j Louisiana Legis­
lative Research Study No. 9, pp. 8 8-8 9 ; and Moody1s Bond 
Survey. XLVIII, No. 23 (June 21+, 1956), 522-23.
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rate that can be paid, therefore, does not seem to contrib­
ute much to the program, but fortunately it will probably 
not do much harm either since it undoubtedly will be changed 
if it becomes necessary. These two criticisms are minor in 
nature and even relatively unimportant when they are compared 
with the advantages of the Long-Range Highway Program.
The development of a long-range plan for highway 
improvements and the financing of these improvements was an 
extremely important step forward for the State of Louisiana. 
Elsewhere in this study, it has been noted that transporta­
tion has always been among the most important reasons for 
state borrowing and that highways have been the most impor­
tant purpose of borrowing in this century. This tendency 
has been apparent in Louisiana where highway costs histori­
cally have been high. When highway debt financing was 
placed on a sound basis in 1955» a major part of the State*s 
debt problem was eliminated. Furthermore, the tremendous 
improvements in highway financing may prove to be the 
example for a revision of the whole State debt structure 
along the same general lines.
The principles of good debt management that were 
applied in this new Long-Range Highway Program may be 
summarized as follows: (1) There was a movement away from
the dedication of specific taxes to the payment of individual 
bond issues which has characterized the Louisiana debt
313
structure until this time* (2) The full faith and credit 
concept was made more meaningful by directing revenues to a 
general type of fund (the Long-Range Highway Fund) instead 
of to smaller individual funds. (3 ) The use of a general 
fund to meet open-end debt service requirements eliminated 
the subordinate lien which is so injurious to bond ratings. 
(I4.) The use of a single fund for meeting all highway debt 
service requirements and the consolidation of certain taxes 
helped to simplify the tax system and the debt structure and 
eliminate the complexity which is so disturbing to invest­
ment bankers. Louisiana*s debt structure and its financial 
structure entered a new era with this improvement in highway 
debt financing.
The fact that the State of Louisiana was on a new
footing in respect to its debt was quickly recognized by
Moody*s. References to Louisiana highway borrowing since
the enactment of the new laws have taken full notice of the
37
improvements that are promised. This immediate recogni­
tion is somewhat remarkable when it is realized that the plan 
would directly affect only bonds sold after the adoption of 
this new legislation. Such sales were not to occur until 
four years later in 1959.
^ Moody*s Bond Survey. XLVIII, No. 23 (June ij., 1956), 
522-23; and Moody*s Bond Survey. L, No. ll̂  (March 31, 1958), 
625.
Not only was the highway bond plan noted immediately 
in the publications of the bond rating services, but it led 
to a reappraisal of all Louisiana bonds then outstanding.
The reappraisal, in turn, resulted in an upgrading of all 
highway bonds, and some other issues, by Moody's in December, 
1955. This chain reaction was an impressive example of the 
importance and effectiveness of full reporting of all rele­
vant information concerning the debt structure, including 
data on public finances and economic conditions within a 
state* In this case, a delegation, representing the Joint 
Highway Committee of the Louisiana Legislature and the 
Louisiana Legislative Council, in the persons of State 
Senator James D. Spark and State Representative Claude 
Kirkpatrick; the Louisiana Department of Highways, in the 
persons of Mr. George S. Convert, the Director of Highways, 
and Mr. W. C. Pegues, Jr., the Chief Counsel of the Highway 
Department; and with Dr. William D. Ross serving as consult­
ant to both the Joint Committee and the Highway Department, 
visited the major investment services, Moody's, Standard and 
Poor's, and Pitch's, in New York in March, 1955* The 
complete Information concerning the debt structure of 
Louisiana, and particularly the highway debt, that had been 
developed by Dr. Ross in connection with his study, Financing 
Highway Improvements in Louisiana, was presented in person
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at this time. The plans for legislation to enact the new 
Long-Range Highway Program were explained, and recommenda­
tions and reactions concerning the new bond financing plan 
were sought. Arrangements were also made to keep the serv­
ices fully informed of developments as these plans were 
effected, and for supplying any other information requested 
by the services in this connection on their own initiative.
The ultimate results of this action, in December, 1955* aa 
mentioned above, were improvements in ratings on almost all 
Louisiana bonds outstanding, highway and nonhighway issues; 
the higher ratings could be expected to save the State
millions of dollars in interest charges on future bond 
38financing.
It is very important that the State*s outstanding 
bonds be given higher ratings when they deserve them. Any 
improvement in the price of outstanding bonds will make 
future offerings more attractive to buyers and will Improve 
the terms on which they can be sold. The most important 
time to get better ratings, however, is when the provisional 
ratings are given— before new issues are sold. That is when 
the ratings have the greatest effect upon what the market 
thinks of the new issue and upon the price that will be paid.
-^Personal interview with Dean William D. Ross, College 
of Business Administration, Louisiana State University,
June 30, 1959.
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It is extremely important, therefore, that the State authori­
ties watch very closely these provisional ratings and also 
the comments that accompany them. If there is some misin­
terpretation or lack of full appreciation of the protection 
provided on an issue or of some other provision, full and 
correct information should be pressed upon those responsible 
for the ratings. Sustained debt reporting consists of just
such activities. Good management may even require that an
39offering be delayed until clarification is made.
The rating services do their best to obtain complete 
information and to keep abreast of new developments in the 
thousands of state and local governmental subdivisions whose 
credits they rate, but the magnitude of the task makes it 
almost an Impossible one. Without well-organized, authori­
tative, and continuous effort by a given governmental unit 
to develop and supply information to the services about its 
outstanding issues as well as new offerings, it cannot 
expect its ratings to be accurate. Unfortunately, the 
successful initial effort in this regard in Louisiana, 
described above, has not been continued. This element of 
debt management was discussed in Chapter II as a matter of 
debt reporting. Its importance in the practical process ofUo
3tate financing should not be underestimated.
39Ibid koIbid.
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The highway offerings of 1958 did not inaugurate the 
new Long-Range Highway Program; rather, they consisted of 
three distinct issues that differed radically in their 
security provisions. These three issues that exhausted 
authorizations predating the Long-Range Highway Program were 
as follows: $350,000 of Series C bonds; $250,000 of Series
A2; and $7*500,000 of "Fourth Series” bonds. Series C, 
authorized by Act 90 of 1952, is secured by a special allo­
cation from Highway Fund Number 2 of $300,000 annually. The 
A2 bonds, authorized by the same act, were also issued on 
the basis of funds allocated from Highway Fund Number 2.
This time the annual allocation from Highway Fund Number 2 
of $200,000 was shared on a parity basis with Series A1 of 
1 9 5 -̂ with both issues being used for the construction of a 
New Orleans Expressway. Neither Series A2 nor Series 0 was
a full faith issue, but rather they were special 
lj.1obligations.
The major part of the 1958 offering was the $7,500,000 
Fourth Series which had the same protection as the first 
three series authorized by Act 28i|. of 1952--a Junior lien on
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 , Sec. 22(g), 
as amended 1952. Act 90: Moody*s' Bond Survey, L, No. llj.
(March 31, 1958), 625; and Moody1s Bond Purvey. L, No. 12 
(March 17, 1958), 65l.
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part of the nine-twentieths of 1-cent gasoline tax, a fifth
lien on the gasoline tax of Ij. cents, and finally the guarantee
of the State*s full faith and credit. This issue was the
fourth and final $7,5 °0 » ° 00 offering under a $3 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  
l\2authorization. These three issues had the same character­
istics and the same faults as their companion issues.
The first issue under the Long-Range Highway Program 
was sold on February Ij., 1959; it consisted of $20,000,000 of 
Long-Range Highway Bonds. The review made by Moody1s before 
the date of sale duly noted the changed nature of these
k-3bonds, and they were given an A rating. The issue initi­
ated a desirable practice which it is hoped will be continued. 
The maturity of the issue was limited to twenty years
although the authorization would have permitted a twenty-
kbfive year term. This type of debt management is reassur­
ing and indicates that the objection given previously in 
connection with this maximum permissible life of highway 
bonds may not be very serious.
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6-A, Sec. 5, 
as amended 1952, Act 28kt Moody^s Bond Survey. L, No. lip 
(March 31, 1958), 625; and Moody* s Bond Survey, L, No. 12
(March 17, 1958), 65l.
^ Moody*s Bond Survey. LI, No. 5 (February 2, 1959),
7̂ 4-3; and Moody*s Bond Survey, LI, No. 6 (February 9, 1959),
725. ~ “
^ Moodv*s Bond Survey, LI, No. 5 (February 2, 1959),
7U-3; and Moody*s Bond Survey, LI, No. 6 (February 9, 1959),
725.
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The most recent highway borrowing was the sale of 
$10,000,000 more of Long-Range Highway Bonds. The April 30, 
1 9 5 9* offering ranks on a parity with the first series of 
$20,000,000 and also bears an A rating.
Institutional Improvement Borrowing. 19li7-1959
Another component of the direct debt incurred from 
19V7 to the present was for the purpose of institutional 
improvement. Institutional Improvement Bonds are payable 
from the proceeds of the 0.75 mill ad valorem tax. This tax 
had been the security for the Confederate veterans* Issues. 
Now, finally, the passing of Confederate veterans* pension 
needs removed a burden from the ad valorem tax revenues.
The availability of these tax funds provided a wonderful 
opportunity in 19^7 for making basic improvements in the 
debt structure. The logical thing to do with the 0.75 mill 
ad valorem tax at the end of World War II would have been to 
make it the keystone of a new debt structure. The surpluses 
of tax revenues over and above those needed for debt service 
could have been channeled into the general fund. All reve­
nues flowing into the fund each year could then have been 
pledged as a first charge to support debt service payments
h<Moody* s Bond Survey. LI, No. 16 (April 20, 1959) 
588; and Moody*s Bond Survey. LI, No. 18 (May Ij., 1959), 562.
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on all full faith and credit obligations of the State. The 
full faith and credit pledge would then have become more 
meaningful and ratings and interest rates, undoubtedly, would 
have a relative decline. Unfortunately, this reform was not 
accomplished; the surplus 0 .7 5  mill ad valorem tax revenues 
were not left free for very long. The tax became the source 
of funds from which State Institutional Improvement Bonds 
would be paid.
Act I4.II4. of 19^6 authorized the issue of Institutional 
Improvement Bonds and dedicated the 0.7£ mill property tax 
to their payment. The $16,000,000 of Series D through I 
bonds sold under this authorization were secured by the full 
faith and credit of Louisiana as well as by the greater 
portion of the 0.75 mill tax. There was only a small prior 
claim upon these tax receipts at the time of the authoriza­
tion. The excess of these receipts over the amounts required 
for debt service was intended to be used for general State 
purposes after i9 6 0. This dedication gave the Institutional 
Improvement Bonds of Series D through I a closed-end charac­
teristic since no bonds could be issued on par with the 
I4.6$16,000,000.
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 8 , as 
amended I9I4.6 , Act 14.1)4.; Louisiana, Financial Report. 1952-53* 
p. 57* Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9* PP. 81, 
814.-85; Moody*s, 1959* pp. 663-65; Moody*s Bond Survey. XLI, 
No. 21 (May 23, 1914-91, 14-5 8 ; and Moody*s iBond Purvey. XLII.
No. 16 (April 17, 19^0), 5H 4-.
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The closed-end feature may be attractive to bond­
holders, but it has an unfavorable impact upon the fiscal 
structure of a state. If, for example, the tax dedicated to 
servicing an issue should become highly productive— more so 
than anticipated--then the closed-end characteristic would 
mean that a great surplus of revenues would be available for 
securing one particular issue while the service needs might 
not even be covered for other issues. The closed-end 
feature on the $16,000,000 authorization was not attractive 
enough to overcome the "fair medium grade" label and an 
initial Baa rating for most of the bonds. Series D was not 
rated because it was sold to the State Teachers* Retirement 
System. Series G, bought by the National American Bank of 
New Orleans and not reoffered, was not rated because it was 
not of general interest to investors. Series E later was
klraised from the initial Baa rating to A, The dates and 
the amounts of these issues were as follows: Series D,
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec. 8 , as 
amended 19^6, Act I4.II4.; Louisiana, Financial Report. 1952-53* 
p. 57* Louisiana Legislative Research Study No, 9, pp. 8l, 
8I4-8 5 * Moody's, 1959. pp. 663-65* Moody's Bond Survey. XLI, 
No. 21 (May 23* 19^9)* 458; and-Moody*s Bond Survey, XLII,
No. 16 (April 17# 1950)* 5llj-. The relatively unsatisfactory 
ratings that were given to the Institutional Improvement 
Bonds were ascribed to the fact that the obligations were 
marginally protected when the whole authorization was 
considered. In the case of the $3,251,000 Series F issue of 
19lj-9> the original Baa rating was given with full knowledge 
that the State's credit was improving because of the broaden­
ing of the State's economy. The State's general credit,
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$3*000,000 in 191+7; Series E and F, $5,000,000 together in 
191+9; and, Series G, $1+,000,000 in 1950. Issues of 
$2,000,000 each, Series H and I of 1951 and 1952, concluded 
the borrowing for this purpose and brought the total insti­
tutional improvement debt issued to the authorized 
$16,000,000. (See Table XXIX, Appendix A.)
The Institutional Improvement Bond Issues described 
above were not destined to remain outstanding until their 
scheduled maturity dates. Early retirement by exercise of 
the call option began In the 1951+—55 fiscal year. The 
remaining principal of $6,3lj-6,000 of Series F and Series G 
was paid at that time. In 1955-56, the $1,525*000 balance
of Series H was paid, and two years later, $1,569*000 of
lj-9Series I bonds was retired.
II. INDIRECT BORROWING, 191+7-1959
Louisiana* s debt history from 191+7 to 1959 has been 
marked by a growing importance of indirect borrowing. The
however, was still considered only fair because of the pre­
vailing high tax and debt burdens in relation to other 
states. Moody*s Bond Survey. XLI, No. 36 (September 5* 
191+9), 2 7 0.
^Louisiana, Financial Report. 1952-53* p. 57*
^Louisiana, Financial Report. 1951+-55, p. 57;
1955-56, p. 53* 1957-58* P* 56; and Louisiana Legislative 
Research Study No. 9, pp. 81, 103-1+.
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reasons for this change are not entirely clear. The first 
impulse would be to blame the constitutional debt limitation 
since this is the major reason for indirect borrowing in 
other states. In Louisiana, however, the importance of this 
factor must be minimized because there is little difficulty 
in amending the Constitution to authorize borrowing. Most 
of the agency issues in Louisiana during the recent period 
have been authorized in this manner. One of the main 
reasons for the widespread adoption of the indirect tech­
nique may well have been political. Davis, in his recent 
publication, Louisiana. The Pelican State, makes reference 
to the establishment of citizens* boards to regulate high­
ways, welfare, and institutions as part of Governor Kennon*s
50
reform of 1953. This observation leads one to suspect 
that the use of indirect borrowing may have been a manifesta­
tion of reform designed to inject rigidities into the State
51fiscal structure in order to reduce political Influence.
50Edwin Adams Davis, Louisiana. The Pelican State 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959),
pp. 290-91.
51
The trend towards agencies In Louisiana has been 
checked and perhaps even reversed If what has happened to 
the Building Authority is any indication. The Building 
Authority was stripped of most of its authority by Act 132  
of 1956. The purpose of this act was nto curtail, limit 
and restrict the powers, duties and functions of the 
Louisiana State Building Authority solely to the issuance of 
any remaining bonds authorized . Louisiana, Acta (19^6), 
Act 132, pp. 325-27.
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Another political factor which may have been impor­
tant in the movement toward agency borrowing in Louisiana 
was the fact that a great many of the improvements financed 
by this means were geographically limited. As a result, 
their political backing may also have been so limited that 
it might have been impossible to induce the people in the 
entire State to support direct borrowing for these purposes. 
People in the other parts of the State might not have been 
favorably inclined to direct borrowing for the purpose of 
financing the Greater New Orleans Expressway and the down­
town New Orleans Mississippi River Bridge. Finally,
Louisiana probably was influenced by the activities of other 
states and by the common assumption that agencies and authori­
ties expedite the acquisition of physical improvements. The 
State of Louisiana now has nine agencies which either have 
acted or can act in the creation of debt. Five of these 
instrumentalities are of long standing in the State finan­
cial structure. The Port of New Orleans Board of Commis­
sioners has been active since its charter in 1 8 9 6. The 
Manager of the State Penitentiary engaged in borrowing as an 
agent of the State in the 1920*s. The Charity Hospital*s 
Board of Administrators, the Board of Supervisors of the 
Louisiana State University, arid the Louisiana State Board of 
Education have all been agents of the State since the 1930*s.
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Of these older agencies, only the Port of New Orleans and
Louisiana State University have borrowed during the current
22period.
Except for the Port of New Orleans Board, the various 
authorities existing in Louisiana before World War II had 
not played a very important role in the State’s debt struc­
ture. The debt activities of these five authorities alone 
would not have been highly significant in the post-war 
period either. However, this relative insignificance of 
authority borrowing was not to continue. The change came in 
1922. Act 7 of that year was a general law that enabled two 
or more parishes to join in establishing authorities for the 
purpose of constructing toll bridges and ferries that would 
improve the State highway system. This legislation was the 
first step in the organization of the Greater New Orleans
Expressway Commission and the Mississippi River Bridge 
23Authority. Other legislation, also passed in 1922, 
chartered the Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission and the 
Louisiana State Building Authority.
^Moody’s, 1929, pp. 672-71}.; and Louisiana, Financial 
 Report. 1927-28, pp. 26-28.
to
-̂ Louisiana, Acts (1922), Act 7, pp. 9-21}..
21tLouisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 29, as 
amended 1922, Act 9; Louisiana, Acts (1922), Act 3 1 7,
PP. 833-38; and Moody’s, 1929, pp. 672-76.
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The creation of new agencies, the dedication of tax 
revenues to these agencies, and the granting to them of the 
authority to borrow large sums of money would appear to have 
been an undesirable development. The specific objections to 
the agency device noted previously seem to be valid criti­
cisms. The wide and increasing use of authorities in 
Louisiana certainly has added complexity to the debt struc­
ture when every effort should have been made to simplify the 
structure according to principles of good debt management.
Port of New Orleans Borrowing. 19)17-1959
Of the "charter member" agencies in Louisiana*s debt 
structure, the Port of New Orleans debt is somewhat unique. 
The New Orleans Port debt is both an agency debt and a full 
faith and credit debt of the State. It is supported by the 
operating revenues of the Port but also by part of nine- 
twentieths of the 1-eent gasoline tax and the State*s full 
faith and credit.
When the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New 
Orleans borrowed $10,000,000 in October, 1955* it was their 
first venture into the bond market since 1939. This 1955 
issue was part of a planned expansion program which will 
entail borrowing $20,lj.50,000. This new issue is protected by 
Port revenues, the first $500*000 annually from the nine- 
twentieths of the 1-cent gasoline tax, and the State*s full
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faith and credit. The rating given the $10,000,000 offering 
was A. The bonds are of the serial variety, and they will
55not be completely retired until 1990. (See Table XXX, 
Appendix A.)
Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission 
Borrowing. 1952-1999
The Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission bonds are 
supported, like the New Orleans Port debt, primarily by the 
revenues resulting from the operation of the Port. But in 
this case, there is no specific dedication of any State tax 
or of State funds for the purpose of servicing the debt.
The connection that the State has with this debt is as a 
guarantor— the full faith and credit of the State is consti­
tutionally pledged in case the revenues of the Port, the 
sale of Port property, and the full faith and credit of 
three parishes (East Baton Rouge, West Baton Rouge, and
56Iberville) should be insufficient to pay the bonds,
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6-A, Sec. 5.1* 
as amended 1952, Act 28I|Y Louisiana, Financial Report.
1956-57# P. 57? Moody1 s, 1959# PP. 673-7*i.: Moody1 s Bond 
Survey. XLVII, No. IjJj. (October 31, 1955)# 177-79; and Moody* s 
Bond Survey. XLVII, No. L{.5 (November 7# 1955)# 168.
-^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 29# as
amended 1952, Act 9# Moody1s, 1959# PP. 673-7*4-# Moody*s Bond
Survey. XLVI, No. !|1 (October 11, 195*4-)# 220; Moody*s - Bond
Survey, XLVI, No. I4.3 (October 25# 195*4-)# 201; and Moody* s
Bond Survey. XLIX, No. 29 (July 15, 1957)# *4-32-3*4-.
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The bonds issued by this Commission, however, are not even
57
listed in the Financial Report of the State. This report­
ing practice can hardly be reassuring to investors who might 
be considering obligations issued by this agency in the 
future.
Series A of the Greater Baton Rouge Port bonds, which
was issued under the terms required by Act 9 of 1952, raised
$12,500,000 for the Port. The same authorization can be
used to issue another $2,£00,000 for the Baton Rouge Port if
debt service requirements are covered one and one-fourth
times. However, the $12,£00,000 Baa rated Series A issue —
now rated A— is the only one that has been sold under the
58
1952 authorization. (See Table XXX, Appendix A.)
The next development in Greater Baton Rouge Port 
Commission borrowing began with Act 597 o f  1956, a constitu­
tional amendment, that increased the borrowing authorization 
from the original $l£,000,000 to $£0,000,000 of debt out­
standing at one time. Another change introduced by the 
amendment was the addition of Ascension parish to the
^Louisiana, Financial Report. 1956-57, PP* 56-59.
58Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 29, as
amended 1952, Act 9; Moody's, 1959, pp. 673-74? Moody's Bond
Survey, XLVI, No. I4.I (October 11, 1954), 220; Moody's Bond
Survey. XLVI, No. 43 (October 2£, 1954), 201; and Moody's
Bond Survey. XLIX, No. 29 (July 15, 1957), 432-34.
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parishes represented on the Commission Board; provision was
also made for the pledge of that parish’s full faith and
credit to support Commission bonds on a parity with the
original three, parishes. The first issue under the revised
authorization was rated Baa. This Series B issue consists
of $1 9,lj.0 0 ,0 0 0  of callable bonds which are junior to the
$ 12 , 500,000  Series A, Series B bonds mature from I960 to
1977. The maturity provisions for Series B require annual
payments ranging from $1 6 0 ,0 0 0 in I9 6 0 to $1,6 5 9 ,0 0 0 in the 
59final year*
Series C of the Baton Rouge Port debt followed 
quickly under the same authorization as Series B— it was 
dated May 1, 1958. This issue is junior to both Series A 
and B, but it is secured by the same full faith and credit 
pledges of the interested parishes and the State and also by 
the proceeds from the operation of the Port. These bonds 
were rated Baa— medium grade— provisionally. The $3,500,000 
of Series C is scheduled to mature from I9 6 0 to 1975, with 
the maturity payments ranging from $l5 5 , ° 0 0  in the first 
year to $267,000 in the last year. The Port of Baton Rouge
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 , Sec, 2 9 , as 
amended 1952, Act 9 ; Art. 6 , Secs. 29.1, 29.2, 2 9 .3 , 29.4, 
as amended 1956, Act 597; Moody’s, 1959, pp. 673-74; Moody*s 
Bond Survey. XLIX, No. 29 (July-15, 1957), 4 3 2 -314.; Moody’s 
Bond Survey. XLIX, No. I4.9 (December 2, 1957), 176-77; and 
Moody’s Bond Survey. XLIX, No. 51 (December 16, 1957), 154.
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borrowing authorization was not exhausted by the sale of
Series C--under certain circumstances, an additional
$1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 may be issued that will rank on parity with
Series C. The sale of Series C, however, did have the
60
effect of closing out Series B which had been open.
Louisiana State University 
Borrowing, 19U.7-I959
The Louisiana State University borrowing during this 
period was very complex and had several different sources of 
revenue for security. The issues during this period came in 
19l|7, 1950, 1952, 1953, X95U* 1956, and 1958. The issues of 
1952 and 195^ were payable mostly from operating revenues of 
the University— for example, dormitory rentals. These 
issues were also secured by part of the $1,000,000 of dedi­
cated funds received from the State insurance excise license 
tax. The 1950 and 1953 Louisiana State University issues 
were secured on a parity basis by the portion of the State
corporation franchise tax that is pledged to the State
6lUniversity after four other dedications.
L, No.
^Louisiana, Financial Report, 19lj.9-50, p. 58;
1956-57, P* 58; and Louisiana Legislative Research Study No.
9, PP. 95-96.
Moody*s, 1959 67ii.; and Moody* s Bond Survey
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The recent borrowing by Louisiana State University
proceeded as follows. Soon after the end of the war, in
I9I4.Y* a $3*500,000 issue of serial bonds was sold which was
to mature in 1 9 6 7. (See Table XXXI, Appendix A.) But the
bonds were callable, and they did not remain outstanding
until that date, as noted below. No further University debt
activity took place until after a new authorization, Act $\\
of 1950, was provided. The first sales under Act 5U came
in December, 1950, when several blocks were sold that
amounted to $5*700,000. Louisiana State University bonds
sold in 19^7 and 1950 were given A ratings while the
$3 0 0 ,0 0 0 issue of 1953* floated under the same terms as the
62
1950 bonds, was given an Aa rating.
The 19^7 Louisiana State Uhiversity issue was refunded 
in 1952. Most of the original 19^7 issue was still out­
standing in 1952 so that the amount refunded was large —  
$3,235*000. The first of these serial blocks totaled 
$1,610,000 and matures in 1962, and the second block of 
$1,625,000 matures serially between 1963 and 1967. The 
interest cost on these two refunding issues averaged 2 .1 3
62Louisiana, Acts (1950), Act 5^, PP* 87-91; Louisiana, 
Financial Report. 195>2-f?3» P. 58; 1953-5^, P» 56; Louisiana 
Legislative Research Study No. 9, p. 95; Moody1s, 1952, 
p. 5l6; Moody*s Bond Survey. XLII, No. lj.7 (November 20, 1950), 
llj.2; and Moody*s Bond Survey. XLII, No. lj.9 (December if.,
1950), life".
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per cent, as opposed to the 2.73 P©** cent carried by the 
191+7 bonds they replaced. The 1952 refunding issues are 
protected by dormitory revenues primarily, but any deficiency 
is covered by the full faith and credit of the Board of 
Supervisors of the University; the bonds are not general 
obligations of the State. Any deficiencies which might 
occur were to paid from all revenues of the Board that 
are not specifically dedicated and also by a third lien on 
the $1,000,000 of revenues dedicated to the Board from the 
proceeds of the insurance excise tax. A second issue with 
this same security, except that it has a fourth lien on the 
insurance excise tax, is the $850,000 issue sold in 195̂ -.
This callable issue of 195^# which matures in 1979* was 
given an A rating. The same protection was also afforded 
to the holders of the $2,650,000 of bonds sold in December, 
1956, These A-rated bonds, which are also callable, were 
sold for the purpose of financing the construction of two
63new residence halls.
Recent activity in Louisiana State University borrow­
ing began with a relatively small issue on April 1, 1958.
This issue, which was authorized by Act 230 of 195̂ -# consisted
^Louisiana, Financial Report. 19i{.6-l|.7» p. 68; 1951- 
52, p. 60; 1955-56, p . S'k* 1956-57* P . 58; Louisiana Legis­
lative Research Study No. 9# p. 95; and Moody*s, 1959# 
pp. 677-78.
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of $850,000 of serial bonds that are to mature from 1959 to
1978. The purpose of this issue was very specific— to 
construct and equip buildings for use in research on ferti­
lizers, feeds, soils, and pesticides. The sole protection 
afforded the bondholders in this issue was the dedication of 
$7 0 ,0 0 0 annually from the registration fees and fines
connected with the sale of feeds, fertilizers, and 
6i±pesticides. Moody*s assigned these bonds a rating of
65A. (See Table XXXI, Appendix A.)
The security for the issue probably had an adverse 
effect on its marketability. The flotation indicates 
clearly the extent to which the atomization of a debt struc­
ture can be carried. The issue also shows how far the State 
of Louisiana has departed from the proper use of Its full 
faith and credit in all of Its borrowing.
Another Louisiana State University sale in April, 
1958# amounted to $7»500>000. The Issue, which was to be 
used to construct and improve University buildings, is 
secured by the following: (1) a first lien on $1,000,000
annually dedicated from the proceeds of the 0.5 mill State
^Louisiana, Acts (195U-)* 230* PP* ij.28-31;
Louisiana Legislative Council Report No. 9» p. 97» Moody*s 
Bond Survey. L, No. 15 (April 7» 19^8)> 613; and Moody*s, 
19^9, pp.' 677-78.
^ Moody* s Bond Survey, L, N0. 15 (April 7# 1958),
613; and Moody*s, 195>9, pp. 677-78.
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ad valorem tax, (2) a fourth lien on $1,000,000 annually
dedicated from the insurance excise tax, and (3) a fifth
lien on $£00,000 annually dedicated from the racetrack and
bookmaking license taxes. Additional bonds can be issued on
a parity basis with the $7»£00,000 if certain revenue
66requirements are satisfied.
The $7,£00,000 issue of 19£8 was offered three
different times during a nine month period before finally
being placed on April 17 of that year. The offering and
reoffering of the building issue resulted from a desire to
get better terms on the borrowing and appears to have been
67
good debt management. However, this case exemplifies the 
point made in an earlier chapter that good debt management 
cannot be expected to overcome all debt difficulties arising 
out of faulty debt structures and unfortunate political and 
legal institutions. Debt management could not overcome the 
difficulties dating back at least as far as the adoption of 
specific revenue dedications and subsidiary liens in 
Louisiana bond financing. The results are inefficient use 
of the State*s credit with correspondingly higher costs for 
borrowing and for State services.
^^Moody* s Bond Survey, L, No. l£ (April 7, 19£8), 613; 
and Moody*s, 19^9, pp. 677-78.
^^Moody*s Bond Survey, L, No, l£ (April 7» 19£8), 613; 
Moody* s Bond Survey, L, No. 17 (April 28, 19£8), £8ii.; and 
Moody*s,“19^9, pp. 677*78.
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It is worth noting here that the uncertainties of 
legal priorities of claims on the general revenues of the 
State and the other complexities of the direct, general 
obligation debt structure of the State of Louisiana result 
In some of the subsidiary State agency obligations, such as 
the Louisiana State University bonds, receiving higher 
ratings and involving lower interest costs than many direct, 
'full faith and credit bonds of the State. The $7»500,000 
issue described above was rated A while most of the direct 
and full faith and credit Institutional Improvement Bonds 
outstanding were rated Baa. (See Table XXXI and XXIX.)
Greater New Orleans Expressway 
doirHm'i'as'ion Sorrowing. 1952-1959
A recently created agency which has authority to
issue bonds ultimately Involving the State*s credit is the
Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission. This agency was
established in October, 195ty» according to the provisions of
enabling Act 7 of 1952. The purpose for the creation of the
Expressway Commission and for borrowing by this group was to
construct a toll bridge across Lake Pontchartrain. The
bridge tolls were pledged to service the debt so that the
68obligations are nominally revenue bonds. The Greater 
68It Is somewhat misleading to call the Greater New 
Orleans Expressway bonds "revenue” bonds. Revenue bonds 
usually are considered to be self-sustaining and
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New Orleans Expressway Commission is not strictly an agency 
of the State; it is primarily an instrumentality of the 
parishes of St. Tammany and Jefferson. But the State is 
involved to the following extent: (1) it pledged $£,000,000
of surpluses from Highway Fund Number 2 for the construction 
of approaches to the Expressway; and (2) it pledged remain­
ing surpluses over $£,000,000 to the payment of the Express­
way bonds until all such bonds are retired. The Greater New 
Orleans Expressway was originally given a fourth lien on the 
surpluses in Highway Fund Number 2, but this was changed to 
a fifth lien when the Mississippi River Bridge Authority was 
chartered and given priority. It must be stressed that only 
a portion of Highway Fund Number 2 was being pledged here—  
only the surplus over the existing dedications. There is no 
full faith and credit pledge by either the State or the 
parishes to the payment of any of these Expressway bonds. 
However, the subordinate claim upon the revenues of a State 
department requires the inclusion of the Expressway Commis­
sion debt in the indirect category with the obligations of
self-liquidating. This Greater New Orleans Expressway issue 
has neither of these characteristics. The use of such 
issues is not advisable if a state»s cnedit Is to be 
improved.
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agencies of the State of Louisiana, even though there is no
69general State pledge.
The original amount issued by the Expressway Commis­
sion in November, 1951*, was $1*6,000,000, These bonds were 
initially rated as substandard— long after their issue in 
August of 1958 they were still simply rated as "speculative."
The reason for this rating was that the toll operation was 
70unproven. There also seemed to be some specific doubt
about the chances of success of the toll bridge because of
proposed Improvements on competing toll-free facilities.
It was not until March of 1959 that the $[(.6,000,000 issue of
1951* finally received a regular rating— It was rated Baa but
was still considered speculative because of the threat of 
71competition. (See Table XXXII, Appendix A.)
The New Orleans Expressway revenue bond issue in 1951* 
created what may amount to a perpetual debt if the maturity 
schedule Is followed. The terms of retirement of the issues 
are as followss $1 ,0 0 0  each year until 1993 and $1*5 *9 6 3 ,0 0 0
69Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 , Sec. 22(g), 
par. 5* as amended 1952, Act 90; and Moody*s, 1959, PP. 6?5-76.
?%he practice of not rating toll operations until they 
are proven may be a result of recent disappointing toll 
ventures in several states.
71Moody’s, 1959, PP. 671*.—75? Moody’s Bond Survey.
L, No. 32 (August 1*, 195o ), 309? and koodyrs £ond Purvey.
LI, No. 9 (March 2, 1959), 6 8 7.
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72in 1991]-. If this amount requires refunding in 199l]-» there 
will have "been no debt retirement and the issue will resemble 
a perpetual debt. Perpetual debts were found to be unde­
sirable because they reduce the State’s ability to borrow in 
the future— they make no provision for sustaining the State’s 
credit standing. Furthermore, the interest costs on this 
type of borrowing are great.
Mississippi River Bridge Authority 
Borrowing (Greater New Orleans'
Bridge). 1992-1999
The second agency or authority resulting from the 
general enabling Act 7 of 1992 was the Mississippi River 
Bridge Authority. The two units directly involved in this 
Authority are Orleans and Jefferson parishes. The purpose 
of the proposed borrowing was to construct a bridge over the 
Mississippi River in downtown New Orleans. The State, as In 
the case of the New Orleans Expressway Commission, is commit­
ted to the extent that after 1 9 9 7* 90 per cent of the 
surplus of the State Highway Fund Number 2 is pledged to the 
Authority. The State also contributed $790*000 either for 
preliminary work or for use as security for bond issues.
These pledges together were the fourth charge on the surplus
72Moody’s, 1999* PP. 67ij--79» Louisiana, Constitution 
(1921), Art. 6 , Sec. 22(gj, par. 9* as amended 19!?2, Act 90.
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in Highway Fund Number 2. The Mississippi River Bridge
Authority was given its place ahead of the Greater New
Orleans Expressway by a constitutional amendment in 195̂ 4-.
State Highway Fund Number 2 is sustained by motor vehicle
license taxes collected in the six parishes around New 
73
Orleans. This revenue from the State is not, however, the 
only source of revenue for the Authority. The Authority is 
expected to derive toll revenues from the operation of the 
bridge and from ferries. Thus, the bridge bonds that were
7-
issued are also (somewhat carelessly) called revenue bonds. 
(See Table XXXII, Appendix A.)
The Mississippi River Bridge Authority exercised part 
of its borrowing power by selling a $6 5*0 0 0 ,0 0 0 issue on 
October 5* 1954* There is no specific limit to the amount 
that the Authority can borrow. The bonds, which were dated 
November 1, 195U» are callable and are due to mature in
75November of 19914-. This large bridge Authority issue of
711^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec, 22, as 
amended 19514-* Act 7l|5» Moody*s, 1959* pp. 671+-75? and Moody*s 
Bond Survey. XLVI, No. lj.0 (October 1|, 195k) t 231-33*
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6 , Sec. 22(g), 
par. I4., as amended 195^* Act 7I4.5 ? Moody*s, 1959* PP. 6714--75? 
Moody*s Bond Survey. XLVI, No. lj.0 (October I4., 19510* 231-33? 
and Moody*s Bond Survey, XLVI, No. I4.I (October 11, 19510*222.
75Moody*s, 1959* pp. 67I4-7 5 ; Moody*s Bond Survey,
XLVI, No. lj.0 (October l\.t 195(14.), 2 3 1-3 3 } and Moody*s Bond 
Survey, XLVI, No. I4.I (October 11, 19510» 222.
3!+0
1951+ has the same characteristics as the Greater New Orleans 
Expressway Commission debt described previously. The evalu­
ation is no different except that in this case, the purpose 
of the borrowing was to construct a major river bridge. The 
tendency toward piecemeal financing had progresed still
further. The $65*000,000 of bridge Authority bonds still
 ̂ 76were not rated by Moody*s as late as February, 1959.
The Mississippi River Bridge Authority has had a rare 
opportunity to exercise some of the principles of good debt 
management in 1959. During this time, the Authority has 
been able to retire a part of its debt by buying its bonds 
on the open market. The funds which have made these pur­
chases possible have come from bridge tolls and from the 
State. Bridge tolls actually have been less than antici­
pated, but the receipts from the surpluses dedicated to the 
Authority by the State have been greater than estimated.
The Authority has retired the bonds by purchasing them on 
the open market although the obligations are callable. The 
open market purchase has been more appropriate because the 
relatively low nominal interest rates on the bonds have 
caused them to be valued at considerably less than par
*^Moody*s Bond Survey, LI, No, 5 (February 2, 1959),
714-5-
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during this period. Retirement of the bonds by exercise of 
the call feature would have been considerably more expensive.
The open market purchases have been as follows: 
January, 1959, $2,550,000; June, 1959, $l|.00,000; July, 1959, 
$900,000; and, September, 1959, $770,000. The amount of 
bonds retired in this fashion thus totaled $1^,620,000 and 
reduced the amount of the Mississippi River Bridge Authority 
debt outstanding to $60,380,000. It has been estimated that 
these bond purchases have reduced the annual interest costs 
by $1 6 6,3 2 0 . 77
The debt management in this phase of the Mississippi 
River Bridge Authority financing seems to have been excel­
lent. There is no intention of disparaging this performance 
when it is pointed out that the whole process depended upon 
the unexpectedly large receipts from State tax dedication as 
well as the extremely high yields that prevailed in the 
market during this time. Debt management is passive to some 
extent, and some of the best debt management results from 
seizing upon such favorable circumstances.
?7Times New Orleans Picayune, June 22, 1959, p. 10; 
Times [New Orleans! Picayune. August 1, 1959, p. 1? and 
Times °New Orleans] Picayune. September 18, 1959, p. 1#
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Louisiana State Building Authority 
Borrowing. 19$2-1959
The Louisiana State Building Authority was created by 
Act 3^7 of 1952 for the express purpose of providing adequate 
buildings for educational, correctional, and charitable 
institutions. The Authority was empowered to borrow 
$9 ,7^0 ,0 0 0  under this act for certain designated purposes as 
well as $20,000,000 for the general purpose. This additional 
$2 0,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 could be borrowed on a parity basis with the 
originally specified $9 ,7 5 0 ,0 0 0 of bonds as soon as addi­
tional legislation was provided. The initial A, B, and C 
issues of $9 ,7 5 0,0 0 0, and any bonds sold under the blanket 
authorization, are payable from the proceeds of the State»s 
l.lj.7 mill ad valorem tax. At the time of the sale of 
Series A, B, C, and AA, the tax was already dedicated to the
payment of about $8,800,000 of bonds serviced from the State
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Bond and Interest Tax Fund. The second lien status of the 
bonds appears to have been responsible for the Baa rating 
which they were given. The prior claims are scheduled to be 
eliminated completely by I960. Series A, B, and C were sold
This fund is the same State Bond and Interest Tax 
Fund that originally serviced direct debt payable from the 
1 .1 5  mill ad valorem tax.
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in 1 9 5 2* ;5 3 » and 1951+ and exhausted the specific authori-
79zation of $9,7^0*000. (See Table XXXIII, Appendix A.)
Before any further Building Authority borrowing could 
take place, there had to be more legislation. It came in 
the form of Act 13 of 1951+ which provided for the issue of 
the aforementioned $2 0,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 of bonds that would rank on 
par with Series A, B, and C. The act also went further and 
amended the original act of 1 9 5 2 so that still another 
$2 1,981+,500 can be borrowed to be junior to the $2 9,7 5 0*0 0 0. 
The last $21,981+,500 was scheduled to remain in this subor­
dinate position until the first $9*750,000 (Series A, B, and 
C) had been retired. It was provided that after this 
retirement the remaining bonds would all be paid on a parity 
basis. The $20,000,000 authorization resulted in the sale 
of Series AA, BB, and CC in 1951+, 1955, and 1956. The final
$21,91+8,500 came in the form of Series DD, EE, and FF in 
80
1956 and 1957. (See Table XXXIII, Appendix A.)
^Louisiana, Acts (1952), Act 317* pp. 833-38; 
Louisiana, Financial Report. 1953-51+* P. 56; Louisiana 
Legislative Research Study No. 9* PP. 3* 92; Moody*s, 1959, 
p. 675* Moody*s Bond Survey. XLV, No. i+9 (December 7, 19531* 
128: and Moody*s Bond Survey, XLV, No. 1+2 (October 19* 1953), 
208.
80Louisiana, Acts (1951)-)» Act 1 3, pp. 21-31;
Louisiana, Financial Report. 1956-57* P. 57* Moody*s, 1959, 
675-76; Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9, pp. 3*
92; Moody*s Bond Survey. XLV, No. 1+9 (December 7, 1953),
128; and Moody*s Bond Survey, XLV, No. 1+2 (October 19* 1953), 
208.
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The retirement of the senior Building Authority issues
of 19,750,000 was accomplished early by the use of the call
feature. Series A was called at the end of 195? and Series
C, in September of 1958. Series B thus was the only barrier
to the establishment of parity among the Building Authority
issues. That issue was scheduled to mature serially until
81
1962, but it was called in May of 1959. The use of the
call feature to eliminate subordination of liens and to
simplify debt structures is recognized as one situation in
which the use of the call feature is proper. The removal of
Series B by this method thus seems to have been an example
of good debt management.
The issues of the Building Authority totaling
$1}.1,9U8,500— AA through FF— are all serial issues now payable
on a parity basis. The last of these will mature by 1985.
They are callable except for Series EE, which was sold to
the State Teachers* Retirement System, Series EE is not
rated by Moody*s, but all of the other issues in the AA-FF
82group were rated Baa.
There was one other Building Authority issue during 
the current period. This issue of $3,925,000, dated
O n
Moody*s, 1959, pp. 675-76; and Moody*3 Bond Survey. 
LI, No. 20 (May 11, 1959), 552.
82Moody*s, 1959, PP. 675-76.
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April 15, 195&, was sold to improve a medical center and a 
charity hospital. The issue was sold at the same time as 
Series DD and also "bears that identifying symbol. This 
issue of $3 ,0 2 5 ,0 0 0 was different from the others sold by 
the Authority because it was secured by an entirely differ­
ent tax— the 0.53 mill ad valorem tax. The tax had 
previously been paid into the general fund. The issue of 
1956 represented the whole amount that was authorized to be 
borrowed. The bonds, which are not callable, are scheduled
83to mature by 1 9 6!|..
The last $3*025,000 Building Authority issue 
described above is another example of complexity being 
added to the debt structure. The other Building Authority 
issues required analysis, but this issue was entirely 
different and thus required a new study and a new explana­
tion. The fact that another tax which had been free of any 
dedication was being diverted from the general fund was also 
an undesirable feature in that issue.
Summary of Borrowing. 19U.7-1959
The direct obligations added during this period con­
sisted of $83,000,000 of Veterans* Bonus Bonds, $98,000,000
^Louisiana, Acts - (1955), Act 3 0, pp. 30-33; Louisiana, 
Financial Report, 19S>6-57, p. £7? Louisiana Legislative 
Research Study No. 9, pp. 98-99? and Moody*s, 1959, p. 6 7 6 .
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of highway obligations, and $16,000,000 of Institutional 
Improvement Bonds. (See Table XXXIV, Appendix A.) The 
direct obligations sold during the decade thus totaled 
$197*000,000. This borrowing was added in a decade when the 
State1s credit was not well recognized relative to the other 
states, although tremendous economic growth occurred during 
the period. Some of this direct borrowing was for ques­
tionable purposes. Furthermore, some of the management in 
connection with the issue of this new debt was not as 
efficient as it should have been. Finally, the continued 
dedication of taxes for servicing specific issues had the 
effect of further undermining the value of the full faith 
and credit pledge offered to secure these direct obligations.
The indirect obligations, sold by agencies in which 
the State had some interest,were as follows: Board of Com­
missioners of the Port of New Orleans, $10,000,000; Greater 
Baton Rouge Port Commission, $35*2+00,000; Louisiana State 
University $21,350,000; Greater New Orleans Expressway 
Commission, $1+6,000,000; Mississippi River Bridge Authority, 
$65*000,000; and the Louisiana State Building Authority,
$51+,723*000. Indirect borrowing totaled $232,1+73*000 in the 
period since 191+7.
Much of this indirect borrowing came in 1951+ a^d 
later— after the State had made great progress in its post­
war economic development. For this reason, it probably
3kl
should not he concluded that this large amount of indirect 
borrowing was unsafe. This indirect borrowing generally was 
for proper purposes, but the management of the issues was 
not always satisfactory. Finally, the main defect in this 
indirect borrowing since 19l|.7 has been its addition of so 
much complexity to the debt structure.
III. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS, 1914.7-1959
Several general matters in connection with Louisiana*s 
debt structure are not brought out clearly when individual 
purposes of borrowing and specific bond issues are analyzed. 
Have Louisiana bond ratings tended to improve or deteriorate 
over the period? To what extent has the call provision been 
used lately by the State? Has recent debt reporting in 
Louisiana been satisfactory? Has the timing of bond sales 
during recent years been consistent with the finding in 
Chapter II that there was a seasonal pattern to interest 
charges during the same period?
Ratings of Louisiana Bonds, 19ii7-1959
There have been several changes in the composition of 
the ratings of Louisiana debt during the last decade. (See 
Table A below and Tables XXVI, XXXV, and XXXVI, Appendix A.) 
In 1914.6 , A and Baa bonds accounted for 85 P©** cent of the 
outstanding debt. The Baa rated debt amounted to $6 9 »90l4-,000
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TABLE A
MOODY*S RATINGS OP LOUISIANA DIRECT AND INDIRECT 
DEBT OUTSTANDING FOR THE YEARS 1946, 1952, AND 19^8
(thousands)
RATING 1946 1952 1958



















TOTAL $67,875 $1 5 1 ,1 2 1 $132,383





$ 6 8 ,011*. 
2 0 .21l8
u C$ 0 
1 1 1 ,6 1 2
TOTAL $69,901}. $ 88,262 $117,672





$ 7 ,0 0 0  
900
$ 1 3 ,0 0 0  
65.180
TOTAL $ 8 ,0 0 1 $ 7,900 $ 7 8 ,1 8 0
Ratings rang© from Aaa to C. These ratings are some­
times changed when new information indicates that the invest­
ment quality is different. The ratings in this Table are as 
of the reporting date and not at the time of issue.
Several issues sold during the 1947-1959 period were 
rated Baa, but by 1958 they had either been called or rerated.
cThe classifications used here are the same as those 
used in the text. For example, Port of New Orleans and 
Baton Rouge Port Commission debt is classified as indirect.
Sources Compiled from Tables XXVI, XXXV, and XXXVI, 
Appendix A.
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and the A rated debt totaled $67*875*000. Only 10.3 P©r 
cent of Louisiana*a outstanding debt was rated Aa at the 
beginning of this period.
By 1952, and before the agency debt had its greatest 
growth, the modal rating of Louisiana debt was the A rating. 
Over 5*4- per cent of all the direct and indirect debt was 
rated A. Baa rated debt was second in importance, account­
ing for almost 33 per cent of the outstanding debt. The 
ratio of outstanding debt rated Aa actually declined during 
this period and comprised only 7.7 per cent of the total,,
Of course, the absolute amount of Aa rated bonds did 
increase slightly from 19*4-6 to 1952.
By 1958, there was a significant change in the distri­
bution of ratings in the State. There was an encouraging 
increase both absolutely and relatively in the amount of 
debt rated Aa— now l5.*J- per cent of the total debt outstand­
ing— and a slight decline in the per cent of the debt rated
81+
Baa— to 30.3 per cent. But there was another develop­
ment: $78,180,000 of the debt was not rated by Moody*s.
The main reason why so much of Louisiana’s debt is not rated 
is that one of the recent large issues was floated to
^Probably the most important factor contributing to 
this change was the temporary improvement in reporting which 
led to higher ratings in 1955. Supra, pp. 3 1*4.-1 6.
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finance construction of a major river toll bridge. Moody1s 
practice is to label all such issues as "speculative11 until 
such time as facilities are completed and some earning record 
is established.
When ratings given to Louisiana bonds in the 1924.7—
1959 period are studied in terms of whether the debts are 
direct or indirect, it appears that the improved ratings 
have been associated with direct borrowing while indirect 
debt includes the large percentage of bonds that are rated 
Baa. Examination of the differences between the debt out­
standing in 1952 and that outstanding in 1958 reveals the 
following changes: (1) Direct bonds rated Aa increased from
$6,268,000 in 1952 to $50,159*0 0 0— an increase of about 700  
per cent; (2) Indirect debt in the Aa category declined from 
$114,3 2 1 ,0 0 0 to $9»62l].,000— 32.2 per cent; (3 ) Bonds rated A 
in the direct category declined from $1145,5 9 1 ,0 0 0  to 
$85,151,000— a decline of Ij.1.5 Per cent; (2;) Bonds rated A 
increased in the indirect class from $5 ,5 3 0 ,0 0 0  to 
$247,2 3 2,000--an increase of over 7,50 per cent; (5) In the 
Baa category, the amount of direct bonds fell from 
$6 8,0114,000 to nothing; (6 ) In the indirect grouping, where 
there had been $2 0 ,2148,000 of Baa bonds in 1952, there was 
$117,672,000 in 1958— an increase of I48I per cent; (7 ) The 
bonds not rated almost doubled in the direct class from
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$7,000,000 in 1952 to $13,000,000 in 1958? (8) In the 
indirect class, the unrated bonds increased from $9 0 0 ,0 0 0  
to $65,180,000.
From the changes noted in the preceding comparisons, 
it appears that the direct debt is faring better than the 
indirect debt when ratings are given. The existence of 
$117,672,000 of indirect debt in the Baa category— -where 
there was only a little more than $20,000,000 before— is 
especially disturbing. It is perhaps even more disturbing 
since agency borrowing is a relatively new phenomenon and 
since further borrowing by these agencies will probably be 
secured by the same dedicated taxes and funds subject to 
prior charges. Thus, if the agency device is widely used in 
the future, and if there are no large increases in the funds 
made available for debt service, there will probably be more 
subrated bonds added to Louisiana*s debt structure.
Use of the Call Feature in Louisiana 
Bond Issues. 19U7-1959"
Another important characteristic of a debt structure 
is the extent to which the call feature is employed. The 
inclusion of a call feature may or may not be desirable, 
depending upon the price charged for the privilege. It will 
be wise, however, for the state to consider using the option 
if there is any prospect that the state*s debt structure and
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management will improve markedly in the future, and/or if 
the market and the rating services are underrating the 
state*s credit.
Both of these conditions appear to have existed to 
some extent in Louisiana during the current post-war period. 
If a comprehensive debt improvement plan had been in the 
process of being formulated, it would have been desirable 
(other things equal) to use the call option in issues sold 
prior to the implementation of such a plan. Although there 
should have been, there was no such plan for the whole debt 
structure. But there was a suitable situation in the case 
of highway borrowing. If the price of the call feature was 
not prohibitive in 1958, it might have been suitable to make 
the three highway issues of that year callable. This 
practice was followed in the case of only one of these 
issues, but since there is no data available about the cost 
of the call, this approach Is suggested only as one which 
may be useful In the future. (See Table XXVIII, Appendix A.)
Louisiana*s economy obviously has gained strength in 
the past fifteen years. This economic growth, however, has 
apparently not been quickly recognized by the rating services 
and by the bond market. Louisiana’s credit seems to have 
been underrated during the early part of the post-war
85period. Later the situation was temporarily remedied when 
0£lnfra, Chap. VI, p. 3 8 0.
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the bond ratings were revised as a result of a single and 
short-lived, but highly successful, debt reporting program. 
If Louisiana*s credit was generally underrated during this 
period, the use of the call feature, other things being 
equal, would have been appropriate.
The actual use of the call feature in Louisiana is 
analyzed in Table B. In 19^6, 8 per cent of Louisiana1s
TABLE B
TEE INCLUSION OP THE CALL FEATURE IN LOUISIANA 
BONDS OUTSTANDING, 19^6, 1952, 1958
DESCRIPTION 19^6 1952 1958
CALLABLE ISSUES
Direct 5 12 12
Indirect 0 2 18
NONCALLABLE ISSUES
Direct 37 29 31
Indirect 21 21
NOT INDICATED
Indirect 1 1 2
Source: Moody1 s, 19U-7» pp. lf.21-29; 1953, PP. I4.7 2-8 3 ;
and 1959, PP. 663-78.
obligations were callable and 91 per cent were not callable. 
By 1952, the callable obligations constituted 21 per cent
^ Supra. pp. 311j.-l6.
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of the total, and the per cent of noncallable bonds declined 
to 78 per cent. The same tendencies were apparent in 1958 s 
3$ per cent of the bonds were callable and 62 per cent were 
noncallable. If the assumption made previously is correct-- 
that is, if it was advisable for Louisiana to include the 
call feature more frequently since World War II--then 
Louisiana has been improving her debt structure in this 
respect.
Also commendable is the fact that the call options 
that were being included more often were also being effec-
87tively exercised during the period. One case was cited in
this Chapter where the State called bonds with a consequent
saving in interest payments. In another case, a senior
issue was eliminated with the result that subsequent issues
88
were put on a parity basis. These are the advantages that 
accrue to good debt management. Still another, and perhaps 
a greater, benefit is possible. The fact that 35 P©^ cent
of the debt outstanding is callable would help greatly in
89any large-scale revision of the debt structure.
8?The call feature was included and exercised in one 
case that led to the question of whether good debt manage­
ment or good fortune was the most important characteristic.
Supra, pp. 293-95, 3 2 2 , and 3I&,
89A debt reform based on the use of the call feature 
has been suggested by William D. Ross and B. F. Sliger. 
William D. Ross and B. F. Sliger, "Dedication of State
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Reporting of Louisiana Debt, I9li-7-l959
The reporting of Louisiana*s debt in the period, 
19U7-1 9 5 9, left something to be desired if a major objective 
of reporting is to inform the taxpayer and the general 
public. The following inadequacies are apparent: (l) There
is no indication in Louisiana Financial Reports that the 
State is involved at all in the Greater New Orleans Express­
way, the Mississippi River Bridge Authority, and the Greater
90Baton Rouge Port borrowing. Yet the State*s credit is 
clearly involved in each of these issues, (2) The Financial 
Reports have never given the specific purposes for which the 
various issues were sold, and they presently do not indicate 
interest rates and maturity schedules. Thus it is impossible 
to determine whether a prompt payment is planned or whether 
deferred serials are being issued. (3) The Financial
91Reports contain some incorrect and misleading information.
Revenues in Louisiana," Louisiana Business Review. XXII,
No. I4. (April, 19^8), 20-23. For a description of this plan, 
infra. Chap. VI, pp. 3 8 3 - 8 if..
^Louisiana, Financial Report. 1956-57* PP* 56-59.
^For example, in the 1956-57 Financial Report, the 
1950 issues of Louisiana State University bonds were listed 
as having been sold in 1953. The $9,1^00,000 issue of highway 
bonds payable from Highway Fund Number 2 which were sold in 
1953 and I951j- were listed as indirect obligations. Still in 
the same report, there is no mention of the State*s commit­
ment in the borrowing noted in (l) above.
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(1|_) Another difficulty is the lack of coordination and 
consistency that is evidenced by the variety of dates upon 
which the debt outstanding is reported.
Reporting in another sense— that of Informing investors 
and those that serve them of all pertinent matters and espe­
cially of improvements which would make offerings more 
attractive— apparently has been somewhat more satisfactory 
in Louisiana, The debt reporting carried on by a special 
group in 1955 showed just how important and worthwhile this 
could become if it were sustained. The task of supplying 
investors complete information on coming issues has been 
difficult because of the complexity of the debt structure. 
Improvements in the general debt structure will make good 
reporting easier.
Timing of Louisiana Bond Sales, 19^7-1959
Another question that was not covered in the analysis 
of individual bond issues concerns the timing of bond sales. 
Since the date of issue is usually the same or very close to 
the date of the bond sale, a review of these dates of issue 
provides a basis for determining whether Louisiana has taken
advantage of the seasonal pattern which seems to exist in
92bond yields. Of the fifty-one bond sales in Louisiana
^^Supra, Chap. II, pp. 128-32.
between X9lj-7 and 1959, twenty-seven (52.9 pen cent) 
consisted of direct obligations. (See Table C.) These 
direct obligations were sold mostly in the first seven 
months of the year when rates appear to be lower than
normal. Twenty-four, or 88.9 per cent, of the direct bond
issues were floated in those months. The only three issues 
sold at other times were two institutional improvement 
flotations totaling $6 ,2 5 1 ,0 0 0  and one highway issue of - ' 
$10,000,000. Only one issue was sold in April when the 
seasonal yields apparently are lowest, but the timing of the
sales of these direct obligations seems to have been
generally satisfactory.
In the indirect category, there were twenty-four 
separate sales during this post-war period. Five of these 
issues were sold in the favorable month of April and eleven 
issues were sold in the first six months of the year. But, 
there were also eleven or l|.5,8.per cent of the indirect 
issues sold in the months of November and December. On the 
whole, direct borrowing seems to have been better timed to 
take advantage of the favorable rates. If the seasonal 
pattern is important, there remains a great deal of room for 
Improvement in the timing of indirect sales. Less efficient 
timing in the sale of indirect obligations Is perhaps addi­
tional evidence of the overuse of the authority device— the 
result being loss of effective control and efficient fiscal
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TABLE C
DATES OP ISSUE OP LOUISIANA BONDS SOLD 





JANUARY 1 k 1
15 3 0
FEBRUARY 1 1 2
15 0 0
MARCH i 2 0
15 1+ 0
APRIL l 1 3
15 0 2
MAY l 2 1
15 0 0
JUNE l 2 1
15 1 0
JULY l 2 1
15 2 0
AUGUST l 0 0
15 0 0
SEPTEMBER i 1 1
15 0 0
OCTOBER i 0 1
15 0 0
NOVEMBER l 1 6
15 0 0
DECEMBER i 1 k
15 0 JL
TOTAL ..... 27 . 2k
^Phe classifications of direct and indirect obliga­
tions here are the same as those used in this Chapter. For 
example, the Port of New Orleans and Port of Baton Rouge 
debts are listed under the indirect heading above. Two of 
the direct issues above are classified by the date of sale 
instead of the date of issue.
Source: Compiled from Tables XXVII-XXXII, Appendix A.
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management. The consequences can be better appreciated if 
it is realized that indirect borrowing since 1 9 ^7 has 
amounted to $232,^73*000. The lowering of the interest rate 
by even one-half of 1 per cent on say per cent of this 
indirect debt would make careful timing very worthwhile.
The classification of the dates of issue of bonds 
sold recently clearly brings out another indisputable fact 
about the debt; there have been a great many issues— fifty- 
one— in the 12-year period. Many of these issues have been 
relatively small ones. According to good debt management 
principles, frequent and relatively small Issues are unde­
sirable. They tend to clutter and complicate debt structures 
and to drive up interest costs and administrative expenses. 
Better planning could have undoubtedly reduced the number of 
issues that were sold by the State in recent years.
Administrative Machinery. 19ii7-1959
There have been no significant changes in the func­
tions of the Board of Liquidation since 19lp7• During the 
same period there have been only a few types of direct 
borrowing. The only new direct borrowing, which was for the 
purpose of financing veterans* bonuses, was managed by the 
Board of Liquidation and thus did not change or add to the 
administrative machinery for debt management. The most
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important change in the direct deht administration since 
World War II has been the improvement in the machinery for 
managing highway issues. This highway debt reform was 
actually much more significant than would have been the case 
for any other borrowing. This change alone has made the 
19l4.7 “1 9 5 9 period more successful than previous periods in 
Louisiana*s debt history.
Another major recent change in the machinery for 
managing the debt structure in Louisiana has been the tendency 
toward more indirect agency borrowing. Pour new agencies 
have been added to the administrative machinery since 1952, 
bringing the total number of agencies with outstanding debt 
to nine. This growing list of authorities bespeaks the lack 
of any centralization and order in this important segment of 
the debt structure. When there are so many agencies, there 
is really no "administrative machinery" in the sense of 
coordinated and unified administration. When reference is 
made to Louisiana*s debt'Administrative machinery" and its 
debt "management," therefore, the terms are used loosely.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The final Chapter of this study summarizes Louisiana 
debt experience with emphasis on the important trends in 
this borrowing. The major defects that have appeared in the 
debt structure and in debt management in recent times are 
also outlined. Important characteristics of the existing 
debt structure are then compared with debt structures that 
are found in several other states. Finally, proposals for 
the improvement of Louisiana’s debt structure and debt 
management are submitted.
I. TRENDS AND INFLUENCES OF EARLY BORROWING 
ON LOUISIANA’S DEBT STRUCTURE
From the standpoint of influence on the present debt 
structure in Louisiana, one of the more significant develop­
ments before 1900 was the establishment of the Board of 
Liquidation of the State Debt. The Board of Liquidation, 
however, has changed a great deal; its original function of 
exchanging bonds in a refunding operation has been greatly 
expanded. Another obvious influence of the early period was 
the carry-over of some of the early debt into this century,
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although the amount brought forward was relatively insignifi­
cant, A third influence of early borrowing is that the 
record of default and repudiation in the nineteenth century 
was not overlooked when some of the Louisiana debt was 
refunded in 1911j., It is even possible that this repudiation 
has had a subtle and indirect influence on the State*s more 
recent credit standing. Finally, some of the provisions of 
acts in the early period were incorporated in whole or in 
part into the Constitution of 1921 and some of them still 
affect the debt structure. One of the most important of 
these provisions in the present Constitution is the debt 
limitation.
For the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
Port development in New Orleans was the major reason for 
borrowing in Louisiana, On the whole, these twenty years 
were conservative and peaceful ones in debt matters. A 
major factor contributing to this quiet was that Louisiana 
did not engage in bonus borrowing after World War I as did 
some of the other states. The tempo of borrowing increased 
rapidly at the end of the twenties and continued at a very 
high rate until about 1932. After 1932, the rate of borrow­
ing declined somewhat, but debt financing still continued at 
a high level. Highway borrowing was the most important debt 
issuance throughout the 1930*s. When World War II came, 
Louisiana practically suspended her borrowing and debt
363
development, while the economy kept growing. By the end of 
World War II, the State was in a relatively strong financial 
position, but pressure was put on the debt structure by 
veterans* bonus borrowing. The most important recent trend 
in the evolution of Louisiana*s debt structure has been the 
movement toward indirect borrowing which has taken place 
since 1952. In most periods, Louisiana*s debt practices 
have had some unique characteristics, but in general, 
practices and trends have paralleled closely the experience 
of other American states. This similarity is evident when 
the debt structure in Louisiana is compared with the debt 
structure in other states.
II. MAIN DEFECTS OF THE DEBT STRUCTURE AND 
DEBT MANAGEMENT IN LOUISIANA SINCE 1921
The major defects of structure and management In 
Louisiana borrowing in recent times have been of two types. 
In the first category are the Institutional defects which 
are included In the Constitution of 1921. The second group 
of flaws, resulting partly from the poor legal framework, 
are the inefficiencies in the administrative machinery.
Legal Impediments to Efficient Borrowing
Many institutional Impediments to efficient public 
finance are contained and perpetuated in the Constitution of
361+
1921. There la no systematic treatment of debt policy in 
this document, and the provisions relative to borrowing are 
detailed and scattered. The constitutional debt limitation 
is highly Inflexible and is not representative of the public 
attitude toward borrowing in the State.
Other institutional flaws that have their origin In 
the Constitution of 1921 are the various tax dedications.
Tax dedications developed at a time when the State*s credit 
was relatively poor; they were apparently intended to lend 
security to bond issues in order to make them more marketa­
ble. The main results of the dedications, however, have 
been to add complexity to the debt structure and to use tax 
revenues and other funds inefficiently as protection for 
bond issues. The dedication of tax revenues to certain bond 
issues has also contributed to wide use of prior and subor­
dinate liens in Louisiana. Other things equal, bonds with 
subordinate liens are less marketable and such borrowing is 
more expensive. Still another defect in the relationship
between taxation and borrowing is the existence of a property
1
tax limitation in the Constitution. This restriction is 
not at all reassuring to bondholders. It has been noted 
that the states which have received the highest ratings on 
their bond issues usually have had unlimited taxing power.
^Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 1 0 , Sec. 3 , as 
amended 195^.
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Administrative Impediments to 
Efficient Borrowing
The second major Institutional impediment in 
Louisiana*s debt structure is in the administrative machin­
ery. This problem, of course, cannot be entirely separated 
from the constitutional or legal framework. The administra­
tive machinery for debt management in Louisiana has had 
these weaknesses! (1 ) there has been no centralized manage­
ment of the entire debt structure; (2 ) the lines of authority 
in debt management have been changed repeatedly and provi­
sion has not always been made for clear and consistent 
administrative machinery; (3 ) there has seldom been enough 
flexibility in administrative authority to permit efficient 
debt management; and, (I4.) finally, there has been no clear 
and consistent planning or comprehensive policy in the 
shaping of the debt structure.
Examples of these major flaws in Louisiana*s debt 
structure and management are numerous. The lack of central­
ized management, which has resulted from the use of separate 
and uncoordinated constitutional authorizations, is evident 
in the fact that not all Louisiana borrowing is reviewed by 
a single governmental unit but rather the borrowing is done 
on an independent or semi-independent basis by the several 
agencies and departments of the State. The fact that the 
administrative machinery has been changed frequently and is 
still not clear is illustrated by the "off-agaln-on-again”
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role of the Board of Liquidation in State borrowing. Today 
it is still difficult to discover exactly the relationships 
between say, the State Treasurer, the Board of Liquidation, 
the Highway Commission, and the State Bond and Tax Board.
The lack of freedom to vary provisions in bond sales, 
which freedom is necessary if debt management is to take 
place at all, has been an especially serious flaw in 
Louisiana. Authors of constitutional amendments authorizing 
borrowing have usually included a superabundance of direc­
tions about bond provisions. It has often been indi­
cated that bonds should be serials, that they should be 
deferred, that they should be callable, and even, on one 
occasion, the exact date of issue was specified. The 
problem of getting the best terms is a matter requiring 
the utmost in flexibility to cope with fast changing condi­
tions in the bond markets— it is, therefore, a function of 
management and not a matter of policy.
In addition to the overdetailing of debt provisions 
in Louisiana*s Constitution, there has also been a lack 
of clarity and consistency in debt policy. Some bonds 
have been direct obligations without being full faith and 
credit obligations. Other bonds have been secured by the 
State*s full faith and credit pledge while at the same time 
being indirect obligations. In still other issues, the
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State's role Is not expressly given. The use of the call 
feature has not been consistent, and the timing of bond 
sales has been less predictable. Even the offices charged 
with the actual process of selling the bonds have often 
been changed. All such practices have contributed uncer­
tainty to the debt structure, and this uncertainty is 
considered reprehensible by the rating agencies arid the 
bond buyers.
III. LOUISIANA'S DEBT STRUCTURE, 1957
Louisiana's debt structure is summarized in Table
XXXVII, Appendix A. The 1957 data are used in order to
2facilitate comparisons with other states. The total 
Louisiana debt outstanding on June 30, 1957* was approxi­
mately $351j.,359,000. This total consisted of $114-3,763,000 
of direct debt and $210,596,000 of Indirect debt.
Debt Outstanding in 1957 Compared 
to Debt'Out standing' in 19̂ .6
On June 30, 19^6, the total debt outstanding In
Louisiana was $160,676,000; In 1957* it had increased by
pThe data in the Table were compiled from three 
sources. The Financial Report omits $123,299*000 of debt 
for which the State either contributes funds or has guaran­
teed payment by pledging its full faith and credit. Moody's 
is the most complete of the three sources. The Census 
Bureau's Compendium of State Government Finances reclassi­
fies data supplied by the states according to uniform 
categories. (See Table XXXVIII, Appendix A.)
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121 per cent to #35J|-*359* 000. (See Table XXXVII, Appendix 
A.) Debt service requirements reported in the Financial 
Report were #12,387*000 in the fiscal year 19ij.7-19Ji.8j and 
they reached a high of #21,730,000 in 1955-3-956— an increase 
of 75 per* cent. The absolute debt burden thus has increased 
considerably over the last decade.
The State*s economy has also grown since 19if6. Total 
tax collections in Louisiana have increased from #98,915*000 
in 19ij-6 to #351*893*000 in 1958— an increase of over 250 per 
cent, (See Tables XXXIX, XL, and XLI, Appendix A.) The 
various taxes dedicated for the payment of the State*s obli­
gations have all increased in yield over the last seven 
years. Total revenues have Increased by about threefold. 
Personal incomes within the State increased during the same 
period by over 130 per cent. The ability to bear debt has 
increased in Louisiana more than enough to offset the 
increase In debt.
Louisiana1s Debt Structure Compared 
to Other States, 1957
The present debt burden in Louisiana is somewhat 
lighter than it was in the past. But, how does this burden
^Louisiana, Financial Report. 19lj.7-Jj-8, p. 3* and 1955- 
56, p. 8. Actual debt service payments were somewhat higher 
than this sum because the report omits several issues.
\
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compare with state debt burdens in other states? The 
Compendlum of State Government Finances in 1957 is the 
source of much valuable information for comparing the debt 
structures of the states. The states selected for this 
comparison are the five states that in 1953 had significant 
amounts of general obligations outstanding, all rated Aaa. 
Louisiana^ general obligations outstanding at that time 
consisted of per cent rated Aa, lf.8.2 per cent rated A,
kIjij-.ij. per cent rated Baa, and 3.1 P®r cent not rated. The 
comparison then is a rigorous one for the State of Louisiana—  
it compares the State with the leaders in the field.
The purposes of borrowing in the six states in the 
comparison were the familiar ones. The percentage of total 
long-term debt devoted to highway finance ranged from 1(.7 . 2  
per cent in Louisiana to 67.1 P®** cent in Connecticut. (See 
Table A.) Highway borrowing was the most important purpose 
for borrowing in the selected states as well as in all 
forty-eight states. (See Table XLII, Appendix A.) Highway 
obligations accounted for 5 ^ .3 Pe** cent of long-term debt 
outstanding in the forty-eight states in 1957. Assuming that 
amounts outstanding indicate the volume of borrowing, high­
way borrowing has actually accounted for a smaller share of 
total borrowing in Louisiana than in other states.
^Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9, p. 81.
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TABLE A
LONG-TERM DEBT OUTSTANDING BY PURPOSE FOR ALL STATES 
























States 54*3 13.1 8.9 1 . 8
Louisiana 47.2 5.5 14.5 1 0 . 3
Conn. 67.1 1 0 . 8 6.7 0.5
Maryland 64.7 1 8 . 2 —
Mas s. 6 0 . 2 .7 6 . 0 3.6
New York 52.1; .4 1.5 6.5
Ohio 60.8 4.9 21.7 ---
aThe percentages here are based on the amounts given 
in Table XLII, Appendix A. The Louisiana amounts are not 
changed in order that the comparison with other states will 
be valid. The Compendium classifications are uniform.
Source: Table XLII, Appendix A.
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Other important purposes for which the states have 
borrowed heavily are education and veterans* bonuses. The 
states as a group devoted 1 3 .1 per cent of their borrowing 
to education. Louisiana was far below this average with 
only 5.5 per cent of its borrowing for education. Veterans* 
bonus debt was 8.9 per cent of the total debt outstanding in 
all states in 1957. In this case, Louisiana was much higher 
than average— 11̂ .5 pen cent of the debt outstanding was 
incurred for this purpose. Among the states in the sample, 
only Ohio borrowed more to finance veterans* bonuses.
Another very important fraction of the Louisiana debt out­
standing at that time was for nonhighway transportation.
The average borrowed for nonhighway transportation was only
1.8 per cent in all the states, but it was 10.3 per cent in 
Louisiana. Two of the other states in the selection also 
had substantial amounts for this purpose— New York had 6.5 
per cent of its borrowing in the nonhighway category, and 
Massachusetts had 3.6 per cent.
Table B contains several comparisons which show the 
relative importance of borrowing in the various state 
financial structures. The State of Louisiana had the lowest 
ratio of borrowing to borrowing plus other revenue of any of 
the individual states selected. Only 2.8 per cent of State 
funds in Louisiana in 1957 came from borrowing. However, 
average annual borrowing in Louisiana actually has been much
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TABLE B
FINANCIAL STRUCTURES IN ALL STATES AND 
SELECTED STATES, 1957





(per cent) Borrowing 
(per cent)
All 48 
States 5.7 2 . 6
aLouisiana 2 . 8 2.5
Conn. 23.5 2 . 8
Maryland 1 2 . 0 5.4
Mass. 17.4 6 . 0
New York 5.9 4.5
Ohio 9.9 2 . 2
Borrowing Per Per Capita 
to Capita Debt to
Expend!- Debt Personal
ture (dollars) Income 
(per cent) Per Capita
(per cent)
6 . 2 I 81.25 4 . 2
2.9 106.74 7.4
2 2 . 8 175.00 6.5
1 2 . 2 1 8 4 .1 7 8 . 8
1 7 . 0 210.61 9.5
6.4 124.75 5.2
11.5 7 8 .0 8 3.6
If the average borrowing in Louisiana for the period 
19 4 7 -1 9 5 7 had been used instead of the borrowing in 1957  
alone, borrowing as a per cent of revenue and borrowing would 
have been 5 P©r cent and borrowing as a per cent of expendi­
ture would have been 5 . 1  P®** cent.
Sources Tables XLII and XLIII, Appendix A.
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greater* than the $l8,7i(-8*000 upon which this ratio was based. 
If the average of $33,036,381}.. 62 for the years 19l}.7-1957 had 
been used, the figure would have been 5 per cent. In all of 
the forty-eight states in 1957, borrowing was 5.7 P®** cent of 
the total revenue and borrowing. In the same Table, Louisiana 
debt redemption was a slightly smaller percentage of revenue 
and borrowing than the average for all states and considera­
bly smaller than the average for most of the states In the 
sample. This ra#!o could mean that the State was postponing 
its debt retirement and/or that it had a relatively light 
debt burden. Other evidence will show that the second 
proposition is the correct one.
In the third comparison in Table B, borrowing as a 
percentage of expenditure, Louisiana in 1957 again depended 
far less upon borrowing than the average state. Borrowing 
in 1957 constituted only 2.9 per cent of Louisiana's expen­
ditures, but it was 6.2 per cent in all states. If average 
Louisiana borrowing for the years 19^7-1957 ($33*036,381}..62) 
is used instead of 1957 borrowing only, the State of 
Louisiana still compares favorably, with borrowing consti­
tuting 5*1 Pe** cent of expenditures. The nearest other 
state in the sample was New York, which was above the in­
state average with 6.1}. per cent. The remainder of the 
states in the sample ranged from 11.5 P®** cent in Ohio to
22.8 per cent in Connecticut.
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Louisiana*s per capita debt in 1957 was $106.7̂ 4-.
This sura was substantially greater than the national average 
of $81.25. There were, however, five other states with per 
capita debts between $100 and $120 and eight others with per 
capita debts greater than $120. Of the five other states 
in the above comparison, only Ohio had a lower per capita 
debt than Louisiana. Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
and New York all had greater per capita debts than Louisiana. 
The fact of greater per capita debts in other states, of 
course, is not a sufficient test— per capita debt must be 
related to some income figure to measure relative burdens.
This comparison is also made in Table B. Per capita 
debt was 1̂ .2 per cent of per capita income in the forty- 
eight states. Louisiana*s per capita debt was J.k per cent 
of per capita income. In the states with prime ratings, the 
ratios were as follows: Connecticut, 6.5 P©r cent; Maryland,
8.8 per cent; Massachusetts, 9.5 P©r cent; New York, 5.2 per 
cent; and Ohio, 3.6 per cent. The debt in Louisiana measured 
by this criterion was greater than the national average, but 
less than the average for the five other states.
^United States Bureau of the Census, Department of 
Commerce, Compendium of State Government Finances in 1957. 
State Finances: 1957~TWashlngton! Government Printing
Office, 1958), p.’T r ’
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As of 1957* Louisiana was using its borrowing power 
sparingly. In this respect, Louisiana compares favorably 
with states that have far surpassed it in the bond ratings. 
This difference in ratings does not seem to be justified on 
the basis of relative debt burdens and ability to pay. Yet, 
these are nominally the basic criteria used in the bond 
market.
The next important table, Table C, shows the long­
term debt outstanding in selected states in 1957 and clas­
sifies this debt according to its character. Of the five 
states selected for the comparison, only one state had rela­
tively as much full faith and credit debt as did Louisiana. 
Louisiana and Massachusetts had 27.2 per cent of their debt 
in the nonguaranteed category. New York had 39.1 per cent 
nonguaranteed while Connecticut and Maryland had 6ij..3 and
65.8 per cent of their debt nonguaranteed. Ohio had 75.7 
per cent not covered by the full faith and credit of the
state. In all of the forty-eight states, 52 per cent of all
6long-term debt was nonguaranteed. It has been Indicated in
^The relatively high percentage of nonguaranteed debt 
in most of the selected states may have another implication; 
it may be a reason why all of the guaranteed or full faith 
and credit bonds of these states have been given the top 
rating by Moody’s. There may be some significance to this; 
however, the states were selected not only because they had 
Aaa ratings but also because they had large amounts of general 
obligations outstanding. It cannot be concluded, therefore, 
that the states had Aaa ratings on their full faith and 
credit debt mainly because they specialized in nonguaranteed 
Issues and thus had little full faith and credit debt.
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TABLE C
LONG-TERM DEBT OUTSTANDING AT END OF FISCAL YEAR 
BY CHARACTER FOR ALL STATES AND SELECTED 
STATES IN 1957
State














All 48 States 48.0 33.9 lî .l 52.0
Louisiana 72.8 72.8
fit 27.2
Connecticut 35 .7 29 .5 6.2 64.3
Maryland 34.2 20.6 13.6 65.8
Massachusetts 72.8 58.9 13 .9 27.2
New York 60.9 20 .9 40.0 39 .1
Ohio 24*3 21).. 3 m m m 75 .7
aThis information Is not entirely accurate. The Port 
of New Orleans debt, which is a long-term full faith and 
credit liability of the State, is payable partly from Port 
revenues.
Source: Compiled from Table XLIV, Appendix A.
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several places in this study that use of the full faith and 
credit of a state appears to be desirable; if the state is 
to be involved at all in debt financing, it is probably best 
to make the most of the involvement by making it as effec­
tive as possible. If this reasoning is correct, it would 
appear that Louisiana is following good debt management 
policy by giving its pledge to a large portion of its issues.
Another Interesting part of Table C is the breakdown 
of the full faith and credit debt of the states into the 
debt that was payable initially from specific nontax reve­
nues and the debt secured solely by the full faith and 
credit pledge. Louisiana Is shown as having only general
obligations and no debt payable Initially from specific
7nontax revenues. The other five states have a relatively 
high incidence of full faith and credit obligations that are 
payable initially from specific nontax revenues. Here it 
appears that the rating services may have drawn a distinc­
tion between tax dedication and nontax revenue dedication.
The distinction has validity in Louisiana; the pledge of 
specific tax revenues is backed by the full faith and credit 
pledge. But this practice amounts to financial redundancy.
7This information is not entirely accurate. The Port 
of New Orleans debt, which is a long-term full faith and 
credit liability of the State, is payable partly from Port 
revenues.
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In some other states, significant portions of full faith and 
credit obligations are payable from nontax revenues and then 
ultimately from tax revenues if all else fails. Whether 
this type of double protection actually Is really necessary 
for the protection of holders of state bonds still seems to 
be questionable. However, as long as the present bond 
criteria remain unchanged, it behooves alert state authori­
ties to shape their debt structures and debt management to 
make the best of the situation.
Another important comparison between Louisiana and 
the selected states concerns the rate at which obligations 
are retired. (See Table XLV, Appendix A.) In this compari­
son, Louisiana’s scheduled maturities decline from 
$20,565,000 in I960 to $7,01^1,000 In 1969. During the 
period from 1957 to 1969, 5^.2 per cent of the debt out­
standing will be retired. Massachusetts* debt maturity 
schedule will require approximately $25,000,000 each year 
until 1969, and the portion retired by that time will be 
almost the same as in Louisiana. The only state, of those 
examined, that will retire its debt more quickly than 
Massachusetts and Louisiana is Maryland. (See Table D.) In 
that state, 61.5 pen cent of the debt will be retired before 
1970. In the other states In the sample, Ohio will retire 
only 14}.. 7 P©r cent of its debt before 1970; New York will 
retire only 32 per cent, and Connecticut will retire 31.3
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TABLE D
LONG-TERM DEBT OUTSTANDING AT END OP FISCAL YEAR, BY 
SELECTED SCHEDULED MATURITY PERIODS FOR ALL 
STATES AND SELECTED STATES, 1957
Total Maturing 1970 Maturing
State Debt and thereafter 1970 and
(thousands) (thousands) thereafter 
(per cent)
All I4.8 States #13,521,970 #7,577,616 5 6 . 0
aLouisiana 321,301 1146,859 1*5.8
Connecticut 388,671 266,935 68.7
Maryland 520,271}. 192,928 38.5
Massachusetts 1,0 1 3 ,6 8 1 1463,1430 1*5.7
New York 1,971)-, 278 1,3142 , 52 0 6 8 . 0
Ohio 708,307 393,310 55.3
aThls sum does not include all of Louisiana*s 
indirect debt, but it has not been changed in order that 
the comparison with other states will be valid.
Source: Compiled from Table XLV, Appendix A.
380
per cent. All of the forty-eight states will have only kk 
per cent of their debts retired by the end of 1969. 
Louisiana, therefore, is providing well for debt retirement 
in comparison with selected states and all states.
In most of the above analysis, Louisiana1s debt 
structure compares favorably. The amount borrowed for 
highways Is not disproportionate. The debt burden is higher 
than the average for all states but lower than in the 
selected states. Pull faith and credit obligations have 
been widely usedj and, finally, the debt is being retired 
rapidly. If the basic economic strength of the State and 
the intrinsic soundness of Its financial structure were 
given the weight they deserve (and the weight that the 
rating services claim to give these factors), Louisiana 
would have a good part of its outstanding debt rated Aaa, 
There Is, nevertheless, ample opportunity for improvement In 
debt management and in the debt structure in Louisiana.
This Internal improvement is imperative as long as the 
rating systems and the market criteria are unchanged.
IV. PROPOSALS
Alternate proposals suggested here for improving 
the State*s debt structure and debt management are based 
upon two different assumptions: the first assumption is
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that a full scale reform of the Constitution and the admin­
istrative machinery is possible; the second assumption is 
that present legal institutions will be continued. Some 
general ideas are presented at the end of this Chapter which 
raise questions about intergovernmental relationships and 
relationships of state and local units to each other and to 
the various rating services.
Constitutional Codification and 
Reform Objectives
A comprehensive reform of Louisiana's debt structure 
and management could best start with the Constitution of 
1921, It would probably be easier to adopt a new constitu­
tion than to try to amend the present one into a satisfactory 
form, but it would not be impossible to amend certain 
existing provisions of the Constitution and to add others.
In either case, constitutional provisions covering the debt 
structure and debt management should be treated separately 
and in an orderly fashion. This procedure would be a very 
Important first step in any reform because it would attack 
the evil of complexity at its source.
In codifying and revising constitutional debt provi­
sions, there are several other objectives besides simplicity 
which would be important in improving the debt structure. 
These objectives would include: building confidence in the
State*s credit standing; allowing for more flexibility In
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debt management; and, providing greater margins of protec­
tion for all issues.
The observation was made in Chapter II that the 
success of a state’s debt structure and debt management 
depends to a great extent on building confidence. With the 
market criteria prevailing today, a state must give very 
careful attention to creating confidence in issues by 
observing all of the conventions which are highly regarded 
in the market, even if there is less than one chance in one 
thousand that a threat of default or repudiation will ever 
cause the extra guarantees to be tested. For this reason, 
the constitutional reform must be written so as to inspire 
confidence in the State’s intention to repay and also in the 
protection offered to the bondholders. A good starting 
point in establishing this debt policy might be a paragraph 
like the following:
The State government of Louisiana and any 
agency chartered by the State is hereby charged 
with the responsibility of maintaining the State’s 
credit by every means possible. It is hereby 
provided that there shall always be prompt and 
complete payment of every valid outstanding^ 
obligation of the State and of the interest due
The term "valid outstanding obligation" is used to 
eliminate difficulty from the Reconstruction issues that may 
be still outstanding.
It is possible that Louisiana made a mistake in not 
paying this debt, If only for the purpose of removing this
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on such obligations on their due dates. The 
State of Louisiana hereby waives its sovereign 
right to repudiate any valid direct or indirect 
obligations of the State.
The objective of permitting better debt management 
could be achieved in a comprehensive reform of the Constitu­
tion by leaving decisions about such matters as timing,
advertising, selling, and other sundry bond provisions to be
determined by some body created primarily to perform the
debt management function. More latitude can be provided for
the debt managers by omitting the management details from 
the constitutional debt ordinance.
Methods of Increasing Protective Margins
An entirely feasible approach to the matter of
increasing protective margins was proposed by Ross and
9Sliger in a 19f>7 study of Louisiana tax dedications. The 
relationship between tax dedications and the debt structure
blemish from its credit record. Such action would have 
required about $llj., 000,000 and could have been extended over 
several years. The decision of the United States govern­
ment to assume the debts incurred by the states during the 
Revolutionary War succeeded dramatically in building this 
nation*s credit. More recently, the repayment of Its World 
War I debts by Finland did much to improve that nation*s 
credit. A similar effect might have resulted from the 
action suggested above for Louisiana. Of course, fortuitous 
windfalls and other problems make the suggestion impractical 
at this late date.
^William D. Ross and B. F. Sliger, ’’Dedication of 
State Revenues in Louisiana," Louisiana Business Review, 
XXII, No, if. (April, 1958), 20-537
was analyzed in that study, and proposals were made as to
what might be done about existing dedications which were
considered to be undesirable. The study distinguished three
time periods and indicated what action would be possible in
each period. It was found that it would have been possible
for the Louisiana Legislature alone to free 35 per cent of
existing State tax dedications between 1957 and the beginning
of 1959. It was also possible that 25 per cent more of the
dedications could have been removed by constitutional change
in the short-run. Since 16 per cent of Louisiana taxes was
not dedicated at the time of the study, this meant that
about 75 per cent of all State tax dedications could have10
been eliminated by the end of 1958.
The second time period examined was the period from
January 1, 1959 to December 31, 196lj., Scheduled debt
retirement would have freed most nonhighway tax revenues by
the end of this Intermediate period. A longer period would
have brought more debt retirement which would have eliminated
most of the remaining tax dedications. Complete freedom
from tax dedication would have been possible by 1975 if some





The value of this analysis has not been altered sub­
stantially by the lapse of time since 1957. Changes in tax 
dedications are not necessarily an almost impossible matter 
pertinent only in the long-term. Changes in the handling of 
tax revenues should be started as soon as it is decided that 
they will make the State*s fiscal structure sounder. The 
elimination of such tax dedications by constitutional and 
other means would be important in its effect on the debt 
structure, but, of course, dedications are only one aspect 
of the debt problem.
Another type of reform, similar but more comprehen­
sive than that proposed by Ross and Sliger and provided by 
means of a new State Constitution, could follow these lines!
1. All existing pledges and dedications to holders
of outstanding bonds could be reenacted. It 
could be made clear that no existing pledges 
will be extended to bonds or Issues sold subse­
quent to the adoption of this policy.
2. There could be no borrowing except in the 
State’s name either by departments, agencies, 
commissions, or boards, for financing ports, 
expressways, public institutions, or similar
public improvements or for any other reason.
There could be no indirect State debt, and 
all State debt could be full faith and credit 
debt of the State of Louisiana,
3. All direct State bonds could be payable from 
the general fund of the State. The general 
fund could consist of: (a) all tax and 
license revenues, mineral lease and royalty 
receipts which are not dedicated to the 
payment of bonds or for other purposes at
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the date when the document is ratified;
(b) all taxes and revenues presently dedi­
cated, as the bonds issued and payable from 
the said taxes and revenues are retired 
and/or called; (c) all undedicated surpluses 
of presently dedicated taxes in the interim 
until they revert to the general fund.
i|. There could be no further dedication of either 
taxes, revenues, or receipts for the payment of 
specific bond issues or for any other purpose.12 
All taxes and revenues not presently dedicated 
and all taxes and revenues presently dedicated, 
as soon as bonds backing them are retired, 
could be paid into the general fund. Taxes 
and revenues presently dedicated for other 
purposes than debt service could be either 
undedicated or the other purposes clearly 
could be given a subordinate claim to debt 
service,
5. The first charge upon the general fund could 
be for the payment of principal and interest 
on all direct obligations. No other payments 
could be made out of said fund until all debt 
service requirements are satisfied.
6. There could be no legal limitation on the 
Legislature*s authority to levy ad valorem 
taxes for the payment of interest and principal 
on the full faith and credit obligations of the 
State.
Greater margins of protection for the State’s issues 
would result automatically if the various obligations of the 
State were not differentiated. The use of the State’s full 
faith and credit pledge, made fully and unequivocally effec­
tive by a constitutional prior claim on all State revenues,
■^The views here about dedications are similar to 
those recommended in the Pro .let, II, p. 227*
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in support of each new State issue would mean that no issue 
would he subordinate to any other issue. All issues, 
individually and in the aggregate, would then clearly be 
protected by the total revenues and other resources of the 
State. Such action would have to be taken in the beginning 
subject to prior specific bond liens. Eventually, however, 
all issues outstanding would be single lien bonds protected 
by the total resources of the State government of Louisiana. 
The results could unquestionably be expected to be Aaa 
ratings for all Louisiana bonds. Every existing excuse for 
not awarding such ratings would have been removed.
Constitutional Debt Limitation
A very important part of any constitutional reform of
the debt structure in Louisiana would have to deal with the
present debt limitation. Louisiana may still need some sort
of debt limitation, but the present one is too rigid. A
flexible limitation, somewhat along the lines suggested by 
13Ratchford, might be appropriate. The Legislature could be 
permitted to borrow so long as the debt outstanding, including
13B. U. Ratchford, American State Debts (Durham,
North Carolina: Duke University Press, i9llj.lV, pp. lf.92-95;
See also, B. U. Ratchford, "State and Local Debt Limitations," 
Proceedings of the Fifty-First Annual Conference on Taxation 
(Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: National Tax Association, 1959),
215.29.
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new borrowing, does not exceed a certain amount or a certain 
percentage of taxes or revenues collected in the preceding 
year or in several earlier years. Because of the time lag, 
the percentage rule would tend to limit borrowing when 
prices and tax collections are rising and permit borrowing 
when they are falling. Borrowing in excess of the basic 
permissible amount might be made possible by having proposed 
borrowing approved by means of referenda. A referendum 
would give the electorate the opportunity to control borrow­
ing when the limit of safety is being approached, but such 
action would not involve complicating the Constitution by 
amendment. A debt limitation might also be modified to give 
special consideration to borrowing for projects that are 
self-supporting. Borrowing for such self-supporting projects 
might properly not be counted at all against the debt limita­
tion or else be counted at some fraction of the actual 
amount borrowed.
Capital Budgeting
Capital budgeting could be an important part of any
111-constitutional debt reform. It would be desirable to 
establish procedures whereby various departments and agen­
cies of the State would prepare estimates of their long-term
^Ross and Sliger, loo, clt.
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capital needs. These different needs could then be reviewed, 
compared, and ranked according to priority. The next step 
would be to compare the cost of the various needs with the 
current revenues available to finance them. The difference 
between current revenues and needs would then be subject to 
still another set of considerations. IS it proper for the 
State to borrow for these purposes? Is it safe for the 
State to engage in borrowing? Can these needs be postponed 
and how long can they be postponed? Any planning that would 
make possible discretion in the timing of bond sales would 
be extremely important.
Some refinement of capital budgeting might be neces­
sary to recognize the fact that there are many existing 
agencies in the State and that these agencies would probably 
continue in operation even after constitutional reform, if 
for no other reason than that they have debt committments 
that must be honored. It might be necessary to consider 
these agencies separately in the capital budget. In review­
ing the different requests, it would appear to be proper to 
allow the anticipated receipts of revenue-producing projects 
to be given special consideration.
Administrative Machinery
After the capital budget has been formulated, and if 
it includes any proposals for borrowing, these proposals
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could be reviewed by a constitutionally established special 
Board (or perhaps two Boards). Reports about the financial 
and economic feasibility of this proposed borrowing could 
then be returned to the budget group for a decision. The 
Bond Boards would have the authority to manage the borrowing 
that might eventually result and to administer any special 
bond service fund that might be established. In Louisiana, 
it would not be necessary and it probably would not even be 
desirable to eliminate the highway debt structure that has 
recently been put in order. In fact, the long-range highway 
plan which has been implemented could well serve as a model 
for redesigning the remaining debt structure of the State.
The long-range highway plan embodies the basic techniques
15for improving a debt structure. Remarks here about a Bond 
Board, therefore, could apply either to a single board system 
or to all other parts of the debt structure except the 
highway debt. If a dual system were installed, both would 
benefit from close cooperation, and it might be desirable and 
economical for the two bodies to share research and other 
facilities since their objectives would necessarily be 
similar.
•̂ P̂or an analysis of the long-range highway plan, 
supra, Chap. V, pp. 308 ff.
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There should be one or two bodies clearly responsible 
for all phases of State borrowing. These units would best 
be composed of legal experts, economists, statisticians, and 
possibly representatives in the financial centers. The 
savings realized by eliminating duplications of debt manage­
ment personnel and facilities in the several agencies of the 
State would probably more than cover the expenses required 
to operate these new units. Consolidation would then provide 
a net gain for the State if it could improve bond ratings 
and make possible lower cost borrowing. One function of 
such a Board would be to establish and to maintain legisla­
tive liason. The debt Board would be responsible for 
receiving and processing requests for borrowing indicated in 
the capital budget. With this as a guide, the Board could 
formulate and even draft bills for submission to the proper 
legislative committees. The initiation of borrowing legis­
lation by a body concerned with building and maintaining an 
effective debt structure would eliminate some troublesome 
provisions from Louisiana’s debt structure which have never 
been eliminated simply because no one has had either the 
responsibility or the authority to study, suggest, explain, 
or protest against the effects of such provisions. It might 
be more politic for the drafting of legislation to start 
with the liason group in the Legislature rather than with
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the Board. However, it would be necessary and proper for 
the Board to explain to the legislative group fully and 
exactly the nature of the provisions recommended for such 
legislation.
The Bond Board, of course, would have to be well- 
informed. In order to be well-informed, it would have to 
include within its organization a research unit. The second 
important function of the Bond Board, therefore, would be 
fact finding. Data that would aid in the advertisement and 
marketing of bonds, the timing of sales, and the reporting 
of debt would need to be gathered.
After bills authcsizing borrowing are approved —  
either by the Legislature or by the Legislature and the 
public in the case of a referendum— the problem would then 
again revert to the Bond Board where the advertising and the 
requesting of bids would be initiated. The same group then 
could review the bids received and select the best bid or 
reject them all according to priorities established in the 
capital budget. After the bid is accepted, the Bond Board 
could begin the process of preparing and finally delivering 
the bonds. Funds received as a result of the borrowing 
would then be placed In the Treasury and made available for 
the purpose designated.
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A final but extremely important function of the Bond 
Board would be debt reporting. This reporting function 
would include responsibility not only for seeing that 
complete information is published in the regular State 
reports, but also informing rating services and investors 
about the State*s debt structure. In addition to answering 
all inquiries about the debt structure, the Bond Board 
should review all official published statements about the 
debt structure in order to avoid errors. Finally, it would 
also be helpful for the Board to study all information 
released by rating services about the State*s outstanding 
and new offerings and to correct any misinterpretations 
which do the State injustice.
Another of the major policies that would have to be 
decided in any constitutional revision of the administrative 
debt machinery would be what to do about agency or authority 
borrowing. The agency appears to be popular today mainly 
because it circumvents debt limitations and because it has 
met with some success in expediting the financing, the 
construction, and the operation of certain improvements. 
These reasons, however, are predicated on the failure of the 
normal machinery of government. If institutional Impedi­
ments are eliminated and the normal channels of government 
are made more effective, and if there is no outdated consti­
tutional limitation, then there may be less justification
3%
for the use of the agency device. The question here, 
however, is not primarily whether the agency is justified 
but whether it should borrow for the state. If states 
engaged only in direct borrowing and agencies were not 
permitted to exercise this function, the alleged advantages 
of the agencies might be utilized without running the risks 
or suffering the disadvantages which may be associated with 
borrowing by the agency means. Agencies could continue 
planning, supervising, and operating improvements while 
being relieved of their borrowing powers. This change would 
not only ensure better control of funds but would also make 
more effective use of the state*s credit In the financing of 
improvements which usually contribute to economic growth on 
the state level.
Improving the Debt Structure and 
Management Under Existing Institutions
A great deal can be done to Improve the State*s debt 
structure and management and its credit standing even under 
the existing legal framework and administrative machinery.
If these cannot be changed, the various agencies authorized 
to borrow in the State*s name could each follow individually 
as far as possible the principles of good debt management 
suggested In Chapter II. For example, agencies requesting 
legislative approval for borrowing could ask for more
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flexibility in the provisions of the act. Or, if it is 
impossible to get this freedom of action, it would be 
desirable for the agencies to request specifically those 
provisions which will make the bonds more marketable. 
Agencies could also keep in mind the general objectives of 
simplicity and confidence, could try to afford maximum pro­
tection to the bondholders, and could try to time their 
issues as effectively as possible. These objectives are 
valid for an entire debt structure and for each individual 
Issue comprising that debt structure. If the structure In 
the aggregate cannot be given these characteristics, it 
would still be desirable to try to extend them to the debt 
structures of the individual agencies and to their Issues.
Another very general improvement that could be made, 
with existing Institutions, would be for the various 
agencies of the State to cooperate on a voluntary basis. 
There is no limit to what could be accomplished by this 
approach. Cooperation would make agencies more cognizant 
of their influence on the entire State*s debt structure. 
Cooperation would also provide a wealth of Information about 
the methods and techniques of debt management as well as 
about market conditions. This knowledge would benefit the 
individual agencies as well as the taxpayers. The various 
agencies could also cooperate in research and in field work 
in the financial centers of the country. Finally, one of
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the places where cooperation is extremely important, and 
■urgently needed if more direct means are not provided, is 
in debt reporting. Not even the Financial Report of the 
State gives a true picture of the debt structure. In 1957* 
for example, the following agency debts were not even men­
tioned: Mississippi River Bridge Authority, $65*000,000;
Baton Rouge Port Commission, $12,500,000; and, the Greater
16New Orleans Expressway Commission, $lj.6,500,000. Yet, the 
State is clearly involved in each of these debts. It Is 
very doubtful that the State can profit in the long run by 
providing incomplete or inaccurate information to those who 
are Interested.
V. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
These miscellaneous considerations relate to matters 
external to state debt structures such as bond ratings and 
Federal and local relationships.
Bond Ratings
A state has a good credit standing if its obligations 
have a high standing In the market, i.e., if Its bonds are 
highly rated. But how accurately do bond ratings reflect 
true ability and willingness to bear and to pay debts?
■^Louisiana, Financial Report. 1956-57* PP. 56-58.
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Bond ratings are subject to question from several different 
standpoints. Prom what has been seen in the comparisons of 
Louisiana ratings with the ratings in selected states, it 
would appear that, with respect to the really fundamental 
measures, Louisiana*s debt structure compares very favorably. 
Why then are Louisiana's ratings substandard?
The superficialities upon which the bond ratings are 
so largely based have been thoroughly violated in the State. 
There has been widespread neglect of even the most obvious 
amenities which would help to get better ratings. The debt 
structure has been made more and more complex, and the 
margin of protection has been dissipated by the device of 
dedication. Specific taxes have been pledged many times, 
and there has evolved a maze of liens. Detailed studies are 
thereby made necessary before the rating services and 
investors can determine the nature of Louisiana's 
obligations.
Violation of market standards is not the only factor 
that underlies the poor ratings. First, appropriately or 
not, Louisiana's credit standing may still be affected by 
the fact that the State twice defaulted on interest payments 
and once repudiated part of its debt. Second, the State is 
relatively remote from the financial centers where munici­
pals are rated and traded. Distance may act as a baffle to 
obscure the fact of rapid economic growth in Louisiana.
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Another factor which cannot be ignored in trying to 
explain why ratings seem to be too low in Louisiana is the 
nature of the ratings themselves. The ratings are not 
intended primarily as a public service but as a commercial 
service. The rating agencies thus actually depend for their 
existence upon finding or emphasizing differences upon which 
they can base and vary their ratings. There are many differ­
ences in indenture provisions and in the nominal protection 
afforded to various issues, and these superficial differences 
can be used very plausibly to justify differences in ratings, 
without any intention of discriminating against any specific 
state or political subdivision. Unquestionably, ratings 
based upon more profound criteria would tend to become more 
uniform, no doubt in the upward direction, but the rating 
services can hardly be expected to lead such a movement.
They may be willing to follow if someone else supplies the 
necessary information to support it.
If the rating services have an Interest in perpetu­
ating the present system of ratings based on traditional 
criteria, they are not alone. The investment bankers and 
the investors have something to gain from the existence of 
differences In ratings. The difference in ratings Is sup­
posed to reflect differences in investment quality. This 
"Investment quality” apparently also is supposed to show
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differences in risk. The difference in quality and risk is 
then a basis for differences in bids and yields. Lower 
ratings lead to higher yields and higher yields normally 
will enable bidders to enjoy higher spreads between their 
bids and their reofferings. If the risk is more superficial 
than real, then the buyers of the lower-rated state obliga­
tions profit from the unreal differentiation caused by the 
ratings. It must not be expected that investment bankers or 
investors would be in favor of revised criteria which would 
emphasize only the total protection afforded by a state*s 
wealth, resources, and honor.
Federal. State, and Local Debt 
Relationships
This study analyzes the means by which a state may 
make its debt financing more efficient. Federal-state-local 
cooperation in this connection may also offer possibilities. 
One of the things that might be done would be to insure 
municipals under some type of plan similar to the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. Perhaps bondholders could 
have the first $1 0 , 0 0 0  of any state {or state and local) 
bonds insured. States might be induced to support sueh a 
plan by paying into a fund according to the amount of bonds 
they sell.
The Federal Government would have a great deal to 
gain from participation in this type of program. It would
ij.00
aid In any coordinated Federal-state local fiscal policy. 
Also, any aid that the Federal government makes available to 
the states may lessen the chances that the Federal govern­
ment will have to assume more of the functions of government. 
The Federal government would also be helping its own credit 
standing by protecting that of the states. The identifica­
tion of the American states with the Federal government in 
the minds of investors and other nations may be greater than 
is generally recognized. For example, when there was a ques­
tion of whether foreign nations should pay their war debts 
after World War I, one of the arguments against payment was 
that the American states had defaulted on their bonds in the
nineteenth century when many of these state bonds were held
17by foreign bondholders.
It might be possible for states to join regionally or 
nationally, even without Federal aid or encouragement, into 
this type of plan. If either of these programs were estab­
lished, it would not be difficult to take the next logical 
step and to add an organization that would provide research 
facilities, expert consultants, Information about market 
conditions, and perhaps even new market outlets to the
^Reginald C. McGrane, Foreign Bondholders and Ameri­
can State Debts (New Yorks The Macmillan Company, 193^1,
p.
l+Ol
member states. The development of such an organization 
would automatically tend to reduce dependence upon invest­
ment bankers and vulnerability to rating services. This 
type of organization might also be better prepared to cope 
with the problems that states some day may have in finding 
enough funds for their needs.
Another great intergovernmental problem which has 
been entirely neglected in this study is that facing subdi­
visions of the states in their borrowing. They, too, could 
certainly profit greatly from assistance from some sort of 
centralized reviewing and reporting agency. For example, 
one of the problems presently facing many subdivisions of 
this State is that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
is rating some of the bank-heId bonds of Louisiana subdivi­
sions as substandard, largely because there is insufficient 
information available about these small issues. There are 
many problems confronting subdivisions, which cost the 
citizens of the State dearly, that probably could be solved 
with some State assistance. Of course, this assistance 
should be predicated on the State*s first putting its own 
house In order.
The State*s responsibility to improve its own credit 
may even require that the State first deliberately disas­
sociate itself from the '’municipal” category. There Is
really a great deal of difference between state borrowing and 
city or subdivision borrowing* One basic difference is 
found in the respective abilities to raise revenue. The 
State obviously can control more funds beoause it is able to 
use some highly productive taxes which are unavailable on 
the local level. The income tax is the most obvious example 
of this type of tax, and the same thing is true to a lesser 
extent of sales and excise taxes. Since state governments 
have greater revenue potential and sounder financial founda­
tions than the local governments, should their obligations 
be appraised according to the same basic standards that are 
applied to local obligations? Perhaps states should 
emphasize these differences and demand that they be rated 
according to different standards, especially when their full 





























-- mm mm m 1 ,2 5 0 -- 1,250
M M -- lj.,000 1*00 l*,l*oo
1918 -- mm mm am 6,000 -- 6 ,0 0 0
1919 -- $ 7 0 0 8,000 -- 8 ,7 0 0
1920 . . . . . . 7,500 _  __ 7^500
TOTAL $10,992 $ 7 0 0 $29,750 $650 $1*2, 092
bounded to the nearest thousand.




STATE BOND AND INTEREST TAX FUND BORROWING, 1913-1920
Series Date Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody's
and of Rate Amount or Non- Date Rating







^hese direct and full faith and credit obligations 
were payable from the proceeds of the 1 .15> mill ad valorem 
tax in the State Bond and Interest Tax Fund.
1̂
Interest rates given throughout this Appendix are 
nominal or coupon rates unless it is otherwise indicated.
g
These bonds were called and refunded prior to 1939; 
the rating is that which was given at the time of issue.
dRounded to the nearest thousand.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1913)> Art. 321p;
A. M. Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal 
Bonds (New Orleans: A. M. Smith Investment Company, 1933)>
p. 1; Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report. 1922-23, pp. ix-x; 
Moody's, 1918, pp. 191-92; and Louisiana, Board of Liquida­
tion, 11 Constitutional Provisions in Reference to Louisiana 
Bonded Debt," (Baton Rouge: November and December, 1913)»














Interest Original Callable 
Rate Amount or Non- 
(per cent) Issued Callable 
(thousands)
Maturity Moody* 1 
Date Rating 
(1939;
Act 1 8, 
1918
Special Session,
A 2/1/19 5.0 |700 NC 1 9 2 0-
1939
Aa
aPayable from the portion of motor vehicle licnese 
taxes in Highway Fund Number 2. These obligations were not 
full faith and credit obligations of the State, but they are 
considered to have been direct obligations.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1913), as amended
1918, Special Session, Act 18; Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report. 
1922-23, pp. ix-x; "Schedule of Bond and Coupon Maturities 
Handled by the Treasurer, State of Louisiana," Compiled by 
H. B. Conner, State Treasurer(corrected to December 31,
1 9 2 9}, p. 2£; Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and 
Municipal Bonds. 1933, p. 8j and Moody1s, 1919, p. 2lHjT
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Date Interest Original 
of Rate Amount 









Louisiana, Constitution (1913)* 
Article 322; and Act 133 of 1910:
4/1 / 1 4  5.0 $3 ,0 0 0 NC 1920-54 Baa
5/1/15 5.0 1 ,2 5 0 NC 1923-55 Baa
3/1/17 4 . 5 4 , 0 0 0 NC 1925-57 Baa
3/1/19 5.o 2 ,0 0 0 NC 1927-59 Baa
Louisiana, Constitution (1913). 
Article 322; and Act 244 of 1914$ 
and Act 3 of 1918:
7/1/18 5.o 6 ,0 0 0 NC 1929-58 Baa
1/1/19 5.0 6 ,0 0 0 NC 1930-59 Baa
1/1/20 5.o 5 , 0 0 0 NC 1931-60 Baa
1/1/20 5.0 2 , 5 0 0 NC 1931-60 Baa
aThese Indirect but full faith and credit obligations 
were payable from the operating revenues of the Port,
These bonds were dated in 1920 but not Issued until1921.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1913)» Art. 322;
Louisiana, Acts (1910), Act 133, p. 209; (1914)» Act 244, 
pp. 475-76; (1918), Act 3, pp. 5-10; Port of New Orleans, 
"Statement of Amortization," 1922, pp. 1-17? Louisiana, 
Treasurer*s Report. 1922-23, pp. ix-x; Moody*s, 1918, pp. 191- 
92; 1923, p.“"8 7 0; .1938, p. 61+0.
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TABLE V





Date Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody's 
of Rat6 Amount or Non- Date Rating 




3/1/11+ £.0 $2^0 NC 1915-39 Baa
Louisiana, Constitution (1913), 
as amended 1916, Act 131+5
1/1 / 1 7 5 . 0  1+00 NC 1918-27 bAaa
£LThese indirect but full faith and credit obligations 
were payable from the revenues of the Penitentiary.
This rating was given at the time of issue rather 
than in 1939.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1913)» as amended
1916, Act 131+J Louisiana, Acts (1912). Act 7 1, p. 82; 
Louisiana, Treasurer* s Report. 1922-23, p. x; Smith, Compila 
tion of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds. 1933> p. 5? and 
Moody's, 1 9 1 8", ~PP". 191-92.
TABLE VI













1921 --------------- $3 , £ 0 0 ---------------- $ 3 , £ 0 0




mm ̂ m m ---------------- 3 ,0 0 0 3 , 0 0 0





1926 — £00 £ 0 0
1927 $2 , 0 0 0 3 , 0 0 0 . £ , 0 0 0
TOTAL $2 ,0 0 0 #1 ,0 0 0 $9 , £ 0 0 $1 , 0 0 0 $1 3 ,5 0 0








Date Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody* 
of Rate Amount or Non- Date Rating 





1 • * 
3/15/27 5.0 $2,000 NC 1928-39 Aa
These obligations were payable from a portion of 
motor vehicle license taxes in Highway Fund Number 2. They 
were not full faith and credit obligations of the State.
Since borrowing by a department is considered borrowing in 
a state*s name, these bonds are considered direct obliga­
tions regardless of the fact that they were not full faith 
and credit bonds.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art 6, Sec.
2I4..I, as amended 192I4., Act 179, Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report. 
1926-27, p. 59; and Moody*s, 1928, p. 12l£j..
IpXl
TABLE VIII





Date interest Original Callable Maturity Moody* 1 
of Rate Amount or Non- Date Rating 




A 12/1 5 / 2 5  $ 5 0 0 NC 1931
b
Aaa
B 11/1/26 5 . 0  50 0 NC 1932
D
Aaa
aThese direct and full faith and credit obligations 
were payable from the proceeds of the 0 . 7 5  mill ad valorem 
tax in the Confederate Veterans* Pension Fund.
These ratings are those which were given at the time 
of issue.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, as
amended 192ij., Act 176; Louisiana, Treasurer*s Report, 
1926-27, p. 59; and Moody*s, 1927, p. 1128; 1931, p. Iip99.
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TABLE IX
PORT OF NEW ORLEANS BORROWING, 1921-1927®
Series Date Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody* s
and of Rate Amount or Non- Date Rating
Authori- Issue (per cent) Issued callable (1939)
zation__________________ (thousands_)_________________________
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), 
Article I4., Section 16:
12/1 / 2 1 9.0 $3 , 9 0 0 NC 1931-71 Baa
12/1 / 2 3 U-79 3 , 0 0 0 NC 1933-73 Baa
8/1 /2 7 b.5 3 , 0 0 0 NC 1937-77 Baa
These indirect but full faith and credit obligations 
were payable from the operating revenues of the Port. These 
three issues sold by the Port during this period were all 
General Improvement Bonds.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. I4., Sec.
16; Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report. 192)i-25. p. 97; 1926-27, 
p. 99; Moodyts, 1923, p. 970; 1929, p. 939; 1928, p. 1 2 1)4.; 
and Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State and Municipal 
Bonds. 1933, PP. 10-11
U 3
TABLE X
STATE PENITENTIARY BORROWING, 1921-19273,
Series bate Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody’: 
and of Rate Amount or Non- Date Rating 
Author!- Issue (per cent) Issued Callable (1939) 
zation (thousands)
Louisiana, Constitution (1921), 
Article 20, Section 1:
1/1 / 2 2  5 . 0  $1 , 0 0 0 NC 1923-62 Baa
aThese indirect but full faith and credit obligations 
were payable from revenues of the Penitentiary.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 20, Sec.
1; Louisiana, Treasurers Report. 1922-23, p. x; Moody’s, 
1922, p. 8J4-O; and A. M. Smith, Compilation of Louisiana 
State and Municipal Bonds (New Orleans: A, M, Smith Invest­
ment Company, 193&), P« 6 .
TABLE XI
LOUISIANA BORROWING BY PURPOSE, 1928-191+0
{thousands)

























1928 I  500 $ 2 9 5 _ _ _ _  _  _ . . . ■IIPW $ 79 5
1 9 2 9 $ 1 5 ,0 0 0 5 8 9 ---------------- --------------- --------------- ---------------- . . . 1 5 , 5 8 9
1 9 3 0 2 1 ,0 0 0 ---------------- ---------------- . . . 2 1 ,0 0 0
1 9 3 1 1 5 , 0 0 0 2 ,0 0 0 5 , 5 0 2 ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- . . . 2 2 ,5 0 2
1 9 3 2 3 2 , 0 0 0 ■■ •mtm . . . . . . ma mm am ---------------- 3 2 , 0 0 0
1 9 3 3 — --------------- l ; , 9 5 o MHW ---------------- ---------------- l+ ,9 5 0
193I+ 500 ---------------- . . . ---------------- 8 1 1 9 61 9
1 9 3 5 7 , 5 0 0 2 , 000 ---------------- -- b . . . --------------- 1 , 5 0 0 ll,000r
1 9 3 6 5 , 0 0 0 , ---------------- ---------------- $1,301+ $ 1+, 1̂ .00 1,000 10,Ij.00®
1 9 3 7 1 7 ,0 0 0 ~ . _ _ --- b --------------- . . . . . . 500 12,000
1 9 3 8 8 , 5 0 0 . . . 8,612 ■ b l+ ,5 oo $6,000 2,000 21,000®
1 9 3 9 1 0 , 6 0 0 500 658 . . . - 11,100
19lj.O 2 .5 0 0 m m m w m — . — ■ — - . . . 2 , 5 0 0 .
$ 1 2 9 , 1 0 0 ° $ 5 , 5 8 9 $ 1 0 ,71+7^
1 ' C
$ 8 ,9 0 0 $ 6 , 0 0 0 $ 5 , H 9 $ i 6 5 A 5 5 w
bounded to the nearest thousand.■L̂
Refunding issues 
cRefunding issues are not included in the totals.
^This sum Includes $£>£00,000 of Series Q, that was sold in order to call Series H
and I.





Series Date Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody's
and of Rate Amount or Non- Date Rating
Authori- Issue (per cent) Issued callable (19391
z at ion__________________ (thousands_)_________________________
PAYABLE PROM THE 1-CENT GASOLINE TAX:
Act 219, 1928; and Act 1, E.S., 1928:
A 3/1/29 5.0 $10,000 NC 1930-49 A
B 12/15/29 5.0 5,000 NC 1930-Ip9 A
0 3/15/30 5.0 6 ,0 0 0 nc 1 9 3 2 - 5 0 A
PAYABLE PROM THE 3-CENT GASOLINE TAX AND THE SURPLUS OF THE 
1-CENT GASOLINE TAX:


















U 10/1 / 3 8
V 1/1/39
W 5/1/39
4 . 5 1 5 ,0 0 0 NC 1934-55 A
4.5 15,000 NC 1935-56 A
5.o 1 5 ,0 0 0 NC 1936-57 A
5.0 7 , 0 0 0 NC 1936-57 A
5.0 7,500 C 1936-39 n.r
5.0 2 , 5 0 0 C 1936-to n.r
5.0 5 0 0 c 1939 A
5.o 1,000 NC 1939-1+9 A
5.o 5 , 0 0 0 NC 1939-60 A
4.5 1 ,5 0 0 NC 1939-60 A
4.5 2 ,5 0 0 NC 1940-60 A
I; . 25 2 ,5 0 0 NC 19l|0-61 A
3.75 5 , 5 0 0 NC 19I4-I-6O A
3.5 6 ,5 0 0 NC 1941-60 Baa
U. 0 2,580 NC 1914.1-57 Baa
3.75 2 ,14.20 NC 1958-60
Ij-.O 2 ,014.1 NC 1943-56 Baa
3.5 1,959 NC 1957-60 1
I4-. 0 1 ,0 5 2 NC 191+2-55 Baa
3 . 7 5 1,1448 NC 1956-60 i
14-.0 731 NC 19l].3-55 Baa
3.5 1,269 NC 1956-61 (
3.5 126 NC 1943-51 Baa
3.0 675 NC 1952-59





Series Date Interest Original Callable Maturity faoodyfs
and of Rate Amount or Non- Date Rating
Authori­- Issue (per cent) Issued callable (1939)
zation (thousands)
X 6/15/39 4.0 $ 801 NC 1943-59
cBaa
3.75 155 NC I960
3.5 44 NC 1961 cY 4/1 5 /4 0 3.5 750 NC 19lj.l4.-55 Baa
3.0 1,200 NC 1956-59
2.75 550 NC I960
Act 39, 1938: cAA 5/1/39 3.5 1,000 NC 1947 BaaBB 6/15/39 3.25 1,000 NC 1947 BaacCC 12/15/39 2.0 2 ,5 0 0 NC 1942-43 Baa
1.75 5 0 0 ' NC 1944
PAYABLE FROM PORTION OF MOTOR VEHICLE LICENSE TAXES (HIGHWAY
FUND NUMBER 2)!
Act 7 1, 1936: nC 1/1/38 4.0 750 NC 1943-56 A
3.5 250 NC 1957-61 cD 10/1/38 3.0 100 NC 1942-43 A
3.5 700 NC 1944-57
3.25 200 NC 1958-61 f*E 1/1/39 3.0 360 NC 1943-54 A
2.75 2i|.0 NC 1955-62 cF 6/15/39 3.0 750 NC 1943-57 A
3.25 250 NC 1958-62
aThese obligations are direct and full faith and credit
ones.
Series H and I were not rated at the time of their 
sale and were either matured and/or called by 1939.
£All of these ratings are those which were given at 
the time of issue instead of 1939.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec.
22(d), as amended 1928, Act 219; Art 6, Sec. 22, as amended 
1930, Act 3, E.S.j Art. 6, Sec. 22, as amended 1934, Act 2; 
Art. 6, Sec. 22(f), as amended 1936, Act 66; Art. 6, Sec.
TABLE XII (continued)
22(g), as amended 1936, Act 71; Art. 6, Sec. 22(h), as 
amended 1938, Act 39; Louisiana, Acts (1928), E.S., Act 1, 
PP.-3-6; Louisiana, Treasurers Report, 1922-23, p. x; 1926- 
27, p. 5>9, 1932-33, p. 82-83; Louisiana, Financial Report. 
19J+1-J+2, pp. 80-81; 19l(-5“l|-6, p. 62; Smith, Compilation of 
Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds. 1933, pp. 6-8; A. M. 
Smith, A Supplement to the Compilation of Louisiana State and 
Municipal Bonds (New Orleans: A. M. Smith Investment Co.,
1931+), pp. 3>-6; A. M. Smith, A Supplement to the Compilation 
of Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds (New Orleans: A. M.
Smith Investment Co., 1935>)» p. 6; and Moody1 s, 1930-191+2.
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TABLE XIII
CONFEDERATE VETERANS * PENSION BORROWING, 1928-1940*
Series Date Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody’s
and of Rate Amount or Non- Date Rating
Author!- Issue (per cent) Issued callable (1939)
z at ion_______________  (thous ands )_________________________
Act
C
1 7 6, 19214.:




2 3 , 1 9 2 8:
1/1/29 5.o 589 NC 1938 Aa
Act
E
7 , E.S., 1930:

















aThese direct and full faith and credit obligations 
were payable from the 0,75 mill ad valorem tax revenues in 
the Confederate Veterans* Pension Fund,
Since this issue was not outstanding in 1939* the 
rating shown is the one which was given at the time of issue.
£
This rating was assigned in 1940.
Sources Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18,
Secs. 2 and 3, as amended 192)p,~Act 178; Art. 18, Sec. 6, as 
amended 1928, Act 23; Art. 18, Secs. 2 and 3» as amended 
1930, E.S., Act 7; Art. 18, Sec. 3* as amended 1934, Act 82; 
Art. 18, Sec. 7 , as amended 1936, Act 61; Louisiana,
Treasurer*s Report, 1928-29, p. 77, 1932-33, p. 82; 1934“35, 
p. l\2V 1 9 3 8-3 9 , p. 55; Louisiana, Financial Report, 19lpl—Ip2, 
p. 80; Moody* s, 1929-19^-0; and Smith, Compilation of Louisiana 
State and Municipal Bonds, 1938, P. 5.
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TABLE XIV
STATE BOND AND INTEREST TAX FUND BORROWING-, 1928-19i;Oa
Series Date Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody’i 
and of Rate Amount or Non- Date Rating 
Author!- Issue (per cent) Issued callable (1939) 
zation (thousands)
Act 6, E.S., 1927;
Flood Relief Bonds:
12/1/28 5.0 ft 2 9 5 NC 1930-38 Aa
Drought Relief Bonds
k/15/31 k-5 502 NC 1932-1*1 Aa
Act 5t 1930; and Act 10, E 
Capitol Building Bonds:
2/1 5 / 3 1 lp. 2  5
. s . ,  1 9 3 0; 
5 , 0 0 0 NC 1933-52 A
Act 122, 1932;
Serial Gold Bonds:
1/1/33 5.5 l* ,9 5 o NC 193l*-53 Baa
Act 3 , 1938;
State of Louisiana Refunding Bonds:
8/1 / 3 8  2 . 5  212 NC 1939-1*1 Aa
3.5 5 , 2 2 0 NC 191*2-56
3.25 3,180 NC 1957-60
^he se direct and full faith and credit obligations 
were payable from the proceeds of the l.lf? mill ad valorem 
tax in the State Bond and Interest Tax Fund.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art, 10, Sec.
11, as amended 1928, E.S., Act i*; Art. 1*, Sec, 12, as amended 
1930, Act 5; Art, i*, Sec. 12, as amended 1932, Act 122; 
Louisiana, Acts (1927), E.S., Act 6, pp. 18-20; (1930),
E.S., Act 10, pp. 39-1*1; (1938)> Act 3, pp. 28-31; Louisiana, 
Treasurer's Report. 1928-29, p. 77; 1930-31, p. 77; 1938-39, 
P. 55; Louisiana, Financial Report. 19lpl—U-2, p. 80; Moody's, 
1930, p. lL*55; 1932, p. 11*82; 1 9 3I*, P. $13; 1938, p. 639; 
1939, pp. 558-62; and Smith, Compilation of Louisiana State 
and Municipal Bonds. 1938, pp. 3-If-'.
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TABLE XV ;
PORT OF NEW ORLEANS BORROWING, 1928-191*0**
Series Date Interest Original 
and of Rate Amount 









Article 6, Section 16;
Serial Gold Refunding Bonds:
7/1/36 Ip.O $1,301*. NC 1938-61 Baa
7/1/39 3.25 658 NC 19U-59 Baa
aThese indirect but full faith and credit obligations 
were payable from operating revenues of the Port and from 
part of nine-twentieths of the 1-cent gasoline tax.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec.
16; Louisiana, Treasurer1s Report. 1936-39. p. 56; Louisiana, 
Financial Report. 19iil-ii2. p. 83; MoodyTs, 1938* P. 61*0;
1939, p. 55>8? 191*0, p. 550; and Smith, Compilation of 
Louisiana State and Municipal Bonds, 1938, p. 17.
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TABLE XVI 
CHARITY HOSPITAL BORROWING, 1928
Series Date Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody1s
and of Rate Amount or Non­ Date Rating
Authori­ Issue (per cent) Issued call able (1939)
zation (thousands)




U . 5 $ 3 U NC . 1938-Ifl Baa
l{..0 1 , 9 2 5 NC 19ij-2-56
3.5 2 ,13k NC 1 9 5 7 - 6 6
3 . 8 5 If,500 NC 19lf2-68 Baa
aThese indirect obligations were not full faith and 
credit obligations but were payable from the operating 
revenues of the hospital and from a portion of the corpora­
tion franchise tax.
Source: Louisiana, Acts (193)f)> Act 166, pp. 5 3 7 “If2;
(1935), First E.S., Act 10, pp. ifl).-5IfJ (1936), Act 72, 
pp. 1 9 0-9 2 ; (1 9 3 8), Act !|, pp. 3 1-3 8 ; Act 5 , pp. 3 8 -I4-I; 
Louisiana, Financial Report, 19ifl-lj2, p. 82; Moody*s, 1937, 




BOARD OP EDUCATION BORROWING, 1928-191+0
Series Date Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody’ i
and of Rate Amount or Non- Date Rating
Authori­ Issue (per cent) Issued callable (1939)
zation (thousands)
Acts 6 and1 7, 1938:
8/1/38 1+.75 $6,000 NC 191+2-66
b
n.r.
gThese indirect obligations were not full faith and 
credit obligations but were payable from a portion of the 
corporation franchise tax.
^This Issue was never rated by Moody’s.
Source: Louisiana, Acts (1938), Act 6, pp. 1+2-1+6;
Act 7, pp. 1̂.7 —if.9i Louisiana, Financial Report. 191+1-1+2, p. 82; 
and Moody’s, 1939> P. £61.
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TABLE XVIII





Date Interest Original Callable 
of Rate Amount or Non- 






6/l/3l+b 5.5 $ 119 c 1939—1+-2
c
n.r.
10/1/35 5.5 1 ,5 0 0 NC 1937-55 Baa








12/1/36 Ij-.O 1 ,0 0 0 NC 1938-55 Baa
Act 95, 
Act 1 8,
1 9 3 6, as amended 
1938:
by
10/1/38 I+.25 2 , 0 0 0 NC 19^1-58 cn. r.
aThese indirect obligations were not full faith and 
credit obligations of the State; the security pledged for 
these issues was not the same. Some of the funds involved 
were University operating revenues, the proceeds of the 0.50 
mill tax, a portion of the excise license tax collections on 
insurance policies and companies, and a portion of the taxes 
collected on bottled soft drinks, 
bThe University Board of Supervisors on October 22, 
1931+, authorized the issuance of $3 0 0 ,0 0 0 of 5.5 per cent 
revenue bonds, only $119*000 of which was ever sold.
cNeither of these issues was ever rated by Moody1s.
Source: Louisiana, Acts, (1936), Act 95* PP. 288-307;
Act 223, pp. 596-600; (19387, Act 18, pp. 106-7; Louisiana, 
Financial Report. 191+1-1+2, p. 82; Moody*s, 1938, pp. 638-39; 
1939* P* 562; 191+0, p. 1+1+0; 191+1, p. 1+70; and Louisiana 
Legislative Research Study No. 9* P. 95.
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TABLE XIX

















191+1 mm mm ̂ $1,175 $6,11+5 $ 7,320
191+2 m mm mm — — --- ---
191+3 $1+, 000 2,000 — --- 6,000




b191+6 -— 1+.972 i+,622 1+.622
TOTAL $7,000 $3,175 $6,ll+5b $5,000 $21,320
aThere was no Indirect borrowing during this period.
This refunding issue is not included in the totals. 




Series Date Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody11
and of Rate Amount or Non- Date Rating
Authori­ Issue (per cent) Issued callable at
zation (thousands) Issue
Act 3 7 7 , 19*4-0: -
DD 7/1/14-3 *l- .0 $  5 o bCb 19*1-7-*1-8 Baa
3 . 0 5 0 C 19*t7“*4-8
2 .2 5 2 7 5 C 19*1-9-59
1 .2 5 2 7 5 C 19*1-9-59
2 . 0 6 7 5 C 1 9 6 0 -6 1
1 . 5 67 5 C 1 9 6 0 -6 1
EE 7 / l / k 3 3 . 0 5 0 c b 19*1-7-*1-8 Baa
2 . 2 5 5 0 C 19*1-9-50
1 .2 5 225 c 1 9 5 1 - 5 9
1 . 5 6 7 5 c 1 9 6 0 -6 1
1 .2 5 150 c 1 9 5 1 - 5 6
1 . 5 850 c 1 9 5 7 - 6 1
PP 7 / 1 / h b 2 . 5 100 NC 19*48- /4.9 Baa
1 . 5 700 C 1 9 5 0 - 6 1
1 . 7 5 1 ,2 0 0 c 1 9 6 2 - 6 3
GG 1 2 / 1 / k S *4-. 0 5 0 NC 19*49-50 Baa
1 . 2 5 225 C 1 9 5 1 - 5 9
1 . 5 7 2 5 C 19 60 - 6*4
aThese direct and full faith and credit obligations 
were payable from the proceeds of the *j.-cent gasoline tax.
Bonds maturing after July 1, 19V? are callable on 
July 1, 19*4-8 at par.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6,
Sec. 22(i), as amended 19*4-0, Act 377; Louisiana, Financial 
Report. 19*45 “*46, p. 63; 19*1-6-14-7, P. 67? Moody’s, 19*5*13 
p. *|2̂ ; 19*4-7, PP. *}.21-22; and 19*1-8, p. *433.
TABLE XXI





Date Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody*: 
of Rate Amount or Non- Date Rating 




A li/iS/U 3 . 0 $ 5 o o NC 19104- A ■u
B 5 A A 3 3 . 0 i , 5 5 o NC 1914.7-50
V
n.r.
k*o 14-50 NC 1 9 5 1
Act 390, 19^-0!
H 7/ 15/ U 1 1.5 225 NC 1924.5 A1.25 175 NC 1914-6
1 . 5 125 NC 1914-61.0 150 NC 19k7
aThese direct and full faith and credit obligations 
were payable from the proceeds of the 0.75 mill ad valorem 
tax in the Confederate Veterans' Fund.
^This issue was not rated because it was sold to the 
State Teachers' Retirement System.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 18, Sec.
7, as amended 1936, Act 61J Art. 18, Sec. 6, as amended 
I9I4.O, Act 390; Louisiana, Financial Report, 19i|l~i)-2, p. 80; 
19i4-5-2j-6, p. 6I4.; Moody's, 19^2, ~p~. 1+1+7; and 1 9I4I]., P.
427
TABLE XXII
STATE BOND AND INTEREST TAX FUND BORROWING, 194l-1946a
Series Date Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody*! 
and of Rate Amount or Non- Date Rating 
Authori- Issue (per cent) Issued callable at 
zation (thousands) Issue
Act 383, 194-0:
4/15/4-1 4.75 $1,173 NC 1946 Baa2.25 3,041 c 1947-56
2.5 i,93i c 1957-61
Act 348, 1946:
9/1/46 1.75 4,397 NC 1947-57 Baa
1.5 575 NC 1958
These direct and full faith and credit obligations 
were payable from the proceeds of the 1 .I).7 mill ad valorem 
tax in the State Bond and Interest Tax Fund.
*|̂
This issue refunded the outstanding portion of the 
above bonds; the issue was privately placed.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 1}.. Sec.
12(a), as amended 194°, Act 303? Louisiana, Acts (194°),
Act 138, pp. £ 4 3 - 4 5 ;  (1946), Act 3^8, pp. 1103 - £ ;  Louisiana, 
Financial Report, 1941-4-2, P. 80; 1 945-46, p. 62; 19̂ 1*6 —i|*7» 
p. 66; Moody's, 1942, p. 4475 194-6, p. 4-15>5 and 194-7,pp. 4.21-22.
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TABLE XXIII





















A 3 / 1 A 5 1 . 2 5 $ 78 C 1 9 U 9 - 5 1 A
0 . 7 5 300 C 1 9 5 2 - 5 5
B 5 / 1 A 6 2.0 622 NC 1 9 5 0 - 5 1 A
1.25 1;, 000 NC 1 9 5 2 - 6 7
9.These direct and full faith and credit obligations 
were payable from certain mineral lease royalties.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art, 1;, Sec.
2(a), as amended 19i|2, Act 36I4.; Louisiana, Financial Report, 
19l;5-l;6, P. 61;; 19)±6-1±7, p. 68; 1951-52, p. 59; Moody's, 
19l|6, p. )4.l5; and 19l;7> p. 1+22.
TABLE XXIV





Payable from 1.1+7 mills
ad valorem tax $> 8,669
Payable from 0.75 mill tax 1,500 $ 10,169
BONDS RATED A
Payable from 1.1+7 mills
ad valorem tax 3*250
Payable from 0.75 mill tax 2,500
Payable from certain motor
vehicle license taxes 3>600
Payable from gasoline taxes 78,356 87*706
BONDS RATED Baa
Payable from 1.1+7 mills
ad valorem tax l+*275
Payable from gasoline taxes 21+,000 28,275
TOTAL DIRECT DEBT $126.150
INDIRECT DEBT
BONDS RATED Baa
Payable from earnings of]-,
' the State Penitentiary $ 575
Payable from Port Commission 
revenues and nine-twentieths 
of 1-cent gasoline tax 35*819
Charity Hospital of Louisiana
at New Orleans 8,820
Louisiana State University





Louisiana State Board of
Education $ 6,000
Louisiana State University
and A & M College 2,000 $ 8,000
TOTAL INDIRECT DEBT $ 56,077
TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT DEBT #182,227
aDirect debt as of August 31* 1939* and indirect debt 
as of various other dates.
bThe classification used here is the same as that used 
in the text.
Source: Moody's, 19*1-0, pp. I4.39—U-0,
TABLE XXV





Payable from I.I4J mills
ad valorem tax $ 8 ,24.00
Payable from 0.75> mill tax £00 $ 8,900
BONDS RATED A
Payable from I .J 4.7 mills 
-ad valorem tax 3j000
Payable from 0.75 mill tax 3,675>
Payable from certain motor
vehicle license taxes 3,600
Payable from gasoline taxes 73.139
BONDS RATED Baa
Payable from 1.14-7 mills
ad valorem tax 10,020
Payable from gasoline taxes 29Jx£9 39.1x79
TOTAL DIRECT DEBT $131.793
INDIRECT DEBT
BONDS RATED Baa
Payable from earnings of^
the State Penitentiary $ £2£
Payable from Port Commission 
revenues and nine-twentieths 
of 1-cent gasoline tax 33 >7 1̂-2
Charity Hospital of Louisiana
at New Orleans 8,6£0
Louisiana State University






of Education $ 6,000
Louisiana State University
and A & M College 2.000 $ 8.000
TOTAL INDIRECT DEBT $ ^3,366
TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT DEBT $189.199
£LDirect debt as of August 5, 19^1, and indirect debt 
as of various other dates.
The classification used here is the same as that 
used in the text.









Payable from I.I4.7 mills
ad valorem tax $ 7,525 $ 7,525
BONDS RATED A
Payable from 1.I+7 mills
ad valorem tax 1,750
Payable from 0.75 mill tax 1,750
Payable from certain motor
vehicle license taxes 2,830
Payable from certain royalties
from mineral leases 5,000
Payable from gasoline taxes £6,E>[(-5 67,875
BONDS RATED Baa
Payable from 1.U7 mills
ad valorem tax 12,569
Payable from gasoline taxes 29,262 [(.1,831
BONDS NOT RATED
Payable from l.Ij.7 mills
ad valorem tax 9
Payable from 0.75 mill tax 2,000 2,009
TOTAL DIRECT DEBT $119,2k0
INDIRECT DEBT
BONDS RATED Aa
Charity Hospital of Louisiana
at New Orleans $ 7,505
Louisiana State University





Payable from earnings of,
■ the State Penitentiary $ lj.00
Payable from Port Commission 
revenues and nine-twentieths
of 1-cent gasoline taxb 27,673 $ 28,073
BONDS NOT RATED
Louisiana State University
and A & M College $3k
Louisiana State Board
of Education 5>,li£8 5.992
TOTAL INDIRECT DEBT $ k3.365
TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT DEBT $l62.605
direct debt as of August 1, 19i|6, and indirect debt 
as of various other dates.
v
The classification used here is the same as that 
used in the text.




WORLD WAR II VETERANS' BONDS, KOREAN COMBAT BONUS, AND 
WAR VETERANS' BONUS BORROWING, 191+7-1959a
Series Date Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody's
and of Rate Amount or Non- Date Ratine
Author!- Issue (per cent) Issued callable (1959)
zation    ____________ (thousands)_________________________
Act 5 3 0 ,  191+8;
World War II Bonus Bonds:
A 1 /1 5 /1 + 9  1+.0 $  3 , 5 0 0 c 1953-51+
bBaa
1+.0 3 , 6 0 5 c 1953-51+
3 . 2 5 3 , 7 1 3 c 1 9 5 5
3 . 1 3 9 , 1 8 2 c 1956-61+
Act 8 and 5 3 0 ,  191+8;
World War II Bonus Bonds: 
B 6/1 /1 + 9  2.7$ 1 0 ,0 0 0 NC 1 9 5 1 - 6 1 cA
Act 1 0 9 ,  1 9 5 2 ;
Bonus Debt Refunding Bonds
1 / 1 5 / 5 3  2 . 7 5
«
*3 0 ,1 0 0 NC I 960 A
2 .2 5 , 2 5 0 NC 1961
2 .1 1 1 ,1 5 0 NC 1 9 6 2 - 6 3
Act 71+8, 1951+;
Korean Combat Bonus Bonds:
3 / 1 / 5 5  2 . 7 5 1 , 1+00 NC 196 0-62 A
2 . 0 3 ,1 0 0 NC 1 9 6 3 - 6 5
2 . 2 5 5 ,5 0 0 NC 1 9 6 6 - 7 0
Act 61l+, 1 9 5 6 ;
Korean Combat Bonus Bonds:
1+ /1 /5 7  2 .9 1+00 NC 1 9 6 1 -6 2 A
3 . 0 1 , 6 0 0 NC 1 9 6 3 - 7 0
Act 6 2 0 ,  1 9 5 6 ;
Various Combat and War Veterans* Bonus Bond s : d
6 / 1 5 / 5 7  3 . 1 3 ,0 0 0 NC 1961+ n.r.
3 . 2 3 ,0 0 0 NC 1 9 6 5
3 . 3 l+,000 NC 1966
B 1 / 1 5 / 5 8  2 . 6 1 ,0 0 0 NC 1966 A
436
TABLE XXVII (continued)
aThese direct and full faith and credit obligations 
are payable from the $10 per barrel beer tax.
This issue was refunded in 1953; the rating is that 
which was given at the time of issue.
cMoody*s rating has changed from Baa to A on this
issue.
dThe issue was sold to the State Teachers* Retirement 
System and was not rated.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution ( 1 9 2 1 ) ,  Art, 8 ,
Sec. 10, as amended 1948, Act 530; Art. 8 , Sec. 11, as 
amended 1954# Act 748; Art. 8 , Sec. 12, as amended 1956,
Act 6l4; Art. 8 , Sec. 13, as amended 1956, Act 620; 
Louisiana, Acts (1948), Act 8 , pp. 28-49; (1952), Act 109, 
pp. 272-74? Louisiana, Financial Report. 1948-49, P* 58;
1949-50, p. 58; 1952-53, p . '57ri954-55, p . 57; 1956-57, 
p. 57? Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9, p. 83; 
Moody*s, 1959, pp. 663-65; Moody*s Bond Survey. XLI, No. 5 
(January 31, 1949), 651; Moody* s Bond Survey, XLI, No. 20 
(May 16, 1949), 471; and Moody*s Bond Survey, XLIV, No. 47 








Date Interest Original 
of Rate Amount 







( 1 9 5 9 )
PAYABLE FROM Ll-CENT GASOLINE TAX:
Act 3 7 7 , 19*|0.: loHH l/l/kl 3 . 5 - $ 5o . NC 1 9 5 1 - 5 2 Aa
2 . 5 2 , 9 5 0 C 1 9 5 3 - 6 5
Act 3 9 3 , 1911-6: b1A 1 /1 /1 1 7 3 . 5 - 2 0 0 NC 1 9 5 1 - 5 2 Aa
2 . 5 A ,  800 C 1 9 5 3 - 6 5
IB 1 1 / 1 A 9 ll-.O 150 NC 195*1 Aab
2 . 5 6 ,3 5 0 C 1 9 5 5 - 6 3
2 .2 5 3 ,5 0 0 C 1 9 6 3 - 6*1
PAYABLE OUT OF A :PORTION OF NINE-TWENTIETHS 1DF 1-CENT
GASOLINE TAX:
Act 28*1, 1 9 5 2 :  • c bFirst 1 / 1 / 5 3 3 . 5 636 NC 1 9 5 8 - 6 3 A
3 . 5 - 6 ,8 6!i. C 196*1-88
2 . 7 5
Second 7 / 1 5 / 5 3 5 . 0 636
a
NC 1 9 5 8 - 6 3 Ab
3 . 2 5 1 , 5 7 2 C 196*1-69
3 . 5 2 ,8 9 2 c 1 9 7 0 - 8 0
3 . 6 2 A 00 c 1 9 8 1 -8 8
Third 5 / l / 5 * i 5 . 0 636 NC 1959-6*1 Ab
2 . 5 1 , 5 7 2 C 1 9 6 5 - 7 0
2 . 7 5 2 , 6 2 9 C 1 9 7 1 - 8 0
2 . 9 2 , 6 6 3 C 1 9 8 1 - 8 9
Fourth 3 / 1 5 / 5 8 ll-.O 636 NC 1 9 6 3 - 6 8 A
3 . 5 6 ,5 6 1 ; C 1 9 6 9 - 9 2







Date Interest Original Callable 
of Rate Amount or Non- 






( 1 9 5 9 )
PAYABLE FROM THE 9-CENT GASOLINE TAX. CERTAIN MINERAL REVE-
NOES. AND SDRPLUS REVENUES FROM OTHER SOURCES (LONG-RANGE
HIGHWAY FUND):
Acts lj.0 and 9 2 ,  1 9 9 5 :
2/J4./59 2 . 7 5 -  
3 . 5 5
$ 2 0 ,0 0 0 C 1 9 7 9 A
^ • /3 0 /5 9 2 . 8 -
3 . 6
1 0 ,0 0 0 C 1 9 7 9 A
PAYABLE FROM PORTION OF MOTOR VEHICLE LICENSE TAXES (HIGHWAY
FDND NUMBER 2 ) :
Act 9 0 ,  
A
1 9 5 2 !






1 9 7 8
1 9 7 9 - 8 3
A
A1 7 A M ll-.O
2 4




1 9 6 5
1 9 6 6-81).
A
B 7 A M 2 . 5
2 .6
2 , 1 2 9
3 ,0 2 1
NC
NC
1 9 7 0
1971-81).
A









1 9 6 0 -6 2
1 9 6 3 - 7 8
1979-61).
A









1 9 6 0 -6 2
1 9 6 3 - 7 8
1979-81).
A
These obligations are all direct obligations, but 
they are not all full faith and credit bonds. The excep­
tions are the several issues sold under the authority of 
Act 90 of 1952 which are payable from a special allocation 
of Highway Fund Number 2.
k39
TABLE XXVIII (continued)
Moody*a ratings have changed from Baa to Aa and A on 
these issues.
°This block of the issue is callable on January 1 ,
1963, or any interest date thereafter.
dThis block of the issue is callable on July 15, 1963* 
or any interest date thereafter.
eThis block of the issue is callable after January,
1963.
Source! Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6,
Sec. 22(i), as amended 194°, Act 377; Art. 6 , Sec. 22(j), 
as amended 1946, Act 393; Art. 6, Sec. 22(g), as amended 
19^2, Act 90; Art. 6-A, Secs. 5.1, 5.2, Act 284; Art. 4,
Sec, 2(c), as amended 1956, Act llf.2 of 1955; Art. 6 , Sec.
23.1, as amended 1956, Act llj.1 of 1955; Louisiana, Acts 
(1955), Act 40, pp. 49-143; Act 92, pp. 197-98; Act”12F, 
pp. 293-94, Act 129, pp. 244-47; Act 1 3 0, pp. 247-48; 
Louisiana, Financial Report, 1946-47, p. 67; 1956-57, P. 56; 
Louisiana Legislative Research Study No. 9, pp. 8 1-8 3 ;
Moody’s, 1950, P. 469; 1959, pp. 663-65; Moody* 3 Bond Survey. 
XLV, No. 9 (March 2, 1953), 601; Moody*s Bond Survey. LI,
No. 5 (February 2, 1959), 743-45; Moody*s Bond Purvey. LI,
No. 6 (February 9, 1959), 725; Moody*s Bond Survey, LI,
No, 16 (April 20, 1959), 588; Moody’s Bond Survey. LI, No. 18, 
(May 4, 1959), 562.
1*0
TABLE XXIX
aINSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENT BORROWING, 191*7-1959
Series Date Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody* s
and of Rate Amount or Non- Date Rating
Author!- Issue (per cent) Issued callable ( 1 9 5 9 )
zation
Act l*.l4, 1946 s
bD 12/1/47 2.7 #3,000 NC 1969-73 n.r.
E 3/1/49 3.0 1 ,2 9 9 NC 1969-72 Ac
2.75 4 5 0 NC 1972-73 dF 9/1/49 5.0 478 NC 1954 Baa
a 2.3 2,773 C 1955-68
G 3/15/50 1.75 2,641 C 1963 n.r.
2.25 1,359 C 1964—68 dH 6/1/51 4.5 575 c 1956 Baa
2.3 1,425 c 1957-68 dI 7/15/52 2 .5 545 c 1957 Baa
2.0 . . 1,455... c 1958-68
aThese direct and full faith and credit obligations 
are payable from the 0.75 mill tax in the Confederate 
Veterans* Fund.
TdThis issue was sold to the State Teachers* Retire­
ment System and was not rated.
cMoody*s rating has changed from Baa to A on this
Issue.
These issues were called prior to the maturity 
schedule above; the ratings are those which were given at the 
dates of issue.
eThis issue was sold to the National American Bahk of 
New Orleans and was not reoffered for sale; It was not rated. 
The whole issue was retired in the 1951*--55 fiscal year.
Sources Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 8, Sec. 
8, as amended 1946, Act I4.ll*.; Louisiana, Acts (1956), Act 132, 
pp. 32£-27; Louisiana, Financial Report. 1947-46. p. 60;
i9 i* -9 -5 o ,  p .  5 7 ;  1 9 5 0 - 5 1 7 ~ p . “ 5 6 ; 195f t - ? 2 ,  p. 5 9 ;  1 9 5 4 - 5 5 ,
P. 57? 1955?-56, p. 53? 1957-58, P. 56; Louisiana Legislative 
Research Study No. 9, pp. 81, 103-1*.; Moody*s, 1950, p. 469? 
1952, p. 506; 1953, P. 478; and 1959, pp. 663-65.
y+1
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Date Interest Original Callable 
of Rate Amount or Non- 







PORT OF NEW ORLEANS
-
PAYABLE FROM REVENUES OF NEW ORLEANS PORT COMMISSION, NINE-
TWENTIETHS OF 1-CENT GASOLINE TAX. AND FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT OF LOUISIANA
Act 281;, 1952:
1 0 / 1 / 5 5  2 . 5 8  $ 1 0 ,0 0 0  c 1990 A
GREATER BATON ROUGE PORT COMMISSION
PAYABLE FROM OPERATING REVENUES OF THE PORT, AND THE FULL
FAITH AND CREDIT OF LOUISIANA AND THREE PARISHES
Act 9 ,  1 9 5 2 : bA l l / l / 5 I i 2 . 7 5 $ 1 , 8 9 0 C 1 9 6 1 - 6 8 A
2 . 6 1 , 6 9 5 C 1 9 6 9 - 7 3
2 . 7 5 3 , 9 5 5 C 197*1.-85
2 . 8 It-,9 6 0 C 1 9 8 6 -9 5 .
Act 5 9 7 ,  1 9 5 6 :  ,
B n / l / 5 7 5 . 0 2 , 3 9 3 NC 1 9 6 0 -6 1 ; Baa
3 . 2 5 8 , 0 1 2 Cc 1 9 6 5 - 7 1
3 . 3 8 , 9 9 5 C 1 9 7 2 - 7 7
C 5 / 1 / 5 8 311|- I 9 6 0 Baa
3 . 0 1 , 7 1 2 c d 1 9 6 1 - 6 9
3.*J- 1,5-75- c 1 9 7 0 - 7 5
aThe indirect and full faith and credit obligation 
of the Port of New Orleans is payable from the nine-twentieths 
of the 1-cent gasoline tax as well as operating revenues of
TABLE XXX (c ont inue d )
the Port, The indirect and full faith and credit obliga­
tions of the Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission are payable 
from the operating revenues of the Port and are also pro­
tected by the full faith and credit pledge of three Interested 
parishes of Louisiana.
Moody's rating has changed from Baa to A on this
issue.
Callable beginning November 1, 1967.
j
Callable beginning November 1, 1963.
Source: Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6-A,
Sec. 5.1* as amended 1952, Act 281+; Art. 6, Sec. 29, as 
amended 1952, Act 9j Art, 6, Secs. 29.1, 2 9 . 2 ,  29.3, 29.1\.t 




.aLOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY BORROWING, 1914-7-1959
Series Date interest Original Callable Maturity Moody*; 
and of Rate Amount or Non- Date Rating 
Authori- Issue (per cent) Issued callable (1959) 
zation (thousands)
Serial Bonds: •u
1/1A7 ¥ 0 $ 265 NC 19U9-52 A
2.5 1,610 C 1953-62
2.75 1,625 C 1963-67
Act 1950:
12/1 /5 0 I4..O 893 NC 1953-55 A
2 .5 788 C 1956-59
2.0 1,570 C- 1960-66
2.1 2,^9 C 1967-75
11/1/53 2.5 150 NC 1958 Aa
2.25 1 5 0 NC 1959-63
12/1/56 Ij-.o 305 NC 1957-62 A
3 . 5 1,380 C 1963-75
3.6 965 C 1976-81
c
Refunding Bonds: d7/1/52 2.0 1,610 C 1953-62 Aa
2.25 1,625 C 1963-67
Act 230, 195^: A
1 1 / l M 2.25- i i5 o c e 1955-69 A
2.5 280 c 1970-76
2.65 120 c 1977-79




U/l/58 ¥ 5 7,500 NC 1959-63 A
3.5 C 19614-67
3.7 C 1 9 6 8 -7 8
3.75 C 1979-83
TABLE XXXI (continued)
These indirect obligations are not full faith and 
credit obligations but are payable from "University operating 
revenues, proceeds of the 0 .5  mill tax, certain proceeds of 
the excise license tax on insurance policies and insurance 
companies, and certain proceeds of the tax on bottled soft 
drinks.
These bonds were refunded in 1952; the rating is 
that which was given at the time of issue.
cThese bonds refunded the balance of the Serial Bonds
of 1947.
^Callable after July, 1957.
eCallable after November 1, I960.
Source: Louisiana, Acts (1950), Act 54, PP. 8 7 - 9 1 j
(1951;), Act 2 3 0, pp. 428-31; Louisiana, Financial Report. 
1946-47, P. 6 8 ; 1951-52, p. 60; 1952-53, p. 58; 1953-54, 
p. 56; 1955-56, p. 54, 1956-57, p. 58; Louisiana Legislative 
Research Study No. 9, p. 95, Moody*s, 1959, pp. 677-78; 
Moody*s Bond Survey, XLII, No. Ii9 (December 4, 1950), 118; 
Moody* s Bond Survey, L, No. 15 (April 7, 1958), 613? Moody* s 
Bond Survey, L, No. 17 (April 28, 1958), 584.
TABLE XXXII
GREATER NEW ORLEANS EXPRESSWAY COMMISSION 
AND MISSISSIPPI RIVER BRIDGE AUTHORITY 
BORROWING, 195>2-19S>9a
Series bate Interest Original bailable Maturity !Moody*~s 
and of Rate Amount or Non- Date Rating 
Author!- Issue (per cent) Issued callable (1959) 
zation (thousands)
GREATER NEW ORLEANS EXPRESSWAY COMMISSION
PAYABLE PROM OPERATING REVENUES AND CERTAIN SURPLUS MOTOR
VEHICLE LICENSE TAXES:
Act 90, 1952: b 
II/I/5I1- 1̂ .0 $i).6,000 C 1991}.
MISSISSIPPI RIVER BRIDGE AUTHORITY
Baa
PAYABLE PROM OPERATING REVENUES AND CERTAIN SURPLUS MOTOR
VEHICLE LICENSE TAXES:
Act 7l|-5,i 1951). S
11/1/51)- 3.6 $65,000 C 1991)- cn.r.
aThese indirect obligations are payable from operating 
revenues and certain surplus motor vehicle license taxes.
They are not protected by the full faith and credit of either
the parishes or the State of Louisiana,
^Due $1,000 on each January 1 to 1993 and $l)-5»799* 000 
on January 1, 199l|.. Callable after January 1, 1961)..
cNot rated pending the establishment of a stable 
record of toll receipts. Callable on January 1, 1959, from 
debt service funds or after January 1, 1961)., from revenues 
other than debt service funds.
Sources Louisiana, Constitution (1921), Art. 6, Sec. 
22(g), par. I)., as amended 195^, Act 7I4.5 J Art. 6, Sec. 22(g), 
par. 5, as amended 1952, Act 90; Moody*s, 1959. pp. 67l)--75; 
Moody*s Bond Survey, L, No. 32 (August!}., 1958), 389; Moody*s 
Bond Survey. XLVI, No. lj.0 (October 1)., 1951)-), 231-33; Moody*s
Bond Survey. XLVI, No. tj.1 (October 11, 195l)J, 222; and
Moody*s Bond Survey. LI, No. 9 (March 2, 1959), 6 8 7.
TABLE XXXIII
LOUISIANA STATE BUILDING AUTHORITY BORROWING, 1947-1959*
Series Date Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody*s
and of Rate Amount or Non- Date Rating
Authori- Issue (per cent) Issued callable (1959)
zation__________________ (thousands)_________________________
PAYABLE FROM THE PROCEEDS OF THE l.lj.7 MILL AD VALOREM TAX:
Act 3 1 7  
A
, 1 9 5 2 :  
12 / 1 /5 2 2 .2
2 .1
1 500  
1 ,5 0 0
NC
C
1 9 5 6
1 9 5 7 - 6 1
bBaa
B 1 2 / 1 5 / 5 3 2 . 6




3 ,1 5 0
rc
c
1 9 5 7 - 5 9
1 9 5 7 - 5 9
1 9 6 0 - 6 2
Baa
C 9/ 1M 2 . 7 5
3 . 0
3 ,7 5 0 c
c
1 9 5 8 - 7 4
1 9 5 8 - 7 4
_ b  Baa
Act 1 3 ,
AA 1 9 5 4 :  ,12 / 1 /5 4 2 . 7 5
2 .0




1 9 5 9 - 8 2
1 9 8 3
Baa
BB 6/ 1 /5 5 If-.o
2 . 9  
2 . 7 5
2 . 9




1 9 6 0 - 6 3
1 9 6 4 - 7 0
1 9 7 1 - 8 0
1 9 8 1 - 8 4
Baa





2 , 2 9 1






1 9 6 1 - 6 3
1 9 6 4 - 7 2
1 9 7 3 - 8 3
1 9 8 4 - 8 5
Baa
DD 4 / 1 5 / 5 6 3 . 3
3 . 3  
3 . 0
2 ,5 0 0
500
6 ,0 0 0
c s
c
1 9 6 1 - 6 6
1 9 6 1 - 6 6
1 9 6 7 - 8 5
Baa
EEh 2 / 1 / 5 7 3 . 5 3 , 0 0 0 n.a. 1 9 6 2 - 7 7 n.r.
PP 4 / 1 / 5 7 4 . 0
3 . 7 5  
3 . 7
3 . 7 5




1 9 6 2 - 6 5
1 9 6 6 - 6 7
1 9 6 8 - 6 9
1 9 7 0 - 7 1
Baa
TABLE XXXIII (continued)
Series Date Interest Original Callable Maturity Moody*s
and of Rate Amount or Non- Date Rating
Author!- Issue (per cent) Issued callable (1959)
zation (thousands)
PAYABLE PROM THE PROCEEDS OF THE 0 . 5 3  MILL AD VALOREM TAX?
Act 3 0 , 1955:
DD 5-/15/56 3 .2 5  $3,025 NC 1960-61; Baa
These indirect but full faith and credit obligations 
are payable from the proceeds of the l.lj.7 and 0.53 mill ad 
valorem taxes.
Issue A was called on December 1, 1957, and issue 
C was called on September 1, 1958. The ratings are those 
which were given at the times of issue.
cCallable after December 1, 1958. Called in May, 1959.
Callable on December 1, 1962.
eCallable on June 1, 1962.
fCallable on February 1, 1 9 6 3.
^Callable on April 15, 1965
Issue EE was sold to the State Teachers* Retirement 
System and was not rated. Information about the call feature 
is not available on this issue.
^Callable on April 1, 1967.
Source: Louisiana, Acts (1952), Act 317, PP. 8 3 3-3 8 ;
(195U), Act 13, PP. 21-31; Tl955), Act 30, pp. 30-33; 
Louisiana, Financial Report. 1956-57, P* 57; Moody*s, 1956, 
p. 57̂ +5 1959. p p . &75-76; Moody*s Bond Survey, XLIX, No. 13 
(March 2f?, 1957J, 61;!; Moody*s Bond Survey. XLV, No. );9 
(December 7, 1953), 128; Moody* s Bond Survey. XLV, No. ij.2 
(October 19, 1953), 208; Moody*s Bond Survey, LI, No. 20 
(May 11, 1939), 552; and Louisiana Legislative Research 





1 9 5 0
1 9 5 119^2
1 9 5 3195U
1955
1956
1 9 5 7
1 9 5 8
1 9 5 9
TOTAL
TABLE XXXIV
DIRECT AND INDIRECT LOUISIANA BORROWING BY PURPOSE, 1 9/4.7 -1 9 5 9
(thousands)
DIRECT INDIRECT




$1 8 ,0 0 0 ¥  3 ,0 0 0  
10,000
Ports of La. New Orleans La.
New State Expressway State
Orleans Univer- & Miss, Bldg.
& Baton sity River Br. Auth.
Rouge_________________ Auth.
¥ 17500"
5 , 7 0 0
3,235* 
3 0 0  
850
2,650
8 , 3 5 0





1 5 ,5 0 016,^00
5 .0 0 0  
^,0002.000 
2,000
$8 3 .0 0 0
8 ,1 0 0  —
3 0 . 0 0 0  -----
$ 9 8 . 0 0 0  $ 1 6 . 0 0 0
$1 2 ,5 0 0
10,000
19,1+00
3 ,5 0 0
luixoo
$111,000
= 21 .3 5 0  $ 1 1 1 . 0 0 0
$ 2,000 
I+,000 6,2^0 
9 ,9 0 0  
1 9 , 6 2 5  
12,91+8
fe lt. 723
aThe classification used here is the same as that used in the text,
■L
These are refunding issues; they are not included In the totals. 
Source: Compiled from Tables XXX-XXXVI, Appendix A.
TABLE XXXV





Payable from 1.1+7 mills
ad valorem tax $ 6.268 $ 6,268
BONDS RATED A
Payable from certain motor
vehicle license taxes 1 ,8 0 0
Payable from gasoline taxes 33*891
Payable from certain royalties
from mineral leases l+,200
Payable from $10 per barrel
beer tax 109.700 11+5,591
BONDS RATED Baa
Payable from 1.1+7 mills
ad valorem tax 3 * 3 5 0
Payable from 0.75 mill tax 9,000
Payable from gasoline taxes 55.661+ 68,011+
BONDS NOT RATED
Payable from 0.75 mill tax 7.000 7.000
TOTAL DIRECT DEBT $226.873
INDIRECT DEBT
BONDS RATED Aa
Charity Hospital of La,
at New Orleans $ 5*935
Louisiana State University
and A & M College 3*967
Louisiana State Board of





and A & M College $ £.530 f £,£30
BONDS RATED Baa
Payable from Port Commission 
revenues and nine-twentieths 
of 1-cent gasoline tax 19,998
Payable from earnings of^
the State Penitentiary  2£0 $ 20,21̂ .8
BONDS NOT RATfiD
Louisiana State University
and A & M College 900 900
TOTAL INDIRECT DEBT $ k0,999
TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT DEBT 1267*872
aDirect debt as of January 1, 19£2, and indirect debt 
as of various other dates.
i .
The classification used here is the same as that used 
in the text.








Payable from 1.1̂ 7 mills
ad valorem tax $ 2,1$.28
Payable from certain motor
vehicle license taxes 670
Payable from gasoline taxes b.7.061 $ 50,159
BONDS RATED A
Payable from 0.75 mill tax 1,7^9
Payable from certain motor
vehicle license taxes 9,177
Payable from gasoline taxes 29,850
Payable from certain royalties
from mineral leases 2,2£0
Payable from $10 per barrel 
beer tax U2.125 85,151
BONDS NOT RATED
Payable from 0.75 mill tax 3,000
Payable from $10 per barrel
beer tax 10.000 13.000V .
TOTAL DIRECT DEBT $lii8.3l0
INDIRECT DEBT
BONDS RATED Aa
Charity Hospital of La,
at New Orleans $ 3*9^8
Louisiana State University
and A 8s M College 2,650
Louisiana State Board of






and A & M College $16,213
Payable from Port Commission 
revenues and nine-twentieths 
of 1-cent gasoline tax 18,519
Payable from revenues of Baton
Rouge Port Commission13 12,500 $ 1+7,232
BONDS RATED Baa
Louisiana State Building 
Authority 1+8,873
Payable from revenues of Baton
Rouge Port Commission 22,900
Greater New Orleans Expressway
Commission 1+5,799
Payable from earnings of,





and A & M College 180 65.180
TOTAL INDIRECT DEBT $239.708
TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT DEBT $388.018
aDlrect debt as of June 30, 1958* and Indirect debt 
as of various other dates.
IdThe classification used here Is the same as that 
used in the text.
Sources Moody*s, 1959, pp. 663-78.
8-53
TABLE XXXVII





State Bond and Interest Tax Fund $ 3,755
Confederate Veterans* Fund 8-, 78-9
Highway Fund Number 2 800
Special Allocation of Highway Funds 8,789
General Highway 76,63kInstitutional Improvement 2 ,5 0 0
Veterans* Bonus 8,6,5.36
TOTAL DIRECT DEBT OUTSTANDING 4343jJ63
INDIRECT
New Orleans Port Commission $ 2 0 ,6 3 2
Baton Rouge Port Commission 1 2 ,5 0 0
Penitent!ary 125
Mississippi River Bridge Authority 6 5 ,0 0 0
Greater New Orleans Expressway 8-5,799
Louisiana State University 10,693
Charity Hospital of Louisiana at New Orleans 3,98-8
Louisiana State Board of Education . 3,026
TOTAL INDIRECT DEBT OUTSTANDING $210,596
TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT DEBT OUTSTANDING
The major portion of indirect debt is from Moody*s 
report of 1959, reported for 1958, instead of for 1957. 
However, since most of the issues are deferred serials, the 
difference in amounts would be slight.
Source: Moody’s, 1958* p. 623; 1959, pp. 672-78;
United States Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, 
Compendium of State Government Finances in 1957 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 38-39* Louisiana, 
Financial Report. 1956-57* PP. 56-58.
TABLE XXXVIII
TOTAL DEBT OUTSTANDING IN LOUISIANA AS REPORTED 





Total Debt Outstanding #2^0,723 $351j-,359a $321,301
Debt Not Reported
Mississippi River Bridge 
Authority 65,000
Baton Rouge Port 
Commission 1 2 ,5 0 0
Greater New Orleans 
Expressway Commission .. 11-5,799
ADJUSTED TOTAL $351+, 022
* ^
$35%359 $3 6 7 ,1 0 0
aAll of the indirect debt or other debt of the State 
of Louisiana is the amount outstanding as of 1958, not 1957. 
However, most of the issues were deferred serials, and the 
total amount outstanding in Moody1s as of 1957 would not be 
much larger than that reported for 1958. A $10,000,000 issue 
sold after June 3 0 was included in Moody1s but is omitted 
here,
The Compendium data are classified according to a 
uniform census classification and are not usually expected 
to compare exactly with data supplied by state reporting 
agencies.
Source: Moody*s, 1958, p. 623} 1959, pp. 672-78}
United States Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, 
Comoendium of State Government Finances in 1957 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1958%' PP. 5, 3 8-3 9 } Louisiana, 
Financial Report. 1956-57, PP. 56-58.
455
TABLE XXXIX
TOTAL DEBT OUTSTANDING, STATE-WIDE INCOME, TAX REVENUES, 
AND TOTAL AD VALOREM TAX COLLECTIONS 




State Ad Valorem Tax 
Collections $ 9,266 $ 13,781
a
Total Tax Collections 98,915 2Jj.0 ,2?0b $ 351,893
Total Revenues lJj.1 ,1 0 6 36l,771b 557,246
Total Expenditures 107,459 336,417 576,967
Total Direct Debt 
Outstanding 1^2 ,961^ 199,371 202,107
Total Agency Debt 
Outstanding 16,778 21,255 70,905'
State-Wide Income 
Louisiana Total 
Louisiana Per Capita 




3 ,1 2 8,OOObb
(#1,135)* 
■ (li,584)
4 ,8 0 4,0 0 0'
(#1,566)'
($2,027)
Collections not complete for this year.
Reported for the year 1951.
cReported for the year 1957.
^Reported for the year 1945.
0Does not include Mississippi River Bridge Authority 
or the New Orleans Expressway Commission debt outstanding.
Source: Moody1 s, 1947, pp. i{.2J;-26; 1953, PP. Jf-75-77»
and 1959, pp. 666-69 .
TABLE XL
TOTAL REVENUE, TOTAL EXPENDITURES, AND DEBT SERVICE IN 
LOUISIANA IN SELECTED YEARS
Total Total ■' ~ Debt Debt
Fiscal Revenue a Expenditures Service a Service




1914-7-14-8 $199,928 $170,761 $12,387 7.25
I9I4-8 -I4-9 322,635 3*44,336 13,013 3.78
19^9-50 3*1-8,660 327,171 15,781 *(..82
1953-5*1 *1-37,9*1-5 *105,373 18,619 *1.59
1955-56 535,399 *196,326 21,730 5.50
1956-57 585,676 576,967 18,979 *(-.09
aAraounts are rounded to the nearest thousand.
Source: Louisiana, Financial Report. 19*j-7-*l8; 19*|8-*j.9
19*19-50; 1953-5*1,’ 1955-56; and 1956-57.
L
TABLE XLI
REVENUES PROM THE VARIOUS TAXES DEDICATED FOR THE PAYMENT OP CERTAIN 





















$ 1 0 bhl. 
Beer 
Tax
1950 #2 ,9^5 ,6 6 6 $1,586,23^ #1,652,733 #18,711-0,7914 #14,653,3141 $ll,2lil4,l4l42
1951 2,7^-1,363 1,1̂ 93,2514- 1,831,911.6 20,087,837 14,921,811.7 11,0014,689
1952 3,080,309 1,672,01^9 1,953,111-8 21,901,903 14,91414,900 11,501,669
1953 3,1492,201 1 ,8 9 6 ,1 6 6 1 ,9 6 2 ,7 8 8 23,176,727 5,7143,1462 11,1477,716
19514- 3,W,^99 1 ,8 7 7 ,1 0 1 2,200,62? 25,260,5114 6 ,0 8 3 ,2 3 8 1 2 ,0 3 2 ,0 8 2
1955 3,568,899 1,953,11-01 2,2li-8,312 26,626,883 6 ,6 1 5 ,2 0 0 11,9149,073
1956 3,553,025 1,91̂ 8,911-2 2,1̂ 98,231}- 29,585,762 7,175,652 1 2 ,0 8 6 ,9 6 8




LONG-TERM DEBT OUTSTANDING AT END OP FISCAL YEAR BY PURPOSE 
FOR ALL STATES AND SELECTED STATES, 1957
(thousands)








Conn. 3 8 8 ,6 7 1  
Maryland 520,275 
Mass. 1,013,681 






































































1 2 8,9 0I4.




386,515 3 0 ,0 0 0  






2 6 ,3 0 1
18.750
aThis sum does not include $57,799,000 of Greater New 
Orleans Expressway debt and otherwise does not reconcile with 
the Financial Report and Moody1s. The figures are used despite 
this in order to make valid comparisons with other states.
^Includes $150,865,000 for Metropolitan District,
Source: United States Bureau of the Census, Department
of Commerce, Compendium of State Government Finances in 1957 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 39.
TABLE XLIII



























1 8 ,7k8 
1 0 1,k53 
5 0 ,0 3 6  
1 3 6,ikk 
lk7,675 
1 5 0 ,3k3
, $669,693 
1 1 6 ,91k 
11,929 
2 2 ,3 1 8  






































State Total Tax 
Revenue
Total Popu- £ 





















3 .0 1 0 .0 0 0
2 .2 2 1 .0 0 0  
2 ,8 2 5 ,0 0 0  
k,8 1 3 ,0 0 0
1 5 ,8 2 6 ,0 0 0  
9 ,0 7 1 ,0 0 0 __













&The sura borrowed in the 1956-57 fiscal year in 
Louisiana was less than average. The average borrowing 
between 19k7 and 1959 was $3 3 ,0 3 6,381}.,6 2 .
^Estimated population excluding armed forces overseas. 
cMillions of dollars. ^Actual dollar amount.
Source: United States Bureau of the Census, Department
of Commerce, Compendium of State Government Finances in 1957 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), PP. 10, 11,
58.
TABLE XLIV
LONG-TERM DEBT OUTSTANDING AT THE END OP FISCAL 195?, BY 

















States $13,521,970 $6,14.90,261). $lj.,581).,800 $l,905A6i). $7,031,706
Louisiana 321,301 233,902 233,902 aam M* m* 87,399
Conn. 3 8 8 ,6 7 1 138,671 111)., 638 2k,033 2 5 0 ,0 0 0
Maryland 520,271). 117,897 107,3l;6 70,551 3^2,377
Mass. 1,013,681 737,521 596,657 ll).0,861t- 276,160
New York 1,971)-, 278 1,203,381 14-16,866 786,515 770,897
Ohio 708,307 172,259 172,259 536,0^8
a„This information does not seem to be entirely accurate. 
The Port of New Orleans debt, which is a long-term full faith 
and credit liability of the State, is payable partly from 
Port revenues.
Source: United States Bureau of the Census, Department
of Commerce, Compendium of State Government Finances in 1957 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1 9 5 8), p. 10.
k61
TABLE XLV
LONG-TERM DEBT OUTSTANDING AT END OF FISCAL YEAR 1957, 
BY SCHEDULED MATURITY PERIODS FOR ALL STATES 
AND SELECTED STATES
(thousands)
State Total 1957. _ 1958 . 1959. . 1960All 1+8 
States $13,521,970 $221,1+53 $519,096 $513,037 $5ol+, 553
Louisianaa 3 2 1 ,3 0 1 2,81+7 18,523 1 8 ,1 3 2 20,565
Conn. 388,671 8 ,3 8 6 1 2 ,9 6 1 11,571+ 11,373
Maryland 520,27k ll+, 076 21,61+3 22,529 2 6 ,0 0 8
Mass. 1 ,0 1 3 ,6 8 1 28,1+1+7 50,599 50,998 50,587
New York l,97l+ ,278 2 5 ,8 6 2 53,176 1+6,663 31,1+63
Ohio __ 708,307 __ 2 0,21+1+ kk .2 8 0 3 2 .1 8 1 _3_2.,_67iL_
(continued)
State 1961 1962 1.963 196k 1965
All L+B
States $522,358 $520,1+59 $1+66,927 $508,795 $1+6 8,1+28
Louisiana 20,205 1 9 ,1+01+ 19,376 13,91+2 7,568
Conn. 11,621+ 6,996 7,266 7 ,6 1 6 8,061
Maryland 26,1+61+ 26,937 2 7 ,2 0 8 2 7 ,0 7 0 2 7 ,8 2 8
Mass. 50,358 5 0 ,21+0 1+9,760 1+5,718 l+i+,199
New York 5 9 ,2 2 7 60,956 28,960 82,21+3 55,1+18
Ohio ... 31,080 __ 33,51!+. ... 26,233 18,218 . __. .!!+,59k
(continued)




States $1+65,137 $1+51+, 981+ $k02,209 $376,818 $7,577,616
Louisiana 7,568 6,778 6,k23 7,0kl lk6,859
Conn. 8,511 8,886 9,126 9,356 266,935
Maryland 28,627 2 5 ,7 0 8 27,93k 25,31k 192,928Mass. 38,168 32,191+ 30,583 28,1+00 k63,k30New York 55,307 59,71+9 35,677 35,057 l,3k2,520
Ohio 111, 790 . Ik,915 15,061 15,213_ 393,310
aThis sum does not include all of Louisiana* s indirect
debt, but it has not been changed in order that the compari­
son with other states will be valid.
The per cents of debt outstanding in each state for 
1970 and thereafter are as follows: All states, 56.0;
Louisiana, k5«8; Connecticut, 68.7; Maryland, 38.5; 
Massachusetts, 1+5.7; New York, 68.0; and, Ohio, 55.3.
Source: United States Bureau of the Census, Department
of Commerce, Compendium of State Government Finances in 1957 
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